context: Under Schedler's view, aggrieved parties could sue the state agencies, the DCFS and the DHH, but not the Secretary of State. But the NVRA's centralization of responsibility counsels against such buck passing. Furthermore, similar to providing for a private cause of action, see NVRA SS 11, requiring states to assign enforcement power to a single person increases the likelihood of NVRA compliance.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 535 F.3d 850, 850
citation_a.parenthetical: Missouri and its Secretary of State "may not delegate the responsibility to conduct a general program to a local official and thereby avoid responsibility if such a program is not reasonably conducted."
citation_a.sentence: See Harkless, 545 F.3d at 452 (expressing concern that the state could escape responsibility for NVRA violations if the chief elections officer lacked enforcement power); see also Missouri, 535 F.3d at 850 (Missouri and its Secretary of State “may not delegate the responsibility to conduct a general program to a local official and thereby avoid responsibility if such a program is not reasonably conducted.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 545 F.3d 452, 452
citation_b.parenthetical: expressing concern that the state could escape responsibility for NVRA violations if the chief elections officer lacked enforcement power
citation_b.sentence: See Harkless, 545 F.3d at 452 (expressing concern that the state could escape responsibility for NVRA violations if the chief elections officer lacked enforcement power); see also Missouri, 535 F.3d at 850 (Missouri and its Secretary of State “may not delegate the responsibility to conduct a general program to a local official and thereby avoid responsibility if such a program is not reasonably conducted.”).