context: Although, in 1999, Sterenbuch was not able to prove the exact amount of damages for the first injury, in terms of lost contingent fees, he could have provided a reasonable estimate of his damages by presenting expert testimony establishing what likely would have transpired (and how much he likely would have recovered) had Goss and Smith not interfered with his relationship with his clients.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945
citation_a.parenthetical: "[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty," ie., by a preponderance of evidence, "uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice
citation_a.sentence: See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945 (Colo.1985) ("[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty," ie., by a preponderance of evidence, "uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice); cf. Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 845 A.2d 602, 613 (2004) (in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages "through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired") (quoting Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417, 427 (1980)).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages "through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired"
citation_b.sentence: See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943, 945 (Colo.1985) ("[allthough an award of damages cannot be based on mere speculation ..., once the fact of damage has been established with the requisite degree of certainty," ie., by a preponderance of evidence, "uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery": proof of a fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages will suffice); cf. Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 845 A.2d 602, 613 (2004) (in a legal malpractice case, plaintiff can prove damages "through the use of expert testimony as to what as a matter of reasonable probability would have transpired") (quoting Lieberman v. Emp'rs Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417, 427 (1980)).