###  VIII-A Lessons Learned

Customized Deployments. E-IoT deployments are diverse and complex. There may
be unique threats from deployment to deployment, especially with the numerous
use cases in E-IoT. For instance, a lightning control E-IoT environment will
be different from a smart media management system in terms of vulnerabilities.
Specifically, a lighting system may rely more heavily on serial-based
communication interfaces in every room than media management that relies on
touchpanels and mobile interfaces. Further, even in a lighting system, a
purely serial-based system will have different threats and vulnerabilities
than a lighting control system with Zigbee/Z-wave interfaces. Many attacks
(e.g., node-capture attacks, sensory channel attacks) may have unique system-
to-system consequences. Namely, if safety or motorization devices rely on
E-IoT sensors, an attacker may create a much bigger safety issue if these
sensors are compromised. The degree of customization in E-IoT means that one
deployment’s solutions and security guidelines are not applicable for all
deployments.

Legacy Systems. Legacy systems are systems considered to be outdated,
discontinued, and that no longer receive software or security updates. With
companies such as Crestron established since the 70’s, it is expected that
there are legacy E-IoT systems installed worldwide [34]. As these systems may
not receive updates for several reasons. For instance, an E-IoT system may
simply be discontinued or the manufacturer may no longer exist (e.g.,
Litetouch lighting control systems) [252]. Alternatively, systems have
frequent updates and a user may choose not to update because of cost of the
update (e.g., new devices, software, updated drivers). For example, if an
entire building is wired to function with a legacy system, re-wiring and re-
programming may be a costly endeavor as opposed to simply keeping an older
E-IoT system. In other cases, discontinued devices may not work on newer
systems (e.g., driver availability) and a user might choose to keep the
current E-IoT system without updating to keep control of these integrated
devices. E-IoT needs unique solutions that can provide protection to legacy
E-IoT systems which cannot be updated.

Reliance on Integrators. In E-IoT systems, consumers rely upon integrators.
This reliance on integrators may create attack scenarios where an E-IoT is
compromised because of this trust. For instance, bad account management could
allow attackers to compromise one or multiple systems purely due to
integrators and remote support tooling. Additionally, as integrators handle
devices before installation, they can be considered part of the supply chain.
This adds another stage to the deployment process where devices may be
compromised by an attacker or a malicious employee for an installation
company. Integrators maintain and diagnose E-IoT devices in case of any
issues, working directly with the client. As such, there is very little
oversight on how well systems are configured. As poorly-configured devices
pose a threat to E-IoT systems, a method for auditing E-IoT system security
may be necessary to guarantee systems are properly configured. Further, more
research into E-IoT security can assist vendors in evaluating existing best
practices for integrators and developing new best practices. Finally, as E-IoT
relies very heavily on integrators, new solutions are needed to protect end-
users against attacks that may come from malicious insiders or poor
configuration.

(Near) Future E-IoT Attacks. Attackers are in constant search of new systems
to attack, with nation-state attackers having the capabilities to perform
attacks never thought to be viable before. Attacks have already been observed
that target E-IoT devices among other devices with Mirai being one of the most
well-known. In Mirai, research has shown that CCTV systems, specifically DVRs
and NVRs were targeted in the password banks [289]. These devices were
possibly configured with default passwords in many cases and reflects the need
for auditing and better research on E-IoT. If research is not done, E-IoT
systems may end up being used in large-scale attacks, such as DDoS. Attacks
would not be limited to DDoS, ransomware attacks may be different in E-IoT,
both rendering a system inoperable and requiring an integrator to repair the
affected system. In more advanced attacks, it may be possible for an attacker
to compromise touchscreens, keypads, controllers, and other devices for
cryptomining through malicious firmware or a malicious controller. Another
recent and notable example of an attack has been coined the “SolarWinds”
attack, where thousands of devices were compromised through vendor tool
updates [330, 331]. It may be possible for E-IoT to be affected by similar
attacks in the future if precautions are note taken. This shows that trusted
software must also be held to high scrutiny. Finally, there are the privacy
aspects of E-IoT. The cost of E-IoT systems means that clients may be wealthy
professionals, well-funded companies, or otherwise lucrative targets for
attackers, especially in E-IoT smart homes. An attacker may predict the cost
of an E-IoT system and attack a target that can benefit them more (e.g.,
businessmen, politicians, wealthy, companies), easily searching by vendor
online and targeting an exposed, poorly configured system.

###  VIII-B Open Issues

Proprietary Communication. E-IoT supports a diversity of protocols, from
publicly-known to proprietary. However, proprietary protocols in E-IoT are
often closed-source, with no public specification. Additionally, E-IoT
hardware and software are often unavailable to the public. Researching E-IoT
communication can be difficult without vendor cooperation as much of the
protocols and practices need to be reverse-engineered. As a result, many E-IoT
components and protocols have not been properly investigated, and many attacks
have not been discovered and addressed. For instance, serial-based proprietary
protocols such as Cresnet are used extensively in Crestron systems; however,
little to no security research exists on this protocol. This case is also
valid for many wireless protocols as highlighted in Section V such as RadioRa,
TopDog RF, and infiNET, where the security methodology used is unknown. It is
a realistic assumption that vulnerabilities must exist with the age and lack
of oversight of many of these proprietary protocols. The absence of known
vulnerabilities is not due to strong design but through security through
obscurity. Unfortunately, once adversaries find vulnerabilities in these
protocols, it may lead to easily-compromised systems as security through
obscurity provides very little legitimate protection. Much more research and
collaboration with vendors are needed for assess the security of these
protocols and develop security tools (e.g., monitoring, auditing).

Proprietary Software. In a similar manner to protocols, research on E-IoT
software is a challenge as much of E-IoT development is closed-source with
minimal external resources available. Further, even if research is done on one
E-IoT system, different systems will follow different integration and
configuration practices. For instance, components like drivers are different
in every system, and the implementation may allow for completely different
attacks in each system. We found that many E-IoT systems have operated under
security through obscurity for their software in addition to communication
protocols, a practice that is currently insufficient. As such, it may be
necessary to find flaws in E-IoT software components and correct these flaws
before malicious actors compromise E-IoT installations. It may be a good idea
for vendors to cooperate with research and academic communities and provide
closed-source software to prevent attacks before they occur. In comparison to
more open industries, in E-IoT, an attacker that acquires source code for
E-IoT devices may have a running start in compromising these devices before
security researchers have even acknowledged the problem. In response to
looming threats, vendors could also offer hackathons, bug bounties, and reward
responsible disclosures of vulnerabilities that can affect their systems.

Honeypots as a Defense Strategy. It may be possible for honeypots to offer
insight and warnings on possible attackers against E-IoT systems and
complement existing security mechanisms. Litchfield et al. noted that
honeypots can vary between different applications, highlighting that high-
interaction honeypots are not suitable in some applications [332]. Other
solutions may be possible, for instance, Conpot, a honeypot system developed
by the Honeynet Project supporting industrial protocols such as BACnet,
EtherNet/IP, and Modbus. These developments are applicable in E-IoT
installations as honeypot frameworks may be expanded to work with less-known
proprietary E-IoT protocols [333, 334]. For instance, Mays et al. proposed a
solution to defend home and building automation systems using decoy networks
[159]. In this work, researchers created a honeypot network on the smart
automation Insteon protocol to hide communication using a dummy network and
hide genuine network traffic from attackers. Such approaches could apply to
E-IoT and other custom systems that rely heavily on physical components, and
hopefully to understand the behavior of attackers, thus secure E-IoT systems.

##  IX Related Work

The security of IoT smart devices have been an ongoing topic of research in
the recent years. As such, a number of IoT security surveys have been
conducted [335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346]. Most
of these surveys cover attacks, defenses, security challenges and general
counter-measures in IoT, others are more specific. For instance, a survey by
Hassan et al., highlights current research trends in in IoT security [338].
Other work has focused on IoT security aspects, such as the survey by
Deogirikar et al., which focused specifically on known IoT attacks [341].
Individually, as early as 2013, works have highlighted threats in smart
devices, and how attackers always search for new, unexplored threat vectors
[14, 9, 11, 12, 7, 5, 6, 13]. However, very little ongoing research has
focused on specific vulnerabilities targeting E-IoT systems or proprietary
technologies. Often, vendors will only guarantee security and perform internal
security analysis in their own devices [291].

Some topics covered in this survey have had dedicated surveys examine attacks,
defenses and threats for each topic. For instance, several surveys have
covered jamming attacks, and defenses against wireless communication [207,
208, 209, 210]. Surveys on communication are also relevant, with a number of
surveys covering attacks, risks, and defense mechanisms for Bluetooth
communication [176, 192, 193, 194]. Sensory channels are also an active
subject of research and relevant to E-IoT. As such, related surveys on the
security of sensory channels touch upon subjects beyond E-IoT applications
such as WSNs and large-scale sensor deployments [113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,
119, 120, 121, 122, 123]. Further, as cloud computing is an active topic of
research, a number of relevant surveys have also covered cloud computing
threats [309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321,
322]. Other works focus on cloud defense mechanisms, applying to different use
cases beyond the scope of this survey and E-IoT applications [317, 311, 319,
321, 315].

Our work differs from previously discussed works as this survey focuses on the
insecurities, possible threats, and defenses applicable to E-IoT. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work that focuses solely on E-IoT systems
and their security, categorizing E-IoT systems into four unique layers.
Specifically, we categorize E-IoT components into four distinct layers, (1)
the E-IoT Devices layer, (2) the communications layer, (3) the Monitoring and
Applications layer, and (4) the Business layer. We take this approach as E-IoT
system architecture differs from many IoT systems, as highlighted in Section
II. Further, we present a threat model for each distinct layer of E-IoT, as
each layer may present different threats and require different capabilities
from attackers.

##  X Conclusion

The rising popularity of smart systems has led to millions of users worldwide
interacting with smart devices on a day-to-day basis. Many of these devices
are commodity, off-the-shelf systems (e.g., Google Home, Samsung SmartThings),
easily maintained and installed by the average end-user in small deployments.
However, while easy to install, commodity systems are limited and do not
provide a viable solution for more sophisticated applications. For more
extensive installations, E-IoT systems provide a custom-installed solutions to
fit a client’s needs. As such, systems such as Crestron, Control4, RTI, and
savant offer a solution for more sophisticated applications (e.g., complete
lighting control, A/V management, managed CCTV security), where commodity
systems are insufficient. For this reason, E-IoT systems are common in
locations such as high-end smart homes, government and private offices,
yachts, and conference rooms. In contrast to commodity systems, E-IoT systems
are usually proprietary, costly, closed source, and more robust for their
configured use cases. However, even with their popularity, very little
research has focused on the overall security of E-IoT systems. Namely, no
study provides a complete overview of E-IoT systems, their components,
threats, and relevant vulnerabilities in the literature. To address this
research gap, motivate further research, and raise awareness on E-IoT
insecurities, this work focused solely on E-IoT systems. Specifically, we
discussed E-IoT components, vulnerabilities, and their security implications.
To provide a better analysis of E-IoT, we divided E-IoT systems into four
layers: E-IoT Devices Layer, Communications Layer, Monitoring and Applications
Layer, and Business Layer. We considered E-IoT components at every layer, the
associated threat models, attacks, and defense mechanisms. We also presented
critical observations on E-IoT security and provided a list of open research
problems that require further research. We believe this study will raise
awareness on E-IoT and E-IoT security, and motivate further research.

## Acknowledgments

This work is partially supported by the US National Science Foundation
(Awards: NSF-CAREER-CNS-1453647, NSF-1663051, and NSF-1718116). The views are
those of the authors only.

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