context: . Montoya-Ortiz does not contend that the weapon was unconstitutionally seized for the sole purpose of enhancing his sentence.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing
citation_a.sentence: See also United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir.) ("Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 124, 121 L.Ed.2d 80 (1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir.1991) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (under particular facts of case, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule would not outweigh detrimental effect of excluding the evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992).
citation_b.signal: contra
citation_b.identifier: 979 F.2d 402, 410-11
citation_b.parenthetical: "exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court's reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines"
citation_b.sentence: Contra, United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir.1992) ("exclusionary rule bars a sentencing court’s reliance on evidence illegally seized during the investigation or arrest of a defendant for the crime of conviction in determining the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines”).