<p>The ability to flash firmware is the critical aspect. If remote flashing is possible at all, it is in theory even possible to remove or disable all software limits, brakes and safety features.</p>
<p>I think this way, you could even make the printer report a cold temperature while it's overheating. <em>Similar to how Stuxnet changed the rotational speed of centrifuges without showing the change in the control tools.</em></p>
<p>All this emphasizes the importance of a legit and trustworthy (signed) firmware source, and the ability to check firmware integrity, as well as the ability to detect and alert about (unexpected) changes. As well as the utter importance of proper authentication and authorization mechanisms around 'remote firmware flash' features (such as offered in OctoPrint) or other, especially network-connected 3D printer hosts.</p>
<p>The only other way to reduce the potential harmful impact I can think of is hardware fail safe design. In my personal opinion at least the hardware safety side should be regulated and enforced with a minimum fire safety standard for network-connected (consumer) 3D printers.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-06-20T13:59:59.483Z
2024-06-20T13:59:59.483Z
Bob Ortiz
<p>It would be highly dependant on the exact printer and the nature of the vulnerability.</p>
<p>Using past events as a guide, we could potentially see the processing capabilities of a 3D printer used to form a botnet for a DDOS style attack. This has previously been done with compromised routers and other IOT Devices.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.computerworld.com/article/2921559/malware-infected-home-routers-used-to-launch-ddos-attacks.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Example</a></p>
<p>We might also see printers with built in cameras being hacked to allow images to be taken inside people's homes</p>
<p><a href="https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/10/14/50000-home-cameras-reportedly-hacked-footage-posted-online/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Example</a></p>
<p>Hypothetically speaking, with a 3D printer, an attack might involve some form of blackmail. Forcing the company to pay money or have their products attacked in some way. For example having a malicious update pushed down to them that rendered them useless.</p>
<p>We could also possibly see someone doing something silly such as to have printers simply spew out spaghetti, or malicious such as having code inserted into them that would drag the nozzles across the print bed, damaging one or both of them.</p>
<p>In an extreme case it's possible that a hacker may find a way heat up a printer until it catches fire.</p>
<p>Given that many 3D printers are wireless, it's possible that they could be harvested for wifi passwords, or for log in details to cloud accounts that contain personal information or payment details.</p>
<p>All of this is speculative though.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-03-10T23:18:37.000Z
If the attacker is positioned to be able to flash the firmware, rather than just interacting with the printer as programmed to react to gcode, they can definitely switch the heaters always-on (vs PID controlled to reach a particular temperature). Ability to start a fire then depends only on whether the wires will melt and break the circuit before the heat ignites something flammable. Clever positioning of the toolhead or use of printing facilities could make that more likely.
R.. GitHub STOP HELPING ICE
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-06-23T12:39:54.920Z
@R.. GitHub STOP HELPING ICE, baring those that have hardware thermal cutouts.
Aaargh Zombies
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-03-10T18:43:10.173Z
2024-03-10T18:43:10.173Z
Aaargh Zombies
<p>Recently a bunch of Anycubic 3D printers have been hacked as reported in an article from  <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/anycubic-3d-printers-hacked-worldwide-to-expose-security-flaw/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">bleedingcomputer.com</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to a wave of online reports from Anycubic customers, someone hacked their 3D printers to warn that the devices are exposed to attacks.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>According to the same text file, 2,934,635 devices downloaded this warning message via the vulnerable API.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://i.sstatic.net/7EH0D.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.sstatic.net/7EH0D.png" alt="hacked_machine_readme.gcode" /></a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>The impact in this case seems limited to only a warning using a text file that was placed on the printer. However, I can imagine a scenario where (through an intermediate host such as OctoPrint) the printer firmware can be reflashed (some OctoPlugin for example allows for remote flashing). The firmware could pose a real physical danger, for example when thermal runaway protection and heating limits are removed, or when fake temperature values are reported to the printer LCD.</p>
<p>My question is, what specific vulnerabilities or risks are associates with 3D printers or 3D printer hosts and what potential impact does it have?</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-03-08T14:33:00.860Z
I rephrased. I'm more interested in the impact, however apart from the standard 'breached network-device' I'm more interested in the specific risks and impacts associated with network connected 3D printers or 3D printer hosts such as OctoPi.
Bob Ortiz
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-03-08T19:41:03.253Z
You're right. I will request a migration to 3D printing Stack Exchange.
Bob Ortiz
<octoprint><safety>
What is the potential impact of security risks associated specifically with 3D printers or their hosts?
Bob Ortiz
# What is the potential impact of security risks associated specifically with 3D printers or their hosts?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2024-03-07)

Recently a bunch of Anycubic 3D printers have been hacked as reported in an article from [bleedingcomputer.com](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/anycubic-3d-printers-hacked-worldwide-to-expose-security-flaw/).

> According to a wave of online reports from Anycubic customers, someone hacked their 3D printers to warn that the devices are exposed to attacks.

> According to the same text file, 2,934,635 devices downloaded this warning message via the vulnerable API.

> [![hacked_machine_readme.gcode](https://i.sstatic.net/7EH0D.png)](https://i.sstatic.net/7EH0D.png)

The impact in this case seems limited to only a warning using a text file that was placed on the printer. However, I can imagine a scenario where (through an intermediate host such as OctoPrint) the printer firmware can be reflashed (some OctoPlugin for example allows for remote flashing). The firmware could pose a real physical danger, for example when thermal runaway protection and heating limits are removed, or when fake temperature values are reported to the printer LCD.

My question is, what specific vulnerabilities or risks are associates with 3D printers or 3D printer hosts and what potential impact does it have?

**Tags:** octoprint, safety
> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: I rephrased. I'm more interested in the impact, however apart from the standard 'breached network-device' I'm more interested in the specific risks and impacts associated with network connected 3D printers or 3D printer hosts such as OctoPi.  
> **username_0**: You're right. I will request a migration to 3D printing Stack Exchange.  

---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_0 on 2024-06-20. Score: 1 | Accepted answer

The ability to flash firmware is the critical aspect. If remote flashing is possible at all, it is in theory even possible to remove or disable all software limits, brakes and safety features.

I think this way, you could even make the printer report a cold temperature while it's overheating. *Similar to how Stuxnet changed the rotational speed of centrifuges without showing the change in the control tools.*

All this emphasizes the importance of a legit and trustworthy (signed) firmware source, and the ability to check firmware integrity, as well as the ability to detect and alert about (unexpected) changes. As well as the utter importance of proper authentication and authorization mechanisms around 'remote firmware flash' features (such as offered in OctoPrint) or other, especially network-connected 3D printer hosts.

The only other way to reduce the potential harmful impact I can think of is hardware fail safe design. In my personal opinion at least the hardware safety side should be regulated and enforced with a minimum fire safety standard for network-connected (consumer) 3D printers.


---

### Answer by username_1 on 2024-03-10. Score: 1

It would be highly dependant on the exact printer and the nature of the vulnerability.

Using past events as a guide, we could potentially see the processing capabilities of a 3D printer used to form a botnet for a DDOS style attack. This has previously been done with compromised routers and other IOT Devices.

[Example](https://www.computerworld.com/article/2921559/malware-infected-home-routers-used-to-launch-ddos-attacks.html)

We might also see printers with built in cameras being hacked to allow images to be taken inside people's homes

[Example](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/10/14/50000-home-cameras-reportedly-hacked-footage-posted-online/)

Hypothetically speaking, with a 3D printer, an attack might involve some form of blackmail. Forcing the company to pay money or have their products attacked in some way. For example having a malicious update pushed down to them that rendered them useless.

We could also possibly see someone doing something silly such as to have printers simply spew out spaghetti, or malicious such as having code inserted into them that would drag the nozzles across the print bed, damaging one or both of them.

In an extreme case it's possible that a hacker may find a way heat up a printer until it catches fire.

Given that many 3D printers are wireless, it's possible that they could be harvested for wifi passwords, or for log in details to cloud accounts that contain personal information or payment details.

All of this is speculative though.

> **Comments:**
> **username_2**: If the attacker is positioned to be able to flash the firmware, rather than just interacting with the printer as programmed to react to gcode, they can definitely switch the heaters always-on (vs PID controlled to reach a particular temperature). Ability to start a fire then depends only on whether the wires will melt and break the circuit before the heat ignites something flammable. Clever positioning of the toolhead or use of printing facilities could make that more likely.  
> **username_1**: @R.. GitHub STOP HELPING ICE, baring those that have hardware thermal cutouts.  

---

