context: The McFadden Court, which dealt with the federal Analogue Act, interpreted the scienter mandate as to controlled-substance analogues as meaning that the government must show that the defendant either knew that the substance was a controlled-substance analogue regardless of his .knowledge of its identity, or knew that it satisfied the specific statutory prerequisites making it a controlled substance analogue. Those prerequisites include a substantially similar chemical structure to that of a scheduled controlled substance.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 342 U.S. 337, 342
citation_a.parenthetical: indicating that a "knowingly" mens rea requirement "does much to destroy any force in the argument" that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds
citation_a.sentence: Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265
citation_b.parenthetical: relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute
citation_b.sentence: Id.; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 & n.14, 102 S.Ct. at 1193 & n.14 (reciting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that- his conduct is proscribed,” and citing cases); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (indicating that a “knowingly” mens rea requirement “does much to destroy any force in the argument” that enforcement of the regulation in question would violate due process on vagueness grounds); United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the McFadden scienter analysis, including the mandate that the government prove the accused knew the chemical structure was substantially similar to that of a scheduled controlled substance); cf. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 2015) (relying on an express scienter requirement in rejecting a vagueness challenge to a counterfeit-controlled-substance statute).