# ‘One Style Does Not Regulate All’: Moderation Practices in Public and
Private WhatsApp Groups

Farhana Shahid  Cornell UniversityIthacaUnited States<EMAIL_ADDRESS>,
Dhruv Agarwal  Cornell UniversityIthacaUnited States<EMAIL_ADDRESS>and
Aditya Vashistha  Cornell UniversityIthacaUnited States<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
###### Abstract.

WhatsApp is the largest social media platform in the Global South and is a
virulent force in global misinformation and political propaganda. Due to end-
to-end encryption WhatsApp can barely review any content and this often pushes
the responsibility of moderation towards group admins. Yet, little is known
about how WhatsApp group admins manage their groups, what factors and values
influence moderation decisions, and what challenges they face in moderating
their groups. To fill this gap, we interviewed admins of 32 diverse groups and
reviewed content from 30 public groups in India and Bangladesh. We observed
notable differences in the formation, members’ behavior, and moderation of
public versus private groups, as well as in how WhatsApp admins operate
compared to those on other platforms. We used Baumrind’s typology of
‘parenting styles’ as a lens to explore moderation practices in WhatsApp
groups and identified four moderation styles based on how responsive and
controlling the admins were and discuss design recommendations to help them
better manage problematic content in WhatsApp groups.

WhatsApp, content moderation, encryption, Global South

††ccs: Human-centered computing Empirical studies in HCI

##  1\. Introduction

WhatsApp is the most popular instant messaging platform with the third largest
active userbase, majority of whom are from the Global South (Cartner-Morley,
2022; Lua, 2023). WhatsApp promotes its ‘groups’ as an effortless way to bring
together one’s closest people. Indeed, most private WhatsApp groups consist of
family, friends, or neighbors, while public groups usually involve strangers
(de Freitas Melo et al., 2019a; Gillespie et al., 2020). Although all groups
start private, when the admin shares the invite link online for anyone to
join, the group is considered public. As end-to-end encryption limits
WhatsApp’s oversight on group activities, misinformation, propaganda, targeted
polarization, and hate speech (Farooq, 2017; Machado et al., 2019; Garimella
and Eckles, 2020; Evangelista and Bruno, 2019; Jakesch et al., 2021) run
rampant, fueling riots, mob lynching, and communal violence in the Global
South (Banaji et al., 2019; Khandelwal, 2022).

WhatsApp claims to use unencrypted user metadata, low-paid human moderators,
and AI algorithms to detect abusive behavior and disable suspected accounts
(FAQ, 2023b). However, these measures are often sporadic and insufficient to
prevent the spread of harmful content (Constine, 2018). For example, given the
end-to-end encryption on WhatsApp, moderators can only review messages when
they are reported by users (Elkind et al., 2021). However, privacy concerns
(Wang et al., 2023) and the reluctance to report misinformation in close-knit
groups (Varanasi et al., 2022; Feng et al., 2022a) practically limit the scope
of content that paid moderators can review. In the absence of effective
platform-mediated moderation, WhatsApp admins are forced to manage and
regulate problematic content propagating in their groups (Varanasi et al.,
2022).

A large body of HCI and CSCW scholarship has examined platform-mediated and
voluntary moderation in Facebook groups, subreddits, and Twitch channels
(Wohn, 2019; Seering et al., 2019; Juneja et al., 2020; Sultana et al., 2022;
Seering et al., 2022). However, these spaces are substantially different from
end-to-end encrypted WhatsApp groups, which remain outside the platform’s
oversight and often connect people, who already know each other offline.
Although WhatsApp stresses the “private” nature of its small close-knit
groups, large public groups are often operationalized as “open forums” and
serve to propagate disinformation and polarized content, which eventually find
way to private groups (Nizaruddin, 2021). Despite WhatsApp’s extensive
userbase and admins’ key position, little is known about how public and
private group admins address problematic content and what challenges they face
in managing their groups. To fill this critical gap, we sought to answer the
following research questions:

  * RQ1:

How admins moderate public and private WhatsApp groups?

  * RQ2:

How can WhatsApp improve moderation in public and private groups?

To address these questions, we observed user activities in 30 public WhatsApp
groups and interviewed 32 admins from various public and private groups in
India and Bangladesh. We focus on these countries mainly because: (1) India
has the largest number of WhatsApp users and one-quarter of Bangladesh’s
population uses WhatsApp (Review, 2023), and (2) both countries are victims of
communal propaganda spread via WhatsApp (Economist, 2021; Banaji et al.,
2019).

In response to RQ1, we draw from prior work that used “parenting” as a
metaphor to describe the dynamics between moderators and offenders (Gillespie,
2018; Seering et al., 2022; Register et al., 2023), considering the presence
of offline ties among members in many WhatsApp groups. We build upon
Baumrind’s typology of “parenting styles” (Baumrind, 1991) to examine how
admins in public and private WhatsApp groups practice care and control and
identify four moderation styles: authoritative, authoritarian, permissive, and
uninvolved.

We observed authoritative approach mostly in private groups with weaker social
ties (e.g., educational, professional, and organizational groups).
Authoritative admins upheld group’s well-being, defined group rules, debunked
misinformation, removed problematic content, and often banned the offenders.
Unlike moderators on other platforms, authoritative admins were transparent
about moderation considering the offline social ties they often shared with
the offenders. Whereas, admins in private groups with strong social ties were
permissive, i.e., they ignored problematic content shared by family and
friends to not jeopardize their personal relations. Thus, offline relations
shaped who can or cannot be moderated in close-knit groups, which is unlikely
on other platforms. On the contrary, lack of social ties in public groups
allowed admins either to fully neglect their groups or enforce harsh measures.
Authoritarian admins disabled messaging in public group chat to prevent
problematic content without caring for the communication needs of innocent
group members. Whereas, uninvolved admins abandoned public groups and did not
bother about the harmful content that accumulated in their groups in the
absence of moderation.

We draw from our findings to answer RQ2 and stress the need to go beyond “one
size fits all” moderation tools, considering the strengths and weaknesses of
different moderation styles grounded within Baumrind’s typology. We recommend
designs to empower admins while maintaining accountability and striking a
balance in their power. This involves providing suitable avenues for
authoritative and permissive admins to confront the offenders, resources to
educate group members against impulsive sharing of harmful content, and
introducing measures that push authoritarian and uninvolved admins to behave
responsibly. Overall, our work makes the following contributions to HCI and
CSCW scholarship:

  * •

A qualitative study built on Baumrind’s typology of parenting styles revealing
different moderation styles in public and private WhatsApp groups compared to
those on other platforms.

  * •

A range of design recommendations to improve moderation in end-to-end
encrypted platforms.

##  2\. Related Work

Social media platforms use different titles for users, who manage online
communities, e.g., admin in WhatsApp groups, moderator in subreddits and
Twitch channels, while Facebook groups have both. Irrespective of the title,
admins and moderators play an important role in keeping the online community
safe. We situate our work first by describing prior work in HCI and CSCW that
extensively studies the roles of admins and moderators on Facebook, Reddit,
and Twitch. We then discuss the current moderation practices on WhatsApp.
Finally, we describe Baumrind’s work on ‘parenting styles’ (Baumrind, 1991)
that we use as a lens to examine admins’ moderation in WhatsApp groups.

###  2.1. Admins and Moderators in Online Communities

Admins and moderators on Facebook, Reddit, and Twitch often take pride in
their position and feel a strong sense of community ownership (Malinen, 2021).
Usually, moderators are selected from users, who are either active community
members, connected to existing moderators, or have prior experiences of
moderation (Seering et al., 2019). In many Facebook groups, admins are elected
by voting among interested users (Sultana et al., 2022). Many subreddits also
have formal application and interview process to appoint moderators (Matias,
2019). Admins and moderators mainly manage user reports, delete problematic
content, mute or ban offenders, and resolve appeals (Seering et al., 2019;
Sultana et al., 2022; Wohn, 2019). They use different auto-moderation tools
and platform provided features to prevent violations by preapproving posts or
turning off post comments (Seering et al., 2019; Sultana et al., 2022). Many
Reddit and Twitch moderators use open-source bots to filter and flag posts
that contain specific keywords (Seering et al., 2019). They often discuss
moderation decisions with fellow admins and moderators, and distribute the
workload among them (Cai and Wohn, 2021, 2022; Sultana et al., 2022). However,
they rarely engage with community members, answer their questions, or
participate in conversations to avoid influencing group discussions with their
positions of power (Wohn, 2019; Malinen, 2021).

Moderators often lack transparency and accountability to users (Malinen, 2021;
Koshy et al., 2023). They enforce hidden rules and often remove content
without any notification or explanation to prevent exploitation of community
rules and dispute with the offenders (Seering et al., 2019; Wohn, 2019; Juneja
et al., 2020). Offenders usually respond to moderators’ actions either by
ignoring, improving their behavior, asking for clarification, or showing
aggression (Seering et al., 2019; Matias, 2019). Due to the lack of training
and onboarding processes, most moderators learn through ‘trial-and-error’,
i.e., they usually make rules or update existing ones following unexpected
misconducts (Seering et al., 2019; Wohn, 2019). In some communities (e.g.,
Reddit) moderators engage in reflective practices to update their mental
models of community standards and moderation practices (Cullen and Kairam,
2022). Admins and moderators also rely on common sense, local laws, advice
from other moderators, and platform-provided resources or help articles to
learn about moderation (Seering and Kairam, 2022; Sultana et al., 2022).

Although these studies detail the roles of admins and moderators on Facebook,
Reddit, and Twitch, the findings may not translate to end-to-end encrypted
platforms like WhatsApp, where most of the user generated content remain
outside the platform’s oversight. Moreover, unlike other platforms, users in
most WhatsApp groups share strong offline ties (Gillespie et al., 2020).
Despite having a large userbase, content moderation on WhatsApp remains
relatively understudied. There is a scarcity of research on how WhatsApp
admins manage their groups. Our work addresses this gap by investigating
moderation practices in different types of public and private WhatsApp groups.

###  2.2. Content Moderation on WhatsApp

Although WhatsApp is one of the main sources of harmful content propagating
online (Rossini et al., 2021; Feng et al., 2022b; Varanasi et al., 2022), end-
to-end encryption makes it difficult for WhatsApp to review, moderate, and
remove problematic content unless it is reported by users. Nevertheless,
WhatsApp uses unencrypted account metadata (e.g., profile and group photos,
account description) and in-app user reports to flag and ban abusive accounts
(FAQ, 2023b; Gillespie et al., 2020). For example, WhatsApp banned more than 3
million user accounts in India in July 2023 (WhatsApp, 2023b). However, such
measures often fail to prevent problematic content on WhatsApp. For example,
when abusive messages contain sensitive personal information or users fear
that their personal data might be shared with moderators, they feel reluctant
to report (Wang et al., 2023). Although there are some tiplines, i.e.,
WhatsApp accounts of fact-checking organizations so that users can request
fact-checks, these services remain underutilized because fact-checking takes
time and most users find it exhausting to fact-check the bulk of messages they
receive on WhatsApp (Reis et al., 2020b; Kazemi et al., 2022; Kanthawala and
Maddox, 2022). In the same vein, privacy preserving measures, for example,
storing hashes of fact-checked misinformation on user devices, is ineffective
in handling new abusive content that does not match with existing patterns
(Reis et al., 2020a; Kamara et al., 2022; Reis et al., 2020b). Moreover,
limiting the number of forwards and labeling which messages are ‘forwarded
many times’ barely stop the propagation of harmful content (de Freitas Melo et
al., 2019b).

As these technological fixes fail, there has been an increased focus on user-
driven social correction. Many studies examine how users’ demographics impact
their tendency to correct misinformation and the results vary across different
geographies. For example, male users tend to correct their peers more in
WhatsApp groups in Brazil (Vijaykumar et al., 2021) and Singapore (Kuru et
al., 2022), whereas in Turkey, females are more likely to correct others (Kuru
et al., 2022). In Brazil, older group members are more likely to confront
misinformation (Vijaykumar et al., 2021), whereas in the US and Singapore,
younger people are more likely to do so (Kuru et al., 2022). Moreover, highly
educated users in Brazil participate in correcting misinformation more than
others (Vijaykumar et al., 2021). Group dynamics and group ties also shape
social correction in WhatsApp groups. A cross-cultural study in the US,
Singapore, and Turkey reveal that users who have greater trust in group
members are more likely to correct misinformation (Kuru et al., 2022).
Pasquetto et al. (2022) observed effect of strong group ties in India and
Pakistan, where users are more likely to share debunking messages that come
from their close friends, family, or politically like minded individuals.
However, a study with WhatsApp users in the UK show that irrespective of group
ties, setting up informal group rules can foster collective reflection and
epistemic vigilance against misinformation (Chadwick et al., 2023).

Regardless of culture, community-driven corrections are considered stressful,
particularly in tight-knit groups (Pasquetto et al., 2020). Scott et al.
(2023) studied family WhatsApp groups in the UK and found that family
hierarchy, difficult personality and biased opinions of misinformed family
members, and lack of support to confront them online make it burdensome to
challenge misinformation. Several studies with WhatsApp users based in India
(Varanasi et al., 2022; Malhotra, 2023), Singapore (Ng and Neyazi, 2022), and
the US (Feng et al., 2022b) show that young group members usually ignore
misinformation shared by elderly relatives to avoid conflicts. As correcting
elders transgress cultural norms in some cultures, young adults carefully
consider the severity of misinformation, their expertise on the topic, rapport
with the relative, and relative’s potential reactions before approaching them
(Malhotra, 2023). Moreover, they carefully choose the appropriate channel to
politely correct relatives so that their act of correction does not reflect
poorly on their family and does not offend the relatives (Pearce and Malhotra,
2022; Malhotra and Pearce, 2022).

Research shows that users are more likely to correct misinformation in groups
with weak social ties (Kalogeropoulos and Rossini, 2023). Varanasi et al.
(2022) show that in neighborhood groups in India, knowledgeable community
members and admins often correct COVID-related misinformation politely and
indirectly. However, in work-related groups in India, higher management
directly calls out the offender for sharing any religious or political
propaganda, or irrelevant messages (Varanasi et al., 2021).

Although these studies provide useful insights into social corrections on
WhatsApp, they mostly examine groups with pre-existing social ties and do not
inform much about admins’ roles in moderation. These studies also show that
local sociocultural norms heavily shape how problematic content is confronted
and handled, with variations across group members in different countries. We
extend this scholarship by carefully investigating admins’ roles and their
moderation strategies in different public and private groups in two countries
in the Global South.

###  2.3. Parenting Styles as a Lens

Several HCI scholars have examined the roles of moderators through the lenses
of care and control. For example, volunteer moderators’ power have been
associated with that of dictator, governor, police, and judge (Matias, 2019;
Wohn, 2019; Gerrard and Thornham, 2020; Seering et al., 2022). While others
position moderators as “care worker, who keep the community safe” (Yu et al.,
2020; Ruckenstein and Turunen, 2020) or “custodian, who help the community
grow” (Seering et al., 2022). Moreover, few researchers applied different
aspects of “parent-child” metaphor to capture how care and control manifest in
the roles of moderators. Seering et al. (2022) found that moderators often
consider online misbehavior to be “childish” and try to resolve them through
patient instructions. Gillespie (2018) discussed how users often perceive
community moderators’ guidelines as the rules of a “stern parent”(Gillespie,
2018). Register et al. (2023) used the concept of attachment between parent-
child to characterize how punishments and rewards by Instagram’s moderation
algorithm affect users (Register et al., 2023). Building on these scholarly
work, we use Baumrind’s “parenting styles” (Baumrind, 1971) as a lens to
examine how WhatsApp admins engage in moderation. Since WhatsApp admins often
know the group members (Gillespie et al., 2020) and prioritize group harmony
over moderation (Ng and Neyazi, 2022), we draw parallels between parenting and
admins’ roles in WhatsApp groups.

Figure 1. Four parenting styles according to Baumrind’s typology.

A 2D plot of Baumrind’s typology. X axis represents Demandingness with values
low to high (from left to right). Y axis represents Responsiveness ranging
from low to high (from bottom to up). Top right segment is Authoritative (high
responsiveness, high demandingness): Nurturing, affectionate, sets boundaries,
disciplines through guidance, open communication. Bottom right segment is
Authoritarian (low responsiveness, high demandingness): Strict, inflexible,
high expectations, punitive, demands blind obedience. Top left represents
Permissive (high responsiveness, low demandingness): Nurturing, affectionate,
barely sets any rules, takes the role of friend rather than parent. Bottom
left is Uninvolved (low responsiveness, low demandingness): Emotionally
detached, self-absorbed, no boundaries, little interaction.

Baumrind’s pioneering research examines the parent-child relationship through
the lens of parental control and proposes a typology with three parenting
styles (e.g., authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive parenting)
(Baumrind, 1966, 1967, 1971). Later Maccoby and Martin (1983) bridged
Baumrind’s typology with the two dimensions of parenting: responsiveness and
demandingness. Here, responsiveness refers to the degree to which parents are
sensitive to their children’s emotional needs and accepting of their behavior
(Kopko, 2017; Li, 2023). This is associated with constructs, such as care,
warmth, and support (Power, 2013). In contrast, demandingness refers to the
degree to which parents control their children’s behavior and demand maturity
(Kopko, 2017; Li, 2023). Based on these two dimensions, Maccoby and Martin
(1983) defined four parenting styles: authoritative (i.e., high demandingness
and high responsiveness); authoritarian (i.e., high demandingness and low
responsiveness); permissive (i.e., low demandingness and high responsiveness);
and uninvolved (i.e., low demandingness and low responsiveness). Later,
Baumrind also expanded her typology to include the uninvolved parenting style
(Baumrind, 1991).

According to Baumrind’s typology (Baumrind, 1991) (see Figure 1),
authoritative parents are caring and clearly communicate their rules and
disciplinary actions to children. In contrast, authoritarian parents are
punitive, less nurturing, and expect children to obey their rules. On the
other hand, permissive parents barely impose any rules and act more like
friends rather than parents, whereas uninvolved parents remain detached from
their children’s lives and do not assert any rules. Research shows that
authoritative parenting helps children self-regulate and act responsibly
(Morris et al., 2007), whereas children with authoritarian parents often
develop high levels of aggression against strict authority (Masud et al.,
2019). Besides, limited moderation by permissive parents often leads to
impulsive attitude and lack of self-regulation among children (Piotrowski et
al., 2013). Similarly, children whose parents remain uninvolved struggle to
cope and control their emotions (Kuppens and Ceulemans, 2019).

Although Baumrind’s typology is based on two-parent, middle class, and White
Western families, it has been applied to different cultural contexts and
demographics. Some studies show that the effects of parenting styles are
consistent in both individualist and collectivist cultures (Sorkhabi, 2005;
Pinquart and Kauser, 2018), including our regions of study: India (Garg et
al., 2005; Sahithya et al., 2019) and Bangladesh (Karim et al., 2013). The
typology has also been useful in modeling complex human relationships around
technology use that require both control and care. For example, Valcke et al.
(2010) first extended this to children’s Internet usage and introduced
“Internet parenting styles.” Since then, the typology has been used to examine
parent-child communication online (Zhou et al., 2017), parental control on
children’s digital devices and social media usage (Yardi and Bruckman, 2011;
Ching and Tak, 2017; Ren and Zhu, 2022), and their impact on adolescents’
online behavior (Ghosh et al., 2018b, a; Wisniewski et al., 2014; Jia et al.,
2015) along with parents’ online sharing practices about their kids (Amon et
al., 2022). Beyond parent-child, the typology has also been used to model how
the teacher-student relationship influences students’ learning outcomes (Yong,
2019). Our work extends this evolving body of work by applying Baumrind’s
typology to explain different moderation styles practiced by WhatsApp group
admins in India and Bangladesh and provide a holistic overview of the values
and factors that drive moderation on end-to-end encrypted platforms.

##  3\. Methods

To examine how WhatsApp group admins manage their groups and handle
problematic content, we performed in-depth qualitative study with admins based
in India and Bangladesh. We define “problematic content” as misinformation,
hate speech, spam, or anything inconsistent with the group’s purpose. We
conducted semi-structured interviews with private and public group admins to
learn about their experiences of moderation. We also joined public groups to
identify instances of problematic content and observe how admins respond in
practice. Our study protocol received an exemption from the Institutional
Review Board of our institution.

Participant Recruitment. To recruit WhatsApp group admins, we advertised our
study on Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and requested our contacts to share the
study within their social networks. We also took help from our contacts in a
grassroots organization based in rural India to recruit admins from rural
regions. Through this, we were able to recruit 23 admins from private WhatsApp
groups, who managed at least one group in India or Bangladesh, and had
encountered problematic content in the groups they managed. To recruit public
group admins, we randomly joined $118$ public groups on various topics (e.g.,
entertainment, politics, business) in India and Bangladesh that were listed
online (e.g., https://whatsgrouplink.com/). We then reached out to the admins
of 30 public groups, where we observed group members frequently sharing
obvious problematic content (e.g., child porn, monetary scams) during the
study period. Through this, we were able to recruit nine public group admins.
We coordinated with all our participants via WhatsApp, shared details of our
study, and scheduled interviews with them. We continued to recruit admins
until the responses reached theoretical saturation (Pandit, 1996).

Interviews with Group Admins. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 32
group admins to learn about their experiences of managing their groups. The
interviews were conducted in English, Bengali, or Hindi depending on the
preferences of the participants. After taking informed consent, we asked them
in detail about how they became admins in WhatsApp groups, what roles they
played, the dynamics among the group members, and their group environment. We
then asked them about the strategies they use to identify and manage
problematic content and the resultant challenges. We also asked them about the
support they expected from WhatsApp to better manage their groups. During the
interview, some admins voluntarily shared messages from their groups that they
found to be problematic. After each interview, we revised our questions if
needed, stopping when the responses reached saturation. We conducted the
interviews either in-person or online. Each interview lasted approximately 40
minutes and was audio-recorded with the consent of the participants. Depending
on the geographic location of the participants, we compensated them with 500
INR in India, 500 BDT in Bangladesh, or 10 USD for expats living abroad.

Observations of Public Groups. Among the public groups we joined, we observed
the top $30$ groups, where group members most recently sent messages during
the study period. We recorded the group name, group description (if any),
number of admins and participants, who could message in the group (either
admin-only or all participants), what type of messages were sent in the group,
and how admins reacted to problematic content shared in these groups. The
analysis was done only for public groups and we did not seek permission to
join private groups for privacy concerns.

Data Collection and Analysis. We collected around 17 hours of audio-recorded
interview data, several pages of notes from our interviews and observations,
and 14 forwarded messages that admins perceived to be problematic. We
translated and transcribed the interviews, notes, and WhatsApp messages into
English before iteratively conducting open coding following reflexive thematic
analysis as defined by Braun and Clarke (2006). Instead of relying on
presupposed codes, we let the data guide us. All authors met regularly to
discuss the codes that freely emerged from the data, did peer debriefing to
resolve disagreements while reviewing and updating the codes, and finalized
the emerging themes. Our prolonged first-hand engagement with the data helped
us establish credibility and reduce coding biases. After multiple passes, we
consolidated 59 codes and categorized them under high-level themes, such as
the roles of admins, their responses to problematic content, and their
expectations from WhatsApp.

Participant Demographics. Table 1 lists the demographics of the 23 private
group admins (13 Bangladeshi and 10 Indian) we interviewed. Among them, 19
identified as male, four as female, and one as non-binary. On average,
participants were 30 years old (SD: 8 years), aged between 21–52 years. Most
of the participants ($n=17$) were from urban areas of Bangladesh and India. We
also interviewed three admins from rural India and four Bangladeshi and Indian
expats living in North America. All private group admins were highly educated;
majority of them ($n=12$) had a master’s degree, six had a bachelor’s degree,
and five were enrolled in a bachelor’s program. They pursued various
professions, including software development, journalism, entrepreneurship,
business, and jobs in government and private sectors, among others. On
average, they had been using WhatsApp for almost 7 years (SD: 2.5 years).

All public group admins ($n=9$) were men and based in India. They were
reluctant to share demographic information out of concerns to protect their
identity. Since they were comfortable interacting with us only informally, we
did not collect demographic information from them.

Table 1. Pseudonym, age, gender, profession, and country of the private
WhatsApp group admins.

Name | Age | Gender | Profession | Country | Name | Age | Gender | Profession | Country
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
| Himadri
---
Ravi
Rudra
Mehrab
Dipali
Jawad
Labib
Munim
Nazma
Rafid
Shaheen
Sabbir
| 26
---
24
30
40
22
23
52
21
22
22
28
26
| Male
---
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
| Software Developer
---
PhD Student
PhD Student
Private Service
Student
Student
Engineer
Student
Student
Student
Government Service
Engineer
| Bangladesh
---
India
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
India
Bangladesh
| Tawhid
---
Mansi
Rizwan
Gautam
Hamid
Arvind
Pranjal
Priya
Kunal
Rakesh
Tulsi
| 39
---
26
42
24
28
27
26
25
40
46
52
| Male
---
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Non-binary
Male
Male
Female
| Entrepreneur
---
Science Journalist
Journalist
Research Assistant
Researcher
Political Leader
Researcher
Private Service
News Reporter
Business Owner
NGO Supervisor
| Bangladesh
---
India
Bangladesh
India
India
Bangladesh
India
India
India
India
India

Positionality. One of the authors is from Bangladesh and two are from India.
The authors who conducted the interviews are native Bengali and Hindi
speakers. The authors have been using WhatsApp for more than a decade, are
admins of several WhatsApp groups, and have first-hand experience of
encountering problematic content in these groups. All authors have extensive
experience in conducting fieldwork in India and Bangladesh. Their
sociocultural and educational backgrounds are on par with that of the
participants. The shared background helped them understand the sociopolitical
and cultural dynamics that shape these groups and elicit nuanced responses
from the participants. All authors approach HCI from a postcolonial lens
(Irani et al., 2010) and strive to uncover the cultural and sociopolitical
epistemologies of the Majority World, whose users dominate online spaces like
WhatsApp and shape the nature of governance on such platforms.

##  4\. Demographics of WhatsApp Groups

Table 2. Demographics of public and private WhatsApp groups in our sample.

Group type | Categories (n) |  | Average number
---
of participants
Examples of groups
Private |  | Family (12)
---
Friends (10)
Educational (9)
Professional (8)
Organizational (5)
Neighborhood (4)
Hobbies (3)
| 30
---
20
130
170
110
250
120
| Immediate family members and relatives
---
Close friends
School, college, or university students
Colleagues, employees, engineers, job seekers
Religious, political, non-profit, development organizations
Local neighbors, communities, villagers
Gamers, animal rescue volunteers, entomophiles
Public |  | Earning (9)
---
Business (6)
Services (6)
Educational (6)
Entertainment (3)
| 300
---
280
320
150
330
| Vacancies, work from home, investments
---
Business opportunity, product sales and promotion
Immigration, travel, paid social media promotion
Exam preparation, tuition, blogging, photography
Sports betting, celebrity fans

Private Groups. The private group admins ($n=23$) in our study managed three
groups on average (SD: 3). Most of them ($n=10-12$) were admins of either
family or friends groups (see Table 2). Others managed groups related to their
educational institution, workspace, neighborhood, or different organizations
they were part of. Few participants ($n=3$) also ran personal hobbies and
interest-based groups. Private groups varied greatly in group size. Family and
friends groups were usually small and close-knit with 20–30 members on
average, whereas other types of groups were fairly large with 100–200
participants on average. Private groups were used for various purposes. Family
and friends groups were mainly used to stay in touch and share personal
updates and photos with close ones. Educational groups were used for study-
related discussion and to stay connected with classmates. Organizational and
professional groups were used exclusively for work, including performing
administrative tasks and monitoring employees’ activities. Political leaders,
who were admins of their party’s dedicated WhatsApp group, orchestrated
political campaigns via the group.

Group members actively participated in these groups to share information,
opinions, worldviews, and resources. For example, some group members shared
information about upcoming events, government notices, and job opportunities.
Group members also posted blood donation requests, admission-related
questions, and requested advice on technological issues, among others.
Regardless of the type, almost all private groups received messages on
politics, religion, and issues of national and regional interest.

Public Groups. We examined 30 public WhatsApp groups with various focus areas,
ranging from business, earning opportunities, online services, education, and
entertainment, among others (see Table 2). The nine admins we interviewed from
these groups managed seven groups on average. Although most of these public
groups were large with 300 participants on average (SD: 205), we barely
observed any interaction among the group members. In most groups ($n=25$),
group members and admins shared irrelevant and problematic messages that we
discuss in detail in Section 5.2. In one-third of the public groups we joined
($n=9$), admins disabled messaging among the group members and only shared
messages that were pertinent to the group’s purpose, e.g., product details in
business groups, visa and immigration services in travel groups, and exam
questions in educational groups.

##  5\. Findings

We first outline the paths that led our participants to become admins in
WhatsApp groups along with their roles as admins (Section 5.1). We then
discuss admins’ perceptions of problematic content (Section 5.2) and use
Baumrind’s typology to categorize admins’ responses to such content and the
aftermath of their actions (Section 5.3). Finally, we present admins’
expectations from WhatsApp to improve handling of problematic content in their
groups (Section 5.4).

###  5.1. Who Gets to Become Admins in WhatsApp Groups and What Roles Do They
play?

We found several differences in how admins were selected and what
responsibilities they assumed.

####  5.1.1. Becoming an Admin

Majority of the participants ($n=19$) in our sample automatically became
admins through WhatsApp’s default setting when they created the group. In
contrast, only a few participants volunteered to be admin ($n=4$) or were
appointed by existing admins ($n=3$). Dipali, an admin of a family WhatsApp
group in Bangladesh, shared:

> “Although my aunt created the group, she became busy with household chores
> and kids and made me an admin instead. Recently one of my cousins
> volunteered to be a co-admin to handle the misleading content shared by some
> relatives.”

Different private groups have varying criteria to select admins. In family and
friends groups, people became admins due to their existing relationship with
the group members ($n=5$). In organizational and professional groups, people
with administrative power or high-ranked positions offline (e.g., CEO,
managers, supervisors) became admins ($n=6$). In a few educational groups
($n=5$), students who stayed up-to-date with academic events, were socially
popular, and demonstrated leadership skills were preferred as admins. Some
participants, who were perceived to be tech-savvy ($n=4$) or active group
members ($n=7$), were also made admins. Munim, who was an admin of a
neighborhood group in Bangladesh, shared:

> “Earlier only the elders in our housing society could become admins. But,
> they were not tech-savvy and couldn’t understand all the features of
> WhatsApp. Then they recruited us because I always have Internet connectivity
> and check the group actively.”

Moreover, two groups followed elaborate processes to elect admins through
voting or in-person interviews. Even in two friends groups, all group members
were made admins so that none could hold power over others. Private groups in
our sample often had multiple admins (mean:5, SD: 3.5), while the public
groups we observed usually had one admin (SD: 1.5). Admins of private groups
often appointed multiple admins so that new group members could be added
easily. This was especially helpful in large private groups, where admins were
often busy with their own work and preferred to have co-admins to manage the
group. Sometimes, the decision to add new admins was strategic. Rakesh, who
was an admin of a large religious group in rural India, commented:

> “I made others admin so that they could add their acquaintances to my group
> instead of forming new groups. This will help my group grow bigger and
> popular.”

However, admins of public groups and few private groups ($n=3$) enjoyed having
ownership and control of the group and felt reluctant to add new admins. They
feared that the other admin might remove them from the group, seize the power,
or add random people to the group. Moreover, in public groups, where members
were usually strangers, admins considered it would be “unwise” to make unknown
people co-admins.

These findings show that apart from the default way of becoming an admin by
creating a group, the selection of admins varies depending on the group’s
needs, dynamics, social hierarchy, and individual’s skills.

####  5.1.2. The Roles of Admins

WhatsApp groups do not have any formal onboarding process and training for
admins. Only a few private group admins ($n=4$) reported receiving informal
instructions from other admins on how to manage their groups. Thus, in the
absence of proper onboarding processes, group management was often left to the
discretion of admins. While several public ($n=6$) and few private group
admins ($n=3$) assumed “there was nothing to do” in the groups or “they were
too busy” to manage the groups, most admins actively supervised their groups.

Adding Group Members. Most private group admins ($n=14$) added new members and
updated the new phone numbers of existing group members. In contrast, public
group admins did not have to bother about adding members as the invite links
to join groups were posted publicly. Usually private group admins carefully
regulated who could join their groups. For example, Dipali declined her aunt’s
request to add a distant relative to their family WhatsApp group to maintain
privacy. Another admin Kunal, who ran a professional group of journalists in
rural India, shared his criteria:

> “We don’t add any unknown people to our group. We only add those who are
> affiliated with the press or are able to provide news materials.”

A few admins ($n=4$) went through elaborate verification process before adding
people to their groups. For instance, in large private groups with weak social
ties (e.g., neighborhood, educational, and professional groups), admins often
asked for relevant ID and other details to confirm identity. They also asked
other group members if they knew the person who wanted to join the group and
could vouch for them. Munim further explained the verification process in his
neighborhood group:

> “When somebody wants to join the group we ask for their building and
> apartment numbers. We have a list of contact details for all residents in
> our housing society. We dial the corresponding apartment to verify if the
> person actually lives there.”

Instilling a Sense of Safety and Belongingness. Several private group admins
($n=8$) felt protective of their groups and tried to create a safe and
welcoming space online. For example, Tulsi, who supervised a group of women
health workers in rural India, warned women in her group against monetary
frauds when such messages were shared in the group. In hobby and interst-based
groups, admins often used words of affirmation to engage people in group
activities. In addition, admins worked as mediators to resolve online
conflicts among group members. Sometimes they handled conflicts offline,
particularly when they knew the group members in person. One of the
Bangladeshi admins Rizwan shared:

> “A Hindu colleague left our office’s WhatsApp group due to hate speech. When
> we noticed, we decided to apologize to him in person instead of contacting
> him online given the seriousness of the matter. After meeting, we requested
> him to rejoin the group.”

Addressing Offline Needs. As private group admins often knew the group
members, in several groups ($n=7$) admins assumed offline responsibilities as
part of their role. For example, admins in neighborhood and college groups
were often tasked with organizing community events as they could leverage
their groups for coordination. They also maintained a record (e.g., contact
details, professions, blood groups) of all members in case anyone within the
group needed help. In job opportunities related group, admins often helped
group members by providing referrals upon request even if they did not always
know them personally.

Distribution of Workload. In private groups, admins usually knew fellow co-
admins, often met them in person, and were on good terms. Several private
group admins ($n=8$) did not bother to differentiate responsibilities among
the co-admins because “there was not much to do” and anyone available managed
the group. Some private group admins ($n=6$) maintained separate WhatsApp or
Messenger chats among themselves to privately discuss the group’s logistics.
They generally discussed whether something was inappropriate, what actions to
take, how to deal with difficult group members, and how to ensure uniformity
in their actions. However, the power differential among co-admins dictated
these conversations and assumed duties. For example, younger admins in family
WhatsApp groups were expected to check with older co-admins before taking any
action. Such power hierarchy often led to friction among the admins. For
example, Ravi shared an incident from his family WhatsApp group in India:

> “Previous admins had fights because the elderly admin argued that non-blood
> relative should not send too many messages. But, the younger admin disagreed
> and was forced to leave the group.”

In a few organizational groups ($n=4$), admins distributed tasks based on
their expertise and official position within the organization. For example, as
the treasurer of a Bangladeshi graduate student organization, Rudra’s task was
to post about funding, budget, and membership fees in their organization’s
WhatsApp group. Tulsi further commented about gendered division of roles:

> “Since all members in our group are women healthcare workers and the other
> co-admins are men, it’s appropriate that I [a female admin] deal with the
> group affairs.”

###  5.2. What Types of Problematic Content Affect WhatsApp Groups?

We now present admins’ account of what they perceived as problematic content
along with how group members responded to them.

####  5.2.1. Admins’ Perceptions of Problematic Content

Admins had diverse opinions regarding what they thought to be problematic;
ranging from obviously harmful messages to often harmless but irrelevant
content.

Religious Hate Speech and Propaganda. One-third of the private group admins
($n=8$) reported religious hate speech and propaganda as one of the most
common and vicious forms of problematic content they encounter in their
groups. Admins in Hindu-dominated groups in India recounted various instances
of pro-Hindu and Islamophobic hate speech propagating in their groups that
they suspected to be originating from right-wing political groups. Gautam, who
managed a group of students in his college in India, reported:

> “In our group, people share religiously charged posts that would blame the
> Muslims for the 2019 Delhi riot, the 2020 COVID pandemic, the 2023 Odisha
> train collision, or almost anything that might go wrong in this country.”

In contrast, Muslim-dominated WhatsApp groups in India received many far-
right, pro-Muslim content. Admins mentioned seeing old videos of riots and
communal violence (e.g., Hindus burning mosques) being propagated as recent
events, conspiracy theories blaming the leftist state government for
discriminating against Muslims, or issuing COVID vaccines with pig remnants to
hurt the religious sentiment of the Muslims. We noted similar dynamics in
WhatsApp groups based in Bangladesh, where Hindus are the religious minority.
Arvind commented:

> “Every year during Durga Puja [Bengali Hindu religious festival] there are
> posts with anti-Hindu sentiment, that would blame the Hindus for
> disrespecting the Quran, the Prophet, or Muslim women to justify violence
> against them.”

Similarly, admins reported religious extremism in small-scale pro-Hindu groups
in Bangladesh.

Political Propaganda. More than half of the admins in private groups ($n=13$)
considered political messages to be problematic as they often led to fights
among group members. Admins routinely dealt with pro-political content shared
in favor of the ruling party, misinformation and propaganda against the
opposition political parties and foreign countries, and conspiracy theories
blaming the government for wrongdoings and corruption, among others. Some
admins feared that the government might track anti-government messages on
WhatsApp and accuse them of spewing distrust. Rizwan shared his thoughts:

> “People think writing on WhatsApp is safe. I doubt if WhatsApp’s encryption
> would work in Bangladesh given the country’s strict digital law against
> anti-government content. The government might trace such messages on
> WhatsApp and accuse admins.”

Misinformation, Fake News, and Spam. Half of the private group admins ($n=12$)
reported misinformation and fake news to be pervasive in their groups. They
gave examples of COVID-related misinformation that denied the impact of COVID,
discouraged people from taking vaccines, and promoted fake cures. Admins also
encountered AI-generated fake videos, viral clickbait content from other
social media platforms, and old pictures and videos being circulated as
current news. They complained about spam messages promising lotteries and
shopping discounts as these derailed the conversation in the group and
compromised the security of group members. Dipali shared an experience from
her college WhatsApp group:

> “After clicking on a spam link shared in the group, many group members’
> Facebook accounts got hacked. Some girls’ sensitive photos were leaked and
> when we informed our teachers, they filed a cybercrime police complaint. The
> police interrogated everyone, recovered the hacked accounts, and asked the
> admins to disable the group.”

Although we observed a large presence of monetary scams, fraudulent
cryptocurrency schemes, illegal betting services, and sales of illicit arms
and hacked social media accounts in public groups, few admins ($n=3$)
acknowledged that these messages were problematic.

Differential Notions of Problematic Content. We found that admins treated some
types of content differently depending on the context and group dynamics. For
instance, admins disliked the use of profanity in educational groups but were
fine with group members cursing in friends groups. A few admins ($n=5$)
considered travel photos, pleasantries, and birthday messages to be irrelevant
and annoying but felt awkward about forbidding casual conversations. Moreover,
admins of political groups prohibited sharing positive news about their
opposing parties. Two admins found jokes and sarcasm to be problematic,
particularly when shared out of context. Mehrab recounted an incident from his
professional group in Bangladesh:

> “Recently while everyone was paying respect to a deceased colleague, someone
> shared a joke without paying attention to the ongoing conversation. This is
> insincere and displays a lack of common sense.”

Several private group admins ($n=6$) disapproved of sharing adult content in
family, professional, and other groups that have female group members. In
contrast, public groups were filled with child pornography, sex chat and video
services, and pornographic images and videos with little-to-no actions from
admins.

####  5.2.2. User Reactions to Problematic Content

Users in public groups seldom responded to problematic content shared in their
groups. Whereas, private group admins reported diverse reactions from users
towards problematic content. For example, group members were often divided
whether certain types of content, e.g., religious messages or curse words
should be allowed. Admins shared that when members felt overwhelmed by the
sheer volume of problematic content propagating in their groups, they opted to
leave the group rather than calling out the offense. Usually group members
ignored political or communal propaganda to avoid conflicts with people in
their offline social sphere. Hamid shared his experience in a college WhatsApp
group:

> “Communal hate speech has been normalized in India over the years and none
> has the time or energy to protest such content. Most group members just care
> about staying connected with college friends instead of constantly arguing
> with them.”

Moreover, in a few family groups ($n=4$), elderly members strongly supported
COVID related misinformation and blindly forwarded them. In many private
groups ($n=10$), members openly supported communal propaganda and hate speech
against minorities. Priya, who ran a private group to share internship and job
opportunities in India, reported:

> “During COVID many group members blamed Muslims for the rise of COVID in
> India. This triggered not only Muslim but other considerate group members
> from different religions, who decided to give up networking opportunities
> instead of being in groups that discriminated against people for their
> religion.”

On rare occasions, group members contested problematic content. This occurred
particularly in private groups in which group members had relatively weaker
social ties. For example, Pranjal shared that a doctor in his workspace group
called out a message on Cancer treatment as misinformation and encouraged
group members to check sources before sharing health-related content (Figure
2(A)). In a few educational and professional groups ($n=4$), where admins did
not intervene at all, some group members resisted religious hate speech and
political propaganda, but this often led to heated arguments among group
members. In friends groups, sometimes group members reacted with haha or angry
emojis on spam messages and warned others against clicking on spam links.
Nazma, an admin of her university classmates’ group in Bangladesh, commented:

> “Sometimes people intentionally share phishing links in the group. If I
> don’t notice, other classmates will call them out as spams and question the
> group member who shared that content.”

These findings show that users’ responses to problematic content are
influenced by group dynamics, group’s purpose, and relationship among group
members.

###  5.3. How do Admins Deal with Problematic Content in WhatsApp Groups?

We now present our analysis of admins’ responses to problematic content
through Baumrind’s typology of parenting styles, with particular focus on how
admins exercise care and control when it comes to moderation. Based on admins’
responsiveness to the needs of the group members and demandingness to control
their behavior, we identify four moderation styles: authoritative,
authoritarian, permissive, and uninvolved. We present these moderation styles
as general attitude that is broadly seen among admins in public and private
groups, and also in groups with different levels of social ties (strong to
weak), instead of a rigid categorization (see Table 3).

Table 3. Characteristics of different parenting styles as per Baumrind’s
Typology and how they manifest in WhatsApp group admins’ attitude towards
moderation.

| Authoritative | Authoritarian | Permissive | Uninvolved
---|---|---|---|---
| Key
---
characteristics
in Baumrind’s
typology
| Warm, responsive, assertive,
---
high expectations, clear
standards, democratic,
communicative
| Limited warmth,
---
rigid, forceful,
adheres to rules,
punitive, autocratic
| Low expectations,
---
few rules, indulgent,
accepting, lenient,
avoids confrontation
| No expectations,
---
absent, passive,
neglectful,
competing priorities
| Attitude of
---
WhatsApp
group admins
| Cares for group members’
---
wellbeing, sets clear group
rules, takes different
disciplinary measures to
moderate harmful content,
gives explanation for
moderation decisions
| Enables admin
---
only messaging,
mutes everyone
for the offense of
a select few,
suppresses group
interaction
| Reluctant to moderate
---
to avoid conflict and
maintain social
hierarchy, gives
offenders benefit of
the doubt
| Too busy to manage
---
group, ignores group
due to excessive
problematic content,
lack of moderation
draws more
problematic content
| Manifestation
---
in WhatsApp
groups
| Mostly educational,
---
organizational, and
professional groups (n=15),
few family (n=5) and
friends groups (n=2)
| Mostly public
---
groups (n=9),
very few family
groups (n=2), one
professional group
| Mostly family and
---
friends groups (n=8),
very few professional
groups (n=2)
| Mostly public
---
groups (n=21),
very few private
groups (n=3)

####  5.3.1. Authoritative

Baumrind (1972) described authoritative parents as warm but firm.
Authoritative parents encourage their children to be independent, but maintain
limits and controls on their actions. They clearly communicate their
expectations to children and provide reasoning for their actions (Kopko,
2017). All these lead to positive development outcomes among children (Li,
2023).

We observed this approach mainly in groups ($n=15$) with weaker social ties
(e.g., educational, organizational, and professional groups), where people
knew each other but maintained a quasi-formal relationship. Admins in some
family ($n=5$) and a couple of friends groups ($n=2$) occasionally exhibited
this style. As characteristic of authoritative style, admins in these groups
took care of members’ needs and emotional well-being. Tawhid, who used
WhatsApp group to run an online magazine in Bangladesh, shared:

> “Whenever there is communal violence against minorities, I try to deal it
> with care. I personally message my Hindu employees and ask how they are
> doing. If they need mental health support or work-related accommodations, I
> try to provide them.”

Authoritative admins usually supported group members right to freedom of
expression and considered group members “mature enough” to behave responsibly.
Often, they maintained a balance between being authoritative but yet
approachable. Mansi shared her view about moderating an animal rescue WhatsApp
group in India:

> “We want to bond with the volunteers, who are helping with our cause.
> However, we need to manage boundaries and establish some sort of command so
> that we can run the group efficiently.”

Depending on the group dynamics, authoritative admins adopted different
techniques to control problematic content in their groups, which we outline
below.

Group Rules. Authoritative admins created group rules to maintain
organizational integrity, professional etiquette, and protect group members
from harmful content. The rules discouraged the sharing of fake news, adult
content, hate speech, spam, gendered harassment, and disrespecting others. Few
admins ($n=3$) also disapproved of religiously and politically charged
messages. Admins either listed the rules in the group description, or shared
them in the group chat or via direct messages when new members joined the
group or someone violated the group policy. However, group members did not
always follow the rules, which required reactive measures from the admins.

Debunking and Fact-Checking. A few admins ($n=4$) used Google, YouTube videos,
journalistic and scientific sources to fact-check content. However, group
dynamics affected how admins informed the group members of the fact-checked
content. In groups with peers, admins directly debunked messages in the group
chat and asked the offender to review the fact-checking links. However, in
family groups, younger admins engaged in a deliberate dialogue to respectfully
convince older relatives not to share misinformation by explaining how it
would negatively impact group members. Priya described her approach in family
group:

> “We don’t try to prove elderly relatives wrong when they share health
> related misinformation. Instead, we give them links and statistics from WHO
> and suggest to review those to inform themselves better.”

In contrast, admins were comfortable correcting younger family members. In
professional and organizational groups, admins reprimanded their subordinates
for spreading misinformation. However, when the offender held higher position
(e.g., a senior colleague), admins messaged them privately so that they do not
feel challenged or disrespected in front of other group members.

Several admins ($n=11$) pointed that when they debunked misinformation and
spams, offenders often excused themselves, claiming they had not checked the
content before sharing or were unaware of it altogether, speculating that it
might have happened when a virus infected their phone or while their children
were using it. Sometimes offenders became defensive to deflect the blame. Ravi
shared his experience:

> “An elderly relative shared fake ayurvedic [herbal] cures of COVID in the
> family group. When we tried to debunk, he became defensive, called the
> scientific articles propaganda, and claimed the ayurvedic remedies had cured
> someone they knew personally.”

Content Removal. Most private group admins ($n=18$) adopted a zero-tolerance
approach to remove religious hate speech, political propaganda, adult content,
and spams in their groups (Figure 2(B)). When we asked admins about their
rationale behind deletion, they expressed that they prioritized the group’s
welfare over displeasing a single user. They argued that these messages, if
stayed longer, could potentially harm group members, hurt their sentiments,
and spread more.

Authoritative admins in groups with weaker social ties usually requested the
offender privately either via phone call, WhatsApp, or Messenger to delete the
post explaining why it was problematic. If the offender did not respond, then
admins tagged them publicly in the group chat and asked them to remove their
post. Recently after WhatsApp enabled admins to delete messages in the group
(of India, 2022), several admins ($n=7$) took advantage of this to directly
remove harmful content without waiting for users to remove them. Dipali shared
an incident from her family WhatsApp group:

> “A female relative had shared an adult content and didn’t respond upon
> contacting. When my younger cousins queried, I asked them to ignore.
> Ultimately, I deleted the video myself to prevent elderly relatives and
> younger members from seeing it.”

Many admins ($n=16$) received positive responses from the offenders, who
readily accepted their mistakes, apologized to the group, deleted their
content, and promised to be considerate in the future. However, some admins
($n=6$) reported facing accusations, harassment, and bullying from the
offenders for moderating hate speech and political propaganda. Admins were
often called “anti-democratic” or “government agent.” Gautam also faced
similar criticism when he condemned Islamophobic hate speech in his college
group:

> “I was shocked to see my professors sharing misleading anti-Muslim videos of
> riots. When I tried to resist, many group members called me names and
> labeled me as a JNU sympathizer.” [Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) is a
> public university in India with a strong center-left political foothold.]

Member Removal. Many admins ($n=12$) felt compelled to remove group members,
who continued sharing hate speech, spam, and adult content despite multiple
warnings. Gautam shared an example from his college group during the 2020
Delhi riot in India:

> “One group member was continuously sharing communally charged gore killing
> videos of the riot without any verified sources. As these videos were
> destabilizing the group, we asked him to stop but he didn’t listen. Then we
> permanently removed him.”

In some cases, admins gave offenders a second chance and added them back to
the group after they apologized and reflected on their behavior. One of the
Bangladeshi admins Jawad commented:

> “We blocked a fellow classmate as he was repeatedly spamming the group with
> links of fake apps. After he clarified that his phone was compromised and
> apologized, we added him back to the group.”

Offline Mediation. In a handful of cases ($n=4$), admins dealt with the
offenders offline, particularly when their harmful behavior persisted for
long. In family groups, admins often requested help from other influential
family members, who were in a position to talk to the offender out of sharing
misinformation and spams. Ravi shared:

> “One of my uncles was continuously spamming our family WhatsApp group with
> different health related misinformation. I requested my father to talk to
> him in person and after that he stopped spamming.”

To handle extreme cases, admins often coordinated among themselves to counsel
repeat offenders offline, understand their point of view, and explain why
their behavior was wrong. Occasionally, admins adopted a format similar to
“public hearing” to create social pressure on the offender. Rafid, who
supervised a college WhatsApp group in Bangladesh, shared:

> “Following several exchanges of communal hate speech in the group, we called
> group members in the college field including the offenders. There we
> discussed the issue at length and the offenders pledged they wouldn’t repeat
> this again.”

Figure 2. (A) Group member deleted their message on fake cures of Cancer after
a group member debunked it. (B) Admin removed both the spam message and the
spammer and discouraged group members from sharing irrelevant messages. (C)
Admin enabled admin-only messaging in a service related public group.

(A)Screenshot of a WhatsApp chat: This message was deleted. Admin replied
“Fake” to a group member’s message on fake cures for cancer. Admin asked a
group member to check before sending messages to the group. (B) This message
was deleted by admin [redacted admin’s number]. The admin removed the group
member for sending spams. Admin requested to not send irrelevant messages in
the group. (C) Admin shared a link on US visa. A label in the bottom said,
“Only admins can send messages.”

####  5.3.2. Authoritarian

Baumrind (1991) described authoritarian parents as highly controlling and
showing little warmth towards their children. They expect blind obedience from
their children and punish harshly, believing that discipline will make the
children resilient. Therefore, children often become highly rebellious and
develop low self-esteem and behavioral issues (Li, 2023).

Nearly one-third of the public groups we joined ($n=9$) imposed authoritarian
moderation. We also noted this in two family groups and a professional group.
These admins enforced admin-only messaging, i.e., disabled messaging for all
members except themselves (Figure 2(C)). They justified such measures were
necessary to manage the inflow of misinformation, spam, and hate speech.
Although not all group members were at fault for sharing problematic content,
authoritarian admins chose to mute everyone instead of only disciplining the
offenders. Several public group admins we talked to preferred admin-only
messaging because it saved their effort to filter harmful content and
protected their mental well-being. They prioritized their interest at the
expense of group members’ freedom of speech. Vivek, an admin of a public
gambling group, commented:

> “I cannot remove the spammers because they are my customers and bring me
> money. Instead, I can cut spamming easily by enabling admin-only messaging.”

The one-way communication, where only admins can send messages, created a
power imbalance as group members had no means to hold the admins accountable.
For example, in a family group of near and distant relatives, where admin-only
messaging was enforced, group members had to send their messages to the admins
first, who then curated what messages could be posted in the group. People
felt annoyed because they could no longer exchange greetings and share
personal updates instantly. Moreover, admins were not always available to
check the messages that group members sent to them, and thus time-sensitive
content went unnoticed. Priya described similar challenge in a group created
to share job opportunities:

> “Recently admins were on vacation and could not check DMs from group members
> daily. Someone sent us a good internship opportunity, but by the time we
> checked, the deadline was over. It was disappointing, since no one in the
> group could benefit from it.”

Although group members requested admins to temporarily lift the restriction on
messaging, authoritarian admins ignored such requests. This decreased group
members’ participation and many left the group since it no longer fulfilled
their needs and restricted the exchange of ideas. Some group members even
threatened to create separate groups. Yet, admins preferred the status quo
saying they were “too busy to manage the groups full-time.”

####  5.3.3. Permissive

Baumrind (1991) defined permissive parents as nurturing and warm. They set
very few rules and are lenient if children break them. They do not like to say
‘no’ to their children and usually allow them to have their own way (Kopko,
2017). We noted this attitude primarily among admins in family and friends
groups ($n=8$), where people shared strong social ties offline. Although an
exception, a couple of admins ($n=2$) in professional groups also showed
reluctance to moderate content mainly to avoid conflict with group members,
who were part of their social circles. Thus, permissive admins did not counter
religious or political propaganda to avoid offending group members. Ravi
emphasized:

> “I do not respond to political forwards in my family WhatsApp group because
> it’s very difficult to change people, where they have already made up their
> mind.”

In family and professional groups, there were unspoken rules that no one would
moderate content from people higher up in the social or professional hierarchy
(e.g., older relatives and senior colleagues). Both in India and Bangladesh,
correcting or contesting elders is considered disrespectful and goes against
social norms. Although the unwillingness to moderate due to hierarchy between
admins and group members might appear contradictory to usual parent-child
power dynamics, research shows that aging parents in collectivist families
yield to adult children’s decisions to maintain family harmony even though
children’s actions might contradict parents’ preferences (Pyke, 1999).

On the other hand, admins in friends groups did not want to assert themselves
when their friends shared fake news arguing that “WhatsApp forwards aren’t
serious.” Admins often gave offenders “benefit of the doubt” and gave them a
pass thinking the spams from their accounts were caused by “some issues in
their phones.” Rizwan, who managed a group of university classmates,
commented:

> “Many allow their children to play with phones and the kids may mistakenly
> click on some link. Then, virus automatically spams the contacts and groups
> through that person’s WhatsApp account.”

Few permissive admins assumed that group members shared casteist and religious
hate speech to vent out their frustrations, and therefore, they ignored those
messages to protect free speech. Pranjal commented:

> “Recently in our group, my colleagues were discussing how lower caste
> students aren’t fit for engineering after a student committed suicide. I
> know some people feel frustrated thinking DEI initiatives that support lower
> caste students work against merit. How can I stop my colleagues from feeling
> deprived and penalize them for their thoughts?”

As permissive parenting leads to lack of self-control among children (Li,
2023), permissive admins’ lack of moderation resulted in eco-chambers in
family, friends, and workspace groups in which hateful content flourished.

####  5.3.4. Uninvolved

Baumrind (Baumrind, 1991) described that uninvolved parents are indifferent to
the emotional and social needs of their children and do not often go beyond
fulfilling children’s basic needs. They barely set any rules, expectations, or
boundaries for the children. They may adopt this style out of frustration due
to their own problems (stress, abuse, etc.) and may give up parental authority
(Kopko, 2017). As a result, children are likely to suffer from impulsive
attitude, aggression, and addiction (Li, 2023).

Majority of the public groups ($n=21$) we observed were completely neglected
by the admins. Among the nine public group admins we talked to, many ($n=6$)
struggled to recognize their groups and had no idea that the previous admin
had arbitrarily made them an admin before leaving the group. Moreover, they
were ill-prepared to handle the onslaught of mass spamming done by group
members. To avoid spam, several admins ($n=5$) either muted or archived the
groups and even uninstalled WhatsApp. Thus, being unsupervised, these groups
attracted all kinds of problematic content and reinforced a negative feedback
loop. Ashok, who created a public group to share job opportunities in India,
denied the harms of monetary scams posted in the group and commented:

> “Not everything is fake. People could benefit from these posts by earning
> money.”

When we probed admins why they did not delete the group or make someone else
admin if they did not have time to manage the group, some of them said that
they might utilize the group later for business purposes or making money.
Vivek shared his plan about his public gambling group:

> “Now that the group is large I may sell it. Whoever buys the group can earn
> money by posting ‘earn from home’ messages. Even if 200 people pay him, he
> can earn a lot.”

In contrast, few private group admins ($n=3$) in our sample exhibited traits
of uninvolved moderation. They excused themselves saying that “they were too
busy with work” or “it was too difficult to check the large volume of incoming
messages.”

These findings show that public and private groups not only differ in terms of
group’s purpose, composition, and size but also vary depending on how admins
moderate them. However, these moderation styles are not a rigid profiling of
WhatsApp group admins because few admins exhibited multiple moderation styles
in a single group, based on the offender’s identity, the frequency and
severity of the offense, and reactions from other group members. For example,
Priya initially moderated hate speech in their professional group
(authoritative) but eventually had to disable messaging (authoritarian) due to
proliferation of hate speech. Moreover, depending on the group dynamics, same
admins would moderate different types of groups differently. For example,
Hamid actively resisted communal content in his college group (authoritative)
but avoided correcting misinformation in the family group (permissive).
Additionally, different admins moderated similar types of groups differently.
For example, we observed various degrees of permissive, authoritative, and
authoritarian styles in family groups managed by different admins.

###  5.4. How Can WhatsApp Support Admins in Managing Problematic Content?

When we asked private group admins about who should handle moderation in
WhatsApp groups, many of them ($n=11$) absolved the platform of the
responsibility. They thought that only admins should be held responsible for
curtailing problematic content in their groups. Few admins ($n=3$) felt that
both WhatsApp and group admins should assume the responsibility for
moderation, but they expected admins to handle most of the work. When we
probed admins why they did not expect WhatsApp to lead moderation, Hamid
commented:

> “Implementing moderation may not satisfy WhatsApp’s interest as a platform.
> Most people get attracted to WhatsApp because there are heated debates in
> close groups. WhatsApp needs unsupervised controversy to fuel participation
> in its groups.”

Below we discuss admins’ expectations from WhatsApp to improve content
moderation.

####  5.4.1. Mixed Feelings about Automated Moderation

Private group admins had mixed feelings about automated platform-mediated
moderation. A couple of them ($n=2$) told us they had no idea whether
automated moderation was possible on WhatsApp. Few of them ($n=3$) opposed
large-scale automated moderation, fearing lack of cultural sensitivity in
moderation outcomes. Rizwan expressed his concerns:

> “In a family group if someone jokingly talks about ‘beating’ and the word is
> blacklisted, then their message may automatically be removed. People may not
> understand such auto-removal and it may negatively affect the relationship
> among group members.”

Hamid further pointed out that without addressing users’ intent, such
technocentrism would provide a “patching solution” as people who willingly
spread disinformation would move to a different platform or find workarounds.
However, some admins ($n=7$), who did not know how end-to-end encryption
works, were open to automated platform-mediated moderation thinking it would
neither violate encryption nor user privacy if user’s personal data is not
used. They wanted WhatsApp to automatically detect and remove or shadowban
messages that contain spam links and offensive language. Admins wanted to be
able to define blacklisted keywords for their groups so that group members
receive automatic warnings if their messages contain any of those words.
Moreover, they wanted a WhatsApp bot to automatically fact-check and verify
posts that were either forwarded many times or reported by multiple users,
saying “it’s not feasible to manually check every group message.”

Admins felt such automated moderation would be appropriate for large public
groups, where people had weak social ties and strangers shared problematic
content without facing any consequences. Others recommended making auto-
moderation optional so that admins could enable or disable it if needed and
review the flagged posts to make decisions.

####  5.4.2. Moderation Related Support

Several admins ($n=7$) complained about how “WhatsApp admins don’t have any
power or moderation tools” compared to those on other platforms. Given the
large volume of incoming messages in some groups, admins wanted dedicated
moderators like that in Facebook groups. Admins suggested that WhatsApp should
inform the offenders of anonymous user reports against their content so that
they could learn from feedback. Pranjal commented:

> “Truecaller shows how many users have marked a number as spam. If WhatsApp
> did something similar, it would discourage people from blindly forwarding
> spams.”

In cases when offenders did not change their behavior, admins wanted the
option to mute or ban them temporarily so that they could not send any
messages to the group for a certain period. In addition, admins struggled to
find fact-checking content in local languages and on local issues and
requested support from WhatsApp. Ravi described:

> “People don’t like to read long articles or watch long fact-checking videos
> on YouTube that force viewers to see ads. If WhatsApp could partner with
> fact-checking organizations to make short debunking videos in local
> languages that could be seen within WhatsApp, then low-literate and non-
> English speaking group members would be benefited.”

Admins also recommended to add credibility indicators to fact-checked
misinformation, disable forwarding of such messages, or show pop-ups that
discourage users from sharing such content.

####  5.4.3. Logistical Support

Admins demanded logistical support to manage their groups. For example,
similar to Facebook groups, they recommended adding screening questions for
people interested in joining groups, where people have weaker or no offline
ties. Admins felt that such a feature would reduce their workload in verifying
people before adding them to the group. At the time of the interview, WhatsApp
had a limit of 2048 characters for group description. Admins wanted WhatsApp
to raise the character limit in the group description so that they could add
group rules for potential members to review before joining. Rizwan remarked
that if WhatsApp had ‘pin messages’ feature they could display group rules at
the top of the chat so that people could easily access the rules111WhatsApp
has recently released this feature (WhatsApp, 2023a).. Moreover, admins
requested a badge for themselves, like that of Facebook admins and Reddit
moderators, so that in large groups people can recognize the admins when they
post instructions.

Participants, who also administered Facebook groups, expressed the need for a
dashboard similar to the one available to Facebook group admins and Reddit
moderators. They wanted WhatsApp to show relevant statistics, such as how many
users reported a content, which users sent forwards and spams the most. They
thought that these data points would help them easily identify perpetrators
and find evidence of past violations. Mehrab mentioned:

> “WhatsApp should give a monthly breakdown of group activities. For example,
> the number and types of messages, shared links, forwards, photos, and spams,
> monthly activity log, such as how many new people joined the group, and the
> list of active users.”

These findings show that admins need a range of sociotechnical tools embedded
within WhatsApp to identify and manage the spread of problematic content in
their groups.

##  6\. Discussion

Our study with private and public group admins in India and Bangladesh reveals
the broad spectrum of how admins operate. By drawing on Baumrind’s typology of
parenting styles, we reveal the dynamics and distinct approaches to moderation
in different private and public groups. We outline below how different aspects
of adminship in WhatsApp groups compare to those of admins and moderators on
Facebook, Reddit, and Twitch. We then discuss design implications to support
the diverse needs and dynamics of moderation on end-to-end encrypted platforms
like WhatsApp.

###  6.1. Admins Across Platforms

####  6.1.1. Selection and Roles of Admins

As is common on other platforms (Seering et al., 2019; Matias, 2019; Wohn,
2019; Sultana et al., 2022), our findings show that people often become admins
on WhatsApp either unexpectedly, voluntarily, or by appointment depending on
their personal ties, digital skills, and standout group activities. However,
unlike other platforms, most admins in our sample became admin either by
default because they created the group or due to their offline position,
power, and popularity.

We found that similar to other platforms (Seering et al., 2019; Wohn, 2019;
Seering and Kairam, 2022), WhatsApp does not provide onboarding for admins. We
noted that like moderators on Facebook (Seering et al., 2019; Malinen, 2021;
Sultana et al., 2022; Kuo et al., 2023), Reddit (Seering et al., 2022), and
Twitch (Wohn, 2019; Seering and Kairam, 2022), private group admins in our
sample assumed the responsibility of curating group members, answering
questions in group chat, and creating safe space online. However, there were
important differences too. For example, we found that providing offline
support, e.g., organizing community events as neighborhood group admin or
resolving conflicts offline, was specific to WhatsApp as admins usually knew
group members in person.

We also noticed that offline power dynamics defined admins’ authority in
WhatsApp groups. While different factors, such as channel ownership (Twitch),
designations of admins vs moderators (Facebook), and tenure/ seniority
(Reddit), determine the power of admins and moderators on other platforms
(Seering et al., 2019). We found that social hierarchy in organizational,
professional, and family WhatsApp groups led to the division of roles and
power among admins. Office superiors and older relatives enjoyed greater
authority over younger and junior co-admins due to their seniority and age. As
we used parenting as a metaphor, such hierarchy among WhatsApp group admins
can be likened to gendered role distinctions between parents in patriarchal
families (Niaz, 2003).

####  6.1.2. Moderating Problematic Content

In line with the findings of previous work on WhatsApp groups (Farooq, 2017;
Resende et al., 2019; Garcia and Vivacqua, 2021; Varanasi et al., 2022), we
found that private and public groups in our sample received widespread
misinformation, propaganda, spam, and pornographic content. As group members
ignore problematic content not to embitter personal ties in the group
(Pasquetto et al., 2022; Feng et al., 2022b; Scott et al., 2023; Malhotra,
2023) and WhatsApp barely intervenes due to end-to-end encryption, content
moderation on WhatsApp greatly relies on the discretion of group admins,
including their values and ideologies.

Indeed, our analysis of WhatsApp admins’ moderation styles using Baumrind’s
typology revealed variances across different groups (see Table 3). For
example, moderation in public groups was at two extremes, i.e., admins either
did not moderate at all (uninvolved) or disabled messaging in the group
(authoritarian). Uninvolved admins’ disregard for moderating problematic
content could be compared to that of moderators in online communities that
intentionally promote toxicity, e.g., r/Incels (Gillett and Suzor, 2022) or
right-wing extremist Facebook groups (Schwarzenegger and Wagner, 2018).
Although moderators of subreddits, Twitch channels, and Facebook groups can
disable commenting on posts (Lo, 2018; Juneja et al., 2020; Kalsnes and
Ihlebæk, 2021) and review posts before they go live (Seering et al., 2017; Kuo
et al., 2023), these measures are not as extreme as completely disabling group
interaction like authoritarian admins in our sample did, which could hurt
diversity of opinions and suppress minority viewpoints (Williams et al.,
2022).

Unlike other social media spaces, we found that group ties greatly impact
moderation styles in different types of private groups. For example, except
for a few exceptions, admins in our sample tended to be permissive in groups
with strong social ties, i.e., family and friends groups. Prior work from
Pasquetto et al. (2022) show that cultural norms in India and Pakistan
discourage correcting those with higher social status on WhatsApp. Similarly,
we found that problematic content from elderly group members and office
superiors went unchallenged since admins deemed it impolite and rude to
correct them. Moreover, as we noted permissive admins giving offenders benefit
of the doubt, Twitch moderators often ignored toxic messages from audiences
considering them as “playful banter” (Li et al., 2023).

In contrast, admins of private groups with weaker social ties among members
(e.g., organizational and professional groups) mostly adopted an authoritative
approach. The way authoritative admins nurtured the community, defined group
rules, penalized problematic content, and faced aggression from offenders bore
similarities to moderators on other platforms (Seering et al., 2019; Wohn,
2019; Seering et al., 2022; Kuo et al., 2023). Moreover, admins’ polite and
deliberative corrections of elderly group members and calling out peers mirror
strategies documented in prior studies on WhatsApp (Varanasi et al., 2022;
Scott et al., 2023; Malhotra and Pearce, 2022). However, while Facebook,
Reddit, and Twitch moderators lack transparency in moderation (Seering et al.,
2019; Wohn, 2019; Juneja et al., 2020; Kuo et al., 2023), authoritative admins
in our sample typically offered explanations for penalizing problematic
content and often dealt with the offenders in person due to the existing
offline ties between admins and group members. Our findings collectively show
that offline relationships and dynamics greatly shape the workings of WhatsApp
group admins, which is rare on other platforms.

###  6.2. Improving Moderation in WhatsApp Groups

Our findings highlight the strengths and weaknesses of different moderation
styles practiced by public and private WhatsApp group admins in our sample.
For example, while authoritative approach helped admins call out and contain
problematic content, they also experienced bullying and harassment from the
offenders, which soured their relationships with people they knew offline. On
the other hand, while authoritarian admins were able to prevent the sharing of
problematic content in their groups, their strict moderation policies (e.g.,
admin-only messaging) stifled all forms of communication within the group and
stripped group members of their agency and freedom of expression. In contrast,
lack of moderation by permissive and uninvolved admins led to echo chambers in
private groups and turned public groups into a cesspool of problematic
behavior. Given the diverse outcomes of different moderation styles, there is
no single moderation tool that might work well for the unique circumstances of
different WhatsApp groups. We outline below how to address the diverse needs
and moderation styles of different WhatsApp group admins.

####  6.2.1. Supporting Authoritative and Permissive Admins

We propose moderation tools considering the strong and weak social ties in
private groups, where permissive and authoritative moderation styles are
prevalent.

Support to Inform Offenders of Moderation. Many authoritative admins in our
study reported being rebuked and harassed by the offenders following
moderation. Prior research shows that young WhatsApp users in India prefer
indirect, respectful language to correct elderly family members (Malhotra and
Pearce, 2022; Pearce and Malhotra, 2022), which was also adopted by some
authoritative admins in our sample while correcting elderly relatives and
senior colleagues so that they do not feel challenged or offended. However,
American users prefer objections that make conscientious moral appeal against
offenses (Zhao et al., 2023). WhatsApp can provide admins with templates
incorporating localized relational politeness norms for debunking, warning,
and explaining moderation decisions to offenders. Given permissive admins
hesitate to moderate those, who are higher up in the social hierarchy than
them, these correction messages will reduce their burden to think of how to
approach the offenders. Moreover, careful choice of words may help de-escalate
tension between authoritative admins and offenders, even when the offender is
a peer.

Adding Frictions and Nudges. We found that lack of moderation by permissive
admins led to eco-chambers in close-knit private groups. Although
authoritative admins in private groups with weaker social ties moderated
communal hate speech and propaganda, they were often harassed by dominant
peers, who might be part of groups, where such politicized and polarized
content flourished. Prior research shows that social nudges from ‘ingroup’,
i.e., those who are from the same race or religion as the offender can reduce
hate speech (Munger, 2017; Siegel and Badaan, 2020). Therefore, apart from
debunking specific propaganda and disinformation, WhatsApp could partner with
local civil organizations and experts to produce content that encourages
people to not spread hatred and division against people from different
ethnicity, caste, religion, gender, and political leanings. WhatsApp should
make these content available in diverse formats and different languages to
reach broader audiences. As admins in our sample often sought help from group
members to approach offenders, admins could involve those, who either share
similar background as the offender or have more power over the offender, to
share social nudges and dissuade them from sharing communal content.

Moreover, ‘nudging’ is useful in reducing users’ intent to share
misinformation (Pennycook et al., 2021). WhatsApp could nudge users when they
try to forward any content and ask them about their reason for sharing it with
the group. WhatsApp’s website lists tips for identifying problematic content
(FAQ, 2023a), which they could also show as a pop-up when users try to share
something viral. These added frictions might dissuade users from widespread
and impulsive sharing of harmful content.

####  6.2.2. Positively Engaging Authoritarian and Uninvolved Admins

As public group admins were either too strict or lax about moderation, we
recommend tools to enable balanced moderation practices in public groups.

Authoritative Moderation Tools for Authoritarian Admins. WhatsApp should
provide proper monitoring and preventive tools so that public group admins,
who are willing to moderate, do not resort to authoritarian measures, which
are both unfair to innocent members and defeat the purpose of the group.
Although invite links to join public groups are available online, WhatsApp
could introduce screening questions like that of Facebook groups to keep out
spamming WhatsApp bots. WhatsApp could use unencrypted account metadata to
evaluate user profiles and use automated tools to filter out accounts that
give low-quality responses to screening questions. Newly joined accounts could
also be restricted from posting or have their initial messages be pre-approved
by admins before being posted in the group. This might help public group
admins immediately identify spammers and remove them from the group. Moreover,
WhatsApp could use unencrypted activity metadata, e.g., number of messages and
forwards sent by users to spot anomalies and alert admins so that they can
review a sample of messages sent by highly active users. Similar to Facebook,
WhatsApp can introduce the feature to temporarily suspend repeat offenders
(Center, 2023), so that they cannot send messages to the group for a certain
period. Another option is to ‘shadowban’ the offenders so that no group
members can see their messages except admins. These measures might protect
innocent users from harmful content without taking away their right to
participate in the group and provide recourses to admins to exercise control
without being authoritarian.

Consequences for Uninvolved Admins. WhatsApp should intervene when admins in
large public groups willingly ignore problematic content, as currently they do
not face any consequences. Facebook reduces privileges and reach for the
groups that have multiple violations and, in extreme cases, removes the group
completely (Alison, 2021). While WhatsApp claims to restrict chat activity in
groups where admins violate WhatsApp’s Terms of Service (FAQ, 2021), it’s
unclear how they do so and we did not come across any groups, where WhatsApp
placed such restrictions. WhatsApp could use unencrypted account metadata to
detect admins who have stopped using WhatsApp or are no longer active in the
group. Then, WhatsApp can send reminders to admins via phone messages or in-
app notification to check their groups. If they continue to remain inactive,
WhatsApp can disable or remove the group.

##  7\. Limitations and Conclusion

We use Baumrind’s typology of “parenting styles” to explore how WhatsApp group
admins in India and Bangladesh manage and regulate their groups. While our
findings reveal important distinctions between the composition, dynamics, and
workings of admins in public and private groups, we also highlight how
moderation in WhatsApp groups qualitatively differ from that of Facebook
groups, subreddits, and Twitch channels. Our work has a few limitations.
Participants in our study were skewed towards highly educated, urban (in
private groups), and male admins (in public groups). Due to the small sample
size, we might not have covered all types of WhatsApp groups and admins. Given
the self-reported nature of qualitative interviews, we could not verify if
admins in our study shared problematic content themselves, perceived hate
speech or propaganda as harmless due to their own biases, treated the
offenders equally, or used their power to suppress minority or opposing views.
Since we did not talk to group members, we could not assess to what extent
offenders found the admins’ explanation of moderation to be useful.
Furthermore, the moderation styles observed in public and private groups in
India and Bangladesh might not apply to groups in other cultures and
geographies. More work is needed to unpack the complex dynamics among admins
and group members across different demographics.

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