context: Additionally, as Janczak explains, the record makes it arguable that the decision to terminate him became definitive not on Oden's stated date of August 14, but instead later that month, shortly after additional information about Janczak's medical condition had been received.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 577 F.3d 1160, 1160
citation_a.parenthetical: observing that "[w]henever termination occurs while the employee is on leave, that timing has significant probative force," and describing a termination that "occurred just one day after [the employee] told [the employer] that she would need to take a full six weeks off and could not return sooner" as involving "particularly suggestive" timing
citation_a.sentence: See DeFreitas, 577 F.3d at 1160 (observing that “[w]henever termination occurs while the employee is on leave, that timing has significant probative force,” and describing a termination that “occurred just one day after [the employee] told [the employer] that she would need to take a full six weeks off and could not return sooner” as involving “particularly suggestive” timing); cf. Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (stating that an employee’s being “fired only two days after his emails and meeting with [the employer] about taking time off’ for FMLA reasons “may be enough to prove ■the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer’s intent is irrelevant”). A reasonable jury might rely on this information to infer that the decision to eliminate Janczak’s position was related to his medical condition and his exercise of FMLA leave.
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 700 F.3d 1227, 1227
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that an employee's being "fired only two days after his emails and meeting with [the employer] about taking time off' for FMLA reasons "may be enough to prove #the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer's intent is irrelevant"
citation_b.sentence: See DeFreitas, 577 F.3d at 1160 (observing that “[w]henever termination occurs while the employee is on leave, that timing has significant probative force,” and describing a termination that “occurred just one day after [the employee] told [the employer] that she would need to take a full six weeks off and could not return sooner” as involving “particularly suggestive” timing); cf. Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (stating that an employee’s being “fired only two days after his emails and meeting with [the employer] about taking time off’ for FMLA reasons “may be enough to prove ■the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer’s intent is irrelevant”). A reasonable jury might rely on this information to infer that the decision to eliminate Janczak’s position was related to his medical condition and his exercise of FMLA leave.