context: "The Supreme Court has applied the intelligible principle test to regulations that may be enforceable through criminal penalties."
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 784 F.3d 666, 672
citation_a.parenthetical: "the Court has never expressly held that an intelligible principle alone suffices to save a putative delegation when the criminal law is involved."
citation_a.sentence: Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928); but see Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir.2015) (“the Court has never expressly held that an intelligible principle alone suffices to save a putative delegation when the criminal law is involved.”)); Carter, 736 F.3d at 734 (describing O’Hagan as “hon- or[ing] the principle that “greater congressional specificity [may be ] required in the criminal context.” ” (Sutton, J., concurring opinion)(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 896 F.Supp. 1057, 1062
citation_b.parenthetical: "The Supreme Court has never rejected the intelligible principle test in the criminal context."
citation_b.sentence: United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir.2015) (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 695 n. 10, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997) and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944)); see United States v. Hill, 896 F.Supp. 1057, 1062 (D.Colo.1995) (“The Supreme Court has never rejected the intelligible principle test in the criminal context.”) (citing Mistretta, Yakus, and J.W.