context: Rather, we find that the district judge's evaluation of this ease supported employing physical restraints to further an essential state interest. Notably, the district judge identified this interest on the record at both the March 27, 2012, status conference and the jury-selection proceeding, explaining that the measures were put into place for security purposes.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 158 F.3d 1225, 1225
citation_a.parenthetical: "Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, 'outweigh[] a defendant's right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.'" (alteration in original
citation_a.sentence: See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (“Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, ‘outweigh[] a defendant’s right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413)). Given that this case involved violent gang-related charges against multiple defendants, threats against the prosecutors and witnesses that were never proven to be unfounded or untrue, and many trial attendees strongly siding with either the Appellants or the witnesses testifying against them, the district court had a legitimate interest in ensuring the physical security of counsel, witnesses, spectators, and all others who would be present at trial.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 125 S.Ct. 2012, 2012
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum
citation_b.sentence: See Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. at 2012 (stating that an essential state interest may include ensuring physical security, preventing escape, or maintaining courtroom decorum); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1225 (“Courtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, ‘outweigh[] a defendant’s right to stand trial before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 728 F.2d at 1413)). Given that this case involved violent gang-related charges against multiple defendants, threats against the prosecutors and witnesses that were never proven to be unfounded or untrue, and many trial attendees strongly siding with either the Appellants or the witnesses testifying against them, the district court had a legitimate interest in ensuring the physical security of counsel, witnesses, spectators, and all others who would be present at trial.