context: . In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the "natural and probable consequence" of obstructing justice is an "evil intent" to obstruct justice
citation_a.sentence: See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the "natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant "was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 491 F.3d 871, 876
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b
citation_b.sentence: See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the "natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant "was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).