context: The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim because the plain tiffs did not allege injury to their business or property. See 18 U.S.C. SS 1964(c) (allowing recovery to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property")- The plaintiffs' allegations that Ms. Santamaria suffered personal injury&emdash;i.e., physical symptoms and emotional distress&emdash;are legally insufficient.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: explaining that the phrase "business or property" in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 15, "retains restrictive significance" and "would ... exclude personal injuries suffered"
citation_a.sentence: See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (explaining that the phrase “business or property” in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, “retains restrictive significance” and “would ... exclude personal injuries suffered”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 835 F.2d 844, 847
citation_b.parenthetical: "In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom."
citation_b.sentence: See Williams v. Mohawk Ind., 465 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2006) (“The terms ‘business or property’ are, of course, words of limitation which preclude [certain forms of] recovery.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir.1988) (“In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property* excludes personal injuries, including pecuniary losses therefrom.”).