context: Mr. Stevens moved to Maine on January 17, 2007. He does not, therefore, argue that SORNA cannot apply to him because he traveled before SOR-NA's effective date.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 551 F.3d 578, 583
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that "applying the Act to persons who crossed state lines before its enactment does not violate [the Ex Post Facto ] clause"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir.2008) (requiring that a sex offender’s interstate travel occur after SORNA’s effective date); United States v. Rusted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (same); but see United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that “applying the Act to persons who crossed state lines before its enactment does not violate [the Ex Post Facto ] clause”). Instead, he argues that SORNA cannot apply to him because he traveled before February 28, 2007, the date the Attorney General promulgated a regulation (the Interim Rule) clarifying that SORNA applies to all sex offenders, including those who committed sex offenses prior to SORNA’s enactment.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 535 F.3d 912, 920
citation_b.parenthetical: requiring that a sex offender's interstate travel occur after SORNA's effective date
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir.2008) (requiring that a sex offender’s interstate travel occur after SORNA’s effective date); United States v. Rusted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (same); but see United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that “applying the Act to persons who crossed state lines before its enactment does not violate [the Ex Post Facto ] clause”). Instead, he argues that SORNA cannot apply to him because he traveled before February 28, 2007, the date the Attorney General promulgated a regulation (the Interim Rule) clarifying that SORNA applies to all sex offenders, including those who committed sex offenses prior to SORNA’s enactment.