# Comprehensive Analysis of BB84, A Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

SujayKumar Reddy M
School of Computer Science and Engineering
Vellore Institute of Technology, Vellore
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Chandra Mohan B
School of Computer Science and Engineering
Vellore Institute of Technology, Vellore
<EMAIL_ADDRESS>

###### Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technique that enables secure
communication between two parties by sharing a secret key. One of the most
well-known QKD protocols is the BB84 protocol, proposed by Charles Bennett and
Gilles Brassard in 1984. In this protocol, Alice and Bob use a quantum channel
to exchange qubits, allowing them to generate a shared key that is resistant
to eavesdropping. This paper presents a comparative study of existing QKD
schemes, including the BB84 protocol, and highlights the advancements made in
the BB84 protocol over the years. The study aims to provide a comprehensive
overview of the different QKD schemes and their strengths and weaknesses and
demonstrate QKD’s working principles through existing simulations and
implementations. Through this study, we show that the BB84 protocol is a
highly secure QKD scheme that has been extensively studied and implemented in
various settings. Furthermore, we discuss the improvements made to the BB84
protocol to enhance its security and practicality, including the use of decoy
states and advanced error correction techniques. Overall, this paper provides
a comprehensive analysis of QKD schemes, focusing on the BB84 protocol in
secure communication technologies.

_K_ eywords QKD, Qubit, Quantum Cryptography, Network Security, Cryptography,
IoT Security

##  1 Introduction

Quantum cryptography stands at the forefront of cryptographic advancements,
harnessing the principles of quantum mechanics to establish communication
channels with unparalleled security between two entities. While classical
cryptosystems have long been employed for secure communication, the escalating
sophistication of cyber threats has necessitated the exploration of more
robust cryptographic methodologies. The vulnerabilities inherent in classical
systems have prompted the evolution of advanced cryptographic techniques, with
public key cryptosystems emerging as a notable solution. These systems deploy
pairs of keys for encryption and decryption, offering a secure communication
framework without the necessity of a shared secret key. However, the
susceptibility of public key cryptosystems to hacking attempts has spurred the
rise of quantum cryptography.

Quantum cryptography redefines secure communication by leveraging the
principles of quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys. Diverging from
classical cryptographic approaches, quantum cryptography derives its security
from the intrinsic laws of physics, rendering it exceptionally resistant to
even the most sophisticated computing systems. At the core of quantum
cryptography lies Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), an innovative protocol that
exploits quantum mechanical principles for secure key distribution. The
fundamental tenet of QKD revolves around the disturbance caused by the act of
measuring a quantum system, thereby enabling the immediate detection of any
unauthorized interception of the key. This inherent property preserves the
confidentiality and integrity of communication, ensuring that the key
distribution process remains secure, with any interception attempts being
promptly identified.

As highlighted by Kalaivani et al. [8], there exists a nuanced distinction
between the terms "Quantum Cryptography" and "Quantum Key Distribution" (QKD).
Quantum Cryptography, utilizing the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the
Principle of Photon Polarization [7], encapsulates a broader spectrum of
quantum-based cryptographic concepts. On the other hand, Quantum Key
Distribution specifically employs the principles of Superposition and Quantum
Entanglement [8] to establish secure communication channels. This
differentiation underscores the diverse and intricate nature of quantum
cryptographic techniques, each playing a vital role in advancing the security
landscape of modern communication systems. Furthermore, this paper delves into
the evolution of the BB84 protocol, elucidating the enhancements devised to
bolster its security and practicality. Noteworthy improvements discussed
herein include the incorporation of decoy states and advanced error correction
techniques. These refinements contribute to fortifying the BB84 protocol
against potential vulnerabilities, rendering it not only secure but also
practical for real-world applications. In essence, our study provides a
thorough and insightful analysis of QKD schemes, with a particular spotlight
on the BB84 protocol, contributing to the understanding and advancement of
secure communication technologies.

###  1.1 Heisenberg Uncertainity Principle

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a foundational principle of quantum
mechanics that arises from the wave-particle duality of quantum objects. It
states that certain pairs of physical properties of a particle or system
cannot be precisely measured simultaneously. This principle has important
implications for quantum cryptography, which relies on the fact that any
attempt to measure or intercept a quantum system carrying a secret key will
inevitably disturb its state in a detectable way [9]. Eavesdropping on a
quantum message is therefore akin to making a measurement, and the uncertainty
principle ensures that any attempt to do so will leave a detectable signature,
allowing legitimate parties to detect and prevent eavesdropping.

###  1.2 Quantum Superposition

Quantum superposition [1] is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics that
has been extensively studied and applied in various fields such as quantum
computing and quantum cryptography. It describes the ability of quantum
particles to exist in multiple states simultaneously, and this property has
been observed experimentally in numerous systems, ranging from photons to
atoms and molecules. One example of quantum superposition is the famous
Schrödinger’s cat experiment, which has been extensively discussed in the
literature. Gerry et al and Knight et al [2] provided a detailed mathematical
interpretation of this experiment, showing that the cat is in a superposition
state of both dead and alive until it is observed, at which point the wave
function collapses into one of the two possible states.

##  2 Quantum Entaglement

In the realm of quantum mechanics, the phenomenon of quantum entanglement is
observed when two or more particles become so strongly correlated that their
states are interdependent, regardless of the distance between them. This
phenomenon was referred to as "Spooky Action of Distance" by Einstein [4]. The
unique nature of quantum entanglement ensures that no other system can be
correlated to the entangled particles, making it a promising tool for secure
communication [11]. The use of entanglement in communication protocols
provides a means of detecting any attempts at eavesdropping, since any such
attempt would result in a change to the entangled state that would be
detectable to the communicating parties [10].

Yixuan et al [3] provide a comprehensive overview of the process of generating
entangled photon pairs using the Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC)
technique. They discuss the Highly Efficient Source of Photon Pairs based on
SPDC in a Single-Mode Fiber (HSPS) method, which is often utilized as the
source of photons in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. The entangled
photons generated via the HSPS method allow for the creation of a shared
secret key that is inherently secure. Any attempt to eavesdrop or intercept
the photons would cause the entanglement to be destroyed, alerting the
communicating parties to the presence of an attacker.

This comprehensive paper unfolds across five meticulously crafted sections,
each contributing to the nuanced exploration of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
and, notably, the BB84 protocol. Sections 2 and 3 delve into the foundational
principles of the QKD protocol, emphasizing a detailed analysis of the
renowned BB84 variant. Shifting focus, Sections 4 and 5 undertake a critical
examination of diverse iterations of the BB84 protocol crafted by different
authors, offering a thorough review of its nuanced variations. The study
reaches its zenith in Section 6, where various simulations are executed to
empirically scrutinize both the Quantum Key Distribution Protocol and the BB84
variant, providing valuable insights into their real-world applicability and
performance under varying conditions.

##  3 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that allows two
parties to distribute a secret key using quantum mechanics principles. QKD
protocols, such as BB84, decoy-based QKD, and phase differential shift QKD,
have been developed to achieve secure key distribution. By utilizing quantum
properties such as the uncertainty principle, QKD enables the generation of a
shared secret key that cannot be intercepted without being detected, providing
a high level of security for cryptographic communications.

##  4 BB84 Protocol

The BB84 protocol, devised by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, is a quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol that utilizes a combination of a quantum channel
and an insecure classical channel which needs to be authenticated inorder to
distribute a secret key between two parties. The protocol ensures the security
of the key by detecting any attempts at eavesdropping on the quantum channel,
thus providing a means of detecting any potential security breaches. The BB84
protocol uses four quantum states that are randomly prepared by the sender,
Alice, in one of two bases (rectilinear basis or diagonal basis) to transmit
information to the receiver, Bob.

The four quantum states used in BB84 are:

  1. 1.

$|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ in the rectilinear basis (X-basis), where
$|0\rangle=(1,0)$ and $|1\rangle=(0,1)$

  2. 2.

$|+\rangle$ and $|-\rangle$ in the diagonal basis (Z-basis), where
$|+\rangle=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(1,1)$ and $|-\rangle=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(1,-1)$

The working principle of BB84 protocol is stated below with Alice and Bob.

Figure 1: Alice, Bob and Mallory Classic Communication Example Figure 2:
Transmission from Alice to Bob without Mallory in the Quantum Channel using
BB84 Protocol Figure 3: Rectilinear and Diagonal Bases according to the
Quantum Transmission

In Figure 1, we can see the communication process between Alice and Bob, with
Mallory being the potential intruder who may attempt to intercept their
communication. In Figure 2, as presented in [16], the transmission of bits
between Alice and Bob can be observed, which ultimately leads to the
generation of the Shared Secret Key, also known as the sifted key in Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD). The BB84 protocol consists of the following steps:

  1. 1.

Alice generates a random sequence of bits and encodes each bit into a randomly
chosen polarization state using one of two bases: Rectilinear (R) or Diagonal
(D).

  2. 2.

However, when information is encoded in non-orthogonal quantum states, such as
single photons with polarization directions 0, 45, 90, and 135 degrees
according to Figure LABEL:fig:figure3.

  3. 3.

Alice sends the encoded photons to Bob through the quantum channel.

  4. 4.

Bob randomly chooses one of the two bases to measure the polarization of each
photon he receives from Alice.

  5. 5.

Bob measures each photon and records the results as either a 0 or a 1.

  6. 6.

After the transmission, Alice and Bob publicly disclose the bases they used
for each bit over the classical channel.

  7. 7.

Alice and Bob discard the bits where the bases did not match.

  8. 8.

The remaining bits form the sifted key.

  9. 9.

To ensure the security of the key, Alice and Bob perform a test to detect any
potential eavesdropping by comparing a subset of their sifted key over the
classical channel.

  10. 10.

Finally, they use error correction and privacy amplification techniques to
extract a shorter, but secure, shared secret key.

To ensure the utmost security of the key generated through the BB84 protocol,
Alice and Bob meticulously conduct a pivotal test designed to detect potential
eavesdropping. This involves a thoughtful comparison of a randomly chosen
subset of their sifted key over the classical channel. Alice communicates her
chosen subset to Bob, who then scrutinizes it against his own subset, promptly
sharing the results with Alice. A substantial correlation between the subsets
signifies the absence of an eavesdropper on the quantum channel, affirming the
key’s security. Conversely, a lack of correspondence indicates potential
eavesdropping, prompting an immediate protocol termination. Termed the
"privacy amplification" step, this test is integral in safeguarding key
distribution. Concluding the protocol, error correction and privacy
amplification techniques are employed to derive a shorter yet highly secure
shared secret key. The accuracy of the key’s authenticity depends on whether
Alice and Bob measured in the same bases, resulting in 100% accuracy, or if
different bases were chosen, reducing accuracy to 50%. In essence, the BB84
protocol ingeniously enables two parties to establish a shared secret key over
an insecure channel, harmonizing the principles of quantum mechanics with
classical communication.

##  5 Related Work

The study done by Meyer et al and his colleagues [12] conducted a survey of
the current state of research in quantum cryptography, with a specific focus
on the BB84 protocol and the quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol. The
authors provided a detailed explanation of the working principle of the BB84
protocol and presented proofs for three concepts of "unconditional security"
in quantum key distribution. These three concepts are the entanglement- based
version of the protocol, the equivalent entanglement-based version, and a
version where these two versions are shown to be equivalent. The QBC protocol
was identified as an active area of research within quantum cryptography.
Sasirekha et al and Hemalatha et al [6] have conducted extensive research on
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and its practical applications. Their work
includes a detailed outline of the six critical steps involved in QKD, as well
as proposed methods for detecting eavesdropping. These methods include
measuring the polarization of photons, which cannot be done without disturbing
the photon, and using entangled photons, which allows Alice and Bob to detect
any interference or disturbance in the protocol. The researchers also
highlight the potential applications of QKD, including IoT and secure voting,
as demonstrated by a case study in Switzerland [13]. Abushgra et al and
Abdulbast et al conducted an extensive investigation [14] into multiple
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) algorithms, which included a comparison of the
performance of the BB84 protocol with its various iterations, such as B92,
SARG04 [15], KMB09, EPR, S13, and DPS. The study focused on the working
principles of these algorithms and evaluated their effectiveness in detecting
presence, polarization, state probability, qubit string, classical channel
presence, decoy states, sifting phase, and different attacks in QKD. The
results of the study showed that the BB84 protocol was vulnerable to some
attacks.

Priyanka et al. [16] identified various limitations of the BB84 protocol,
including the introduction of noise caused by imperfect detectors, technical
difficulties in producing a perfectly single-photon pulse, inefficiency in
generating the key, and the assumption that the subset of the total
transmission will be used to generate the key. The paper also delves into the
modifications made to the BB84 protocol, such as omitting the public
announcement of bases, using multilevel encoding, implementing the decoy pulse
method, and employing bi-directional QKD with practical faint pulses.

##  6 Recent Enhancements in BB84

In the study [17], the authors focused on improving the BB84 protocol using
the polarization technique, which allows for the transmission of n-bit keys
via photons without any loss of information. They proposed an enhanced BB84
protocol (EBB84) that eliminates the need for a classical channel by allowing
the sender to randomly encode n-bit keys into photons and transmit them
through a quantum channel. The receiver then generates the key using the same
polarization, and both parties agree on the basis used for encoding and
transmitting the key. The authors used simulations to compare the performance
of the BB84 and EBB84 protocols in terms of execution time, key length
parameter, and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). The simulations were carried out
on a computer with specific hardware and software specifications, and the
results were presented in tables and figures.

In the study [18], the authors propose a modified version of the BB84 protocol
to overcome security issues caused by various source imperfections, including
state preparation flaws and side channels such as Trojan-horse attacks, mode
dependencies, and classical correlations between emitted pulses. The proposed
protocol exploits basis mismatched events and employs the Reference Technique,
a powerful mathematical tool, to ensure implementation security. The authors
also compare the achievable secret-key rate of the modified BB84 protocol with
that of the three-state loss-tolerant protocol and demonstrate that adding a
fourth state significantly improves the estimation of leaked information in
the presence of source imperfections, resulting in better performance.

In their research [20], the authors introduce the BB84 protocol as the first
quantum confidential communication protocol and propose a QKD network
structure specifically designed for power business scenarios, which accounts
for the complexity and diversity of power grid environments and communication
transmission losses. To evaluate the performance of the QKD system, the study
analyzes two tiers - the key tier, which focuses on factors that may affect
the secret key rate in the quantum channel, and the business tier, which
examines the transmission performance of the system when using a quantum
virtual private network (QVPN) for encrypted transmission. The performance of
the QKD device and QVPN is then tested in various simulated environments,
providing insights into the system’s suitability for large-scale applications.

The paper [21] delves into the security concerns and risks that arise when
transmitting sensitive medical data through wireless body sensor networks
(WBSNs). To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the paper proposes an enhanced
BB84 quantum cryptography protocol (EBB84QCP) that uses a bitwise operator for
secure secret key sharing between communicating parties. This approach avoids
the direct sharing of keys through traditional methods like email or phone,
which are susceptible to interception by attackers. The proposed protocol is
demonstrated to be efficient in terms of the constrained resources of WBSNs
and provides a robust level of security for transmitting sensitive
information.

##  7 Simulation Results of Quantum Key Distribution , BB84 Protocol

###  7.1 BB84 Alice- Bob Simulation Results [23]

The paper [22] proposes some existing simulations and we choose do simulations
with this tool for different parameters.

Figure 4: Alice and Bob have same bases(X) Figure 5: Alice and Bob have same bases(Z) Figure 6: Alice(X) and Bob(Z) have different bases Figure 7: Alice(Z) and Bob(X) have different bases Figure 8: Alice and Bob have random orientation Figure 9: Alice and Bob have random orientation with Eve intercepting and resend particles Table 1: Nodes Location for only Key Generator Layer Node s.no | LOCATION | LAYER
---|---|---
Node 1 | MUMBAI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 2 | DELHI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 3 | NEAR TO MUMBAI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 4 | NEAR TO DELHI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Table 2: Nodes Parameters for only Key Generator Layer Layer | Nodes | Parameters
---|---|---
1-2 | QKD KMS | Node 1 and Node 2
|  | Key Size (BIT) – 512
|  | PP Packet size – 100
|  | OKD Stop Time – 50sec
3-4 | Key Generator Layer | Node 3 and Node 4
|  | Average size of consumed key-pairs (bits) - 0
|  | Average size of generated key-pairs (bits) - 512
|  | Key rate (bit/sec) - 10811
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 0
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 0
|  | Key-pairs generated - 1055
|  | Key-pairs generated (bits) - 540160
|  | Link distance (meters) - 1441565
|  | QKD Buffer Capacity (bits) - 50000000
|  | Start Time (sec) - 0
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
Figure 10: Key Generated Pairs for Key Generated Layer Table 3: Nodes Location for ETSI 014 and Key Generator Layer Node s.no | LOCATION | LAYER
---|---|---
Node 1 | MUMBAI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 2 | DELHI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 3 | NEAR TO MUMBAI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 4 | NEAR TO DELHI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 5 | PUNE | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 014)
Node 6 | GWALIOR | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 014)
Table 4: Nodes Parameters for ETSI 014 and Key Generator Layer Layer | Nodes | Parameters
---|---|---
1-2 | QKD KMS | Node 1 and Node 2
|  | Key Size (BIT) – 512
|  | PP Packet size – 100
|  | OKD Stop Time – 50sec
3-4 | Key Generator Layer | Node 3 and Node 4
|  | Average size of consumed key-pairs (bits) - 487
|  | Average size of generated key-pairs (bits) - 498
|  | Key rate (bit/sec) - 100000
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 2938
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 1432256
|  | Key-pairs generated - 11517
|  | Key-pairs generated (bits) - 5735936
|  | Link distance (meters) - 1410425
|  | QKD Buffer Capacity (bits) - 50000000
|  | Start Time (sec) - 0
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
5-6 | Key Consumer Layer ETSI 014 | Node 5 and Node 6
|  | Key Consumption Statistics
|  | Average size of consumed key-pairs (bits) - 464
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 1500
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 696000
|  | QKD Apps Statistics
|  | Authentication - SHA-1
|  | Bytes Received - 154294
|  | Bytes Sent - 154294
|  | Encryption - OTP
|  | Key/Data utilization (%) - 74.91
|  | Missed send packet calls - 251
|  | Number of Keys to Fetch From KMS - 3
|  | Packet Size (bytes) - 100
|  | Packets Received - 749
|  | Packets Sent - 749
|  | Start Time (sec) - 10
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
|  | Traffic Rate (bit/sec) - 20000
|  | QKD Apps-KMS Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 978368
|  | Bytes Sent - 572684
|  | Packets Received - 1439
|  | Packets Sent - 1439
|  | Signaling Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 365000
|  | Bytes Sent - 365000
|  | Packets Received - 1000
|  | Packets Sent - 1000
Figure 11: Key Generated Pairs for ETSI 014 and Key Generator Layer Figure 12: Key Consumer Layer ETSI 014 Statistics Table 5: Nodes Location for ETSI 004 and Key Generator Layer Node s.no | LOCATION | LAYER
---|---|---
Node 1 | MUMBAI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 2 | DELHI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 3 | NEAR TO MUMBAI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 4 | NEAR TO DELHI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 5 | PUNE | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 004)
Node 6 | GWALIOR | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 004)
Table 6: Nodes Parameters for ETSI 004 and Key Generator Layer Layer | Nodes | Parameters
---|---|---
1-2 | QKD KMS | Node 1 and Node 2
|  | Key Size (BIT) – 512
|  | PP Packet size – 100
|  | OKD Stop Time – 50sec
3-4 | Key Generator Layer | Node 3 and Node 4
|  | Average size of consumed key-pairs (bits) - 512
|  | Average size of generated key-pairs (bits) - 512
|  | Key rate (bit/sec) - 100000
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 1796
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 919552
|  | Key-pairs generated - 9767
|  | Key-pairs generated (bits) - 5003456
|  | Link distance (meters) - 1440197
|  | QKD Buffer Capacity (bits) - 50000000
|  | Start Time (sec) - 0
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
5-6 | Key Consumer Layer ETSI 004 | Node 5 and Node 6
|  | Key Consumption Statistics
|  | Average size of consumed key-pairs (bits) - 462
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 1976
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 914848
|  | QKD Apps Statistics
|  | Authentication - SHA-1
|  | Bytes Received - 202910
|  | Bytes Sent - 202910
|  | Encryption - OTP
|  | Key/Data utilization (%) - 100
|  | Missed send packet calls - 0
|  | Packet Size (bytes) - 100
|  | Packets Received - 985
|  | Packets Sent - 985
|  | Size of Key Buffer for Authentication - 6
|  | Size of Key Buffer for Encryption - 1
|  | Start Time (sec) - 10
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
|  | Traffic Rate (bit/sec) - 20000
|  | QKD Apps-KMS Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 1978801
|  | Bytes Sent - 1716638
|  | Packets Received - 3964
|  | Packets Sent - 3966
|  | Signaling Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 1812
|  | Bytes Sent - 1812
|  | Packets Received - 6
|  | Packets Sent - 6
Figure 13: Key Generator Layer for ETSI004 and Key Generator Layer Figure 14: Key Consumer Layer ETSI004 Statistics Table 7: Nodes Location for ETSI 004, ETSI 014, and Key Generator Layer Node s.no | LOCATION | LAYER
---|---|---
Node 1 | MUMBAI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 2 | DELHI | QKD-KMS Default
Node 3 | NEAR TO MUMBAI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 4 | NEAR TO DELHI | 3-4 Key Generator Layer
Node 5 | PUNE | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 004)
Node 6 | GWALIOR | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 004)
Node 7 | Goa | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 014)
Node 8 | Kolkata | 5-6 Key Consumer Layer (ETSI 014)
Table 8: Nodes Parameters for ETSI 004, ETSI 014, and Key Generator Layer Layer | Nodes | Parameters
---|---|---
1-2 | QKD KMS Node 1 and Node 2 | Key Size (BIT) - 512
|  | PP Packet size - 100
|  | OKD Stop Time - 50sec
3-4 | Key Generator Layer Node 3 and Node 4 | Average size of consumed key-pairs (bits) - 479
|  | Average size of generated key-pairs (bits) - 498
|  | Key rate (bit/sec) - 100000
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 4902
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 2351584
|  | Key-pairs generated - 11519
|  | Key-pairs generated (bits) - 5739488
|  | Link distance (meters) - 1440197
|  | QKD Buffer Capacity (bits) - 50000000
|  | Start Time (sec) - 0
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
5-6 | Key Consumer Layer ETSI 004 | Node 5 and Node 6
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 914848
|  | QKDApps Statistics
|  | Authentication - SHA-1
|  | Bytes Received - 202910
|  | Bytes Sent - 202910
|  | Encryption - OTP
|  | Key/Data utilization (%) - 100
|  | Missed send packet calls - 0
|  | Packet Size (bytes) - 100
|  | Packets Received - 985
|  | Packets Sent - 985
|  | Size of Key Buffer for Authentication - 6
|  | Size of Key Buffer for Encryption - 1
|  | Start Time (sec) - 10
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
|  | Traffic Rate (bit/sec) - 20000
|  | QKDApps-KMS Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 1978469
|  | Bytes Sent - 1716656
|  | Packets Received - 3964
|  | Packets Sent - 3966
|  | Signaling Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 1812
|  | Bytes Sent - 1812
|  | Packets Received - 6
|  | Packets Sent - 6
Table 9: Nodes Parameters for ETSI 004, ETSI 014, and Key Generator Layer Layer |  Nodes | Parameters
---|---|---
7-8 |  Key Consumer Layer ETSI 014 Node 7 and Node 8 | Average size of consumed
|  | key-pairs (bits) - 464
|  | Key-pairs consumed - 1500
|  | Key-pairs consumed (bits) - 696000
|  | QKDApps Statistics
|  | Authentication - SHA-1
|  | Bytes Received - 154294
|  | Bytes Sent - 154294
|  | Encryption - OTP
|  | Key/Data utilization (%) - 74.91
|  | Missed send packet calls - 251
|  | Number of Keys to Fetch
|  | From KMS - 3
|  | Packet Size (bytes) - 100
|  | Packets Received - 749
|  | Packets Sent - 749
|  | Start Time (sec) - 10
|  | Stop Time (sec) - 50
|  | Traffic Rate (bit/sec) - 20000
|  | QKDApps-KMS Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 978368
|  | Bytes Sent - 572684
|  | Packets Received - 1439
|  | Packets Sent - 1439
|  | Signaling Statistics
|  | Bytes Received - 365000
|  | Bytes Sent - 365000
|  | Packets Received - 1000
|  | Packets Sent - 1000
Figure 15:  Key Generator Layer for ETSI 004, ETSI 014 and Key Generator Layer
Figure 16: Key Consumer Layer for ETSI 004 Statistics Figure 17: Key Consumer
Layer for ETSI 014 Statistics

In Figures [4] and [5], the experimental results depict the utilization of X/Z
bases by both Alice and Bob, aiming for theoretically zero errors. However,
this method is deemed insecure since it involves the use of identical bases by
both parties, potentially enabling Eve to intercept the messages by possessing
the same bases.

Figures [6] and [7] reveal that no key generation occurs when Alice measures
in the X bases and Bob in the Z bases, regardless of the parameters. This
observation is based on a fixed orientation approach. To delve deeper into the
subject, we further investigate the outcomes of a random orientation approach.

Figure 8 illustrates that employing random bases enhances security between
Alice and Bob, as Eve faces the challenge of selecting the same basis as
Alice.

The data presented in Figure [9] indicates the occurrence of an error,
suggesting a potential interception by Eve. Consequently, it is advisable to
discard the entire key to preempt any security breach.

###  7.2 Quantum Key Distribution Network Simulation Results [24]

QKDNetSim serves as a pivotal network simulation platform designed to
streamline the integration of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) into established
networks. As QKD research continues to evolve in complexity, the role of
simulation technologies has become indispensable for evaluating the practical
viability of theoretical advancements. QKDNetSim empowers researchers by
providing a platform to construct intricate network topologies and execute
repeatable experiments. This capability not only expedites the research
process but also mitigates the time and costs typically associated with
deploying a comprehensive physical testbed. The platform’s versatility
contributes to a more efficient and cost-effective exploration of QKD
implementations within diverse network environments.

The QKDNetSim is anchored on the QKD-Key Management System (KMS) as the
central entity, establishing connections between applications that demand
cryptographic operations and the broader QKD network. It adheres to the
standards outlined by ETSI004 [26] and ETSI014 [27]. The simulator
incorporates various components, including the QKD Key, QKD Buffer, QKD
Encryptor, and QKD Post-Processing Application. A distinctive feature of
QKDNetSim is its implementation of custom signalization, enabling
communication between two KMS. This sets it apart from other simulators [28]
and enhances its capabilities in simulating quantum key distribution
scenarios.

A notable strength of QKDNetSim lies in its capacity to analyze diverse attack
scenarios, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) on Key Management
Systems (KMS) [25]. Additionally, QKDNetSim offers the flexibility to
integrate post-quantum techniques, thereby providing researchers with novel
avenues for exploration and development within the realm of quantum
cryptography. This feature enhances the simulator’s utility by accommodating
evolving security challenges and fostering advancements in quantum
cryptographic protocols.

In this study, a comprehensive simulation was conducted specifically focusing
on the Key Generator Layer in conjunction with the default QKD KMS layer. The
simulation results and analyses are presented in Tables 1 and 2, providing
intricate details about node locations, layers, and the corresponding
parameters employed in the QKDNetSim simulation.

Furthermore, Figure [10] visually encapsulates the statistics related to the
generation and storage of key pairs in the QKD buffers. It also outlines the
consumption patterns of key pairs by Alice and Bob’s QKD systems.

Extending our analysis, Tables 3 and 4 furnish a detailed breakdown of node
locations, layers, and associated parameters employed in the QKDNetSim
simulation. Complementing this information, Figure [11] offers key insights
into statistics concerning the generation and storage of key pairs in QKD
buffers, as well as their consumption by Alice and Bob’s QKD systems.

Figure [12] is dedicated to presenting statistics specifically related to the
Key Consumer Layer ETSI 014, highlighting authentication type VMAC and
encryption type One-Time Pad.

Moving forward, Tables 5 and 6 provide an exhaustive breakdown of node
locations, layers, and associated parameters employed in the QKDNetSim
simulation. Figure [13] visually represents key statistics pertaining to the
generation, storage, and consumption of key pairs by Alice and Bob’s QKD
systems. Additionally, Figure [14] focuses on statistics for the Key Consumer
Layer ETSI004 with authentication type VMAC and encryption type One-Time Pad.

Continuing the exploration, Tables 7 and 8 offer a comprehensive overview of
node locations, layers, and relevant parameters utilized in the QKDNetSim
simulation. Figure [15] complements this data by presenting key statistics
related to the generation and storage of key pairs, along with their
consumption by Alice and Bob’s QKD systems. Furthermore, Figure [16] delves
into statistics for the Key Consumer Layer ETSI 004, emphasizing
authentication type VMAC and encryption type One-Time Pad. Finally, Figure
[17] provides insights into statistics for the Key Consumer Layer ETSI 014,
sharing authentication type VMAC and encryption type One-Time Pad.

##  8 Conclusion

The comparative analysis presented in [14] underscores the vulnerabilities of
the BB84 protocol to a spectrum of attacks, encompassing PNS, IRUD, BS, DoS,
MAM, and IRA attacks. Consequently, ongoing research is actively exploring
enhancements to the BB84 protocol. Integrating Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
protocols into the realm of the Internet of Things (IoT) and real-time
networks is identified as a viable avenue, achievable through the
implementation of a key generation layer utilizing the QKDNetSim simulation.

One of the paramount advantages of QKD lies in its ability to furnish a
Secured Shared Key (SSK) via secure communication channels. It is imperative
that the generated key demonstrates resilience against a myriad of potential
attacks. As part of future research endeavors, there is a planned exploration
of diverse QKD protocols, incorporating post-quantum cryptography and lattice-
based cryptosystems. This proactive approach seeks to fortify the security
landscape and ensure robust key generation in the face of evolving threat
landscapes.

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# Security Methods in Internet of vehicles

1st Mahmood A. Al-Shareeda  National Advanced IPv6 Centre
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Penang, Malaysia  2nd Selvakumar Manickam  National Advanced IPv6 Centre
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Penang, Malaysia

###### Abstract

The emerging wireless communication technology known as vehicle ad hoc
networks (VANETs) has the potential to both lower the risk of auto accidents
caused by drivers and offer a wide range of entertainment amenities. The
messages broadcast by a vehicle may be impacted by security threats due to the
open-access nature of VANETs. Because of this, VANET is susceptible to
security and privacy problems. In order to go beyond the obstacle, we
investigate and review some existing researches to secure communication in
VANET. Additionally, we provide overview, components in VANET in details.

###### Index Terms:

Authentication, Privacy, Security, IoV

##  I Introduction

The improvement of road transportation is the goal of VANET. According to a UK
government report on traffic accidents in 2015, there were 1,732 fatalities
and 22,137 injuries. It is challenging to control traffic on crowded city
streets, and doing so frequently results in unpleasant events like traffic
jams, accidents, fuel waste, wasted time, etc. As a result, it is now
essential to safely and effectively manage traffic on highways in these cities
[1, 2, 3]. The fast developing wireless communication technologies enable
effective management of the traffic generated by thousands of cars, enabling
intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Equipment known as on-board units
(OBUs) can be put on vehicles thanks to ITS applications that take the form of
vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs)[4, 5, 6].

Through a dedicated short range communications (DSRC) system, the OBU in each
vehicle transmits safety messages to the OBUs in nearby cars and
infrastructure (such as the road-side unit (RSU) and the trusted authority
(TA)) within a range of 300 metres, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Environment of Safety Road [7].

The US Department of Transportation’s groundbreaking ITS effort for VANET
standardisation is called the DSRC. Both vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) communication are supported by VANETs. For the purpose
of preventing collisions, reducing traffic congestion, and enhancing the
driving environment, communicative vehicles (V2V) communicate information
about their speed, location, heading, and traffic jams with one another.

Due to their crucial significance in the field of smart transportation by
supporting vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication,
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have become more widespread in recent years
[8, 9].

##  II Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET)

###  II-A Overview

A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) contains a group of automobiles, moving or
stationary, that are connected by a wireless network. VANETs were developed
with the intention of giving drivers comfort and safety in moving vehicles.
This viewpoint is evolving since VANETs are now seen as the foundation for
smart transportation systems that enable autonomous vehicles and any activity
that needs Internet connection in the context of a smart city environment.
Additionally, VANETs allow onboard computers in stationary vehicles, such as
those in airport parking lots, to function as mobile computing cloud resources
with the least amount of Internet infrastructure support.

###  II-B VANET Components

As shown in Figure 2, A typical VANETs consists of the following three primary
parts:

  * •

OBU: Every vehicle has a wireless OBU that allows for the processing,
transmission, and reception of beacons using the DSRC protocol.

  * •

RSU: It is situated by the side of the road and is tasked with managing each
OBU within its coverage area using the DSRC protocol. The RSU communicates
with OBUs and TA via wireless networks and a secure wired network,
respectively. A Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) is a component of each RSU that is
used to store private information and perform system-wide cryptography
operations. Therefore, the opponent is unable to disclose it.

  * •

TA: Is in charge of registering vehicles, RSUs, and generating system
parameters in VANETs. It is also in charge of handling the revocation
procedure.

Figure 2: Typical VANETs.

##  III Exciting Research

In order to solve the issues listed above in VANET, [10] suggested a solution
in this study called efficient conditional privacy preservation with mutual
authentication. This system is predicated on the partition and distribution of
geographical regions into a number of domains, each of which is responsible
for storing the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in all Road-side Units
(RSUs) situated inside the domain. The vehicle should authenticate with the TA
during the mutual authentication phase. The vehicle is permitted to send a
message to the other components in the VANET after receiving a pool of pseudo-
identities and the matching secret keys from RSU.

[11] offered a privacy-preserving communication scheme (VPPCS) based on the
VANET that satisfies the needs for both content and contextual privacy. It
makes use of identity-based encryption and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
To confirm and verify the suggested system, we performed a thorough security
analysis using the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, the random oracle model,
the security of proof, and security attributes.

In order to discover an optimal or almost optimal solution, [12] provided the
well-known genetic algorithm based on RSU location in this study. We offer the
fundamental simulation environment needed for this job. To produce automotive
mobility, simulate road traffic, execute vehicular network simulations on
Omnet++ using the veins model framework, simulate realistic networks using
Omnet++, and build the algorithm to analyse the results, we need to use OSM to
get real map data, GatcomSUMO, Omnet++, and Matlab.

In this research, [13] offered a conditional identity-based privacy-preserving
authentication technique that provides batch verification for the concurrent
message verification by each node. Additionally, the TPD regularly and often
updates its database of vehicle information to thwart side-channel attacks.

To find the most suitable or nearly optimal solution, [14] employed the well-
known genetic algorithm that is mostly based on the RSU region. We provide the
basic simulation environment for this work using OpenStreetMap (OSM) to
download real map data, Group for Architecture and Computer Technology
(Gatcom) to generate car mobility, Software Update Monitor (SUMO) to simulate
street traffic, Veins model framework for simulating walking vehicular
networks, OMNET++ to simulate real networks, and Matlab to create the
algorithm to analyse the results.

[15] investigated and examined the impact of the replay attack, one of the
most frequent security assaults in VANETs. This paper covers the findings from
the research and analysis, as well as an examination of the replay attack
defence mechanisms already in use in VANETs.

[16] talked about what a traffic monitoring centre is and how it works.
Additionally, we will describe the idea of early event detection and highlight
the drawbacks and advantages of each method.

[17] suggested an Elliptic Curve Cryptography-based Lightweight Security
Without Batch Verification Method (LSWBVM) technique (ECC). During mutual
authentication, the proposed LSWBVM technique employs the XOR operation and
universal hash function. The proposed system, however, leverages an effective
single verification rather than batch verification in a high traffic density
location to check a large number of messages. The LSWBVM accomplishes the
security objectives of mutual authentication between the nodes, as shown by
BAN logic. The security study shows that the LSWBVM satisfies the security
requirements, including safe non-forgery under the random oracle model in an
adaptively generated message assault, identity privacy preservation,
tractability, and revocability.

The fundamental backdrop of VANET from an architectural perspective and
communication kinds are covered in [18]. The overview of the VANET
modification attack is then given. This report also presents a comprehensive
evaluation of the current VANET modification attack preventive measures. This
review study shows that a more effective preventive strategy is still required
to deal with the modification assault in VANET.

Two theoretical models that display and predict the QoS in terms of
performance are presented in [19]. In terms of throughput, the star
architecture performs 15% better than the grid layout. While the average end-
to-end latency record for star network topology and grid network topology,
respectively, is 17.25 ms and 76.25 ms. Grid and star topologies both see a
reduction in jitter as the data rate increases from 1 to 11 Mbps; however, in
all testing, the average jitter was lower in star topologies than in grids.

According to the literature, [20] discovered many Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks with a range of behaviours, including message tampering, message
stalling, and message dropping. The fundamental backdrop of VANET from an
architectural perspective and communication kinds are covered in this paper.
The outline of the MITM attack in the VANET is then given. This study also
presents a comprehensive evaluation of the current VANET MITM attack
protection measures. This review study shows that a more effective preventive
strategy is still required to deal with the MITM attack in VANET.

Any link within VANETs must be protected from cyberattacks, which is a need
[21]. This is because data transmission in any context with open access could
result in a variety of network assaults. To address many problems relating to
security and privacy in VANETs, the identity-based privacy-preserving
authentication technique (ID-PPA) was presented in this study. Numerous ID-
based security protocols for VANETs have recently been introduced in [21].

On order to secure communication in VANETs, [22] suggested the New and
Efficient Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication (NE-CPPA) scheme.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is the algorithm that NE-CPPA utilises to
meet security and privacy criteria. The suggested scheme’s security analysis
is presented for several attack scenarios.

In [23], a Secure and Efficient Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication
(SE-CPPA) technique is developed for thwarting impersonation attacks and
improving performance efficiency. The bilinear pair cryptography used for
message signing and verification forms the foundation of the SE-CPPA proposal.
The proposed SE-CPPA method can achieve security goals in terms of formal and
informal analysis through security analysis and comparison. The genuine
identification of the vehicle contained in the tamper-proof device (TPD) is
often updated and has a limited time of validity in order to fend off
impersonation attacks.

On order to protect communication in VANETs, [24] suggested a secure
pseudonym-based conditional privacy-persevering authentication system. The
proposed method for message signing and verification used safe hash
cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). During the broadcasting
process, a vehicle employs a sizable number of pseudo-IDs it has received from
the Trusted Authority (TA) and the appropriate signature key to sign messages.
As a result, the proposed approach mandates that every vehicle examine each
broadcasting message that it receives. Additionally, the proposed approach
allows the TA to stop misbehaving vehicles from broadcasting signed messages
continually, protecting against insider attacks.

[25] suggested a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)-based password-guessing
attack-aware authentication method that would protect inter-vehicle
communication on 5G-enabled vehicular networks. In the suggested method,
trusted authorities (TAs) generate and broadcast fresh group keys to the CRT-
assisted vehicles. Furthermore, the suggested approach simply needs believable
TPDs because the system’s master key does not have to be preloaded. The
suggested method prevents password guessing attacks and ensures the highest
level of security for all 5G-enabled vehicle networks.

[26] examined the security flaws in the current schemes. In order to secure
and boost the effectiveness of VANETs communications, it also suggests
improvements to the identity-based conditional privacy-preserving
authentication mechanism. The suggested approach has been shown to be secure
using the random oracle model in addition to meeting the security and privacy
requirements.

The design and development of any new VANETs approaches may use in [27] as a
guide and a reference. Additionally, this paper may aid academics and
developers in choosing the key VANET characteristics for their objectives in a
single document.

An effective conditional privacy-preserving authentication (E-CPPA) system
based on elliptic curve encryption is presented in [28]. In the VANETs system,
E-CPPA increases the effectiveness of message signing and verification for
both vehicle to infrastructure and vehicle to vehicle communication. The
E-CPPA scheme’s goal is to satisfy demands about the security and privacy of
VANETs. Finally, this study discusses the anticipated outcome for the E-CPPA
scheme and subsequent research in addition to discussing the critical review
of comparable works in VANETs.

In the context of 5G-enabled vehicle networks, [29] suggested a Chebyshev
polynomial-based method for fending off side-channel attacks. Our study was
able to accomplish the Chebyshev polynomial’s crucial chaotic and semi-group
features. System startup, enrollment, signature, verification, and pseudonym
renewal are the five stages of our job. Additionally, our work regularly and
constantly updates the vehicle’s information in the TPD to fend off side-
channel attacks.

In order to ensure communication security in 5G-enabled automotive networks, a
chaotic map-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication (CM-CPPA)
technique is suggested in [30]. The proposed CM-CPPA method uses a chaotic
map-based hash function and a Chebyshev polynomial mapping operation to sign
and validate communications. Additionally, the suggested CM-CPPA scheme’s
security analysis results utilising the AVISPA simulator are good and secure
against common threats.

##  IV Conclusion

VANET can improve traffic efficiency and safety by fostering cooperative
communication between cars, roadside infrastructure, and traffic management
centres. To guarantee safe service delivery in VANET, message authentication
is essential. This work has examined and analysed some recent studies on
communication security in VANETs.

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