context: Under Skilling, bribery remains a basis for honest services fraud. It is apparent from the jury's findings regarding bribery that the Defendants would have been convicted on the bribery theory of honest services fraud by itself. The references to the invalidated conflict of interest theory in the jury instructions and the government's argument at trial therefore did not prejudice Defendants.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 662 F.3d 524, 544
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that "the jury's guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court's definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved"
citation_a.sentence: United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining that prejudice requires a "reasonable probability" that the error in the instructions "affected the outcome of the trial"
citation_b.sentence: United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that “the jury’s guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery [under federal law] confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted [the defendant] of honest services fraud if the court’s definition had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved”); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (explaining that prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the error in the instructions “affected the outcome of the trial”).