context: However, the appellant in Laird framed the issue not as one of relevance, but as implicating prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court addressed it as such. Id. Of the other jurisdictions that have directly addressed the issues presented, our sister states generally have found such questioning proper, so long as the prosecution does not elicit superfluous facts from prior cases that might confuse the jury.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: attorney's opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination
citation_a.sentence: Cf. People v. Bennett, 45 Cal.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535, 555-56 (2009) (attorney’s opinion on death penalty was permissible subject for cross-examination).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 787 So.2d 786, 798
citation_b.parenthetical: "We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants."
citation_b.sentence: See Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 798 (Fla.2001) (“We have in fact recognized a host of matters upon which cross-examining counsel may inquire in demonstration of bias, including, for instance, the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for capital defendants.”); State v. Irish, 807 So.2d 208, 213-14 (La.2002); Albarran v. State, 96 So.3d 131, 172-73 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), cert. quashed, 96 So.3d 216 (2012).