context: Quade contends that equitable estoppel excuses him from having to personally serve a notice of 61aim on defendants. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Quade did not raise this argument in the district court.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 194 F.3d 1045, 1052
citation_a.parenthetical: "As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal."
citation_a.sentence: See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”). Second, even if we were to consider the merits of equitable estoppel, Quade did not allege conduct on the part of either individual defendant that prevented him from serving them with notice of his claims.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 202 F.3d 1170, 1176
citation_b.parenthetical: equitable estoppel "focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit"
citation_b.sentence: See Gorman v. Pima County, 230 Ariz. 506, 287 P.3d 800, 804-05 (Ct. App. 2012) (elements of equitable estop-pel); see also Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (equitable estoppel “focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit”), overruled on other grounds by Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1194-96 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).