context: (See Standard's Surreply 4 (citing common law and First Amendment precedent in same footnote).) Nevertheless, due to the important constitutional principles at stake, the Court construes Standard's argument as a separate assertion of both the common law and the First Amendment presumptions of access with respect to all of the documents.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 377 F.3d 141, 141
citation_a.parenthetical: recognizing court's role as "primary representative of the public interest" and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over "records filed wholesale under seal" is warranted
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141 (recognizing court’s role as “primary representative of the public interest” and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over “records filed wholesale under seal” is warranted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124 (“Having concluded that the common law presumption of access exists in this context, we may not avoid the ques tion of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also exists.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 435 F.3d 124, 124
citation_b.parenthetical: "Having concluded that the common law presumption of access exists in this context, we may not avoid the ques tion of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also exists."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141 (recognizing court’s role as “primary representative of the public interest” and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over “records filed wholesale under seal” is warranted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124 (“Having concluded that the common law presumption of access exists in this context, we may not avoid the ques tion of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also exists.”).