context: It is the treatment provisions of the statutory scheme that purportedly distinguish Minnesota's sex offender commitment law from criminal punishment. Therefore, individuals must be committed for the purpose of receiving treatment-- not as retribution for their past criminal acts, however heinous, for which they have already served and completed their sentences.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 534 U.S. 412, 412
citation_a.parenthetical: distinguishing "a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons" and finding such a distinction "necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence -- functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment"
citation_a.sentence: See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 521 U.S. 373, 373
citation_b.parenthetical: "If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function."
citation_b.sentence: See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412, 122 S.Ct. 867 (distinguishing “a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from other dangerous persons” and finding such a distinction “necessary lest civil commitment become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence — functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function.”).