\field{sortinithash}{23a3aa7c24e56cfa16945d55545109b5}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Trade execution on Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) is automatic and does not require individual buy and sell orders to be matched. Instead, liquidity aggregated in pools from individual liquidity providers enables trading between cryptocurrencies. The largest DEX measured by trading volume, Uniswap V3, promises a DEX design optimized for capital efficiency. However, Uniswap V3 requires far more decisions from liquidity providers than previous DEX designs.In this work, we develop a theoretical model to illustrate the choices faced by Uniswap V3 liquidity providers and their implications. Our model suggests that providing liquidity on Uniswap V3 is highly complex and requires many considerations from a user. Our supporting data analysis of the risks and returns of real Uniswap V3 liquidity providers underlines that liquidity providing in Uniswap V3 is incredibly complicated, and performances can vary wildly. While there are simple and profitable strategies for liquidity providers in liquidity pools characterized by negligible price volatilities, these strategies only yield modest returns. Instead, significant returns can only be obtained by accepting increased financial risks and at the cost of active management. Thus, providing liquidity has become a game reserved for sophisticated players with the introduction of Uniswap V3, where retail traders do not stand a chance.}
\field{booktitle}{Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies}
\field{isbn}{9781450398619}
\field{series}{AFT '22}
\field{title}{Risks and Returns of Uniswap V3 Liquidity Providers}
\field{year}{2023}
\field{pages}{89\bibrangedash 101}
\range{pages}{13}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1145/3558535.3559772
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559772
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559772
\endverb
\keyw{blockchain,decentralized exchange,constant product market maker,liquidity provider}
\endentry
\entry{hotelling1929stability}{article}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{[Royal Economic Society, Wiley]}%
\strng{namehash}{628a6bd9bb208bfcbeb8394b69088107}
\strng{fullhash}{628a6bd9bb208bfcbeb8394b69088107}
\strng{bibnamehash}{628a6bd9bb208bfcbeb8394b69088107}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{628a6bd9bb208bfcbeb8394b69088107}
\strng{authornamehash}{628a6bd9bb208bfcbeb8394b69088107}
\strng{authorfullhash}{628a6bd9bb208bfcbeb8394b69088107}
\field{sortinit}{H}
\field{sortinithash}{23a3aa7c24e56cfa16945d55545109b5}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{After the work of the late Professor F. Y. Edgeworth one may doubt that anything further can be said on the theory of competition among a small number of entrepreneurs. However, one important feature of actual business seems until recently to have escaped scrutiny. This is the fact that of all the purchasers of a commodity, some buy from one seller, some from another, in spite of moderate differences of price. If the purveyor of an article gradually increases his price while his rivals keep theirs fixed, the diminution in volume of his sales will in general take place continuously rather than in the abrupt way which has tacitly been assumed.}
\field{issn}{00130133, 14680297}
\field{journaltitle}{The Economic Journal}
\field{number}{153}
\field{title}{Stability in Competition}
\field{urlday}{13}
\field{urlmonth}{9}
\field{urlyear}{2023}
\field{volume}{39}
\field{year}{1929}
\field{urldateera}{ce}
\field{pages}{41\bibrangedash 57}
\range{pages}{17}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.2307/2224214
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb http://www.jstor.org/stable/2224214
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb http://www.jstor.org/stable/2224214
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{irmen1998competition}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
giveni={J\bibinithyphendelim F\bibinitperiod}}}%
\strng{namehash}{e54dd7d64a5d521d399e40e84e9c2bc0}
\strng{fullhash}{e54dd7d64a5d521d399e40e84e9c2bc0}
\strng{bibnamehash}{e54dd7d64a5d521d399e40e84e9c2bc0}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{e54dd7d64a5d521d399e40e84e9c2bc0}
\strng{authornamehash}{e54dd7d64a5d521d399e40e84e9c2bc0}
\strng{authorfullhash}{e54dd7d64a5d521d399e40e84e9c2bc0}
\field{sortinit}{I}
\field{sortinithash}{8d291c51ee89b6cd86bf5379f0b151d8}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics space. We show that standard results on prices and locations no longer hold when firms compete in a multi-characteristics space. In the location game withncharacteristics, firms choose to maximize differentiation in the dominant characteristic and to minimize differentiation in the others when the salience coefficient of the former is sufficiently large. Thus, the principle of minimum differentiation holds for all but one characteristic. Furthermore, prices do not necessarily fall when products get closer in the characteristics space because price competition is relaxed when products are differentiated enough in the dominant characteristic.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: L1, M3, R3.}
\field{issn}{0022-0531}
\field{journaltitle}{Journal of Economic Theory}
\field{number}{1}
\field{title}{Competition in Multi-characteristics Spaces: Hotelling Was Almost Right}
\field{volume}{78}
\field{year}{1998}
\field{pages}{76\bibrangedash 102}
\range{pages}{27}
\verb{doi}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2348
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053197923486
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053197923486
\endverb
\keyw{product positioning,multi-characterisitcs space}
\endentry
\entry{jain2008digital}{article}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{1a8372a58ceed5ab43b8bebf86f5e189}
\strng{fullhash}{1a8372a58ceed5ab43b8bebf86f5e189}
\strng{bibnamehash}{1a8372a58ceed5ab43b8bebf86f5e189}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{1a8372a58ceed5ab43b8bebf86f5e189}
\strng{authornamehash}{1a8372a58ceed5ab43b8bebf86f5e189}
\strng{authorfullhash}{1a8372a58ceed5ab43b8bebf86f5e189}
\field{sortinit}{J}
\field{sortinithash}{b2f54a9081ace9966a7cb9413811edb4}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{In recent years, the issue of copyright protection for intellectual properties such as computer software, music CDs, and videos has become increasingly important. It is often claimed that illegal copying of intellectual property costs companies billions of dollars in lost revenues and reduces firms' incentives to innovate. Some researchers have shown that copying can be beneficial to firms when there are strong network effects and copying expands the market. In this paper, we first examine the impact of illegal copying of software and other similar intellectual properties on firms' prices, profits, and quality choices, even when there are no network effects and the market is saturated. We show that contrary to the claims of manufacturers, there are conditions under which copying can increase firms' profits, lead to better quality products, and increase social welfare. This is because weaker copyright protection enables firms to reduce price competition by allowing price-sensitive consumers to copy. Thus, weaker copyright protection can serve as a coordination device to reduce price competition. We also examine how equilibrium copyright enforcement is affected by network externalities. In contrast to previous research, we show that strong network effects can sometimes lead to a firm choosing higher levels of copyright protection. Our results show that in the presence of strong network effects, stronger copyright enforcement by one firm can serve as a coordinating device to reduce price competition.}
\field{journaltitle}{Marketing Science}
\field{number}{4}
\field{title}{Digital Piracy: A Competitive Analysis}
\field{volume}{27}
\field{year}{2008}
\field{pages}{610\bibrangedash 626}
\range{pages}{17}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1287/mksc.1070.0313
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0313
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0313
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{jetpr352024didnt}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{2d223c11b822dd9c3bfc75442d5ac641}
\strng{fullhash}{2d223c11b822dd9c3bfc75442d5ac641}
\strng{bibnamehash}{2d223c11b822dd9c3bfc75442d5ac641}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{2d223c11b822dd9c3bfc75442d5ac641}
\strng{authornamehash}{2d223c11b822dd9c3bfc75442d5ac641}
\strng{authorfullhash}{2d223c11b822dd9c3bfc75442d5ac641}
\field{sortinit}{J}
\field{sortinithash}{b2f54a9081ace9966a7cb9413811edb4}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{month}{2}
\field{title}{Didn't get my airdrop and still haven't figured out why :( would've staked as well}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://twitter.com/JetPr35/status/1755341049902284872
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://twitter.com/JetPr35/status/1755341049902284872
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{jhackworth2022uniswap}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{e824b034779b0d044685cf900a5cee55}
\strng{fullhash}{e824b034779b0d044685cf900a5cee55}
\strng{bibnamehash}{e824b034779b0d044685cf900a5cee55}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{e824b034779b0d044685cf900a5cee55}
\strng{authornamehash}{e824b034779b0d044685cf900a5cee55}
\strng{authorfullhash}{e824b034779b0d044685cf900a5cee55}
\field{sortinit}{j}
\field{sortinithash}{b2f54a9081ace9966a7cb9413811edb4}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Over the past couple of years, airdrop mania consumed the attention of large swathes of the crypto community. It doesn’t take a gigabrain to figure out why. Airdrops are essentially free money, sometimes a lot of it. And who doesn’t like free money? Airdrops have been touted as a killer Web3 marketing tactic, a great way to drum up hype around your project, boost adoption, and gain traction in a competitive market. New and established platforms alike seem to love them. Just over the past few months we’ve seen high profile airdrops of Optimism’s \$OP, Hop’s \$HOP, Apto’s \$AP, and several others. There are many more to come. There’s an important question that needs to be asked though....... Do they actually work? It’s a complicated one to answer, and depends largely on what we define as "working". To investigate we need to dive into the on-chain data. We’re going to dig into one of the biggest airdrops of them all, Uniswap’s \$UNI drop of September 2020. Since it was the largest and highest profile airdrop in recent history, and spawned countless imitators, it will serve as a good case study for the model as a whole.}
\field{month}{11}
\field{title}{The Uniswap Airdrop - Lessons for the Industry}
\field{year}{2022}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20221124132657/https://dune.com/blog/uni-airdrop-analysis
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20221124132657/https://dune.com/blog/uni-airdrop-analysis
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{jia2022evm}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
\strng{namehash}{9b28a6456aef9e18cbba207950c04204}
\strng{fullhash}{9b28a6456aef9e18cbba207950c04204}
\strng{bibnamehash}{9b28a6456aef9e18cbba207950c04204}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{9b28a6456aef9e18cbba207950c04204}
\strng{authornamehash}{9b28a6456aef9e18cbba207950c04204}
\strng{authorfullhash}{9b28a6456aef9e18cbba207950c04204}
\field{sortinit}{J}
\field{sortinithash}{b2f54a9081ace9966a7cb9413811edb4}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We study the competition between blockchains in a multi-chain environment, where a dominant EVM-compatible blockchain (e.g., Ethereum) co-exists with an alternative EVM-compatible (e.g., Avalanche) and an EVM-incompatible (e.g., Algorand) blockchain. While EVM compatibility allows existing Ethereum users and developers to migrate more easily over to the alternative layer-1, EVM incompatibility might allow the firms to build more loyal and "sticky'' user base, and in turn a more robust ecosystem. As such, the choice to be EVM-compatible is not merely a technological decision, but also an important strategic decision. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model to study this competitive dynamic, and find that at equilibrium, new entrants/developers tend to adopt the dominant blockchain. To avoid adoption failure, the alternative blockchains have to either (1) directly subsidize the new entrant firms or (2) offer better features, which in practice can take form in lower transaction costs, faster finality, or larger network effects. We find that it is easier for EVM-compatible blockchains to attract users through direct subsidy, while it is more efficient for EVM-incompatible blockchains to attract users through offering better features/products.}
\field{booktitle}{Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security}
\field{month}{11}
\field{series}{CCS ’22}
\field{title}{To EVM or Not to EVM: Blockchain Compatibility and Network Effects}
\field{year}{2022}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1145/3560832.3563442
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{johnson2023concave}{inbook}{}
\name{author}{5}{}{%
given={Nicholas\bibnamedelimb A.\bibnamedelimi G.},
giveni={N\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim A\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim G\bibinitperiod}}}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{Springer Nature Switzerland}%
\strng{namehash}{a78c2fe27faf4e875ece13cd2e01dddf}
\strng{fullhash}{633ff779481c4f0f82510da3fe86217f}
\strng{bibnamehash}{633ff779481c4f0f82510da3fe86217f}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{633ff779481c4f0f82510da3fe86217f}
\strng{authornamehash}{a78c2fe27faf4e875ece13cd2e01dddf}
\strng{authorfullhash}{633ff779481c4f0f82510da3fe86217f}
\field{sortinit}{J}
\field{sortinithash}{b2f54a9081ace9966a7cb9413811edb4}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{In this paper, we introduce a family of games called concave pro-rata games. In such a game, players place their assets into a pool, and the pool pays out some concave function of all assets placed into it. Each player then receives a pro-rata share of the payout; i.e., each player receives an amount proportional to how much they placed in the pool. Such games appear in a number of practical scenarios, including as a simplified version of batched decentralized exchanges, such as those proposed by Penumbra. We show that this game has a number of interesting properties, including a symmetric pure equilibrium that is the unique equilibrium of this game, and we prove that its price of anarchy is in the number of players. We also show some numerical results in the iterated setting which suggest that players quickly converge to an equilibrium in iterated play.}
\field{booktitle}{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}
\field{isbn}{9783031488061}
\field{issn}{1611-3349}
\field{month}{12}
\field{title}{Concave Pro-rata Games}
\field{year}{2023}
\field{pages}{266\bibrangedash 285}
\range{pages}{20}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_18
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{jumpersketch2023wearecrypto}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
familyi={J\bibinithyphendelim s\bibinitperiod}}}%
\strng{namehash}{64d4052290a483aa605f7da66f1ecb5b}
\strng{fullhash}{64d4052290a483aa605f7da66f1ecb5b}
\strng{bibnamehash}{64d4052290a483aa605f7da66f1ecb5b}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{64d4052290a483aa605f7da66f1ecb5b}
\strng{authornamehash}{64d4052290a483aa605f7da66f1ecb5b}
\strng{authorfullhash}{64d4052290a483aa605f7da66f1ecb5b}
\field{sortinit}{J}
\field{sortinithash}{b2f54a9081ace9966a7cb9413811edb4}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{AirdropMaximizer is an innovative bot built based on historical data analysis and airdrops that have yielded the highest returns. If you want to maximize the potential of airdrops, our bot is the perfect tool for you.}
\field{title}{WeAreCrypto}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20230916094314/https://github.com/Jumper-sketch/WeAreCrypto
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20230916094314/https://github.com/Jumper-sketch/WeAreCrypto
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{kalodner2018arbitrum}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{5}{}{%
given={S.\bibnamedelimi Matthew},
giveni={S\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim M\bibinitperiod}}}%
given={Edward\bibnamedelima W.},
giveni={E\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim W\bibinitperiod}}}%
\list{location}{1}{%
{Baltimore, MD}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{USENIX Association}%
\strng{namehash}{5870f49c6524ef4dda469e3316b59ce9}
\strng{fullhash}{6d9620a7464473e1eb60994f11a145ac}
\strng{bibnamehash}{6d9620a7464473e1eb60994f11a145ac}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{6d9620a7464473e1eb60994f11a145ac}
\strng{authornamehash}{5870f49c6524ef4dda469e3316b59ce9}
\strng{authorfullhash}{6d9620a7464473e1eb60994f11a145ac}
\field{sortinit}{K}
\field{sortinithash}{c02bf6bff1c488450c352b40f5d853ab}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{booktitle}{27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18)}
\field{isbn}{978-1-939133-04-5}
\field{month}{8}
\field{title}{Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts}
\field{year}{2018}
\field{pages}{1353\bibrangedash 1370}
\range{pages}{18}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/kalodner
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/kalodner
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{kunin2023on}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
\strng{namehash}{77dc6cb9bbfe2de01728a061a1844178}
\strng{fullhash}{77dc6cb9bbfe2de01728a061a1844178}
\strng{bibnamehash}{77dc6cb9bbfe2de01728a061a1844178}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{77dc6cb9bbfe2de01728a061a1844178}
\strng{authornamehash}{77dc6cb9bbfe2de01728a061a1844178}
\strng{authorfullhash}{77dc6cb9bbfe2de01728a061a1844178}
\field{sortinit}{K}
\field{sortinithash}{c02bf6bff1c488450c352b40f5d853ab}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We study how private intellectual property rights protection affects equilibrium prices in a duopoly competition between firms that offer a product variety of distinct qualities (vertical product differentiation) in a setup that is closely related to that put forward by Jain where firms offer the same qualities in equilibrium (horizontal product differentiation). Consumers may make a choice to buy a legal version, use an illegal copy (if they want to and can), or not use a product at all. Using an illegal version violates intellectual property rights protection and is thus punishable when discovered. Thus, both private and public (copyright) intellectual property rights protection are available on scene.}
\field{journaltitle}{Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja}
\field{number}{1}
\field{title}{On Jain’s digital piracy model: horizontal vs vertical product differentiation}
\field{volume}{36}
\field{year}{2023}
\field{pages}{1299\bibrangedash 1316}
\range{pages}{18}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1080/1331677X.2022.2086149
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2086149
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2086149
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{l2beat2024state}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{0a5ff9d439284700130a474c4b7d6de1}
\strng{fullhash}{0a5ff9d439284700130a474c4b7d6de1}
\strng{bibnamehash}{0a5ff9d439284700130a474c4b7d6de1}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{0a5ff9d439284700130a474c4b7d6de1}
\strng{authornamehash}{0a5ff9d439284700130a474c4b7d6de1}
\strng{authorfullhash}{0a5ff9d439284700130a474c4b7d6de1}
\field{sortinit}{L}
\field{sortinithash}{7c47d417cecb1f4bd38d1825c427a61a}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{month}{2}
\field{title}{The state of the layer two ecosystem}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20240201212151/https://l2beat.com/scaling/summary
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20240201212151/https://l2beat.com/scaling/summary
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{liu2022fighting}{misc}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{afabbc3bf6d75ee86ca8a431f44deba1}
\strng{fullhash}{afabbc3bf6d75ee86ca8a431f44deba1}
\strng{bibnamehash}{afabbc3bf6d75ee86ca8a431f44deba1}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{afabbc3bf6d75ee86ca8a431f44deba1}
\strng{authornamehash}{afabbc3bf6d75ee86ca8a431f44deba1}
\strng{authorfullhash}{afabbc3bf6d75ee86ca8a431f44deba1}
\field{sortinit}{L}
\field{sortinithash}{7c47d417cecb1f4bd38d1825c427a61a}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Airdrop is a crucial concept in tokenomics. Startups of decentralized applications (DApps) reward early supporters by airdropping newly issued tokens up to a certain amount as a free giveaway. This naturally induces greedy hackers, called Sybils, to create multiple accounts for more shares. Most airdrops have prerequisites for qualification, in which utilizing these DApps is unsurprisingly the principal. One particular characteristic of DApps is to implement users' interactions with them in the form of token transfer transactions or smart contract calling transactions on public blockchains. We argue that these individual transactions could reveal underlying signatures of their sending accounts. Specifically, accounts controlled by the same Sybil may exhibit some common behaviors. A careful analysis of Sybil's behaviors shows that accounts controlled by the same Sybil may produce similar DApp activities and regular token transfer patterns. We model the transactions as graphs by representing accounts as vertices and transactions as edges. When multiple accounts receive tokens from the same Sybil to conduct interactions with DApps, we inspect the graphs for these activities and patterns to detect suspicious accounts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in a recent airdrop by presenting the suspicious accounts controlled by Sybils. All the detected accounts exhibit similar interaction activities and regular transfer patterns.}
\field{journaltitle}{arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.04603}
\field{title}{Fighting Sybils in Airdrops}
\field{year}{2022}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.48550/arXiv.2209.04603
\endverb
\verb{eprint}
\verb 2209.04603
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{lommers2023designing}{misc}{}
\name{author}{3}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{629a3b65e9893718e7363461d2fb0e4c}
\strng{fullhash}{629a3b65e9893718e7363461d2fb0e4c}
\strng{bibnamehash}{629a3b65e9893718e7363461d2fb0e4c}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{629a3b65e9893718e7363461d2fb0e4c}
\strng{authornamehash}{629a3b65e9893718e7363461d2fb0e4c}
\strng{authorfullhash}{629a3b65e9893718e7363461d2fb0e4c}
\field{sortinit}{L}
\field{sortinithash}{7c47d417cecb1f4bd38d1825c427a61a}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Airdrops have become an increasingly popular tool among web3 projects to reward existing community members and attract new users. However, little is known about their efficacy and how to design them. This article analyzes past airdrops, surveys the literature, and discusses how to design successful airdrops. In particular, we explore how eligibility criteria, signaling, and implementation strategy of the airdrop affect its success and we provide practical guidance on how to toggle these.}
\field{journaltitle}{Available at SSRN 4427295}
\field{title}{Designing Airdrops}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.2139/ssrn.4427295
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{luther2015cryptocurrencies}{article}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
given={William\bibnamedelima J.},
giveni={W\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim J\bibinitperiod}}}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
\strng{namehash}{f2f9dede0e84e815b08fd82ed811ae32}
\strng{fullhash}{f2f9dede0e84e815b08fd82ed811ae32}
\strng{bibnamehash}{f2f9dede0e84e815b08fd82ed811ae32}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{f2f9dede0e84e815b08fd82ed811ae32}
\strng{authornamehash}{f2f9dede0e84e815b08fd82ed811ae32}
\strng{authorfullhash}{f2f9dede0e84e815b08fd82ed811ae32}
\field{sortinit}{L}
\field{sortinithash}{7c47d417cecb1f4bd38d1825c427a61a}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Cryptocurrencies are digital alternatives to traditional government-issued paper monies. Given the current state of technology and skepticism regarding the future purchasing power of existing monies, why have cryptocurrencies failed to gain widespread acceptance? I offer an explanation based on network effects and switching costs. In order to articulate the problem that agents considering cryptocurrencies face, I employ a simple model developed by Dowd and Greenaway (1993) (Dowd, K., and D. Greenaway. “Currency Competition, Network Externalities, and Switching Costs: Towards an Alternative View of Optimum Currency Areas.” The Economic Journal, 103(420), 1993, 1180–89). The model demonstrates that agents may fail to adopt an alternative currency when network effects and switching costs are present, even if all agents agree that the prevailing currency is inferior. The limited success of bitcoin—almost certainly the most popular cryptocurrency to date—serves to illustrate. After briefly surveying episodes of successful monetary transition, I conclude that cryptocurrencies like bitcoin are unlikely to generate widespread acceptance in the absence of either significant monetary instability or government support. (JEL E40, E41, E42, E49)}
\field{issn}{1465-7287}
\field{journaltitle}{Contemporary Economic Policy}
\field{month}{10}
\field{number}{3}
\field{title}{Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, And Switching Costs}
\field{volume}{34}
\field{year}{2015}
\field{pages}{553\bibrangedash 571}
\range{pages}{19}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1111/coep.12151
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12151
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12151
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{lv2013fair}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\list{location}{1}{%
{Montréal, Québec, Canada}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{Association for Computing Machinery}%
\strng{namehash}{bdfb47915c93dff73740b5c92f87e747}
\strng{fullhash}{bdfb47915c93dff73740b5c92f87e747}
\strng{bibnamehash}{bdfb47915c93dff73740b5c92f87e747}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{bdfb47915c93dff73740b5c92f87e747}
\strng{authornamehash}{bdfb47915c93dff73740b5c92f87e747}
\strng{authorfullhash}{bdfb47915c93dff73740b5c92f87e747}
\field{sortinit}{L}
\field{sortinithash}{7c47d417cecb1f4bd38d1825c427a61a}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We study Incentive Tree for motivating the participation of people in crowdsourcing or human tasking systems. In an Incentive Tree, each participant is rewarded for contributing to the system, as well as for soliciting new participants into the system, who then themselves contribute to it and/or themselves solicit new participants. An Incentive Tree mechanism is an algorithm that determines how much reward each individual participant receives based on all the participants' contributions, as well as the structure of the solicitation tree. The sum of rewards paid by the mechanism to all participants is linear in the sum of their total contribution.In this paper, we investigate the possibilities and limitations of Incentive Trees via an axiomatic approach by defining a set of desirable properties that an incentive tree mechanism should satisfy. We give a mutual incompatibility result showing that there is no incentive tree mechanism that simultaneously achieves all the properties. We then present two novel families of incentive tree mechanisms. The first family of mechanisms achieves all desirable properties, except that it fails to protect against a certain strong form of multi-identity attack; the second set of mechanisms achieves all properties, including the strong multi-identity protection, but fails to give participants the opportunity to achieve unbounded reward. Given the above impossibility result, these two mechanisms are effectively the best we can hope for. Finally, our model and results generalize recent studies on multi-level marketing mechanisms.}
\field{booktitle}{Proceedings of the 2013 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing}
\field{isbn}{9781450320658}
\field{series}{PODC '13}
\field{title}{Fair and resilient incentive tree mechanisms}
\field{year}{2013}
\field{pages}{230\bibrangedash 239}
\range{pages}{10}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1145/2484239.2484252
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1145/2484239.2484252
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1145/2484239.2484252
\endverb
\keyw{reward mechanisms,multi-level marketing,incentive trees}
\endentry
\entry{makridis2023rise}{article}{}
\name{author}{4}{}{%
given={Christos\bibnamedelima A.},
giveni={C\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim A\bibinitperiod}}}%
\strng{namehash}{ec82691dad81725ce5ff8efade9b3738}
\strng{fullhash}{8b6bf8e7670ff18a5d2b4dd35a3be04c}
\strng{bibnamehash}{8b6bf8e7670ff18a5d2b4dd35a3be04c}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{8b6bf8e7670ff18a5d2b4dd35a3be04c}
\strng{authornamehash}{ec82691dad81725ce5ff8efade9b3738}
\strng{authorfullhash}{8b6bf8e7670ff18a5d2b4dd35a3be04c}
\field{sortinit}{M}
\field{sortinithash}{4625c616857f13d17ce56f7d4f97d451}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{While most cryptocurrency financial activity is conducted on centralized exchanges, decentralized finance (DeFi) has experienced a particular surge with roughly 90,000 users at the start of 2020 to 4.28 million by the end of 2021. Based on data collected from a popular crypto-asset data aggregation service and manually collected data, we document the rapid growth in decentralized exchanges and their differences in volume and price dynamics from centralized exchanges. Next, we investigate the role of airdrops and governance tokens as mechanisms for expanding the base of users and driving up the value of an exchange. While our results do not have a causal interpretation, they provide preliminary evidence that both mechanisms are effective for expanding and strengthening networks, particularly for decentralized exchanges. We also exploit two event studies that suggest the growth in decentralized exchanges is not driven by speculation, but at least partially by value-creating cybersecurity benefits.}
\field{issn}{0929-1199}
\field{journaltitle}{Journal of Corporate Finance}
\field{title}{The rise of decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges: Evaluating the role of airdrops and governance tokens}
\field{volume}{79}
\field{year}{2023}
\field{pages}{102358}
\range{pages}{1}
\verb{doi}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102358
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092911992300007X
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092911992300007X
\endverb
\keyw{Airdrops,Blockchain,Decentralized exchanges,Decentralized finance,Expectations,Smart contracts}
\endentry
\entry{mei2022theory}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{Elsevier BV}%
\strng{namehash}{2a6106eb162e1aad42c473ea41c6f6e8}
\strng{fullhash}{2a6106eb162e1aad42c473ea41c6f6e8}
\strng{bibnamehash}{2a6106eb162e1aad42c473ea41c6f6e8}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{2a6106eb162e1aad42c473ea41c6f6e8}
\strng{authornamehash}{2a6106eb162e1aad42c473ea41c6f6e8}
\strng{authorfullhash}{2a6106eb162e1aad42c473ea41c6f6e8}
\field{sortinit}{M}
\field{sortinithash}{4625c616857f13d17ce56f7d4f97d451}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We model a community platform where users learn about the quality of its services over time by using its native tokens. The key friction is users can buy tokens for services or trade them primarily for speculation. In the presence of network effects, this tension can lead to situations where no user adopts the platform’s services because the risk-adjusted benefit of adoption is lower than that from speculation. Our model can be applied to any asset that derives value from network effects and suggests high token inflation and incentive schemes favoring service usage may be integral to sustaining community participation.}
\field{issn}{1556-5068}
\field{journaltitle}{SSRN Electronic Journal}
\field{title}{A Theory of Speculation in Community Assets}
\field{year}{2022}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.2139/ssrn.4115073
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4115073
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4115073
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{messias2023airdrops}{misc}{}
\name{author}{3}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{b3a497f7a342e31abfef7c005c238f53}
\strng{fullhash}{b3a497f7a342e31abfef7c005c238f53}
\strng{bibnamehash}{b3a497f7a342e31abfef7c005c238f53}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{b3a497f7a342e31abfef7c005c238f53}
\strng{authornamehash}{b3a497f7a342e31abfef7c005c238f53}
\strng{authorfullhash}{b3a497f7a342e31abfef7c005c238f53}
\field{sortinit}{M}
\field{sortinithash}{4625c616857f13d17ce56f7d4f97d451}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Airdrops are used by blockchain applications and platforms to attract an initial user base, and to grow the user base over time. In the case of many airdrops, tokens are distributed to select users as a "reward" for interacting with the underlying platform, with a long-term goal of creating a loyal community that will generate genuine economic activity well after the airdrop has been completed. Although airdrops are widely used by the blockchain industry, a proper understanding of the factors contributing to an airdrop's success is generally lacking. In this work, we outline the design space for airdrops, and specify a reasonable list of outcomes that an airdrop should ideally result in. We then analyze on-chain data from several larger-scale airdrops to empirically evaluate the success of previous airdrops, with respect to our desiderata. In our analysis, we demonstrate that airdrop farmers frequently dispose of the lion's share of airdrops proceeds via exchanges. Our analysis is followed by an overview of common pitfalls that common airdrop designs lend themselves to, which are then used to suggest concrete guidelines for better airdrops.}
\field{eprintclass}{cs.CR}
\field{eprinttype}{arXiv}
\field{title}{Airdrops: Giving Money Away Is Harder Than It Seems}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.48550/arXiv.2312.02752
\endverb
\verb{eprint}
\verb 2312.02752
\endverb
\verb{file}
\verb https://arxiv.org/pdf/2312.02752.pdf
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.02752
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.02752
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{muth1961rational}{article}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
given={John\bibnamedelima F},
giveni={J\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim F\bibinitperiod}}}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
\strng{namehash}{3b2d4d67c398b7a7847353d52d7f7fa8}
\strng{fullhash}{3b2d4d67c398b7a7847353d52d7f7fa8}
\strng{bibnamehash}{3b2d4d67c398b7a7847353d52d7f7fa8}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{3b2d4d67c398b7a7847353d52d7f7fa8}
\strng{authornamehash}{3b2d4d67c398b7a7847353d52d7f7fa8}
\strng{authorfullhash}{3b2d4d67c398b7a7847353d52d7f7fa8}
\field{sortinit}{M}
\field{sortinithash}{4625c616857f13d17ce56f7d4f97d451}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{journaltitle}{Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society}
\field{title}{Rational expectations and the theory of price movements}
\field{year}{1961}
\field{pages}{315\bibrangedash 335}
\range{pages}{21}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.2307/1909635
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{nftwhistledown2024you}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{b06cda6d4994da08c9da32ed6cfe3719}
\strng{fullhash}{b06cda6d4994da08c9da32ed6cfe3719}
\strng{bibnamehash}{b06cda6d4994da08c9da32ed6cfe3719}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{b06cda6d4994da08c9da32ed6cfe3719}
\strng{authornamehash}{b06cda6d4994da08c9da32ed6cfe3719}
\strng{authorfullhash}{b06cda6d4994da08c9da32ed6cfe3719}
\field{sortinit}{N}
\field{sortinithash}{22369a73d5f88983a108b63f07f37084}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{month}{2}
\field{title}{You didn't give me any allo.}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://twitter.com/NFTWhistledown/status/1754906031379853777
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://twitter.com/NFTWhistledown/status/1754906031379853777
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{ohlhaver2024compressed}{misc}{}
\name{author}{3}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{d83e7160c0e6554add7896329cb250cc}
\strng{fullhash}{d83e7160c0e6554add7896329cb250cc}
\strng{bibnamehash}{d83e7160c0e6554add7896329cb250cc}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{d83e7160c0e6554add7896329cb250cc}
\strng{authornamehash}{d83e7160c0e6554add7896329cb250cc}
\strng{authorfullhash}{d83e7160c0e6554add7896329cb250cc}
\field{sortinit}{O}
\field{sortinithash}{2cd7140a07aea5341f9e2771efe90aae}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Experiments in Proof of Personhood—where each person has a single, unique identity—have increasingly been touted as a mechanism for tracing information provenance, distributing Universal Basic Income, and facilitating democratic governance over systems of artificial intelligence. This paper chronicles Idena’s experiment in Proof of Personhood from launch in August 2019 to a crisis in May 2022, which prompted a pivot towards a novel experiment in sublinear identity staking. We show how despite verifying humans, hidden pools rapidly emerged—some cooperative, but most controlled by “puppeteers” who, at best, remunerated participants for periodically proving their uniqueness in exchange for access to their secret keys and controlling their accounts. Instead of fostering an egalitarian network of unique identities, the protocol fractured into hidden subnetworks vying for control over an economic pie with economies of scale trending towards oligopoly, undermining the protocol’s security and ambitions for democratic governance (one-person, one-vote) and UBI rewards (one-person, one reward). By giving humans economic incentives to periodically differentiate themselves from bots—even as low as \$2 to \$14 every few weeks—the protocol gave more informed, resourceful humans financial incentives to puppeteer less informed humans like bots. Notably, by May 2022, 23 entities constituting less than 0.6\% of the network’s distinct entities controlled at least ~40\% of accounts and the distribution of almost half (~48\%) the network rewards. More striking, 3 entities controlled ~19\% accounts and ~24\% rewards. An off-chain system trending towards oligopoly subsumed an on-chain egalitarian system, quietly and opaquely. Achieving de jure sybil-resistance (filtering humans from bots) revealed a deeper challenge of de-facto sybil resistance (filtering humans acting like bots), which could not coherently or computationally be disentangled from the problem of collusion-resistance.}
\field{journaltitle}{Available at SSRN}
\field{title}{Compressed to 0: The Silent Strings of Proof of Personhood}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4749892
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4749892
\endverb
\keyw{Proof of Personhood,Decentralized Identity,Collusion,Sybil-Resistance,Mechanism Design,Artificial Intelligence,Voting Security,Computational Democracy}
\endentry
\entry{optimism2024airdrop}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{34c7353b02e3eaf16792732aabcb9454}
\strng{fullhash}{34c7353b02e3eaf16792732aabcb9454}
\strng{bibnamehash}{34c7353b02e3eaf16792732aabcb9454}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{34c7353b02e3eaf16792732aabcb9454}
\strng{authornamehash}{34c7353b02e3eaf16792732aabcb9454}
\strng{authorfullhash}{34c7353b02e3eaf16792732aabcb9454}
\field{sortinit}{O}
\field{sortinithash}{2cd7140a07aea5341f9e2771efe90aae}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Airdrop \#4 celebrates the vibrant creative energy that artists introduce to the Superchain, and highlights the essential role creators fulfill within the Optimism Collective and the broader Ethereum ecosystem. Creators with addresses that deployed NFT contracts on Ethereum L1, Base, OP Mainnet and Zora before 2024-01-10 00:00:00 UTC were considered in this airdrop.}
\field{title}{Airdrop 4}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://community.optimism.io/docs/governance/airdrop-4
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://community.optimism.io/docs/governance/airdrop-4
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{ostern2021know}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
given={Nadine\bibnamedelima Kathrin},
giveni={N\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim K\bibinitperiod}}}%
\strng{namehash}{c4b0f588ba68c277bfafab5daa929caa}
\strng{fullhash}{c4b0f588ba68c277bfafab5daa929caa}
\strng{bibnamehash}{c4b0f588ba68c277bfafab5daa929caa}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{c4b0f588ba68c277bfafab5daa929caa}
\strng{authornamehash}{c4b0f588ba68c277bfafab5daa929caa}
\strng{authorfullhash}{c4b0f588ba68c277bfafab5daa929caa}
\field{sortinit}{O}
\field{sortinithash}{2cd7140a07aea5341f9e2771efe90aae}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Blockchain technology is often proposed as an infrastructure for decentralized Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification, i.e., a process determining whether a customer is eligible for a given transaction. The benefit of using blockchain technology lies in the expected compliance costs reduction for companies by automatically enforcing KYC-requirements, whose results are accessible by multiple financial institutions. While information systems researchers have proposed conceptual models and prototypes of blockchain-based KYC-systems, they do not yet consider severe penalties that are applicable to companies if KYC-requirements are not met. Hence, if the legal requirements for KYC-processes cannot be met, these systems are not applicable. The paper uses an objective-centered design science research approach to develop a blockchain-based KYC-system for the conduct of ICOs that is compliant-by-design. To this end, the authors first identify existing KYC-requirements and define corresponding system design objectives that are used to develop a KYC-system that automatically enforces KYC-regulations, thereby preventing money laundering and other forms of identity fraud. Second, the authors contribute to the literature by providing a blueprint for compliant-by-design blockchain-based KYC-systems, in the paper, integrated into the investment flow of an ICO. Third, the authors propose a KYC-system that is applicable in the real world, by making - due to legal certainty - KYC-processes cost-effective, i.e., the proposed blockchain-based KYC-system expectably reduces compliance costs for customers and financial organizations.}
\field{issn}{1867-0202}
\field{journaltitle}{Business \& Information Systems Engineering}
\field{number}{5}
\field{title}{Know-Your-Customer (KYC) Requirements for Initial Coin Offerings}
\field{volume}{63}
\field{year}{2021}
\field{pages}{551\bibrangedash 567}
\range{pages}{17}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1007/s12599-020-00677-6
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-020-00677-6
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-020-00677-6
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{otegbeyeboluwa12023what’s}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{916e41934562d96cf149c1211af1269c}
\strng{fullhash}{916e41934562d96cf149c1211af1269c}
\strng{bibnamehash}{916e41934562d96cf149c1211af1269c}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{916e41934562d96cf149c1211af1269c}
\strng{authornamehash}{916e41934562d96cf149c1211af1269c}
\strng{authorfullhash}{916e41934562d96cf149c1211af1269c}
\field{sortinit}{O}
\field{sortinithash}{2cd7140a07aea5341f9e2771efe90aae}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{month}{6}
\field{title}{But what’s the purpose of the whole testnet ? I’ve had sleepless nights because of Linea There must be a reward for testnet users !!}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://twitter.com/Otegbeyeboluwa1/status/1674020063408472065
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://twitter.com/Otegbeyeboluwa1/status/1674020063408472065
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{reguerra2023arbitrum}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{ae2ab066fe14d5b711846a16bf0a3d4c}
\strng{fullhash}{ae2ab066fe14d5b711846a16bf0a3d4c}
\strng{bibnamehash}{ae2ab066fe14d5b711846a16bf0a3d4c}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{ae2ab066fe14d5b711846a16bf0a3d4c}
\strng{authornamehash}{ae2ab066fe14d5b711846a16bf0a3d4c}
\strng{authorfullhash}{ae2ab066fe14d5b711846a16bf0a3d4c}
\field{sortinit}{R}
\field{sortinithash}{5e1c39a9d46ffb6bebd8f801023a9486}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{One wallet received \$2 million in ARB, while another collected around \$1.38 million worth of tokens.}
\field{month}{3}
\field{title}{Arbitrum airdrop sees 1,500 addresses consolidate \$3.3M into two wallets}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20230915134738/https://cointelegraph.com/news/arbitrum-airdrop-sees-1-500-addresses-consolidate-3-3m-into-two-wallets
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20230915134738/https://cointelegraph.com/news/arbitrum-airdrop-sees-1-500-addresses-consolidate-3-3m-into-two-wallets
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{shakhnov2023utility}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\list{publisher}{2}{%
{Institute for Operations Research}%
{the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}%
\strng{namehash}{cd9d26c33a6db11a0420b3b6fdf1af20}
\strng{fullhash}{cd9d26c33a6db11a0420b3b6fdf1af20}
\strng{bibnamehash}{cd9d26c33a6db11a0420b3b6fdf1af20}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{cd9d26c33a6db11a0420b3b6fdf1af20}
\strng{authornamehash}{cd9d26c33a6db11a0420b3b6fdf1af20}
\strng{authorfullhash}{cd9d26c33a6db11a0420b3b6fdf1af20}
\field{sortinit}{S}
\field{sortinithash}{b164b07b29984b41daf1e85279fbc5ab}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We examine digital product markets where consumers are heterogeneous in their propensity to actively interact with other users, and valuations increase with the share of active users (e.g. social network platforms). We propose a model where entrepreneurs can issue digital claims (tokens) to promise exclusive access to benefits that specifically enhance the utility of active users. This allows entrepreneurs to extract consumer surplus through price discrimination. Since there is an incentive to renege on the “exclusivity” promise ex-post and expand the network of active users, the credibility of this commitment resides in a costly technology (blockchain) that embeds automatic contracts in the tokens sold and limits entrepreneurial discretion. We show that the profitability of token-based sales increases with entrepreneurial ability and with the intensity of network effects.}
\field{issn}{1526-5501}
\field{journaltitle}{Management Science}
\field{month}{11}
\field{number}{11}
\field{title}{Utility Tokens, Network Effects, and Pricing Power}
\field{volume}{69}
\field{year}{2023}
\field{pages}{6625\bibrangedash 6640}
\range{pages}{16}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4917
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{siddarth2020who}{article}{}
\name{author}{4}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{252647826aa6c92b0014906e4f3ef810}
\strng{fullhash}{c3272d86b802f7f5aedc484407bf95d7}
\strng{bibnamehash}{c3272d86b802f7f5aedc484407bf95d7}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{c3272d86b802f7f5aedc484407bf95d7}
\strng{authornamehash}{252647826aa6c92b0014906e4f3ef810}
\strng{authorfullhash}{c3272d86b802f7f5aedc484407bf95d7}
\field{sortinit}{S}
\field{sortinithash}{b164b07b29984b41daf1e85279fbc5ab}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Most self-sovereign identity systems consist of strictly objective claims, cryptographically signed by trusted third-party attestors. Lacking protocols in place to account for subjectivity, these systems do not form new sources of legitimacy that can address the central question concerning identity authentication: “Who verifies the verifier?” The legitimacy of claims is instead derived from traditional centralized institutions such as national ID issuers and KYC providers. This architecture has been employed, in part, to safeguard protocols from a vulnerability previously thought to be impossible to address in peer-to-peer identity systems: the Sybil attack, which refers to the abuse of a digital network by creating many illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge in networked protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching, and interpreting to arrive at a decentralized and Sybil-resistant consensus for identity. In doing so, these projects illustrate that the best technologies do not abstract away subjectivity but instead embrace it as a necessity and strength. In this review, we will outline the approaches of these new and natively digital sources of authentication—their attributes, methodologies, strengths, and weaknesses—and sketch out possible directions for future developments.}
\field{issn}{2624-7852}
\field{journaltitle}{Frontiers in Blockchain}
\field{title}{Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-Resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols}
\field{volume}{3}
\field{year}{2020}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.3389/fbloc.2020.590171
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.590171
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.590171
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{stylianou2021cryptocurrency}{article}{}
\name{author}{4}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{University Library System, University of Pittsburgh}%
\strng{namehash}{42cb1c9b143bc324e0a0fdddfd105dbf}
\strng{fullhash}{ec9b2f1f068493f1fb645e243aa4ab12}
\strng{bibnamehash}{ec9b2f1f068493f1fb645e243aa4ab12}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{ec9b2f1f068493f1fb645e243aa4ab12}
\strng{authornamehash}{42cb1c9b143bc324e0a0fdddfd105dbf}
\strng{authorfullhash}{ec9b2f1f068493f1fb645e243aa4ab12}
\field{sortinit}{S}
\field{sortinithash}{b164b07b29984b41daf1e85279fbc5ab}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{When network products and services become more valuable as their userbase grows (network effects), this tendency can become a major determinant of how they compete with each other in the market and how the market is structured. Network effects are traditionally linked to high market concentration, early-mover advantages, and entry barriers, and in the market they have also been used as a valuation tool. The recent resurgence of Bitcoin has been partly attributed to network effects, too. We study the existence of network effects in six cryptocurrencies from their inception to obtain a high-level overview of the application of network effects in the cryptocurrency market. We show that, contrary to the usual implications of network effects, they do not serve to concentrate the cryptocurrency market, nor do they accord any one cryptocurrency a definitive competitive advantage, nor are they consistent enough to be reliable valuation tools. Therefore, while network effects do occur in cryptocurrency networks, they are not (yet) a defining feature of the cryptocurrency market as a whole.}
\field{issn}{2379-5980}
\field{journaltitle}{Ledger}
\field{month}{9}
\field{title}{Cryptocurrency Competition and Market Concentration in the Presence of Network Effects}
\field{volume}{6}
\field{year}{2021}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.5195/ledger.2021.226
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.5195/ledger.2021.226
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.5195/ledger.2021.226
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{tokenbrice2021what}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{d7db9d356ee0d38c03c60e356ee57988}
\strng{fullhash}{d7db9d356ee0d38c03c60e356ee57988}
\strng{bibnamehash}{d7db9d356ee0d38c03c60e356ee57988}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{d7db9d356ee0d38c03c60e356ee57988}
\strng{authornamehash}{d7db9d356ee0d38c03c60e356ee57988}
\strng{authorfullhash}{d7db9d356ee0d38c03c60e356ee57988}
\field{sortinit}{T}
\field{sortinithash}{9af77f0292593c26bde9a56e688eaee9}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Aka measuring engagement: the journey from >1.3M “unique users” to 20 000 “active users”}
\field{month}{11}
\field{title}{What’s an “active user”? Clarifying PSP token distribution filtering logic}
\field{year}{2021}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://medium.com/paraswap/whats-an-active-user-clarifying-psp-token-distribution-filtering-logic-81df6096d410
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://medium.com/paraswap/whats-an-active-user-clarifying-psp-token-distribution-filtering-logic-81df6096d410
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{venkatesh2003optimal}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
\strng{namehash}{2d58516f0d95dc31f8d0426aabf0885b}
\strng{fullhash}{2d58516f0d95dc31f8d0426aabf0885b}
\strng{bibnamehash}{2d58516f0d95dc31f8d0426aabf0885b}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{2d58516f0d95dc31f8d0426aabf0885b}
\strng{authornamehash}{2d58516f0d95dc31f8d0426aabf0885b}
\strng{authorfullhash}{2d58516f0d95dc31f8d0426aabf0885b}
\field{sortinit}{V}
\field{sortinithash}{afb52128e5b4dc4b843768c0113d673b}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We develop an analytical model of contingent valuations and address two questions of import to a monopolist: (i) should a given pair of complements or substitutes be sold separately (pure components), together (pure bundling), or both (mixed bundling), and at what prices? (ii) How do optimal bundling and pricing strategies for complements and substitutes differ from those for independently valued products? We find that the combination of marginal cost levels and the degree of complementarity or substitutability determines which of the three bundling strategies is optimal. Complements and substitutes should typically be priced higher than independently valued products.}
\field{journaltitle}{The Journal of business}
\field{number}{2}
\field{title}{Optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly: Contrasting complements and substitutes from independently valued products}
\field{volume}{76}
\field{year}{2003}
\field{pages}{211\bibrangedash 231}
\range{pages}{21}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1086/367748
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{victor2020address}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\list{location}{1}{%
{Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
\strng{namehash}{8da3e09a487405f2a8f340bb43e693b6}
\strng{fullhash}{8da3e09a487405f2a8f340bb43e693b6}
\strng{bibnamehash}{8da3e09a487405f2a8f340bb43e693b6}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{8da3e09a487405f2a8f340bb43e693b6}
\strng{authornamehash}{8da3e09a487405f2a8f340bb43e693b6}
\strng{authorfullhash}{8da3e09a487405f2a8f340bb43e693b6}
\field{sortinit}{V}
\field{sortinithash}{afb52128e5b4dc4b843768c0113d673b}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{For many years, address clustering for the identification of entities has been the basis for a variety of graph-based investigations of the Bitcoin blockchain and its derivatives. Especially in the field of fraud detection it has proven to be useful. With the popularization and increasing use of alternative blockchains, the question arises how to recognize entities in these new systems. Currently, there are no heuristics that can directly be applied to Ethereum’s account balance model. This drawback also applies to other smart contract platforms like EOS or NEO, for which previous transaction network analyses have been limited to address graphs. In this paper, we show how addresses can be clustered in Ethereum, yielding entities that are likely in control of multiple addresses. We propose heuristics that exploit patterns related to deposit addresses, multiple participation in airdrops and token authorization mechanisms. We quantify the applicability of each individual heuristic over the first 4 years of the Ethereum blockchain and illustrate identified entities in a sample token network. Our results show that we can cluster 17.9\% of all active externally owned account addresses, indicating that there are more than 340,000 entities that are likely in control of multiple addresses. Comparing the heuristics, we conclude that the deposit address heuristic is currently the most effective approach.}
\field{booktitle}{Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 24th International Conference, FC 2020 , Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, February 10–14, 2020 Revised Selected Papers}
\field{isbn}{978-3-030-51279-8}
\field{title}{Address Clustering Heuristics For Ethereum}
\field{year}{2020}
\field{pages}{617\bibrangedash 633}
\range{pages}{17}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_33
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_33
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_33
\endverb
\keyw{Accounts,Network analysis,Ethereum,Blockchain}
\endentry
\entry{wahby2020airdrop}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{4}{}{%
given={Riad\bibnamedelima S.},
giveni={R\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim S\bibinitperiod}}}%
\name{editor}{2}{}{%
\list{location}{1}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{Springer International Publishing}%
\strng{namehash}{8b139724995e2c60c7344fa5f42ecc52}
\strng{fullhash}{b9c06ef8961161c0b8b7b4f7df94e459}
\strng{bibnamehash}{b9c06ef8961161c0b8b7b4f7df94e459}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{b9c06ef8961161c0b8b7b4f7df94e459}
\strng{authornamehash}{8b139724995e2c60c7344fa5f42ecc52}
\strng{authorfullhash}{b9c06ef8961161c0b8b7b4f7df94e459}
\strng{editorbibnamehash}{bb9102479dd50505470489b2cfcb53b9}
\strng{editornamehash}{bb9102479dd50505470489b2cfcb53b9}
\strng{editorfullhash}{bb9102479dd50505470489b2cfcb53b9}
\field{sortinit}{W}
\field{sortinithash}{4315d78024d0cea9b57a0c6f0e35ed0d}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{A common approach to bootstrapping a new cryptocurrency is an airdrop, an arrangement in which existing users give away currency to entice new users to join. But current airdrops offer no recipient privacy: they leak which recipients have claimed the funds, and this information is easily linked to off-chain identities.}
\field{booktitle}{Financial Cryptography and Data Security}
\field{isbn}{978-3-030-51280-4}
\field{title}{An Airdrop that Preserves Recipient Privacy}
\field{year}{2020}
\field{pages}{444\bibrangedash 463}
\range{pages}{20}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_24
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{wei2021cryptocurrency}{article}{}
\name{author}{2}{}{%
given={Yanhao\bibnamedelima (Max)},
giveni={Y\bibinitperiod\bibinitdelim (\bibinitperiod}}}%
\list{publisher}{2}{%
{Institute for Operations Research}%
{the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}%
\strng{namehash}{38678e3c99b9dd39c69acb4237ada0f4}
\strng{fullhash}{38678e3c99b9dd39c69acb4237ada0f4}
\strng{bibnamehash}{38678e3c99b9dd39c69acb4237ada0f4}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{38678e3c99b9dd39c69acb4237ada0f4}
\strng{authornamehash}{38678e3c99b9dd39c69acb4237ada0f4}
\strng{authorfullhash}{38678e3c99b9dd39c69acb4237ada0f4}
\field{sortinit}{W}
\field{sortinithash}{4315d78024d0cea9b57a0c6f0e35ed0d}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We study product adoption in the context of a cryptocurrency market. Cryptocurrencies are subject to network effects and speculative investments, which are not part of standard models of product diffusion. To explore this unique setting, we marry models of stochastic bubbles and the standard model of product diffusion. A rational bubble is raised by speculative investors seeking short-term gains. We find that a bubble accelerates the adoption, which can help explain the fast diffusion of bitcoin. There are reinforcing interactions between the speculative investors and regular users of currency, which can make it easier to form a bubble (compared with a setting without regular users). Our findings suggest how bubbles may help to market products. We also provide conditions under which bubbles may unravel.}
\field{issn}{1526-548X}
\field{journaltitle}{Marketing Science}
\field{month}{3}
\field{number}{2}
\field{title}{Cryptocurrency Adoption with Speculative Price Bubbles}
\field{volume}{40}
\field{year}{2021}
\field{pages}{241\bibrangedash 260}
\range{pages}{20}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1287/mksc.2020.1247
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{droppables2023outsmarting}{misc}{}
\name{author}{1}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{84bc482f04b3886345824bfb2942ecfe}
\strng{fullhash}{84bc482f04b3886345824bfb2942ecfe}
\strng{bibnamehash}{84bc482f04b3886345824bfb2942ecfe}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{84bc482f04b3886345824bfb2942ecfe}
\strng{authornamehash}{84bc482f04b3886345824bfb2942ecfe}
\strng{authorfullhash}{84bc482f04b3886345824bfb2942ecfe}
\field{sortinit}{X}
\field{sortinithash}{1965c258adceecf23ce3d67b05113442}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{month}{6}
\field{title}{Outsmarting the System: Sybil Attacks in Airdrop Farming}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20230916100836/https://droppables.beehiiv.com/p/sybil
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://web.archive.org/web/20230916100836/https://droppables.beehiiv.com/p/sybil
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{yaish2024strategic}{misc}{}
\name{author}{3}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{5b702514b5079de2acb8fc3c4c34954b}
\strng{fullhash}{5b702514b5079de2acb8fc3c4c34954b}
\strng{bibnamehash}{5b702514b5079de2acb8fc3c4c34954b}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{5b702514b5079de2acb8fc3c4c34954b}
\strng{authornamehash}{5b702514b5079de2acb8fc3c4c34954b}
\strng{authorfullhash}{5b702514b5079de2acb8fc3c4c34954b}
\field{sortinit}{Y}
\field{sortinithash}{fd67ad5a9ef0f7456bdd9aab10fe1495}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We study the effect of public voting tallies on online elections, in a setting where voting is costly and voters are allowed to strategically time their votes. The strategic importance of choosing \emph{when} to vote arises when votes are public, such as in online event scheduling polls (e.\,g., Doodle), or in blockchain governance mechanisms. In particular, there is a tension between voting early to influence future votes and waiting to observe interim results and avoid voting costs if the outcome has already been decided. Our study draws on empirical findings showing that ``temporal'' bandwagon effects occur when interim results are revealed to the electorate: late voters are more likely to vote for leading candidates. To capture this phenomenon, we analyze a novel model where the electorate consists of informed voters who have a preferred candidate, and uninformed swing voters who can be swayed according to the interim outcome at the time of voting. In our main results, we prove the existence of equilibria where both early and late voting occur with a positive probability, and we characterize conditions that lead to the appearance of ``last minute'' voting behavior, where all informed voters vote late.}
\field{eprintclass}{cs.GT}
\field{eprinttype}{arXiv}
\field{month}{2}
\field{title}{Strategic Vote Timing in Online Elections With Public Tallies}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.48550/arXiv.2402.09776
\endverb
\verb{eprint}
\verb 2402.09776
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{yaish2023suboptimality}{misc}{}
\name{author}{5}{}{%
\strng{namehash}{dc3778bdc050efb8f0aba5c9f9aaa936}
\strng{fullhash}{ce88da2306db4200a85336bc97370814}
\strng{bibnamehash}{ce88da2306db4200a85336bc97370814}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{ce88da2306db4200a85336bc97370814}
\strng{authornamehash}{dc3778bdc050efb8f0aba5c9f9aaa936}
\strng{authorfullhash}{ce88da2306db4200a85336bc97370814}
\field{extraname}{1}
\field{sortinit}{Y}
\field{sortinithash}{fd67ad5a9ef0f7456bdd9aab10fe1495}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{The Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystem has proven to be immensely popular in facilitating financial operations such as lending and exchanging assets, with Ethereum-based platforms holding a combined amount of more than 30 billion USD. The public availability of these platforms' code together with real-time data on all user interactions and platform liquidity has given rise to sophisticated automatic tools that recognize profit opportunities on behalf of users and seize them. In this work, we formalize three core DeFi primitives which together are responsible for a daily volume of over 100 million USD in Ethereum-based platforms alone: (1) lending and borrowing funds, (2) liquidation of insolvent loans, and (3) using flash-swaps to close arbitrage opportunities between cryptocurrency exchanges. The profit which can be made from each primitive is then cast as an optimization problem that can be readily solved. We use our formalization to analyze several case studies for each primitive, showing that popular platforms and tools which promise to automatically optimize profits for users, actually fall short. In specific instances, the profits can be increased by more than 100\%, with highest amount of ``missed'' revenue by a single suboptimal action equal to 428.14 ETH, or roughly 517K USD. Finally, we show that many missed opportunities to make a profit do not go unnoticed by other users. Indeed, suboptimal transactions are sometimes immediately followed by ``trailing'' back-running transactions which extract additional profits using similar actions. By analyzing a subset of such events, we uncover that some users who frequently create such trailing transactions are heavily tied to specific miners, meaning that all of their transactions appear only in blocks mined by one miner in particular. As some of the backrun non-optimal transactions are private, we hypothesize that the users who create them are, in fact, miners (or users collaborating with miners) who use inside information known only to them to make a profit, thus gaining an unfair advantage.}
\field{howpublished}{Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/892}
\field{title}{Suboptimality in DeFi}
\field{year}{2023}
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://ia.cr/2023/892
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://ia.cr/2023/892
\endverb
\endentry
\entry{yaish2024speculative}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{5}{}{%
\list{location}{1}{%
{Philadelphia, PA}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{USENIX Association}%
\strng{namehash}{dc3778bdc050efb8f0aba5c9f9aaa936}
\strng{fullhash}{5b224d49f80afaa1eb5bfe50af40f885}
\strng{bibnamehash}{5b224d49f80afaa1eb5bfe50af40f885}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{5b224d49f80afaa1eb5bfe50af40f885}
\strng{authornamehash}{dc3778bdc050efb8f0aba5c9f9aaa936}
\strng{authorfullhash}{5b224d49f80afaa1eb5bfe50af40f885}
\field{extraname}{2}
\field{sortinit}{Y}
\field{sortinithash}{fd67ad5a9ef0f7456bdd9aab10fe1495}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{Transaction fees compensate actors for resources expended on transactions and can only be charged from transactions included in blocks. But, the expressiveness of Turing-complete contracts implies that verifying if transactions can be included requires executing them on the current blockchain state. In this work, we show that adversaries can craft malicious transactions that decouple the work imposed on blockchain actors from the compensation offered in return. We introduce three attacks: (i) ConditionalExhaust, a conditional resource-exhaustion attack against blockchain actors. (ii) MemPurge, an attack for evicting transactions from actors' mempools. (iii) GhostTX, an attack on the reputation system used in Ethereum's proposer-builder separation ecosystem. We evaluate our attacks on an Ethereum testnet and find that by combining ConditionalExhaust and MemPurge, adversaries can simultaneously burden victims' computational resources and clog their mempools to the point where victims are unable to include transactions in blocks. Thus, victims create empty blocks, thereby hurting the system's liveness. The attack's expected cost is \$376, but becomes cheaper if adversaries are validators. For other attackers, costs decrease if censorship is prevalent in the network. ConditionalExhaust and MemPurge are made possible by inherent features of Turing-complete blockchains, and potential mitigations may result in reducing a ledger's scalability.}
\field{booktitle}{33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)}
\field{month}{8}
\field{series}{USENIXSEC '24}
\field{title}{Speculative Denial-of-Service Attacks in Ethereum}
\field{year}{2024}
\verb{eprint}
\verb https://ia.cr/2023/956
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/yaish
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/yaish
\endverb
\keyw{Ethereum,blockchain,cryptocurrencies,security,denial-of-service}
\endentry
\entry{yaish2022blockchain}{inproceedings}{}
\name{author}{3}{}{%
\list{location}{1}{%
{Boulder, CO, USA}%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{Association for Computing Machinery}%
\strng{namehash}{4d35c9b3012b4c3b5b1689635ebc02ba}
\strng{fullhash}{4d35c9b3012b4c3b5b1689635ebc02ba}
\strng{bibnamehash}{4d35c9b3012b4c3b5b1689635ebc02ba}
\strng{authorbibnamehash}{4d35c9b3012b4c3b5b1689635ebc02ba}
\strng{authornamehash}{4d35c9b3012b4c3b5b1689635ebc02ba}
\strng{authorfullhash}{4d35c9b3012b4c3b5b1689635ebc02ba}
\field{sortinit}{Y}
\field{sortinithash}{fd67ad5a9ef0f7456bdd9aab10fe1495}
\field{labelnamesource}{author}
\field{labeltitlesource}{title}
\field{abstract}{We present a novel way for cryptocurrency miners to manipulate the effective interest-rate on loans or deposits they make on decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms by manipulating difficulty-adjustment algorithms (DAAs) and changing the block-rate. This presents a new class of strategic manipulations available to miners.These manipulations allow miners to stretch and squeeze the time between consecutive blocks. We analyze these manipulations both analytically and empirically, and show that a 25\% miner can stretch the time between consecutive blocks by up to 54\% in Ethereum and 33\% in Bitcoin, and squeeze it by up to 9\% in Ethereum. Ethereum is particularly vulnerable, and even relatively small miners can seriously affect the block-rate.An interesting application of these manipulations is to create an artificial interest-rate gap between loans taken from one DeFi platform which accrues interest according to block height (such as Compound [66]) and deposited in some other platform that does so according to elapsed time (like a bank, or other DeFi platforms such as Aave [99]). Hence, stretching and squeezing the block-rate can decrease the interest paid on DeFi loans relative to external financial platforms.The profit made from this interest-rate gap provides a large incentive for miners to deviate. For example, a 25\% Ethereum miner using our manipulations can increase mining profits by up to 35\%, even after taking potential losses into consideration, such as less block-rewards.Our analysis of these manipulations and their mitigations has broad implications with regards to commonly-used cryptocurrency mechanisms and paradigms, such as Ethereum's difficulty-adjustment algorithm and reward schemes, with Ethereum's handling of uncle blocks being particularly manipulable. Interestingly, Bitcoin's mechanism is more resistant Ethereum's, owing to its larger incentives and a more resilient DAA.}
\field{booktitle}{Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation}
\field{isbn}{9781450391504}
\field{series}{EC '22}
\field{title}{Blockchain Stretching \& Squeezing: Manipulating Time for Your Best Interest}
\field{year}{2022}
\field{pages}{65\bibrangedash 88}
\range{pages}{24}
\verb{doi}
\verb 10.1145/3490486.3538250
\endverb
\verb{urlraw}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538250
\endverb
\verb{url}
\verb https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538250
\endverb
\keyw{proof of work,blockchain,decentralized finance,cryptocurrency}
\endentry
\entry{zhang2016duopoly}{article}{}
\name{author}{4}{}{%
\list{publisher}{1}{%
{Informa UK Limited}%
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\field{abstract}{Many software firms, especially mobile app providers, offer perpetually free basic products to users, but premiums are charged for access to the additional features or functionalities. While the free offering helps capture potential customers, it might cannibalize the sales of premium goods or services. This paper adopts a game theoretical approach to examine the impact of free offering on the competition between two firms in the presence of network effects. The firms can either offer a free core product and a paid service or offer them as a bundle. The core product has stand-alone value and can be used separately but the value-added service has no value without the core product. We derive the market equilibria and present conditions under which the free offering strategy outperforms the bundling strategy. We show that when a firm’s core product has a sufficient advantage in product quality, it is better for this firm to sell the bundle but for the other to use free strategy. However, if the core products are similar in terms of quality, it is optimal for them to use the same strategies. Whether to offer a free product depends largely on the core products’ quality. We also show that the firms may be caught in a prisoner’s dilemma when both adopt the free strategy. Finally, we find that the profitability of the firm that offers a free product always increases in network effects intensity and market size, but this is not the case for the firm that sells the bundle. This study contributes to understanding the behavior of feature-limited free offering in a duopoly setting. Our findings also provide insights into the design of free product and the impact of network effects on the firms’ offering decisions.}
\field{issn}{1557-928X}
\field{journaltitle}{Journal of Management Information Systems}
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\field{title}{Duopoly Pricing Strategy for Information Products with Premium Service: Free Product or Bundling?}
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\field{abstract}{As Web3 projects leverage airdrops to incentivize participation, airdrop hunters tactically amass wallet addresses to capitalize on token giveaways. This poses challenges to the decentralization goal. Current detection approaches tailored for cryptocurrencies overlook non-fungible tokens (NFTs) nuances. We introduce ARTEMIS, an optimized graph neural network system for identifying airdrop hunters in NFT transactions. ARTEMIS captures NFT airdrop hunters through: (1) a multimodal module extracting visual and textual insights from NFT metadata using Transformer models; (2) a tailored node aggregation function chaining NFT transaction sequences, retaining behavioral insights; (3) engineered features based on market manipulation theories detecting anomalous trading. Evaluated on decentralized exchange Blur's data, ARTEMIS significantly outperforms baselines in pinpointing hunters. This pioneering computational solution for an emergent Web3 phenomenon has broad applicability for blockchain anomaly detection. The data and code for the paper are accessible at the following link: hrefhttps://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10676801 doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10676801.}
\field{booktitle}{Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024}
\field{isbn}{9798400701719}
\field{series}{WWW '24}
\field{title}{ARTEMIS: Detecting Airdrop Hunters in NFT Markets with a Graph Learning System}
\field{year}{2024}
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\keyw{airdrop hunters,graph neural network,multimodal deep learning,nfts,web3}
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\field{title}{Do you already have any answers why didn't all the eligible wallets get the airdrop? Ty}
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\appendix

\newpage

\section{Reproduction}
\label[appendix]{sec:Reproduction}
To ensure complete reproducibility of our results, we provide all the code used to produce them.
Furthermore, we provide all data and images produced by our code, as used in the current version of the paper.

\paragraphNoSkip{Reproduction instructions}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Download our \texttt{zip} archive from:
\\\texttt{\url{https://drive.proton.me/urls/P0BYXPF3D4\#t10YScLHVza3}}

\item Unpack the archive, which includes the following folders:
\begin{enumerate}
\item \texttt{code}, which includes all code used in the paper
\item \texttt{data}, which includes all data used in the paper (note that by running our code, the latest versions of the data will be collected, and thus will overwrite the included files, which correspond to the version of the data used in our paper)
\item \texttt{images}, which includes all images used in the paper (note that by running our code, the images will be re-created, and thus will overwrite the included files, which correspond to the version of the figures used in our paper)
\item \texttt{requirements}, which includes the names and versions of all python packages required to execute our code
\end{enumerate}

\item Install the packages required to run our code by using one of the following files:
\begin{enumerate}
\item \texttt{requirements/requirements.txt}, a succinct list of the python packages used in our code.
These packages can be installed using \texttt{Python v3.11.7} and \texttt{pip v23.3.1} by running:
\\\texttt{pip install -r /path/to/requirements.txt}

\item \texttt{requirements/pip\_env.txt}, a list of all python packages installed on our computer when we ran our code, including packages unused by our code.
The packages contained in this list can be installed in a similar manner for \texttt{requirements.txt}.

\item \texttt{requirements/conda\_env.yml}, a specification of the complete Anaconda environment that we used to run our code, including packages unused in our code.
This environment can be installed using \texttt{Anaconda v2024.02-1} by running:
\\\texttt{conda env create -f /path/to/conda\_env.yml}
\end{enumerate}

\item Run our main code file, \texttt{code/code.ipynb}.
We note that we use a Jupyter notebook so that all outputs created by our code and used in this submission can be viewed by simply opening the file, without running it
\end{enumerate}

\paragraphNoSkip{Hardware used}
For complete transparency, we provide the specifications of the hardware used to execute our code.
Specifically, we used a computer equipped with an \texttt{Intel Core i9-13905H} \gls{CPU}, \texttt{32GB} of \gls{RAM}, and a \texttt{SAMSUNG MZVL21T0HCLR-00BL2} \gls{SSD}.

\newpage
\section{Additional Related Work}
\label[appendix]{sec:AdditionalRelatedWork}
For completeness, we go over additional related works which may be of interest to readers.

\subsection{Sybil Detection}
A line of work focuses on detecting sybil accounts in the context of airdrops.
\citeauthor{liu2022fighting}{Liu and Zhu}~\cite{liu2022fighting} build a tool that clusters accounts that behave similarly with respect to their on-chain activities, i.e., issue transaction sequences that perform the same actions in the same order.
They evaluate their tool using data collected from an airdrop performed by the Hop cross-rollup bridge.

Although not the main focus of their work, \citeauthor{fan2023altruistic}{Fan~\etal}~\cite{fan2023altruistic} attempt to cluster airdrop farmers, and empirically evaluate their methods on ParaSwap's airdrop.

\citeauthor{zhou2024artemis}{Zhou~\etal}~\cite{zhou2024artemis} propose a farmer detection tool that incorporates heuristics that are relevant to airdrops in which eligibility criteria may involve \gls{NFT}-related actions, such as buying and selling \glspl{NFT}.
Appropriately, the tool is evaluated on empirical data collected from the Blur \gls{NFT} marketplace, which issued several airdrops.

The above studies are preceded by several papers on deanonymizing and clustering of cryptocurrency users which can also be used to identify sybil accounts, with several elegant examples being the works of \citeauthor{victor2020address}{Victor}~\cite{victor2020address} and \citeauthor{beres2021blockchain}{Beres~\etal}~\cite{beres2021blockchain}.

\subsection{Sybil Resistance}
\citeauthor{siddarth2020who}{Siddarth~\etal}~\cite{siddarth2020who} review different methods that \gls{PoH} protocols, such as the ones adopted by various airdrops \cite{allen2023crypto}, can use to increase their resistance to sybil attacks.

Some argue that airdrops can be used to market new platforms \cite{allen2023crypto,allen2023why,lommers2023designing}.
We highlight that multi-level marketing mechanisms are infamous for serving the same purpose, with a long line of prior research on ensuring the sybil-resistance of such mechanisms, beginning with \citeauthor{emek2011mechanisms}{Emek~\etal}~\cite{emek2011mechanisms}.
This study was continued by \citeauthor{drucker2012simpler}{Drucker and Fleischer}~\cite{drucker2012simpler}, who present simple sybil-proof multi-level marketing mechanisms, and by \citeauthor{lv2013fair}{Lv and Moscibroda}~\cite{lv2013fair}, who generalize the setting by allowing to set different participation prices for actors.

\newpage

\section{Glossary}
\label[appendix]{sec:Glossary}
Following is a list of the notations and acronyms used in the paper.
\setglossarystyle{alttree}\glssetwidest{AAAA} %
\printnoidxglossary[type={symbols}]
\printnoidxglossary[type={acronym}]
\end{document}