context: The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.parenthetical: Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because "the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind"
citation_a.sentence: Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 53 F.3d 874, 878
citation_b.parenthetical: "The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons."
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”).