11institutetext: Blockpass ID Lab, Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, UK
11email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>22institutetext: Democracy Counts
22email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>33institutetext: vSpace Wallet
33email<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
# vSPACE: Voting in a Scalable, Privacy-Aware and Confidential
Election††thanks: Supported by Innovate UK.

Se Elnour 11 William J Buchanan 11 Paul Keating 22 Mwrwan Abubakar 11 Sirag
Elnour 33

###### Abstract

The vSPACE experimental proof-of-concept (PoC) on the [TrueElect][AnonCreds]
protocol presents a novel approach to secure, private, and scalable elections,
extending the TrueElect and ElectAnon protocols with the integration of
AnonCreds SSI (Self-Sovereign Identity). Such a protocol PoC is situated
within a Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA) and leverages confidential computing,
continuous authentication, multi-party computation (MPC), and well-architected
framework (WAF) principles to address the challenges of cybersecurity,
privacy, and trust over IP (ToIP) protection. Employing a Kubernetes
confidential cluster within an Enterprise-Scale Landing Zone (ESLZ), vSPACE
integrates Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) for immutable and certifiable
audit trails. The Infrastructure as Code (IaC) model ensures rapid deployment,
consistent management, and adherence to security standards, making vSPACE a
future-proof solution for digital voting systems.

###### Keywords:

Confidential Computing, Continuous Authentication, eGovernance, Smart
Contracts, Digital Wallets, Voting Distributed Systems, Election-tech,
Cybersecurity, Privacy

##  1 Introduction

Electronic voting is frequently employed in various decision-making elections
since it is adaptable, easy to use, and inexpensive compared to a traditional
poll [1]. Despite this, the currently used electronic voting techniques pose
the risk of excessive power and the manipulation of information, which reduces
the basic levels of fairness, privacy, secrecy, anonymity, and transparency in
the voting process. However, there are a variety of approaches that have been
used in electronic and online voting systems. These methods use various
encryption and decryption strategies to ensure that data exchanges are kept
safe.

The [TrueElect][AnonCreds] vSPACE (Voting in a Scalable, Privacy-Aware and
Confidential Election) is a novel solution that extends our TrueElect [as
shown in the below Figure 1] and ElectAnon [2] Protocols, leveraging
confidential computing, continuous authentication, multi-party computation,
and well-architected framework (WAF) principles. This paper presents an
experimental proof-of-concept on Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), using Zero-
Trust Architecture (ZTA) of Critical Infrastructure as Code (IaC) for
cybersecurity, privacy, and Trust Over IP (ToIP) protection.

The main contribution of this paper is the design and implementation of a
Kubernetes confidential cluster within an Enterprise-Scale Landing Zone (ESLZ)
and which integrates Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) for immutable and
certifiable audit trails. This approach addresses the challenges of existing
voting systems - offering a high level of security, privacy, and trust for
both voters and election authorities.

Figure 1: TrueElect Voting Outline, credit: asecuritysite.com/blogs/graphics

##  2 Related work

The development of secure Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)-based voting
systems is contingent upon meeting a comprehensive set of requirements. These
criteria are essential for preserving the integrity, confidentiality, and
resilience of the voting process, thereby ensuring voter trust and the
legitimacy of election outcomes.

Notwithstanding that, to analyze Eligibility, Uniqueness, Privacy, Universal
Anonymity, Fairness, Accuracy, Universal Verifiability, Individual
Verifiability, Robustness, Autonomy, and Scalability, Onur & Yurdakul (2022)
[2] evaluated four prominent DLT-voting protocols [McCorry et al. (2017) [3],
Chaintegrity (2019) [4], Yang et al. (2020) [5], and Panja et al. (2020) [6]];
nonetheless, this section analyzes such necessary requirements for a future-
proof DLT-based voting as analyzed by Onur & Yurdakul (2022) [2], and given
that the security of online elections has been studied as early as 2002 by D.A
Gritzalis [7], and in 2021, Jafar et al work [8] mentioned requirements for
secure DLT-based online elections; such as: Eligibility, Uniqueness, Privacy,
Universal Anonymity, Fairness, and Accuracy.

Moreover, these foundational requirements guide the design and implementation
of our secure DLT-voting system, ensuring the integrity and trustworthiness of
the election process; and such core requirements for secure DLT-voting are
outlined as::

  * •

Eligibility: Ensuring that only authorized individuals participate in the
election is paramount. The system must incorporate mechanisms for verifying
voter eligibility without compromising their privacy [7]. Only eligible voters
should vote [7]. Eligibility requires trusting the authority. DLT-voting is
vulnerable if not properly implemented, enabling vote-buying and coercion.

  * •

Uniqueness: To uphold the principle of ”one person, one vote,” the system must
prevent double voting by ensuring each eligible voter can cast only one vote
[7]. Each voter should cast one ballot [7] [5]. Uniqueness eliminates double
voting.

  * •

Privacy: The confidentiality of a voter’s ballot is crucial. The system must
safeguard the secrecy of the vote, preventing any party from determining a
voter’s choices [7]. Privacy may enable multiple votes from one voter using
different keys [3] [6]. Some protocols bind keys to eligibility certificates
to prevent this. No results should be available before tallying [7] [8].

  * •

Fairness: The voting process should be conducted in a manner that prevents the
premature disclosure of results, thereby ensuring a fair election. The system
must also secure votes against any post-casting alterations [7]. Fairness
avoids biased voting. Protocols relying on authorities’ or candidates’ keys
risk attacks to learn intermediate results [4]. Candidates may not cooperate
if unsatisfied [5].

  * •

Accuracy: It is critical that every vote is accurately recorded and counted in
the final tally, with the system being resilient against vote manipulation or
fraud [7]. Accuracy discards invalid votes. Usually zero-knowledge proofs
ensure validity. Some protocols make invalid votes impossible [3] [6]. Only
valid ballots should count [9].

  * •

Individual Verifiability: Voters should have the capability to confirm that
their vote has been correctly recorded and included in the final tally,
enhancing their confidence in the voting process [7].

  * •

Universal Verifiability: The integrity of the election process must be
verifiable by any observer, ensuring that the system provides means for third
parties to independently verify the correct counting of votes [7].

  * •

Universal Anonymity: In addition to privacy, the system must ensure that a
voter’s identity cannot be linked to their voting behavior or other DLT
activities, thus guaranteeing universal anonymity [7]. Voters’ addresses [3]
[6] or public keys [4], [5], [10] are used. Both approaches risk linkage
attacks.

  * •

Robustness: The voting system must demonstrate resilience against a broad
spectrum of potential attacks and failures, ensuring the election’s smooth
progression under various conditions [7].

  * •

Scalability: The system must efficiently manage a large number of voters and
candidates without compromising performance or security, enabling scalability
according to election needs [7].

##  3 Design

The [TrueElect][AnonCreds] protocol is a novel approach designed to address
the challenges of scalability, privacy, and confidentiality in distributed
ledger technology (DLT)-based voting systems. Its design incorporates the
principles of privacy-preserving auditing and anonymization trust layers, as
depicted in the provided diagram. It utilizes smart contracts for various
stages of the election process, including voter registration, vote auditing,
and the creation of trusted vote counting. The integration of Hyperledger
ensures a secure and transparent process, with public keys for citizens and
trusted election agents, as well as attribute-based access control for various
roles such as auditors and returning officers. Privacy-preserving biometric
data and key management are also critical components of the protocol, ensuring
the security and confidentiality of the voting process.

Such [TrueElect][AnonCreds] protocol proposal extends the capabilities of our
own TrueElect protocol, as well as the ElectAnon protocol, as proposed by Onur
& Yurdakul (2022); with the integration of Hyperledger AnonCreds for Self-
Sovereign Identity (SSI) to be implemented by our vSpaceWallet; alongside our
vSpaceVote Confidential Computing cluster, leveraging ZKPs (Zero-Knowledge
Proofs to ensure voter anonymity while maintaining the integrity and
verifiability of the election-tech process.

Noting that the TrueElect and ElectAnon protocols were designed to facilitate
secure and private voting mechanisms. Both protocols employ advanced
cryptographic techniques to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the
voting process. However, they differ in their specific implementations and the
flow of their respective protocols.

###  3.1 Overview of EMS, SSI, ZTA, IaC, and ToIP

The Election Management System (EMS) integrated with Self-Sovereign Identity
(SSI), Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA), Infrastructure as Code (IaC), and Trust
Over IP (ToIP) represents a paradigm shift in the domain of digital elections.
This integration aims to establish a certifiable, privacy-aware, and scalable
framework for conducting elections, leveraging the latest advancements in
cybersecurity and digital identity management.

  * •

Election Management System (EMS): The EMS is a comprehensive system designed
to manage all aspects of the electoral process, from voter registration to
ballot casting and result tabulation. The goal is to ensure a secure,
transparent, and efficient election process that can scale to accommodate a
large number of constituents while maintaining the integrity of the vote.

  * •

Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI): SSI is a user-centric approach to digital
identity that gives individuals control over their personal data. In the
context of EMS, SSI allows constituents to manage their digital identities
securely and to interact with the election system without relinquishing
personal data control to third parties.

  * •

Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA): ZTA is a security model that operates on the
principle of ”never trust, always verify.” It is designed to protect against
internal and external threats by rigorously verifying the identity and
trustworthiness of every device and user before granting access to the
system’s resources.

  * •

Infrastructure as Code (IaC): IaC is a method of managing and provisioning
computing infrastructure through machine-readable definition files, rather
than physical hardware configuration or interactive configuration tools. This
approach enables the rapid and consistent deployment of infrastructure, which
is essential for the scalability and reliability of the EMS.

  * •

Trust Over IP (ToIP): ToIP is a set of principles and standards that aim to
establish a global framework for digital trust. It combines governance,
technology, and legal considerations to create a secure, decentralized system
for digital interactions. Within the EMS, ToIP ensures that all communications
and transactions are secure and that the privacy of the constituents is
preserved.

###  3.2 Purpose and Scope of the Proof of Concept

The Proof of Concept (PoC) is designed to validate the practical application
and effectiveness of integrating an Election Management System (EMS) with
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA), Infrastructure
as Code (IaC), and Trust Over IP (ToIP) for the purpose of enhancing the
security, privacy, and scalability of digital elections. The PoC aims to
demonstrate the feasibility of this integrated approach and to provide a
blueprint for its implementation in real-world election scenarios.

The scope of the PoC encompasses several key components:

  * •

The creation of a digital ballot within a secure and verifiable EMS, as
outlined in the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) diagrams provided.

  * •

The execution of a verification algorithm that ensures the integrity of the
digital ballot and the eligibility of the voters, as depicted in the BPMN and
sequence diagrams.

  * •

The integration of a constituent digital wallet, which allows voters to
securely manage their digital identities and interact with the election system
using SSI principles within a ZTA framework.

  * •

The application of IaC to facilitate the rapid and consistent deployment of
the necessary infrastructure to support the EMS, while adhering to ToIP
standards for secure and private digital interactions.

The PoC serves to illustrate the technical viability and the potential
benefits of our adopted framework, such as improved election security,
enhanced voter privacy, and the ability to scale to accommodate a large
electorate. It also seeks to address the challenges associated with digital
elections, including the prevention of fraud, ensuring the verifiability of
votes, and maintaining the confidentiality of voters’ choices.

##  4 Implementation

Algorithm 1 MPC (Multi-Party Computation) integration between business
processes and distributed registry DLT (Distributed Ledger Technology)

1:Constituency Acting Returning Officers or POs (Presiding Officers):

2:Initiate consortium’s distributed EMS (Elections Management System)

3:Finalise security tokens’ HYOK (Hold Your Own Key) ceremony

4:Activate confidential ZTA (Zero-Trust Architecture) integrity attestation

5:Verify DID (decentralized identity) with SSI (Self-Sovereign Identity)
Wallet

6:Enable MFCA (Multimodal Fusion-based Continuous Authentication)

7:Multi-sign constitution counterparts irrevocably as Ricardian contracts

8:Proceed with overseeing an anonymised ElectionProcess if authenticated

9:for each ElectionProcess in EMS do

10: Generate a smart contract for the election process

11: if ElectionContractAddress is set then

12: Generate a variable containing hard coded address

13: else

14: Generate a process contract constructor parameter for setting the election
contract address

15: end if

16:end for

17:for each VoterRegistration in EMS do

18: Obtain voter DID, eligibility proof from SSI-as-a-Service

19: Generate Chaincode or Solidity code for registering voter on the DLT

20: Ensure verification of identity using AI-based biometric MFCA

21: Inject generated DID code to function body of registration process

22:end for

23:for each VoteCasting in EMS do

24: Obtain voter identity, ballot choice from SSI-as-a-Service

25: Generate Chaincode or Solidity code for casting vote on the DLT

26: Ensure privacy-preserving verification of voter identity and eligibility

27: Inject generated voting code to function body of voting process

28:end for

29:for each VoteTallying in EMS do

30: Aggregate votes using secure MPC and the quantum-safe DLT

31: Generate Chaincode or Solidity code for tallying votes

32: Ensure ZKP (Zero-Knowledge Proof) verification of integrity attestation

33: Inject generated tallying code to function body of tallying process

34:end for

35:for each VoteCertifiability in EMS do

36: Verify the certifiable audited integrity and authenticity of the votes

37: Use registry services ZTA to validate vote transactions

38: Update the EMS with the verified vote counts to be announced

39: Multi-sign confidential consensus by a quorum of POs if verified

40: Publish combined certifiable ZKPs and audit into public DLTs

41:end for

The executed verification algorithm is a pivotal component of the digital
ballot creation process within the novel framework. This algorithm ensures the
integrity and authenticity of the digital ballots and the eligibility of the
constituents casting votes. The verification process is depicted in the
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) and sequence diagrams provided in
the related figures.

The algorithm commences with the Election-tech Officer’s initiation of the
consortium’s distributed Election Management System (EMS). The digital ballot
creation process involves several critical steps, including the finalization
of a quorum security tokens’ Hold Your Own Key (HYOK) ceremony and the
enabling of AI-based continuous authentication Decentralized Identifiers
(DIDs). Once these preliminary steps are completed, a Digi-Ballot claim is
issued as a Verifiable Credential (VC) with DID:CCF/Web, which is then multi-
signed by the consortium’s officers to establish irrevocability.

The eligible constituent, equipped with their Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
Wallet, verifies the VC. Upon successful verification, the constituent may
cast a confidential-tally attempted-vote. The algorithm accounts for coercion-
resistance, allowing constituents to produce either a spoiled-vote or a
committed-vote. A committed-vote triggers the transfer of confidential-tally
and Committed-Vote Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to the final Digi-Ballotbox
Audit, ensuring a certifiable audit trail.

The verification algorithm concludes with the transfer of the Digi-Ballot hash
to the Zero-Trust Registry-Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), which includes
the eligible-constituent public key address. The final step is the publication
of certifiable results and foresight, marking the completion of a secure and
verifiable voting process.

The sequence diagrams further elaborate on the interactions between the
constituent VC-holder, the SSI-as-a-Service Edge Custodianship Wallet Platform
as a Service (PaaS), the Verification-as-a-Service Authenticator, and the
Zero-Trust Registry Service Trustee DLT. These interactions are governed by
our Critical Infrastructure as Code (IaC) for Trust Over IP (ToIP) framework,
ensuring a certifiable, privacy-aware, and scalable i-Voting system.

###  4.1 Constituent Digital Wallet PoC

The Constituent Digital Wallet Proof of Concept (PoC) is a critical component
of the framework, designed to demonstrate the practical implementation of a
secure and privacy-preserving digital wallet system for constituents. This
system is integral to the digital ballot creation process and the overall
election management system, as it provides a means for constituents to
interact with the election infrastructure in a manner that is both secure and
verifiable.

The PoC encompasses the design and architecture of the digital wallet, which
is built upon the principles of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) and operates
within a Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA). The digital wallet serves as a secure
repository for constituents’ credentials and enables them to perform critical
election-related actions, such as verifying their identity, receiving and
casting digital ballots, and participating in the election process with a high
degree of confidence in the system’s integrity.

The sequence diagram in Figure 2 outlines the interactions between the
constituent VC-holder and various components of the system, including the
Self-Attested SSI-as-a-Service Edge Custodianship Wallet Platform as a Service
(PaaS), the Verification-as-a-Service Authenticator, and the Zero-Trust
Registry Service Trustee Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). These
interactions are facilitated by the Critical Infrastructure as Code (IaC) for
Trust Over IP (ToIP) framework, ensuring that the digital wallet operates in a
manner that is consistent with the overarching goals of certifiability,
privacy, and scalability.

The digital wallet PoC demonstrates the feasibility of the constituent digital
wallet system and its ability to integrate with the broader framework. It
provides a tangible example of how constituents can securely manage their
digital identities and participate in digital elections, thereby contributing
to the advancement of certifiable, privacy-aware, and scalable i-Voting
systems.

Figure 2: Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Sequence Diagram

###  4.2 Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN)

Figure 3: Election-tech Digital Ballot Creation BPMN

The Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) provides a graphical
representation of the election technology’s digital ballot creation and the
executed verification algorithm. The BPMN diagram in Figure 3 illustrates the
sequential flow and decision points that constitute the digital ballot
creation process, integrating various components such as the Election-tech
Officer, the consortium’s distributed EMS, and the Zero-Trust Registry-DLT.
The process begins with the Election-tech Officer initiating the distributed
EMS and proceeds through several steps, including the finalization of a quorum
security tokens’ HYOK ceremony, enabling AI-based continuous authentication
DIDs, and the issuance of a Digi-Ballot claim as a Verifiable Credential (VC)
with DID:CCF/Web.

The BPMN diagram further delineates the path taken by an eligible constituent
to verify the VC with their SSI Wallet and cast a confidential-tally
attempted-vote. The process accounts for the possibility of vote coercion-
resisting, leading to either a spoiled-vote or a committed-vote. The
committed-vote then undergoes a transfer of confidential-tally and committed-
vote ZKPs to the final Digi-Ballotbox Audit, ensuring a certifiable audit
trail. The process concludes with the transfer of the Digi-Ballot privacy-
aware hash to the Zero-Trust Registry-DLT, which includes the eligible-
constituent public key address to prevent re-voting, and the publication of
certifiable results and foresights.

This BPMN is critical for understanding the intricate workflow and ensuring
that each step adheres to the principles of certifiability, privacy, and
scalability within the context of i-Voting systems. The BPMN serves as a
blueprint for the implementation of the digital ballot creation process,
ensuring that all actions are verifiable and auditable in a manner that
upholds the integrity of the election process within our proposed framework.

###  4.3 App High-Level Design

Figure 4: Constituent Digital Wallet App IaC

The envisioned High-Level Design (HLD) is outlined in Figure 4. It outlines a
scalable digital wallet app implementation leveraging Enterprise-Scale IaC and
best practices. By following the AWS’s Well-Architected Framework and
utilizing modern CI/CD and container orchestration technologies, such Digital
Wallet App with a electoral management system (EMS) aims to achieve high
availability, security, and scalability for the use case of digital Voting.

##  5 Evaluation Analysis

ElectAnon is implemented with smart contracts and a ZKP gadget, and it has
been observed to run safely for 1,000,000 voters. While the
[TrueElect][AnonCreds] protocol’s current evaluation and security analysis are
further provided in this section, advanced analysis and more detailed results
are pending final insights on our envisioned vSPACE R&D pilot [Certifiable
Consensus using Combined Confidential Computing and Continuous Authentication
with Integrity], which aims to achieve certifiable consensus through the
integration of confidential computing and continuous authentication with
integrity attestation. This system is designed as a SERVE (Secure Electronic
Registration and Voting Election-tech) inspired Infrastructure as Code (IaC).
This approach is critical for ensuring the security, privacy, and integrity of
the voting process, addressing the challenges of insider threats, network
vulnerabilities, and auditing difficulties that have been identified in
previous studies [11] [12].

In addition to these foundational elements, our research is deeply invested in
exploring advanced cryptographic techniques, notably Zero-Knowledge Proofs
(ZKPs). ZKPs enable a party to prove the truth of a statement without
revealing any information beyond the validity of the statement itself. This
cryptographic method is essential for a voting infrastructure that prioritizes
privacy, verifiability, and transparency while eliminating associated risks.
The seminal works of Fiat & Shamir (1986) and Goldreich & Oren (1994) laid the
groundwork for ZKPs, highlighting their potential in secure cryptographic
protocols [13].

Our ambition is to pioneer the first technology of its kind that could become
a future standard for secure, private, and accessible decision-making
processes. This technology is envisioned to be universally applicable, from
public engagements and elections to boardroom decisions. By offering an
alternative to traditional by-mail systems and current election management
solutions, our system aims to enhance the accessibility of i-Voting and/or REV
for absentee and overseas citizens [11] [12].

The integration of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) for immutable and
certifiable audit trails further strengthens the system’s integrity and
trustworthiness. DLT’s application in securing IoT deployments and enhancing
the overall security posture of such systems is well-documented, underscoring
its potential in our voting infrastructure [12]. Moreover, the use of
Kubernetes confidential clusters within an Enterprise-Scale Landing Zone
(ESLZ) aligns with our commitment to adopting a Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA)
for cybersecurity. This approach ensures that all components of the system are
continuously authenticated and verified, minimizing the risk of unauthorized
access and data breaches [11] [12].

###  5.1 Security Analysis

The security analysis of the vSPACE PoC on the [TrueElect][AnonCreds] protocol
is critical in ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and scalability of
digital elections. This analysis leverages the integration of SSI (Self-
Sovereign Identity) within a Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA), employing
confidential computing, continuous authentication, multi-party computation
(MPC), and well-architected framework (WAF) principles.

The vSPACE framework/PoC employs a Kubernetes confidential cluster within an
Enterprise-Scale Landing Zone (ESLZ), integrating Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT) for immutable and certifiable audit trails. The
Infrastructure as Code (IaC) model ensures rapid deployment, consistent
management, and adherence to security standards, making vSPACE a future-proof
solution for digital voting systems

The security assurance focuses on several key areas:

  * •

Certifiable Confidential Computing: Ensuring that data is encrypted at rest,
in transit, and in use. The use of confidential computing technologies, such
as CNCF-certified Constellation Kubernetes with aTLS (attested TLS) protocol,
provides end-to-end certifiable confidentiality

  * •

Privacy-aware Continuous Authentication with SSI: Leveraging continuous
authentication mechanisms, such as Multimodal Fusion-based Continuous
Authentication (MFCA), to ensure that only authorized individuals can access
the voting system. This is further enhanced by the integration of Keycloak for
SSI OpenID Connect-based authentication

  * •

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC): Utilizing MPC to enable secure
computation over encrypted data, ensuring the privacy of voters’ choices while
allowing for the accurate tallying of votes

  * •

Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) Auditability: Integrating DLT for creating
immutable and certifiable audit trails, enhancing the transparency and
verifiability of the election process

  * •

Well-Architected Framework (WAF) principles: Adhering to WAF principles for
operational excellence, security, reliability, performance efficiency, cost
optimization, and sustainability. This includes passing the CIS Kubernetes
security benchmarks and defending the system against various cyberattacks

  * •

ZTA Infrastructure as Code (IaC) compliance: Employing IaC for rapid
deployment and consistent management of the voting infrastructure, ensuring
compliance with security standards

###  5.2 Protocol Evaluation - Comparative Analysis

Table 1 outlines a comparative analysis of [TrueElect][AnonCreds] in contrast
to related protocols [McCorry et al. (2017), Chaintegrity (2019), Yang et al.
(2020), Panja et al. (2020), Priscore, and ElectAnon as evaluated by Onur &
Yurdakul (2022)]:

  * •

Scalability: Efficiently managing a large number of voters and candidates
without compromising performance or security, enabling scalability according
to election needs.

  * •

Certifiable Confidentiality: Providing immutable and certifiable audit trails
through the integration of off-chain confidential computing and/or for the
confidential cluster of an on-chain DLT implementation.

  * •

DIDs/SSI Continuous Authentication: Utilizing Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
for Multimodal Fusion-based Continuous Authentication (MFCA).

  * •

Consensus AI Hybridization: Leveraging AI techniques (such as: feature
extraction and anomaly detection) for the likes of privacy-preserving
biometric authentication, enhanced consensus mechanisms and/or 51% attack
prevention.

  * •

Integrity Audit Autonomy: Once initiated, the system should function
independently without the need for manual intervention, ensuring an
uninterrupted election process; while also ensuring the integrity of the
voting process through comprehensive auditability.

Table 1: Evaluation summary of related DLT-Voting studies.

DLT-Voting Work |  Eligibility Requirement |  Uniqueness Requirement |  Privacy Requirement |  Universal Anonymity Req. |  Fairness Requirement Req. |  Accuracy Requirement |  Universal-Verifiability Req. |  Individual-Verifiability Req. |  Robustness Requirement |  Self-Tallying |  Scalability |  Certifiable Confidentiality |  DIDs/SSI Continuous Auth. |  Consensus AI Hybridization |  Integrity Audit Autonomy
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
McCorry et al.[3] | ✓ | x | ✓ | x | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | o | ✓ | x | x | x | x | x
Chaintegrity [4] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | x | x | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | x | x | x | x | x | x | x
Yang et al. [5] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | x | x | ✓ | o | ✓ | x | o | x | x | x | x | x
Panja et al.[6] | ✓ | x | ✓ | x | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | o | ✓ | x | x | x | x | x
Priscore [10] | ✓ | ✓ | o | x | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | o | o | x | x | x | x | x
ElectAnon [2] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | x | x | x | x
[TrueElect][AnonCreds] (this work) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓

✓: implemented, x: not implemented, o: partially implemented
---

##  6 Conclusions

This paper has outlined the vSPACE experimental proof-of-concept (PoC) on the
[TrueElect][AnonCreds] protocol. This approach extends the TrueElect and
ElectAnon protocols with the integration of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI). The
core advantages include scalability, integrated privacy and confidential
computing; not to mention the next future direction of further innovating the
credentialing security through Quantum metamaterials and/or AI-based privacy-
preserving biometric Verified Credentials (VCs) with Multimodal Fusion-based
Continuous Authentication (MFCA).

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