context: We recognize that the Dissent is not alone in this confusion. Indeed, in addressing identical language in 21 U.S.C. SS 841(b)(1)(C), some of our sibling circuits have made linguistic references that bespeak mens rea.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 591 F.3d 945, 950
citation_a.parenthetical: expressing "misgivings about interpreting 'results from' in the statute to impose strict liability"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir.2010) (expressing "misgivings about interpreting ‘results from’ in the statute to impose strict liability”); see also United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 522, 525 (6th Cir.2000) ("On its face, the statute [i.e., 21 U.S.C. § 841] is, in effect, a strict liability statute with respect to the injury or death of another arising out of the distribution of drugs.”). However, as the Supreme Court has indicated in Burrage, the question before us is one of causation.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 226 F.3d 521, 522, 525
citation_b.parenthetical: "On its face, the statute [i.e., 21 U.S.C. SS 841] is, in effect, a strict liability statute with respect to the injury or death of another arising out of the distribution of drugs."
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir.2010) (expressing "misgivings about interpreting ‘results from’ in the statute to impose strict liability”); see also United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 522, 525 (6th Cir.2000) ("On its face, the statute [i.e., 21 U.S.C. § 841] is, in effect, a strict liability statute with respect to the injury or death of another arising out of the distribution of drugs.”). However, as the Supreme Court has indicated in Burrage, the question before us is one of causation.