context: Courts have uniformly held voluntary murder to be a "crime involving moral turpitude." Courts have also consistently held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.parenthetical: voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment
citation_a.sentence: Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event).
citation_b.signal: but see
citation_b.identifier: 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19
citation_b.parenthetical: in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether "imperfect self-defense" should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude
citation_b.sentence: Op., No. CV91-0320379, 1993 WL 407983, *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 1993) (murder and voluntary manslaughter are crimes involving moral turpitude, citing Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 507, 111 A. 861, (1920)); People v. Gutierrez, 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376 (1993) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching witness); People v. Ballard, 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 628 (1993) (parties conceded conviction for voluntary manslaughter was conviction of crime involving moral turpitude); People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 143 (1992) (same conclusion, but such conviction may not be useable for impeachment of witness for other reasons), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993); People v. Foster, 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855, 857 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of witness impeachment); In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 404, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (circumstances surrounding attorney’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon exhibited moral turpitude as a matter of law in attorney discipline case); People v. Partner, 180 Cal.App.3d 178, 225 Cal.Rptr. 502, 506 (1986) (voluntary manslaughter is crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment of witness); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, 709 (1985) (same, but stating that discussion applied only to voluntary manslaughter, despite defendant’s arguments, which'had principally involved involuntary manslaughter); but see Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law, and therefore like offense with same elements under New York law, are not crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeaching a witness); In re Mostman, 47 Cal.3d 725, 254 Cal.Rptr. 286, 292-93, 765 P.2d 448, 454 (1989) (in attorney discipline case, court read its precedent as holding that voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, citing In re Strick, 43 Cal.3d 644, 238 Cal.Rptr. 397, 405, 738 P.2d 743, 750 (1987), and In re Nevill, 39 Cal.3d 729, 217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332 (1985)); People v. Thomas, 206 Cal.App.3d 689, 254 Cal.Rptr. 15, 19 (1988) (in considering impeachment with conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, court discussed, but did not decide, question of whether “imperfect self-defense” should call into doubt whether voluntary manslaughter necessarily involves moral turpitude); State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn.1976) (concluding that voluntary manslaughter was not “infamous crime” under Tennessee statute ■ allowing use of “infamous crimes,” to be used to impeach credibility, but not deciding whether such a crime was one involving moral turpitude, finding issue of fact to be settled on remand as to whether conviction was too remote to be used in any event).