context: We cannot agree. Jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions but are not presumed to follow the law as recited by counsel during closing argument.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's instructions
citation_a.sentence: See Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind.1991) (holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions); Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.1983) (holding that “[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction”); Barnes v. State, 435 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Ind.1982) (same); see also Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that “we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court’s erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel”). Consequently, this argument must fail.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 6 F.3d 265, 271
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that "we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court's erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel"
citation_b.sentence: See Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind.1991) (holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions); Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind.1983) (holding that “[a]ny misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction”); Barnes v. State, 435 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Ind.1982) (same); see also Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 271 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting an argument that a Spradlin-like instructional error was harmless because both parties argued during closing that the State was required to prove intent to kill, reasoning that “we cannot conclude that the jurors ignored the court’s erroneous instructions and chose, instead, to apply the law as stated correctly by counsel”). Consequently, this argument must fail.