context: Without standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2
citation_a.parenthetical: equating Court's review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
citation_a.sentence: See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 422 U.S. 490, 517-18
citation_b.parenthetical: "The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention."
citation_b.sentence: See Brod, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 2 (equating Court’s review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638, 640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is “threshold requirement of every case” and may be raised at any time); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) (“The rules of standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.”).