context: At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 921 P.2d 446, 453
citation_a.parenthetical: determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when "[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]"
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when "[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it "reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, "mere presence" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, "mere presence" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime
citation_b.sentence: See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when "[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it "reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, "mere presence" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990).