context: (Defs.' Reply 19.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the governing case law supports the conclusion that RLUIPA, because of its jurisdictional provision and as has already been determined by the Second Circuit, constitutes a proper constitutional exercise of Congress' power and does not run afoul of any constitutional provisions.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 560 F.3d 316, 328, n. 34
citation_a.parenthetical: "Every circuit to consider whether RLUIPA is Spending Clause legislation has concluded that it is constitutional under at least that power."
citation_a.sentence: See Sossamon, 131 S.Ct. at 1664 (“Though the Court reserves the general question whether RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause, there is apparently no disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals.”); see also Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 328, n. 34 (5th Cir.2009) (“Every circuit to consider whether RLUIPA is Spending Clause legislation has concluded that it is constitutional under at least that power.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 131 S.Ct. 1664, 1664
citation_b.parenthetical: "Though the Court reserves the general question whether RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause, there is apparently no disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals."
citation_b.sentence: See Sossamon, 131 S.Ct. at 1664 (“Though the Court reserves the general question whether RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause, there is apparently no disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals.”); see also Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 328, n. 34 (5th Cir.2009) (“Every circuit to consider whether RLUIPA is Spending Clause legislation has concluded that it is constitutional under at least that power.”).