context: The first and often the last step in any effort to interpret a piece of legislation is to examine the language of the statute.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 644 N.E.2d 870, 872
citation_a.parenthetical: "nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature" as ascertained from "the plain and obvious meaning" of the words of the statute
citation_a.sentence: See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1994) (“nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature” as ascertained from “the plain and obvious meaning” of the words of the statute); see also In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 676, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (the Commission must “determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a ‘practical construction’ ”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 171 N.E. 65, 68
citation_b.parenthetical: the Commission must "determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a 'practical construction' "
citation_b.sentence: See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1994) (“nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature” as ascertained from “the plain and obvious meaning” of the words of the statute); see also In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 676, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (the Commission must “determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a ‘practical construction’ ”).