context: (Dkt. No. 345, Ex. 1 at APP00007; Dkt. No. 349, Ex. 42 at APP00963.). The parties do not insinuate that the language set forth above is ambiguous. Therefore, because the provision is not ambiguous, the Court will employ the plain meaning of its terms.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 2008 WL 2405975, *1
citation_a.parenthetical: reasoning that exclusionary language is unambiguous and both phrases -- "profit or advantage" and "legally entitled" -- have been applied by courts without explanation or difficulty
citation_a.sentence: See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir.1998) (when exclusion is susceptible to one interpreta tion, courts employ the exclusion as written); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 4:07-CV-1958, 2008 WL 2405975, *1 (S.D.Tex. June 11, 2008) (reasoning that exclusionary language is unambiguous and both phrases — “profit or advantage” and “legally entitled” — have been applied by courts without explanation or difficulty).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 133 F.3d 363, 369
citation_b.parenthetical: when exclusion is susceptible to one interpreta tion, courts employ the exclusion as written
citation_b.sentence: See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir.1998) (when exclusion is susceptible to one interpreta tion, courts employ the exclusion as written); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 4:07-CV-1958, 2008 WL 2405975, *1 (S.D.Tex. June 11, 2008) (reasoning that exclusionary language is unambiguous and both phrases — “profit or advantage” and “legally entitled” — have been applied by courts without explanation or difficulty).