context: As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49
citation_a.parenthetical: finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 469 U.S. 287, 292-99
citation_b.parenthetical: considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent).