context: Plaintiffs have simply not alleged enough context specific details and facts to plausibly support a disparate impact claim based on these vague facts. Furthermore, there is no allegation that these remarks were made by decisionmakers or that they are contemporaneous in time as to the underlying action.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 304 F.3d 63, 69
citation_a.parenthetical: " '[Sjstray workplace remarks,' as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus."
citation_a.sentence: See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.”); see also Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (“Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 983 F.2d 509, 545
citation_b.parenthetical: "Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight...."
citation_b.sentence: See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.”); see also Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (“Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”).