context: Disparate treatment cannot automatically be imputed in every situation where one of the State's reasons for striking a venire person would technically apply to another venire person whom the State found acceptable. For example, where the only evidence of discriminatory intent is that the party striking the venire person made an honest mistake in recalling what the venire person said, pretext is not shown.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 892 F.Supp. 245, 248-49
citation_a.parenthetical: mere mistaken belief is insufficient to prove discriminatory intent and pretext
citation_a.sentence: See Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 892 F.Supp. 245, 248-49 (D.Kan. 1995), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1540, 1546-48 (10th Cir.1997) (mere mistaken belief is insufficient to prove discriminatory intent and pretext); see also Salinas v. State, 888 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd) (“Even if the prosecutor was mistaken in some of these beliefs, the judge could still conclude that the strike was race-neutral because the prosecutor based his peremptory strike on an honest belief.”); Jack v. State, 867 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1993, no pet.) (“Even if the prosecutor was mistaken, the trial judge could still conclude that the strike was race neutral because the prosecutor based his peremptory strike on an honest belief.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 867 S.W.2d 942, 947
citation_b.parenthetical: "Even if the prosecutor was mistaken, the trial judge could still conclude that the strike was race neutral because the prosecutor based his peremptory strike on an honest belief."
citation_b.sentence: See Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 892 F.Supp. 245, 248-49 (D.Kan. 1995), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1540, 1546-48 (10th Cir.1997) (mere mistaken belief is insufficient to prove discriminatory intent and pretext); see also Salinas v. State, 888 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd) (“Even if the prosecutor was mistaken in some of these beliefs, the judge could still conclude that the strike was race-neutral because the prosecutor based his peremptory strike on an honest belief.”); Jack v. State, 867 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1993, no pet.) (“Even if the prosecutor was mistaken, the trial judge could still conclude that the strike was race neutral because the prosecutor based his peremptory strike on an honest belief.”).