context: Opp'n to Furse & Covington Mot. to Dismiss at 12-17. Yet the plaintiffs entirely fail to demonstrate how the central holding of Gray -- that government attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on their conduct in initiating and prosecuting child neglect actions -- does not apply to their claims against defendant Furse. Furthermore, even if it were the case that defendant Furse had acted in bad faith and fallen under the "spell" of Carolina Lundebye, such behavior would not vitiate the absolute immunity conferred under Gray and Butz.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 65 F.3d 189, 194
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their "knowing or inadvertent" failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence
citation_a.sentence: See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that "[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith”); cf. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their "knowing or inadvertent” failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 243 F.3d 575, 575
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that "[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith"
citation_b.sentence: See Gray, 243 F.3d at 575 (noting that "[w]here absolute immunity is deemed appropriate, an official is protected from all suits attacking conduct within the scope of the immunity, even if the official is alleged to have acted in bad faith”); cf. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their "knowing or inadvertent” failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence).