context: This is because any reliance on post-1995 amended portions of chapter 51 did not inordinately burden the Bairs' property "apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being amended." SS 70.001(12). Rather, the reliance on those amended portions of chapter 51 was part of the City's overall decision to require compliance with the 50 percent Rule, a rule that was enacted prior to May 11, 1995. Because the City established that there was no genuine issue of. material fact regarding whether section 70.001(12) applied, the burden shifted to the Bairs to prove that there was- a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the application of any newly amended sections of chapter 51 imposed an inordinate burden on their real property.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 120 So.3d 27, 29
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town's actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property
citation_a.sentence: See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist); Pelz v. City of Clearwater, 568 So.2d 949, 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), for the same proposition); see also Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, 120 So.3d 27, 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town’s actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 370 So.2d 368, 370
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist
citation_b.sentence: See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (explaining that once a movant for summary judgment has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that such an issue does exist); Pelz v. City of Clearwater, 568 So.2d 949, 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), for the same proposition); see also Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, 120 So.3d 27, 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (noting that plaintiff who brought Bert Harris Act claim had burden of proving that town’s actions constituted inordinate burden on plaintiffs vested right to use its property).