context: Accordingly, whatever might be true in other circumstances as to the appealability upon its entry of an order making a priority determination, the Trust could not have appealed as of right from the August 26, 1999 order until after the entry of the order in Adversary Nos. 99-0231 and 99-0524 concluding the adversary proceedings on January 31, 2000, as the August 26, 1999 order did not conclude Adversary No. 99-0231.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 81 F.3d 376, 381
citation_a.parenthetical: "With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court's order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment."
citation_a.sentence: See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 893 F.2d 264, 266
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that a bankruptcy court's partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able
citation_b.sentence: See In re Professional Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir.2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court order ending a separate adversary proceeding is appealable as a final order even though that order does not conclude the entire bankruptcy case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (holding that a bankruptcy court’s partial summary judgment order that established the priority of one creditor relative to another but did not completely resolve the particular adversary proceeding was interlocutory in nature, and therefore not directly appeal-able); In re Compton Corp., 889 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Em.App.1989) (“[U]ntil all of the significant elements of a claim are determined in the adversary proceeding between the trustee and the [claimant], the final disposition of the priority issue alone is insufficient for a final order to exist.”); cf. Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir.1996) (“With limited exceptions, we will not entertain an appeal unless the district court’s order ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).