context: Here, Plaintiffs' primary asserted injury is violation of their statutory right of publicity under California Civil Code SS 3344. As discussed more fully below, SS 3344 prohibits the nonconsensual use of another's name, voice, signature, photo graph, or likeness for advertising, selling, or soliciting purposes, and creates a cause of action for persons injured by such actions. See SAC P 2; Opp'n at 5-6. Without assessing the merits of Plaintiffs' claim, the Court finds that they have alleged a violation of their individual statutory rights under California Civil Code SS 3344, and therefore, an invasion of a legally protected interest for Article III purposes.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: exercising jurisdiction over surfer's SS 3344 claim against clothing retailer
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.2000) (“[Plaintiff] has suffered the loss of a statutory right to disclosure [under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693] and has therefore suffered injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.”); see also Graczyk v. W. Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where plaintiffs alleged that defendant engaged in bulk compilation and distribution of their personal information contained in motor vehicle records, in violation of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2722); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d 705, 711-13 (N.D.Cal.2011) (Ware, C.J.) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where they alleged violation of their rights under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq., even though dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim for relief thereunder); cf. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2001) (exercising jurisdiction over surfer’s § 3344 claim against clothing retailer).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 660 F.3d 275, 278
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where plaintiffs alleged that defendant engaged in bulk compilation and distribution of their personal information contained in motor vehicle records, in violation of the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.2000) (“[Plaintiff] has suffered the loss of a statutory right to disclosure [under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693] and has therefore suffered injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.”); see also Graczyk v. W. Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where plaintiffs alleged that defendant engaged in bulk compilation and distribution of their personal information contained in motor vehicle records, in violation of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2722); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d 705, 711-13 (N.D.Cal.2011) (Ware, C.J.) (holding that plaintiffs had constitutional standing where they alleged violation of their rights under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq., even though dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim for relief thereunder); cf. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2001) (exercising jurisdiction over surfer’s § 3344 claim against clothing retailer).