context: We have interpreted Doyle to allow prosecutors to comment on post -Miranda silence in response to defense arguments.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "By electing to dwell on the justifications for petitioner's silence after arrest, defense counsel opened the door for the prosecutor to suggest contrary inferences."
citation_a.sentence: See Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (“By electing to dwell on the justifications for petitioner’s silence after arrest, defense counsel opened the door for the prosecutor to suggest contrary inferences.”); see also United States v. Kennedy, 714 F.2d 968, 977 (9th Cir.1983) (allowing invited comment that defendant was “not like every other witness in the case” in response to defense counsel’s argument).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 714 F.2d 968, 977
citation_b.parenthetical: allowing invited comment that defendant was "not like every other witness in the case" in response to defense counsel's argument
citation_b.sentence: See Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (“By electing to dwell on the justifications for petitioner’s silence after arrest, defense counsel opened the door for the prosecutor to suggest contrary inferences.”); see also United States v. Kennedy, 714 F.2d 968, 977 (9th Cir.1983) (allowing invited comment that defendant was “not like every other witness in the case” in response to defense counsel’s argument).