context: P 16. The third factor is the actor's good faith. We have stated that the good-faith factor "is relevant only to the question of whether the converter intended to exercise dominion over the property."
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 64 P.3d 1197, 1197
citation_a.parenthetical: reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion
citation_a.sentence: See Beall Transp. Equip. Co., 64 P.3d at 1197 (reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion); see also Trickey, 933 P.2d at 536 (citing intent and good faith as relevant factors in determining whether conversion occurred); Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (applying good-faith factor).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 629 A.2d 329, 329
citation_b.parenthetical: "Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort."
citation_b.sentence: O’Brien, 160 Vt. at 300, 629 A.2d at 329. That comment, however, was part of a discussion rejecting good faith as a complete defense to liability. Id. at 299, 629 A.2d at 329 (“Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.”). Other jurisdictions applying the Restatement factors have rejected good faith as a defense to a conversion claim but considered it as a factor in determining whether a defendant so seriously interfered with another’s property that the defendant may justly be required to pay the full value of the property.