context: When disputes have arisen regarding the division of authority among the three branches of government in the development and administration of the criminal laws, we have acted to prevent one branch from intruding upon the domain of another branch.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 163 Ariz. 81, 85
citation_a.parenthetical: "[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion."
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 689 P.2d 561, 564
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence "based upon the prosecutor's recommendation" was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because "the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., State v. Larson, 159 Ariz. 14, 17, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (App.1988) (trial court cannot intrude upon the prosecutor’s charging function by dismissing charges pursuant to misdemeanor compromise statute without the prosecutor’s statutorily-required recommendation); State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 305, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (App.1984) (holding that DUI sentencing statute that permitted the trial court to impose an alternative sentence “based upon the prosecutor’s recommendation” was unconstitutional in violation of Article 3 because “the decision to mitigate a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor”); see also State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 85, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (1989) (“[O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court’s exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion.”).