context: The District claims that the relief Plaintiffs request would essentially reinstate Sections II and III of the Settlement Order.' This, the District contends, would deprive it of the sunset provisions that it had negotiated in Section II and substitute for a foregone appeal with respect to Section III.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 76 F.3d 76, 81
citation_a.parenthetical: "If we were to enforce this consent decree against Local 40 twelve years after its expiration, we would be depriving the union of the benefit of its bargain."
citation_a.sentence: See EEOC v. Local 40, 76 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir.1996) (“If we were to enforce this consent decree against Local 40 twelve years after its expiration, we would be depriving the union of the benefit of its bargain.”); cf. Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1141 (“Indeed, it is a commonplace that Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a substitute for an appeal not taken.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 841 F.2d 1141, 1141
citation_b.parenthetical: "Indeed, it is a commonplace that Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a substitute for an appeal not taken."
citation_b.sentence: See EEOC v. Local 40, 76 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir.1996) (“If we were to enforce this consent decree against Local 40 twelve years after its expiration, we would be depriving the union of the benefit of its bargain.”); cf. Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1141 (“Indeed, it is a commonplace that Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a substitute for an appeal not taken.”).