context: The present complaint might be interpreted, alternatively, as asserting a substantive due process violation based on the theory that the conduct of appellee Morales "shocks the conscience."
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 927 F.2d 6, 6
citation_a.parenthetical: alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which "shocks the conscience"
citation_a.sentence: See Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which “shocks the conscience”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 72 S.Ct. 205, 209
citation_b.parenthetical: substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is "egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking"
citation_b.sentence: See also Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 (substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking”). Offensive conduct is not conscience-shocking, however, in a substantive due process sense, merely because it trespasses on “some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).