context: This approach had been followed in other circuits. In instances of joint occupancy in which the government fails to demonstrate a nexus between the defendant and the contraband, they have concluded that the government's evidence of constructive possession was insufficient.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 968 F.2d 1393, 1396
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant's residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 942 F.2d 680, 681-82
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting government's argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver's seat because "[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107-08 (4th Cir.1992) (rejecting the government’s contention that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol underneath his seat when the only evidence of a nexus was an officer’s testimony that the defendant dipped his shoulder as the officer approached ); United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681-82 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting government’s argument, offered in support of a sentencing enhancement, that the defendant passenger constructively possessed a gun discovered behind the driver’s seat because “[although [the defendant] may have had access to the gun, there is no evidence he owned it, or even was aware of its presence”); United States v. Whitfield, 629 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C.Cir.1980) (finding evidence sufficient that the defendant driver, who owned the car, constructively possessed pistols under the driver’s and passenger’s seats but holding that the evidence was insufficient as to the defendant passenger); cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1396 (1st Cir.1992) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a pistol discovered behind the front seats of a van in which he was a passenger when the government presented testimony that the pistol had been taken to the defendant’s residence on the preceding day and that the defendant was in charge of the impeding drug transaction).