# Religious Competition, Culture and Domestic Violence: Evidence from Colombia

Hector Galindo-Silva
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, E-mail:
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>Guy Tchuente
Purdue University Purdue University, E-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
###### Abstract

This paper studies how religious competition, as measured by the emergence of
religious organizations with innovative worship styles and cultural practices,
impacts domestic violence. Using data from Colombia, the study estimates a
two-way fixed-effects model and reveals that the establishment of the first
non-Catholic church in a predominantly Catholic municipality leads to a
significant decrease in reported cases of domestic violence. This effect
persists in the long run, indicating that religious competition introduces
values and practices that discourage domestic violence, such as household
stability and reduced male dominance. Additionally, the effect is more
pronounced in municipalities with less clustered social networks, suggesting
the diffusion of these values and practices through social connections. This
research contributes to the understanding of how culture influences domestic
violence, emphasizing the role of religious competition as a catalyst for
cultural change.

Keywords: Marketplace for Religion, Domestic violence.
JEL classification: H41, J13, O17.

##  1 Introduction

Domestic violence is a pervasive global issue, afflicting millions daily with
a variety of abusive behaviors, including psychological abuse, sexual and
physical violence, and homicide. This problem is widespread across different
regions and highly prevalent.111According to the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2017, about 78,000 individuals (64% female, 36%
male) were killed by intimate partners or family members. Globally, about 30%
of women experienced intimate partner violence, and child abuse affected
50-75% of children worldwide (UNODC, 2017). This issue endures over time and
is present in developed countries as well (UN, 2015). Its consequences are
profound and long-lasting, significantly impacting the health and well-being
of individuals, both in the short term and over the long run.222There are
different ways through which domestic violence negatively affects the economy.
For example, it reduces productivity, diminishes the workforce, especially
among women, hinders skill development, and reallocates resources from public
investment to healthcare and legal services. Previous studies have found
domestic violence costs a given economy between 1 and 2 percent of GDP (see
for instance Duvvury et al., 2013, 2019). However, it is plausible that this
effect is even higher (Ouedraogo and Stenzel, 2021).

Among the various factors contributing to domestic violence, culture is
increasingly recognized, by researchers and policymakers, as one of its key
determinants.333While there exists variation in scholarly views of culture
(see for instance Acemoglu and Robinson, 2021, for a discussion of this
concept), we adopt a broad and conventional definition: by culture we refer to
the customary beliefs, social structures, and material traits of specific
social groups (Fernández, 2016). One way in which domestic violence can be
tied to culture is through the belief that a dominant household figure can
legitimately use violence as a means of education or discipline. To the extent
that this belief is deeply ingrained and aligns with other social practices,
domestic violence becomes significantly dependent on the cultural environment
in which it occurs.444The first scholars that studied, quantitatively, this
phenomena, found that domestic violence is linked to traditional notions of
masculinity and male privilege, patriarchal ideologies, and social norms
regarding wife beating (see for instance O’Neil and Harway, 1997; Murnen et
al., 2002; Koenig et al., 2006). Recent studies have documented evidence
consistent with those findings, in particular regarding the of the impact of
family types, gender roles, stereotypes, dowry practices and a variety of
ancestral cultural characteristics on domestic violence (see Tur-Prats, 2019;
Bhalotra et al., 2019; González and Rodríguez-Planas, 2020; Calvi and Keskar,
2021; Alesina et al., 2021). For a more extensive review of this and other
literature, mostly in economics, see Fernández (2011) and Bau and Fernández
(2023).

The connection between domestic violence and cutlure helps explain its
persistence.555See for instance Tur-Prats (2019), González and Rodríguez-
Planas (2020) and Alesina et al. (2021). However, both domestic violence and
culture can change.666 Although the empirical literature on culture has mostly
focused on showing that culture has persistent effects, there is also evidence
that culture can change, for instance regarding attitudes about fertility (La
Ferrara et al., 2012), same-sex relationships (Fernández et al., 2019),
women’s labor market participation (Galindo-Silva and Herrera-Idárraga, 2023)
and, importantly, regarding the acceptability of domestic violence (Jensen and
Oster, 2009). Understanding the dynamics of culture and its impact on domestic
violence is crucial for promoting inclusive economic development.

This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the interplay between
domestic violence and culture by examining the consequences of a significant
phenomenon in the recent history of several countries: the profound
transformation of their religious landscape.777Regarding the nature of this
phenomenon, as well as its geographical scope, see Miller et al. (2013). In
this transformation, established churches encounter competition from other
religious organizations that often introduce new cultural practices. If these
practices are associated with a decrease in domestic violence and if they
spread and gain acceptance among the population, the phenomenon of religious
competition holds the potential to substantially reduce this critical form of
violence.

This study focuses on Colombia, a deeply religious country which in the last
few decades has experienced a significant increase in religious competition
between the Catholic Church, which held a near-monopoly on religion for four
centuries, and new evangelical Pentecostal churches. To measure the
establishment of new religious organizations in areas where traditional
religious entities have historically held a monopoly, we use data on the
instalment of a first non-Catholic church in a typically deeply Catholic
Colombian municipality. Then, we study how these events of increased religious
competition impact domestic violence.

To estimate this impact, we employ a two-way fixed-effects model that
incorporates both geographical (municipality) and temporal (year) dimensions.
We use (linear) dynamic and static specifications. In the dynamic
specifications, our central assumption for identification is that “control"
municipalities, referring to those where no non-Catholic church has been
established yet, as well as those where such churches were established a long
time ago, serve as valid reference points to measure the evolving patterns of
domestic violence in adopting municipalities. This comparison allows us to
estimate what the dynamics of domestic violence would have been in these
adopting municipalities if they had never experienced the arrival of a non-
Catholic church. Under a similar assumption, we estimate the static versions
of the two-way fixed-effect model using a difference-in-differences estimator.
We interpret these estimates as capturing the long-term effects of religious
competition on domestic violence.

Our analysis shows that the establishment of a first non-Catholic church in a
municipality leads to a reduction in domestic violence incidents.
Specifically, during the period that followed the first non-Catholic church
establishment, there is a decrease of about 14 reported cases of domestic
violence per 100,000 inhabitant and per year. Furthermore, this effect endures
over the long term, resulting in a sustained decrease of approximately 14
reported cases of domestic violence per 100,000 inhabitants. These findings
are robust to the use of alternative datasets, econometric specifications and
estimators (such as de Chaisemartin and DHaultfoeuille, 2020, Sun and Abraham,
2021 and Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021’ heterogeneity-robust DID estimators).

We explain the above findings by proposing the following rationale. When a
non-Catholic church is established for the first time in a Colombian
municipality, it introduces new styles of worship, notably those with a
‘Pentecostal-Charismatic’ nature, which resonate effectively with the local
population. Amidst religious competition for followers and due to the greater
efficiency of these worship styles, they are adopted by other religious
organizations, notably the Catholic Church. Importantly, these worship styles
are associated with values and norms that discourage domestic violence, such
as household stability, reduced alcohol consumption, sexual restraint, and
decreased male dominance. The consequence of this phenomenon is a substantial
and widespread reduction in domestic violence in the areas where it occurs.

This mechanism aligns with a substantial body of existing anecdotal evidence
derived from numerous interviews with members of non-Catholic churches, as
well as reports in newspapers and official statements from the Catholic
Church. Furthermore, this rationale is consistent with additional quantitative
evidence grounded in established models of innovation diffusion within social
networks. These models, as exemplified by Morris (2000) and particularly by
Acemoglu et al. (2011), underscore the pivotal role of network structure in
the diffusion of innovations. Specifically, they show that in networks with
less clustering and/or cohesion, and with longer connections between sub-
communities, the diffusion of innovations is faster and more extensive,
particularly when these innovations originate within a select few sub-
communities.

In the context of our study, ‘innovation’ denotes the introduction of new
cultural practices which contribute to the reduction of domestic violence.
These innovative practices were initially introduced in Colombian
municipalities by the first non-Catholic church. If the spread of these
practices through social networks accounts for the extent of the reduction in
domestic violence, we expect a more significant reduction where this
innovation spreads more, particularly in municipalities with greater
population homogeneity, characterized by lower ethnic fragmentation, fewer
civil society organizations and reduced religious diversity. Our empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis, showing a more pronounced reduction in
domestic violence in those municipalities

In the last part of the paper, we assess the plausibility of alternative
explanations by examining the link between domestic violence and other types
of violence, particularly those connected to the Colombian armed conflict. We
also investigate whether there is a plausible economic phenomenon coinciding
with religious competition that may impact domestic violence. None of the
available evidence appears to lend support to these alternative mechanisms.

As our data is confined to Colombia, we are cautious about making claims
regarding external validity. Nevertheless, we believe that the mechanisms and
evidence in this paper can be extended to other countries due to the global
nature of domestic violence and the role of cultural factors in its
occurrence. The results of this paper may be most applicable in areas with
deeply religious populations that are also undergoing significant changes in
the religious landscape, such as Brazil, Guatemala, Bolivia, Kenya, and the
Philippines (in this respect, see for instance Miller et al., 2013).

This study makes several contributions to the existing body of literature.
First, it adds to the studies mentioned earlier (see footnotes 4 to 6) that
investigate the impact of different aspects of culture on social outcomes,
with a specific focus on domestic violence. This paper enhances this
literature by focusing on a type of institution with significant influence in
shaping cultural pracrices: religious organizations. In this regard, this
study is connected to the literature that examines the role of religious
institutions in determining various social, economic, and political outcomes
(Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015; Cantoni, 2015; Cantoni et al., 2018;
Becker and Pascali, 2019; Schulz et al., 2019; Galindo-Silva and Tchuente,
2021; Schulz, 2022).

Building upon the previously discussed idea that religious organizations wield
the power to influence cultural practices, this study aligns with the growing
body of literature that explores cultural change and its effects on various
social outcomes (see La Ferrara et al., 2012; Fernández et al., 2019; Galindo-
Silva and Herrera-Idárraga, 2023; Jensen and Oster, 2009). Our study shares
common ground with Bau and Fernández (2023) and the aforementioned studies,
emphasizing the idea that cultural change often requires a ‘shock’ to
technology, institutions, or information. This ‘shock’ fundamentally alters
the incentives for conforming to societal norms. In this context, our research
identifies one such ‘shock’: the establishment of new religious organizations
introducing novel and appealing worship styles in areas previously dominated
by older religious organizations with less attractive worship styles. This
represents both an institutional change, with the transformation of informal
institutions in these areas, and a technological change, as the introduction
of innovative and attractive worship styles can be seen as a form of
technological innovation. Our paper delves into the effects of these changes
on domestic violence, a culturally rooted and pertinent phenomenon. To our
knowledge, no existing studies in the literature have examined the
consequences of this type of ‘shock’ on this specific social outcome.

Furthermore, in the context of broader cultural change, our study also relates
to the literature that examines the production and diffusion of new
technologies, and the role on it played by market conditions (Griliches, 1992;
Aghion et al., 2005, 2009, 2014). In our preferred explanation for the
baseline results, supported by anecdotal and additional quantitative evidence,
we propose that the observed effect is driven by the emergence of new cultural
technologies, which are generated and diffused within a context of religious
competition. This suggests that competition, particularly among religious
organizations, plays a pivotal role in the dynamics of cultural change, which
we consider to be an additional contribution of this paper to the field of
cultural economics.

The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the Colombian’s religious identity and domestic violence. The data and
empirical strategy are discussed in Section 3. The main results are presented
in Section 4 alongside explanatory mechanisms and robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.

##  2 Background

In this section, we provide a brief description of the Colombian context,
focusing on the evolution of the religious landscape and domestic violence.

###  2.1 Religious Landscape

In recent decades, Colombia has undergone a significant transformation in its
religious composition, departing from the long-standing Catholic dominance
that had been upheld for four centuries through state-imposed barriers to
alternative religious affiliations. During the period from 1950 to 1970, the
proportion of Colombians identifying as Catholic remained relatively stable,
fluctuating between 91% and 95%. However, by 2014, this figure had declined to
79% (see Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 27). This decline in Catholic adherence
was accompanied by a noteworthy increase in the prevalence of Protestantism.
In 2014, while Catholicism experienced a net decrease of 13 percentage points,
Protestantism witnessed an 8-percentage-point rise.888Data from 2019 and 2021,
as reported by Colombia’s _National Administrative Department of Statistics_
(DANE), is consistent with these figures: around 78.4% of the Colombian
population identifies as Catholic, while approximately 10.1% identifies as
Protestant (including Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Traditional Protestant
non-evangelical denominations)(see DANE, 2021). This pattern of religious
change, albeit with slight temporal variations, has been observed consistently
in other countries (see Pew Research Center, 2014 and Somma et al., 2017 for
evidence of this phenomenon in Latin America countries).

Pentecostalism has been the fastest-growing Protestant denomination in
Colombia, with at least 56% of Colombian Protestants identifying as
Pentecostal in 2014 (see Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 62).999These figures
are also consistent with what was reported by the DANE for the years 2019 and
2021: among those who identify as non-Catholic Christians, approximately 58.4%
specifically identify as Evangelical or Pentecostal (see DANE, 2021). Several
factors contributing to Pentecostalism’s success in Colombia include
urbanization, the need for hope amid urban challenges, perceived shortcomings
of the Catholic Church, and the efficiency of Pentecostal organizations in
addressing these needs (see Bastian, 2005; Beltrán, 2013a).101010In Galindo-
Silva and Tchuente (2021), we found evidence that supports this explanation,
particularly in municipalities with less political competition. Pentecostal
groups are seen as efficient in responding to the population’s demands due to
charismatic leadership, flexibility, and strategic use of marketing and mass
media (see Bastian, 2005; Beltrán, 2013a). Additionally, Colombian Pentecostal
denominations have been characterized as ideologically diverse, fragmented,
and economically limited, often initiated by religious leaders founding their
own churches (see Tejeiro, 2010, p. 19).

###  2.2 Domestic Violence

The significant transformation of religious identities in Colombia in recent
decades has coincided with significant fluctuations in various societal
indicators, some of which may be directly associated with this phenomenon. In
this study, we propose that one such indicator is domestic violence.

Domestic violence, defined as any form of verbal, psychological, physical, or
other abuse inflicted by a family member on another family member, has
exhibited notable variations in recent decades in Colombia, with a slight
overall trend toward reduction. Figure A2 in Web Appendix A illustrates this
variation for the period spanning from 2005 to 2019.

According to the Colombian _National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic
Sciences_ (INMLCF),111111The INMLCF is the most reliable source of data on
this phenomenon in Colombia. We will describe the INMLCF data in detail in the
following section. the majority of victims of domestic violence are women,
with the most common age range for such occurrences being between 29 and 44
years. The primary forms of domestic violence include intimate partner
violence, followed by violence among other family members, violence against
minors, and violence against the elderly (see INMLCF, 2005 to 2019).

When considering the factors influencing domestic violence, previous studies
in Colombia have identified factors such as poverty, the educational levels of
household members, the number of children, the presence of women in the
household, the presence of young mothers, and women’s participation in the
labor force (see Ribero and Sanchez, 2005; Gáfaro and Ibáñez, 2012). In
addition to these factors, and significantly for our investigation, cultural
elements have also been cited in explaining this phenomenon. In line with this
hypothesis, surveys of domestic violence victims conducted by the INMLCF have
consistently revealed that victims attribute this type of aggression to three
‘cultural’ factors: alcohol consumption, intolerance and machismo (see INMLCF,
2005 to 2019).

The notion that cultural factors may be contributory factors in domestic
violence has also been a recurring theme in the discourse and initiatives of
social and political entities in Colombia. For instance, the Colombian
government has implemented policies aimed at transforming cultural norms based
on dominance into more egalitarian interactions within households (see
Minsalud, 2016).121212In the Colombian main government’s policy document
regarding family matters, strategy 2A explicitly aims to confront and
transcend cultural ideas rooted in authoritarianism while promoting the
development of family and societal perspectives grounded in democratic
relationships (see Minsalud, 2016, p. 21). Although these policies have
demonstrated some effectiveness, several authors have underscored their
limitations, including their limited reach, their focus on victim assistance
rather than preventive mechanisms, and their lack of coordination with non-
governmental social actors (see Santander et al., 2020, p. 41-48).

Non-governmental actors, particularly religious organizations like the
Catholic Church and non-Catholic Christian churches, have also expressed
concerns about fostering cultural change in households to reduce domestic
violence. The Catholic Church, as evidenced in several of its official
statements, has recently embraced this goal (see Conferencia Episcopal de
Colombia, 2015, 2017; Caritas, 2017). Similarly, non-Catholic Christian
churches, from their earliest days, have consistently advocated for social
practices that improve living conditions and condemn domestic violence (see
Beltrán, 2013a, p. 220).

##  3 Data and Empirical Strategy

###  3.1 Data

Our primary data focuses on the establishment of non-Catholic churches in
Colombian municipalities. As mentioned in the introduction, this is the main
measure proposed in this paper to assess the presence of a first non-Catholic
Christian religious organization in a municipality.131313Our data source does
not provide the specific denomination of these churches. However, a quick look
at their names suggests that the vast majority are Christian churches. Given
the deeply Catholic historical context of Colombia, we interpret this
establishment as a measure of the existence of religious competition. The data
on the establishment of these churches is obtained from the “Public Registry
of Religious Organizations," provided by the Colombian Ministry of the
Interior.141414In Spanish, this registry is called the _Registro Público de
Entidades Religiosas_. This data is publicly available from
https://www.mininterior.gov.co/registro-publico-de-entidades-religiosas/. This
registry documents the exact timing and location at which a non-Catholic
church attains legal “personhood." In Colombia, non-Catholic churches are
required to apply for legal status, whereas the Catholic Church already
possesses this status. The application process typically takes a minimum of 60
working days to receive a response from the government, and approval is the
usual outcome. Gaining legal personhood status enables a church to engage in
various activities, such as entering contracts (e.g., opening bank accounts,
hiring employees, compensating organizational leaders, purchasing properties,
and qualifying for tax incentives). It also grants churches the ability to
collect contributions from their members, as outlined in Law 133 of 1994. This
dataset covers the years from 1995 to 2021 and includes information regarding
the date of legal recognition and the primary municipality in which each
church operates.151515Upon obtaining legal recognition, a church is permitted
to operate throughout the entire country under the law. It’s essential to note
that this circumstance could introduce potential bias into our measurement of
religious competition. This is because a church that becomes the first to
acquire legal personhood in a specific municipality may not necessarily be the
first church to commence its activities there. It’s possible that another
church in the same municipality had already obtained its legal status
elsewhere. Therefore, we should exercise caution when interpreting our
estimates, as they may tend to underestimate the true level of religious
competition or exhibit a bias toward lower competition. However, there is
evidence showing that Colombian non-Catholic churches are very fragmented (see
Beltrán 2013a, p. 140 and Tejeiro 2010, p. 19).

Between 1995 and 2021, a total of 582 non-Catholic churches obtained legal
recognition for the first time. The temporal evolution of this phenomenon can
be observed in Figure A1 within Web Appendix A. Crucially, these newly
established churches were distributed across a wide range of municipalities,
specifically in 497 municipalities. The majority of these municipalities
witnessed the establishment of only one new church in any given year, with 435
municipalities falling into this category. Additionally, this phenomenon was
not confined to any particular region of Colombia. In the period of our focus,
from 2005 to 2019, on average, 28.4 new non-Catholic churches established
annually (see Table LABEL:nonCatho_tab in Web Appendix A for detailed
descriptive statistics). Significantly, this trend of new church
establishments in Colombia aligns with the religious shift discussed in
Section 2, where we highlighted a substantial decline in Catholic adherence in
recent decades coupled with a concurrent rise in Protestantism.

The second primary data source for this study, utilized to collect information
regarding domestic violence, is the _National Institute of Legal Medicine and
Forensic Sciences_ (INMLCF).161616In Spanish, it is called the _Instituto
Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses_. This institute serves as
Colombia’s public entity responsible for overseeing forensic investigations.
It consistently releases statistical bulletins covering diverse forms of
violence and compiles this data into a publication known as the _Forensis_
magazine.171717These bulletins are publicly available from
https://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/cifras-estadisticas/forensis. Starting from
2005, this publication offers yearly domestic violence data at the municipal
level, encompassing the overall count of domestic violence cases,181818The
INMLCF defines domestic violence as an intentional act by which one or more
members of a family group cause physical, mental, sexual harm, restrict
freedom of movement, or cause the death of other family members. In its data
collection process, one inclusion criterion is the presence of some type of
injury evaluated by the Colombian forensic medical system (usually through
doctor assessments). and those directed towards the victim’s intimate
partner.191919For years preceding 2005, there is some municipal-level
information, but it is highly fragmented. Therefore, our analysis starts from
that year. Figure A2 depicts the temporal evolution of domestic violence
across Colombian municipalities from 2005 to 2019, marked by significant
fluctuations in both the number of cases and the rate per 100,000 inhabitants.

In our study, we use the _National Police of Colombia_ as an alternative data
source for domestic violence statistics.202020This data is publicly available
from https://www.policia.gov.co/grupo-informacion-criminalidad/estadistica-
delictiva. This institution uses a definition of domestic violence that is
essentially the same as that used by the _Colombian National Institute of
Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences_. However, and importantly, this data is
less comprehensive and undergoes fewer quality checks. Additionally, this data
is only available at the municipal level from 2010 onwards. Therefore, we have
opted to employ this alternative data source only for our robustness analyses.

Other controls include the number of civil society organizations and the
number of Catholic churches in each municipality (available only for the year
1995), the ethnic composition of each municipality (available for the years
1993, 2005 and 2018), municipal population, index of rurality, and the
proportion of people with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for
poverty, and available for the years 1993, 2005 and 2018). Sources for these
controls are listed in the note attached to Table Figures and Tables.

###  3.2 Empirical Strategy

To estimate the impact religious competition on domestic violence we use a
linear two-way (unit and time) fixed effects (FE) estimator. Our main
specification models a given outcome $v_{i,t}$ (e.g. number of reported cases
of domestic violence) in municipality $i$ and year $t$ as a function of the
arrival of the first non-Catholic church:

$v_{i,t}=\alpha_{i}+\beta_{t}+\sum_{\tau=-K}^{-2}\gamma_{\tau}D_{i,t}^{\tau}+\sum_{\tau=0}^{L}\gamma_{\tau}D_{i,t}^{\tau}+\epsilon_{i,t}$
(1)

where $D_{i,t}^{\tau}$ is an indicator for $\tau$ years for municipality $i$’s
treatment (which in our case is the establishment of the first non-Catholic
church in municipality $i$, occurring at $\tau=0$).212121 Note that negative
values of $\tau$ indicate the arrival of the first non-Catholic church
$|\tau|$ years in the future, representing the “lead” effect denoted by $K$,
while positive values indicate its arrival $\tau$ years in the past, denoting
the “lag” effect represented by $L$). In this dynamic specification, we allow
the treatment to have different effects in the adoption year than in
subsequent years. It is important to note that we do not include all possible
relative time indicators in Eq. (1) due to multicollinearity, as discussed by
Laporte and Windmeijer (2005), Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), and Sun and
Abraham (2021). Regarding which relative time to exclude, we follow common
practice and normalize relative to the period prior to treatment. $\alpha_{i}$
and $\beta_{t}$ represent municipality and year fixed effects, respectively,
while $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term.

The primary identifying assumption of the dynamic two-way fixed-effects model
in Equation (1) is that changes in “control" municipalities (those that have
not yet experienced the arrival of a non-Catholic church and those that
experienced it $L$ periods ago) provide a valid counterfactual to measure the
dynamics of domestic violence that would have occurred in adopting
municipalities if they had never experienced the arrival of a non-Catholic
church. In other words, this assumption presupposes the absence of time-
varying unobserved effects. It is crucial for interpreting our estimates as
causal effects but may be invalid if, for example, the arrival of a non-
Catholic church was most of the time preceded (and explained) by an unobserved
event (which is not observed by the econometrician).

We also assume no reverse causality between domestic violence and the
establishment of a municipality’s first non-Catholic church. This implies that
it is the establishment of the non-Catholic church that leads to changes in
domestic violence, not the other way around.

The main specification further assumes that the treatment effects are
homogeneous, meaning that the change in domestic violence associated with the
establishment of a non-Catholic church is the same for all municipalities,
particularly for those treated at different times. If the assumption of
homogeneous treatment effects is not satisfied, the estimates obtained using a
dynamic two-way fixed-effects model may not be causally interpretable.

We offer a variety of evidence consistent with our assumptions. First, in
Table LABEL:dfirstiglesiasnc_tab, we show that the level of domestic violence,
as well as related factors (such as poverty, homicide rates, internally
displaced populations, and political outcomes), prior to the arrival for the
first time of a non-Catholic church in a municipality, are not correlated with
the church’s arrival. This evidence indicates the absence of reverse causality
and supports our parallel trends assumption. Second, we show that our findings
are robust to the inclusion of various potentially confounding municipality-
year variables. Third, we show that our estimations are robust to employing
alternative heterogeneity-robust DID estimators (such as those proposed by de
Chaisemartin and DHaultfoeuille 2020, Sun and Abraham 2021, and Callaway and
Sant’Anna 2021). All this evidence supports our interpretation of the
estimates from Equation (1) as causal average treatment effects.

We also consider the static alternative specifications to Equation (1)

$y_{i,t}=\alpha_{i}+\beta_{t}+\gamma D_{i,t}+\epsilon_{i,t}$ (2)

where $D_{i,t}$ is a treatment indicator that is equal to one if municipality
$i$ is treated at time $t$ or before and zero otherwise. We refer to this
specification as _static_ , and we interpret $\gamma$ as capturing longer-run
effects.

##  4 Main results

###  4.1 Effects of Religious Competition on Domestic Violence

The primary findings from our analysis are presented in Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab and Figure
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_fig. The main outcome of interest is the number
of reported case of domestic violence per 100 000 inhabitants in a
municipality. The results reveal that the establishment of the first non-
Catholic church in a municipality causes a reduction in domestic violence.
During the initial year when the first non-Catholic church is established, we
observe a substantial decline, ranging from 8.9 to 10.7 reported cases of
domestic violence per 100,000 inhabitants. In the subsequent years, this
effect appears to persist within this range, reaching a value of 14.5 in the
fifth year (see columns (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab). This effect corresponds to a decrease in
domestic violence of 0.1 standard deviations. Furthermore, this impact of
religious competition appears to have a lasting effect, resulting in a
reduction of between 10.6 and 14.1 reported cases of domestic violence per
100,000 inhabitants in the long term (as indicated in columns (1) and (2) of
Panel B of Table LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab).

In columns (3) to (6) of Table LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab and in Figure
3(b), we break down the findings in columns (1) and (2) based on the victim’s
identity, distinguishing between cases where the victim is the intimate
partner of the perpetrator, and cases involving other household members. The
estimates in these columns indicate that both types of violence exhibit
similar but slightly smaller effects. Since the majority of victims of
intimate partner violence in Colombia are women, these results suggest that
the observed effect may extend beyond reducing violence against women.

Finally, in Table LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrateALTESTM_tab, we show that the
results from Table LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab are qualitatively robust
to using alternative DID estimators which do not assume homogeneous treatment
effects. Specifically, we consider the estimators introduced by de
Chaisemartin and DHaultfoeuille (2020) (columns (1) and (2)), by Callaway and
Sant’Anna (2021) (columns (3) and (4)), and by Sun and Abraham (2021) (columns
(5) and (6)). However, for almost all years and estimators, the estimations do
not exhibit statistically significant differences compared to the results in
Table LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab.222222It is important to highlight
that the results in Table LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrateALTESTM_tab exhibit
variations in the estimated standard errors when compared to those in Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_tab. This divergence implies that, for some
years and the estimates of the coefficients of interest, while generally
consistent in magnitude with the results obtained with our baseline model, the
alternative estimator differ in their statistical significance levels.
Although we currently lack a definitive explanation for this divergence, we
attribute it to the assumption of heterogeneous treatment effect used in
generating these estimates. To obtain these estimations, we employed Stata
commands, namely _twowayfeweights_ , _csdid_ , and _eventstudyinteract_. As
previously mentioned, this supports the interpretation of our estimates as
causal average treatment effects.

The findings presented in this section can be explained in multiple ways. In
the following section, we provide what we believe to be the most likely
explanation for these findings and present additional evidence to support this
interpretation. Additionally, we explore alternative explanations,
acknowledging their potential but ultimately deeming them less likely.

###  4.2 Mechanisms

Our preferred explanation for the observed reduction in domestic violence
following the establishment of a first non-Catholic church in a municipality
is grounded in the notion that this event introduces into the municipality a
new and more efficient ‘cultural’ technology for the adoption of practices
that lead to results that are widely recognized as beneficial in the
community. Less domestic violence is one of these results. That technology is
rapidly adopted by a significant number of households due to its enhanced
efficiency. The net result is a substantial reduction in domestic violence.

To render this explanation more plausible, we offer now a range of evidence,
both quantitative and anecdotal, that aligns with it.

The first set of evidence supports the assertion that major religious
organizations in Colombia actively endorse specific practices aimed at
improving interpersonal dynamics within households. As stated in Section 2 the
main types of religious organizations in Colombia are the Catholic Church and
non-Catholic churches (mostly Pentecostal denominations).

Concerning non-Catholic churches, Beltrán (2013a), based on a large number of
interviews with members of these churches, corroborates this assertion (see
Beltrán, 2013a, p. 184 and p. 220), specifically identifying some to the
practices promoted by these churches:

> “the new religious movements condemn all addictions, especially alcohol and
> cigarette consumption, and promote changes in consumption habits […]
> Additionally, thanks to their participatory dynamics, the new religious
> movements—especially the Pentecostal movement—promote female leadership,
> turning into spaces of empowerment for women." (see Beltrán, 2013a, p.
> 220).232323Regarding the participation and significance of women in these
> religious movements, Beltrán specifies that the leaders he interviewed
> ”unanimously assert that women constitute, roughly speaking, two-thirds of
> their congregation […] Membership in a religious group provides practical
> advantages to women. Religious organizations offer support and protection to
> women who experience daily economic precarity, spousal abandonment, and
> domestic abuse.” (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 184)

These practices “involve changes in the lifestyle of the converts, which they
value as positive" (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 379), and they are part of a
broader project promoting the formalization of families through marriage,
which provides security for women and children (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 184).

An important characteristic of these practices is their direct connection to
domestic violence. Members of non-Catholic churches, as interviewed by
Beltrán, explicitly state this (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 173), and this is
consistent with additional anecdotal evidence provided by Rey Martínez (2008).
Importantly, reduced alcohol consumption, the empowerment of women, and, in
general, a culture of intolerance and sexism have also been consistently
reported by victims of domestic violence as the main causes of these
incidents, regardless of their religious identities (see INMLCF, 2005 to
2019).

The Colombian Catholic Church has also promoted similar practices. For
example, in the last decade the fight against violence to women has gained a
significant place in the Catholic Church official communications (see
Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia, 2015, 2017; Caritas, 2017). Moreover, over
the same period, the Colombian Catholic Church has actively supported lay
associations that operate with varying degrees of autonomy. These associations
play a crucial role in promoting religious practices among family members and
friends, emphasizing the welfare of families, and assigning a significant role
to individuals, particularly women (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 292).242424In this
context, with respect to the lay activities undertaken in Bogota within a
specific Catholic lay organization, a member provides the following
description of its activities:  “To face all these challenges within the
framework of social pastoral action, we founded the Fundehi Corporation 15
years ago, simultaneously committing to the promotion of women […] Before, I
didn’t have time for God or my children, as I left home at 4 a.m. and returned
around 9 at night,” she confesses. “Now I share what I’ve learned, participate
in Saturday Bible groups, and celebrate the Eucharist on Sundays, also with my
children.” (see El tiempo, 2022).

This evidence supports the assertion that, in recent decades, major religious
organizations in Colombia have actively promoted practices closely associated
with a reduction in domestic violence. Two key questions arise: which type of
religious organization initially introduced and promoted these practices, and
if the introduction wasn’t simultaneous, did these practices spread beyond the
organization that introduced them first?

Regarding the first question, anecdotal evidence suggests that, although the
Catholic Church and non-Catholic Christian churches have come to converge on
similar policies (after all, these are Christian denominations founded on
fundamentally similar moral principles),252525Opinion surveys in Colombia
provide some quantitative evidence consistent with this convergence. Table
LABEL:tab_attitude_2019 compares the attitudes of individuals who identify as
non-Catholic Christians with those who identify as Catholics regarding the
importance of religion (column (1)), the importance of family (column (2)),
and the rejection of the use of violence (column (3)). Interestingly, non-
Catholic Christian individuals perceive religion and family as more important,
but they do not hold a stronger stance regarding the use of violence. These
results remain consistent when considering individuals who identify as
actively religious (columns (4) to (6)). the non-Catholic churches were likely
the ones to introduce this agenda for the first time (or at least promote it
on a large scale). Subsequently, as a result of religious competition, the
Catholic Church also began promoting these policies (see Ospina Martínez 2004,
Cleary 2011, pp. 54-77, Moreno 2011, Beltrán 2013a, pp. 271-292).

An illustrative example of this phenomenon is the ‘Pentecostalization of
Catholicism,’ which refers to the integration or reinvigoration of the
Charismatic Renewal movement within the Colombian Catholic Church in recent
decades (see Cleary 2011, pp. 54-77 and Beltrán 2013b, p. 77). One noteworthy
aspect of this process is that coincided with the increased presence of the
Catholic Church in mass media, including the emergence of new Catholic
television channels and, notably, the appearance of charismatic Catholic
priests on very popular TV channels.262626Three examples of Catholic priests
who had a significant presence in mass media at the beginning of the 2000s and
broke into these media in a novel way are Jesús Orjuela Pardo (’Chucho’),
Alberto Linero, and Alirio López (El tiempo, 2006). Importantly, these
practices had already been extensively utilized by non-Catholic Christian
churches in the country since their entry into Colombia in the early 1990s (p.
184 Beltrán, 2013a),272727In this respect, Beltrán says that non-Catholic
churches had effectively reached the Colombian population by broadcasting
testimonies from troubled households that had been “restored” through “the
power of God” via radio and television (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 184). and have
been seen as one of the factors explaining the adoption of similar practices
by the Catholic Church several years later (see Beltrán, 2013a, p. 284 and
292). Another important characteristic of the ‘Pentecostalization of
Catholicism’ in Colombia is the recent focus placed by the Catholic Church on
endorsing lay organizations that rely on individual ‘enterprises’ and are
frequently led by women. This support has also been interpreted as a response
to the longstanding tradition within non-Catholic Christian churches of
promoting individual capabilities and granting women a prominent role within
these organizations (see Beltrán, 2013a, pp. 184 and 291-292).

As for the second question, which concerns the potential diffusion of these
practices to non-members of non-Catholic religious organizations, it’s worth
noting that this phenomenon is supported by the previously mentioned anecdotal
evidence, as it points out that religious organizations have utilized various
media channels to reach a wide audience through mass communication, with the
specific goal of promoting practices and values aimed at improving household
relationships.

To complement this evidence, we now introduce additional quantitative evidence
that considerably strengthens the plausibility of our hypothesis. This
evidence is based on the theoretical idea, from Morris (2000) and, in
particular, from Acemoglu et al. (2011), that the diffusion of innovations
crucially depends on the structure of the social network in which households
are embedded. This diffusion is faster and more extensive when there is less
clustering and/or cohesion and more connections between sub-communities
(assuming that innovations start in a few subcommunities).282828 The following
figures, from Acemoglu et al. (2011), illustrate this theoretical finding and
serve to clarify our empirical hypothesis. Figure (a) displays a network with
high clustering and few connections between sub-communities. In contrast,
Figure (b) shows a network with reduced clustering but more connections
between sub-communities. Assuming that innovations start from a few nodes,
Acemoglu et al. (2011) show that innovations spread faster and more
extensively in networks resembling Figure (b).

(a) (a)

Based on the previous idea but applying it to what we referred to earlier as
‘cultural innovations,’ particularly within the Colombian context of religious
competition, we present the following empirical hypothesis: If there is a
process of diffusion of cultural practices (which contribute to the reduction
of domestic violence), initiated in Colombian municipalities by the arrival of
new non-Catholic churches, and if the extent of this reduction is associated
with the diffusion process, then we expect a more significant reduction in
areas where these practices spread more extensively. In line with the theory
we discussed earlier, these areas should correspond to municipalities with a
higher degree of population homogeneity. We hypothesize that these
municipalities have lower levels of ethnic diversity, fewer civil society
organizations, and reduced religious diversity. In such municipalities, it is
plausible that there are fewer sub-communities, fostering increased
interactions among all individuals within the municipality. Consequently, in
these municipalities, we expect a higher likelihood of widespread adoption of
novel and appealing social practices, which should result in a more pronounced
reduction in domestic violence.292929This empirical implication can be deduced
from Acemoglu et al. (2011) under one key assumption: that the seed set is
small, which in our empirical application means that in each municipality, a
small number of non-Catholic churches are established for the first time.
Table LABEL:nonCatho_tab provides evidence that this is indeed the case: in
the vast majority of municipalities and years where at least one non-Catholic
church is established for the first time, exactly one non-Catholic church is
established. Furthermore, the average population in these municipalities is
high.

Figures 4(b) to 5(b), along with Tables
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_highlowethnic_tab to
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_highlowcivil_tab, offer evidence that aligns
with our hypothesis. Figure 4(b) and Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_highlowethnic_tab compare municipalities with
varying levels of ethnic diversity, as measured by the index of ethnic
fractionalization based on 1993 data.303030Colombia is composed of three main
self-identified ethnic groups: Afro-Colombians, indigenous aboriginals, and
Romani. Afro-Colombians constitute approximately 10% of the population,
indigenous aboriginals account for about 4%, and Romani for 0.6%. Data on
these percentages are available at the municipal level in Colombia for the
years 1993, 2005, and 2018, sourced from the DANE. Using the 1993 data, we
calculate the ethnic fractionalization index for each municipality by
subtracting one from the Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index is derived by
squaring the proportion of the population represented by each ethnic group and
then summing the resulting values. Notably, the figure and table show that the
impact of religious competition on domestic violence is more pronounced in
municipalities with lower ethnic fractionalization. Figure 5(b) and Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_highlowcivil_tab compare the impact of the first
non-Catholic church’s arrival in a municipality on domestic violence between
municipalities with varying numbers of civil society organizations per 100,000
inhabitants in 1995.313131To quantify the number of these organizations, we
utilized data from the Social Foundation, a nonprofit organization that
compiled this information for the year 1995. These organizations include
associative businesses, cooperatives, guild associations, NGOs, charitable
entities, clubs, networks, and multiple organizations with social,
environmental, cultural, ethnic, and gender-related purposes (see Fundación
Social, 1998, p. 126). On average, each municipality had around 142 such
organizations in 1995, or about 731 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Table Figures
and Tables). Although there is no data available in Colombia regarding the
size of these organizations, the diversity and prevalence of these
organizations suggest they reflect social fragmentation. Our hypothesis,
therefore, is that the more of these organizations exist in a municipality
(per 100,000 inhabitants), the more sub-populations are present, implying less
social homogeneity in that location. Here, we also find results that support
our hypothesis: the impact of religious competition on domestic violence is
weaker in municipalities characterized by a below-median number of civil
society organizations. Finally, Figure 6(b) and Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_highlowcatholic_tab focus on the religious
homogeneity of municipalities, measured by whether a municipality had an
above-median number of Catholic churches per 100,000 inhabitants in
1995.323232As previously mentioned, about 78.4% of the Colombia population
identify as Catholic, while approximately 10.1% identify as Protestant.
Unfortunately, there is no available municipal-level data in Colombia
concerning religious affiliation. To address this data gap, we propose using
the number of Catholic churches in each municipality, with data available for
the year 1995, as a proxy. Our hypothesis is that the greater the presence of
Catholic churches (measured per 100,000 inhabitants) in a municipality, the
stronger the Catholic Church’s capacity to attract adherents. This, in turn,
results in a higher prevalence of this religious affiliation and greater
religious homogeneity within the population. Consistently with our previous
findings, these results also show that the effects are more significant in
municipalities characterized by greater religious homogeneity.

A final set of evidence combines the results described in the previous
paragraph, specifically investigating whether the effect is more pronounced in
municipalities with lower levels of ethnic fractionalization and,
simultaneously, a reduced number of civil society organizations. Table
LABEL:twfe_domeviolenceMLrate_highlowcivilethnicivil_tab confirms that this is
indeed the case: the impact of the first non-Catholic church’s arrival in a
municipality on domestic violence is more significant in municipalities with
lower ethnic fractionalization and fewer civil society organizations (column
(2)). This table provides crucial evidence that supports the hypothesis
discussed in Section 4, suggesting that the effect of religious competition on
domestic violence is influenced by a diffusion phenomenon within social
networks, which explains the magnitude of this effect.

#### Alternative explanations

There may be alternative explanations for the results presented in Section 4.
One potential alternative explanation is that domestic violence decreases due
to changes in other, more significant factors often associated with this type
of violence. One example of such factors is the internal armed conflict. If
the establishment of a first non-Catholic church in a municipality leads to a
decrease in armed violence, and if armed violence is related to domestic
violence, then the decline in domestic violence might be viewed as a byproduct
of a presumed reduction in armed violence. While this explanation may seem
plausible, recent evidence from Galindo-Silva and Tchuente (2021) contradicts
it. According to their findings, the establishment of the first non-Catholic
church in a municipality actually increases conflict-related violence rather
than reducing it. Therefore, based on this result, we consider this
alternative explanation to be unlikely.

Another alternative explanation, which shares similarities with our favoured
one but is somewhat broader, suggests that the arrival of a first non-Catholic
church in a municipality reduces domestic violence by altering people’s moral
values, leading them to exhibit more moral behavior in general. While this
hypothesis aligns with our preferred explanation, it’s worth noting that this
effect may not be universally applicable. Evidence from Galindo-Silva and
Tchuente (2021) indicates that the establishment of a first non-Catholic
church in a municipality does not influence homicide or robbery rates in those
municipalities.

A third alternative explanation suggests that the establishment of the first
non-Catholic church in a municipality coincided with a positive economic boost
in that area, potentially leading to a decrease in domestic violence. It’s
important to note that this alternative explanation can complement our primary
hypothesis, as long as it doesn’t imply that the economic boost preceded the
church’s arrival, as we have argued in Section 4 with supporting evidence. In
this scenario, the cultural transformation initiated by the first non-Catholic
church may have positively influenced household economic conditions,
discouraging costly behaviors like alcohol consumption and promoting greater
female participation in the job market. This economic improvement may have
significantly contributed to the reduction in domestic violence.333333Since
there is no household-level data in Colombia that encompasses a significant
number of municipalities, and because we have found no anecdotal support for
this explanation, we consider it plausible but have opted not to emphasize it.

However, note that this third explanation can also be viewed in a way that
diverges from our primary hypothesis. It’s possible that the establishment of
the first non-Catholic church had a direct and positive impact on the local
economy, and the improved economic conditions in these municipalities may have
played a role in reducing domestic violence. One potential mechanism for this
impact is the investment in public goods, such as education or childcare, by
religious organizations to attract followers.

Empirically testing this hypothesis presents a challenge due to the absence of
municipal-level data in Colombia that can capture these investments. To
address this challenge, we propose examining poverty data at the municipal
level. Our hypothesis is that if the local economy in a municipality improved
as a result of the introduction of the first non-Catholic church, poverty
levels may have been affected. Table LABEL:poverty_tab presents the results of
this analysis, using the proportion of the population in the municipality with
unsatisfied basic needs as a proxy for poverty. Due to the limited
availability of poverty indicators at the municipal level in Colombia,343434In
Colombia, there are primarily three measures of poverty at the municipal
level: the proportion of population with unsatisfied basic needs, the
Multidimensional Poverty Index, and the incidence of poverty. Among these
three, only for the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index there is data for more than
one year (within period studied in this paper). However, this variation is
limited to three years: 2000, 2005, and 2011. the table only provides
estimations based on a static specification.353535Specifically, the table
displays TWFE estimates in which the dependent variable is the proportion of
population with unsatisfied basic needs, and the independent variable is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if a non-Catholic church was established
in the municipality for the first time in the previous year, and zero
otherwise. Importantly, the estimates in Table LABEL:poverty_tab are
statistically insignificant, which reduces the plausibility of this
explanation.

While the evidence mentioned in this last section does not rule out the
existence of alternative explanations to our main findings, we do believe that
it significantly diminishes the plausibility of some of these explanations,
such as the relationship with the armed conflict. It also points to a
potential extension of this work: What could have been the economic
consequences (at the household level or at a slightly more aggregated level)
of the cultural change in Colombia resulting from the increase in religious
competition?

##  5 Conclusion

Violence among members of the same family occurs in all countries and
cultures. The consequences and costs of these acts are both private and
social. This paper documents the causal link between a change in cultural
practices (induced by changes in religious competition) and domestic violence
using data from Colombia. We posit that in contexts where multiple religions
can peacefully coexist, increased religious competition will lead to less
domestic violence.

Colombia, which has a long history of Catholic dominance upheld by state-
imposed barriers, has undergone a significant transformation in its internal
religious composition. The liberalization of the religious services
marketplace has led to an increase in the population’s adherence to new non-
Catholic churches. Our results show that, in the Colombian context, more
religious competition (measured by the arrival of the first non-Catholic
church in a municipality) leads to fewer domestic violence events. To address
the problem of endogeneity, we use a two-way fixed effects model and allow for
a dynamic and static specification. We also control for an exhaustive set of
observable contemporary, and historical, characteristics. We demonstrate that
our estimates are robust compared to alternative estimators proposed in the
literature.

We provide evidence supporting the following mechanism: new non-Catholic
churches, to gain followers, develop new and more efficient cultural practices
that result in beneficial outcomes for the community. The reduction in
domestic violence serves as an example of these benefits. These benefits then
diffuse throughout society via the social network. Our findings suggest that
in municipalities where the social network is less clustered, the benefits of
religious competition are greater. Indeed, we show that in municipalities that
have lower levels of ethnic diversity, fewer civil society organizations, and
reduced religious diversity, the arrival of a new non-Catholic church further
reduces domestic violence.

This paper contributes to the literature examining the role played by
religious institutions in determining various social, economic, and political
outcomes. In the context of broader cultural change, this paper also relates
to the literature that examines the production and diffusion of new
technologies and the role played by market conditions. Although the evidence
presented in our paper is based on the Colombian experience, we believe that
the mechanism presented here could apply to other developing nations with
deeply religious populations undergoing significant peaceful changes in
religious composition.

## Figures and Tables

Table I: Descriptive Statistics |  |  |  | Municipalities where
---|---|---|---|---
|  |  |  | a first non-Catholic
|  |  |  | church was established
| All municipalities | in 2005-2019
| Obs. | Mean | St. dev. | Obs. | Mean | St. dev.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6)
_Domestic Violence_ |  |  |  |  |  |
Domestic violence (cases) | 16830 | 69.904 | 625.802 | 7530 | 108.865 | 353.813
Domestic violence (rate) | 16819 | 104.737 | 146.339 | 7525 | 124.907 | 155.189
Intimate partner violence (cases) | 16830 | 44.545 | 408.012 | 7530 | 69.579 | 228.013
Intimate partner violence (rate) | 16819 | 60.536 | 86.484 | 7525 | 75.509 | 93.354
Other domestic violence (cases) | 16830 | 25.359 | 219.191 | 7530 | 39.286 | 128.531
Other domestic violence (rate) | 16819 | 44.201 | 69.460 | 7525 | 49.398 | 68.868
Domestic violence (NP data, cases) | 11220 | 58.299 | 679.936 | 5020 | 90.506 | 380.767
Domestic violence (NP data, rate) | 11220 | 75.509 | 92.048 | 5020 | 87.675 | 95.539
_Sociodemographics and economy_ |  |  |  |  |  |
Total population | 16830 | 40190.309 | 243082.412 | 7530 | 63685.983 | 171820.532
Rurality index | 14575 | 0.572 | 0.244 | 6521 | 0.441 | 0.242
Index of ethnic fractionalization (1993) | 16800 | 0.042 | 0.119 | 7530 | 0.039 | 0.112
Unsatisfied basic needs (1993) | 2236 | 45.170 | 21.043 | 1001 | 40.753 | 20.905
Homicide (rate) | 12829 | 36.441 | 41.388 | 6441 | 35.235 | 36.857
Internally displaced pop. (outflow, rate) | 14575 | 1217.041 | 3004.463 | 6521 | 1106.387 | 2470.288
Internally displaced pop. (inflow, rate) | 14575 | 656.547 | 1650.789 | 6521 | 734.723 | 1473.844
Catholic churches (1995) | 15045 | 2.218 | 10.994 | 6915 | 2.820 | 7.873
Civil society organizations (1995) | 15780 | 141.589 | 341.569 | 7185 | 203.084 | 324.619
Vote share for traditional parties | 3299 | 0.336 | 0.252 | 1497 | 0.305 | 0.242

Note: The sample used in all columns is limited to data from the year 2005
onwards. Columns (1) through (3) encompass all municipalities, while columns
(4) through (6) are restricted to municipalities in which non-Catholic
churches acquired legal status within the specified time frame. ‘NP’ denotes
the Colombian _National Police_ , and the rates are presented per 100,000
inhabitants. Population data, information on the ethnic minority population,
and data on people with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty)
are from the _National Administrative Department of Statistics_ (DANE). Data
on internally displaced people and homicide rates are from the _Center for
Studies of Economic Development_(CEDE). Data on the number of civil society
organizations and the count of Catholic churches in 1995 are from the _Social
Foundation_ , a non-profit organization. Electoral data is from the from the
Colombian Electoral Agency.

Note: This figure shows the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (1), in a
specification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department
$\times$ year fixed effects, and the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, rurality index, and proportion of the population with
unsatisfied basic needs. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure III: Effect of first non-Catholic church on domestic violence: violence
against intimate partner and violence against other household members (a)
Violence against intimate partner

Note: These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (1), in
a specification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department
$\times$ year fixed effects, and the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, rurality index, and proportion of the population with
unsatisfied basic needs. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

_Static_ specification Effect at t$\geq 0$ -10.547∗ -14.089∗∗ -5.069 -6.965∗
-5.478∗∗ -7.124∗∗ (6.373) (6.541) (3.960) (4.042) (2.688) (2.802) R-sq 0.715
0.722 0.722 0.729 0.626 0.631 Observations 7465 6930 7465 6930 7465 6930
Baseline controls No Yes No Yes No Yes  Note: All columns in Panel A report
the estimates from Eq. (1) and all columns in Panel B report the estimates
from Eq. (2). All models include municipality and year fixed effects and
department $\times$ year fixed effects. The models in Panel A include 10 lags
and 10 leads, normalized to the period prior to treatment. The models with
baseline controls (columns (2), (4) and (6)) include the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, rurality index, and proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs. Samples for regression models use data from 2005 to
2019. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. *
denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at
5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.

Figure IV: Effect of first non-Catholic church on domestic violence:
heterogeneous effects by ethnic fractionalization (a) Above median ethnic
fractionalization

Note: These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (1) in
municipalities with an above median (a) and below median (b) index of ethnic
fractionalization, using data from 1993. All the specifications include
municipality and year fixed effects, department $\times$ year fixed effects,
and the following (lagged) covariates: log of total population, rurality
index, and proportion of the population with unsatisfied basic needs. Vertical
lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure V: Effect of first non-Catholic church on domestic violence:
heterogeneous effects by number of civil society organizations (a) Above
median # of civil society organizations

Note: These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (1) in
municipalities with an above median (a) and below median (b) number of civil
society organizations (per 100.000 inhabitants), using data from 1995. All the
specifications include municipality and year fixed effects, department
$\times$ year fixed effects, and the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, rurality index, and proportion of the population with
unsatisfied basic needs. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure VI: Effect of first non-Catholic church on domestic violence:
heterogeneous effects by number of Catholic churches in 1995 (a) Above median
# of Catholic churches

Note: These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (1) in
municipalities with an above median (a) and below median (b) number Catholic
churches (per 100.000 inhabitants), using data from 1995. All the
specifications include municipality and year fixed effects, department
$\times$ year fixed effects, and the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, rurality index, and proportion of the population with
unsatisfied basic needs. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

_Static_ specification Effect at t$\geq 0$ -22.196 -32.515∗∗ -8.835 -16.563
(15.469) (16.319) (5.938) (15.214) R-sq 0.695 0.762 0.674 0.790 Observations
1670 1673 1806 1524 Baseline controls No Yes No Yes  Note: All columns in
Panel A report the estimates from Eq. (1) and all columns in Panel B report
the estimates from Eq. (2), in municipalities with an above or below median
index of ethnic fractionalization, and, simultaneously, with an above or below
median number of civil society organizations. The models in Panel A include 10
lags and 10 leads, normalized to the period prior to treatment. All models
include municipality and year fixed effects, department $\times$ year fixed
effects, and the following (lagged) covariates: log of total population,
rurality index, and proportion with unsatisfied basic needs. Samples for
regression models use data from 2005 to 2019. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically
significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes
significant at 1%.

##  Appendix A Web Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: New non-Catholic churches, 1995-2021

Source: Public Registry of Religious Organizations (Office of Religious
Affairs, Colombian _Ministry of the Interior_)

Figure A2: Domestic Violence, 2005-2019

Source: _Forensis_ (Colombian _National Institute of Legal Medicine and
Forensic Sciences_)

Figure A3: Effect of first non-Catholic church on domestic violence:
robustness to using Colombian National Police Data

Note: This figure shows the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (1), in a
specification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department
$\times$ year fixed effects, and the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, rurality index, and proportion of the population with
unsatisfied basic needs. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

_Static_ spec. Effect at t$\geq 0$ -10.043∗∗ -10.361∗∗ (4.282) (4.081) R-sq
0.725 0.736 Observations 4980 4476 Baseline controls No Yes  Note: All columns
in Panel A report the estimates from Eq. (1) and all columns in Panel B report
the estimates from Eq. (2). All models include municipality and year fixed
effects and department $\times$ year fixed effects. The models in Panel A
include 10 lags and 10 leads, normalized to the period prior to treatment. The
model with baseline controls (column (2)) includes the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, rurality index, and proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs. Samples for regression models use data from 2005 to
2019. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. *
denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at
5% and *** denotes significant at 1%..

_Static_ specification Effect at t$\geq 0$ -7.583 -9.070 -15.596 -24.098∗∗
(6.704) (6.851) (11.157) (11.646) R-sq 0.719 0.722 0.717 0.726 Observations
3690 3442 3668 3385 Baseline controls No Yes No Yes  Note: All columns in
Panel A report the estimates from Eq. (1) and all columns in Panel B report
the estimates from Eq. (2), in municipalities with an above median (columns
(1) and (2)) and below median (columns (3) and (4)) index of ethnic
fractionalization, using data from 1993. All models include municipality and
year fixed effects, department $\times$ year fixed effects. The models with
baseline controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, rurality index, and proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs. Samples for regression models use data from 2005 to
2019. The models in Panel A include 10 lags and 10 leads, normalized to the
period prior to treatment. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at
10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%

_Static_ specification Effect at t$\geq 0$ -10.435 -11.190 -15.506 -20.124∗
(7.851) (7.909) (10.656) (11.270) R-sq 0.657 0.661 0.762 0.769 Observations
3865 3579 3540 3295 Baseline controls No Yes No Yes  Note: All columns in
Panel A report the estimates from Eq. (1) and all columns in Panel B report
the estimates from Eq. (2), in municipalities with an above median (columns
(1) and (2)) and below median (columns (3) and (4)) number of civil society
organizations (per 100.000 inhabitants), using data from 1995. All models
include municipality and year fixed effects, department $\times$ year fixed
effects. The models with baseline controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the
following (lagged) covariates: log of total population, rurality index, and
proportion with unsatisfied basic needs. Samples for regression models use
data from 2005 to 2019. The models in Panel A include 10 lags and 10 leads,
normalized to the period prior to treatment. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically
significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes
significant at 1%

_Static_ specification Effect at t$\geq 0$ -25.421∗∗ -29.036∗∗ 4.291 2.637
(11.164) (11.258) (6.227) (6.174) R-sq 0.681 0.692 0.814 0.818 Observations
4000 3701 3345 3119 Baseline controls No Yes No Yes  Note: All columns in
Panel A report the estimates from Eq. (1) and all columns in Panel B report
the estimates from Eq. (2), in municipalities with an above median (columns
(1) and (2)) and below median (columns (3) and (4)) number Catholic churches
(per 100.000 inhabitants), using data from 1995. All models include
municipality and year fixed effects, department $\times$ year fixed effects.
The models with baseline controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the following
(lagged) covariates: log of total population, rurality index, and proportion
with unsatisfied basic needs. Samples for regression models use data from 2005
to 2019. The models in Panel A include 10 lags and 10 leads, normalized to the
period prior to treatment. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at
10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.

## References

  * Acemoglu et al. (2011) Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A. and Yildiz, E. (2011). Diffusion of innovations in social networks. In 2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, pp. 2329–2334.
  * Acemoglu and Robinson (2021) — and Robinson, J. A. (2021). Culture, Institutions and Social Equilibria: A Framework. Working Paper 28832, National Bureau of Economic Research.
  * Aghion et al. (2014) Aghion, P., Akcigit, U. and Howitt, P. (2014). Chapter 1 - what do we learn from schumpeterian growth theory? In P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 2, Elsevier, pp. 515–563.
  * Aghion et al. (2005) —, Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Howitt, P. (2005). Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (2), 701–728.
  * Aghion et al. (2009) —, Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P. and Prantl, S. (2009). The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (1), 20–32.
  * Alesina et al. (2021) Alesina, A., Brioschi, B. and La Ferrara, E. (2021). Violence against women: A cross-cultural analysis for africa. Economica, 88 (349), 70–104.
  * Bastian (2005) Bastian, J. P. (2005). Pentecostalismos lationoamericanos. In A. M. Bidegaín and J. Demera (eds.), Globalización y diversidad religiosa en Colombia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
  * Bau and Fernández (2023) Bau, N. and Fernández, R. (2023). Culture and the family. In S. Lundberg and A. Voena (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of the Family, Volume 1, Handbook of the Economics of the Family, vol. 1, North-Holland, pp. 1–48.
  * Becker and Pascali (2019) Becker, S. O. and Pascali, L. (2019). Religion, division of labor, and conflict: Anti-semitism in germany over 600 years. American Economic Review, 109 (5), 1764–1804.
  * Beltrán (2013a) Beltrán, W. (2013a). Del monopolio católico a la explosión pentecostal Pluralización religiosa, secularización y cambio social en Colombia. Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
  * Beltrán (2013b) — (2013b). Pluralización religiosa y cambio: social en colombia. Theologica Xaveriana, 63 (175).
  * Bhalotra et al. (2019) Bhalotra, S., Kambhampati, U., Rawlings, S. and Siddique, Z. (2019). Intimate Partner Violence: The Influence of Job Opportunities for Men and Women. The World Bank Economic Review, 35 (2), 461–479.
  * Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) Borusyak, K. and Jaravel, X. (2017). Revisiting event study designs. Working Paper, Harvard University, May 2017.
  * Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) Callaway, B. and Sant’Anna, P. H. (2021). Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. Journal of Econometrics, 225 (2), 200–230, themed Issue: Treatment Effect 1.
  * Calvi and Keskar (2021) Calvi, R. and Keskar, A. (2021). ’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families. CEPR Discussion Papers 15696, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  * Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) Campante, F. and Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2015). Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan *. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130 (2), 615–658.
  * Cantoni (2015) Cantoni, D. (2015). The Economic Effects of the Protestant Reformation: Testing the Weber Hypothesis in the German Lands. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13 (4), 561–598.
  * Cantoni et al. (2018) —, Dittmar, J. and Yuchtman, N. (2018). Religious Competition and Reallocation: the Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133 (4), 2037–2096.
  * Caritas (2017) Caritas (2017). Iglesia católica pide actuar ya contra la violencia hacia las mujeres. https://caritascolombiana.org/iglesia-catolica-pide-actuar-ya-contra-la-violencia-hacia-las-mujeres/, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * Cleary (2011) Cleary, E. L. (2011). The Rise of Charismatic Catholicism in Latin America. University Press of Florida.
  * Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (2015) Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (2015). Iglesia anima campaña de la no violencia contra la mujer. https://www.cec.org.co/noticias-de-los-departamentos-del-spec/archivo/iglesia-anima-campana-de-la-no-violencia-contra-la, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (2017) Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (2017). Rueda de prensa: Iglesia contra todo tipo de violencia contra la mujer. https://www.cec.org.co/noticias-de-los-departamentos-del-spec/archivo/rueda-de-prensa-iglesia-contra-todo-tipo-de, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * DANE (2021) DANE (2021). Encuesta de cultura política (ecp). https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/gobierno/cultura-politica, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * de Chaisemartin and DHaultfoeuille (2020) de Chaisemartin, C. and DHaultfoeuille, X. (2020). Two-way fixed effects estimators with heterogeneous treatment effects. American Economic Review, 110 (9), 2964–96.
  * Duvvury et al. (2013) Duvvury, N., Callan, A., Carney, P. and S., R. (2013). Intimate partner violence: economic costs and implications for growth and development. Tech. rep., World Bank Women’s Voice, Agency, & Participation Research Series, [Online; accessed 12 October 2023].
  * Duvvury et al. (2019) —, Kijong, K., Sinead, A., Asante, F., Petri, T. P. and S., R. (2019). The macroeconomic loss due to violence against women and girls: the case of Ghana. Working Paper 939, Levy Economic Institute of Bard College.
  * El tiempo (2006) El tiempo (2006). Los padres de la televisión. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1948759, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * El tiempo (2022) El tiempo (2022). Personas como usted y como yo, en la primera línea de la iglesia. https://www.eltiempo.com/vida/religion/iglesia-los-laicos-que-apoyan-a-las-parroquias-y-comunidades-en-el-pais-679984, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * Fernández (2016) Fernández, R. (2016). Culture and Economics, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 1–10.
  * Fernández (2011) Fernández, R. (2011). Chapter 11 - does culture matter? Handbook of Social Economics, vol. 1, North-Holland, pp. 481–510.
  * Fernández et al. (2019) —, Parsa, S. and Viarengo, M. (2019). Coming out in America: AIDS, Politics, and Cultural Change. Working Paper 25697, National Bureau of Economic Research.
  * Fundación Social (1998) Fundación Social (1998). Municipios y Regiones de Colombia. Una mirada desde la sociedad civil. Antropos.
  * Galindo-Silva and Herrera-Idárraga (2023) Galindo-Silva, H. and Herrera-Idárraga, P. (2023). Culture, gender, and labor force participation: Evidence from colombia.
  * Galindo-Silva and Tchuente (2021) — and Tchuente, G. (2021). Fighting for not-so-religious souls: The role of religious competition in secular conflicts. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 191 (C), 127–152.
  * González and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) González, L. and Rodríguez-Planas, N. (2020). Gender norms and intimate partner violence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178, 223–248.
  * Griliches (1992) Griliches, Z. (1992). The search for r&d spillovers. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, S29–S47.
  * Gáfaro and Ibáñez (2012) Gáfaro, M. and Ibáñez, A. M. (2012). Violencia doméstica y mercados laborales: ¿Previene el trabajo femenino la violencia doméstica? Documentos CEDE 9822, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  * INMLCF (2005 to 2019) INMLCF (2005 to 2019). Forensis. datos para la vida. Forensis, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses.
  * Jensen and Oster (2009) Jensen, R. and Oster, E. (2009). The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women’s Status in India*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (3), 1057–1094.
  * Koenig et al. (2006) Koenig, M. A., Stephenson, R., Ahmed, S., Jejeebhoy, S. J. and Campbell, J. (2006). Individual and contextual determinants of domestic violence in north india. American Journal of Public Health, 96 (1), 132–138, pMID: 16317213.
  * La Ferrara et al. (2012) La Ferrara, E., Chong, A. and Duryea, S. (2012). Soap operas and fertility: Evidence from brazil. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4 (4), 1–31.
  * Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) Laporte, A. and Windmeijer, F. (2005). Estimation of panel data models with binary indicators when treatment effects are not constant over time. Economics Letters, 88 (3), 389–396.
  * Miller et al. (2013) Miller, D. E., Sargeant, K. H. and Flory, R. (2013). Spirit and Power: The Growth and Global Impact of Pentecostalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
  * Minsalud (2016) Minsalud (2016). Política Pública Nacional de Apoyo y Fortalecimiento a las Familias. Tech. rep., Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, [Online; accessed 12 October 2023].
  * Moreno (2011) Moreno, C. (2011). Discursos y estrategias de la iglesia católica frente a la pluralización religiosa en colombia. Revista Guillermo de Ockham, 9 (2).
  * Morris (2000) Morris, S. (2000). Contagion. The Review of Economic Studies, 67 (1), 57–78.
  * Murnen et al. (2002) Murnen, S. K., Wright, C. and Kaluzny, G. (2002). If "boys will be boys," then girls will be victims? a meta-analytic review of the research that relates masculine ideology to sexual aggression. Sex Roles, 46 (11-12), 359 – 375.
  * O’Neil and Harway (1997) O’Neil, J. M. and Harway, M. (1997). A multivariate model explaining men’s violence toward women: Predisposing and triggering hypotheses. Violence Against Women, 3 (2), 182–203, pMID: 12294813\.
  * Ospina Martínez (2004) Ospina Martínez, M. A. y. F. S. (2004). Nuevas espiritualidades y recomposición institucional en la iglesia católica: la era del laicado. In A. M. Bidegain (ed.), La experiencia cristiana en Colombia, Santillana.
  * Ouedraogo and Stenzel (2021) Ouedraogo, R. and Stenzel, D. (2021). The Heavy Economic Toll of Gender-based Violence: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. Working Paper 21/277, IMF.
  * Pew Research Center (2014) Pew Research Center (2014). Religion in Latin America. Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region. Report, Pew Research Center.
  * Rey Martínez (2008) Rey Martínez, O. L. (2008). El empoderamiento de mujeres en los procesos cristiano-protestantes: historias de vida. Tech. rep., Universidad Pedagógica Nacional.
  * Ribero and Sanchez (2005) Ribero, R. and Sanchez, F. (2005). Determinants, Effects And Costs Of Domestic Violence. Documentos CEDE 2339, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  * Rios-Avila et al. (2021) Rios-Avila, F., Sant’Anna, P. H. and Callaway, B. (2021). CSDID: Stata module for the estimation of Difference-in-Difference models with multiple time periods. Statistical Software Components, Boston College Department of Economics.
  * Santander et al. (2020) Santander, J., González, A. and Rojas, S. (2020). Análisis de las Respuestas del Estado Colombiano Ante el Problema de Violencia Intrafamiliar en Colombia. Documento de Política, Cider 11, Universidad de los Andes, Centro Interdisciplinarios de Estudios sobre Desarrollo, Cider.
  * Schulz (2022) Schulz, J. F. (2022). Kin Networks and Institutional Development. The Economic Journal, 132 (647), 2578–2613.
  * Schulz et al. (2019) —, Bahrami-Rad, D., Beauchamp, J. P. and Henrich, J. (2019). The church, intensive kinship, and global psychological variation. Science, 366 (6466), eaau5141.
  * Somma et al. (2017) Somma, N. M., Bargsted, M. A. and Valenzuela, E. (2017). Mapping religious change in latin america. Latin American Politics and Society, 59 (1), 119–142.
  * Sun and Abraham (2021) Sun, L. and Abraham, S. (2021). Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects. Journal of Econometrics, 225 (2), 175–199, themed Issue: Treatment Effect 1.
  * Tejeiro (2010) Tejeiro, C. (2010). El pentecostalismo en el contexto del cambio social y religioso en américa latina y colombia. In C. Tejeiro (ed.), El pentecostalismo en Colombia. Prácticas religiosas, liderazgo y participación política, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
  * Tur-Prats (2019) Tur-Prats, A. (2019). Family Types and Intimate Partner Violence: A Historical Perspective. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 101 (5), 878–891.
  * UN (2015) UN (2015). The world’s women 2015 trends and statistics. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/downloads/worldswomen2015_report.pdf, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.
  * UNODC (2017) UNODC (2017). World drug report. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf, online; consulted 18 Oct 2023.