context: Courts must be wary of exaggerating what are properly recognized as contemptible improprieties into grandiose visions of injustice. The temptation to entertain such visions is especially great in cases that pit lonely criminal defendants against the police and prosecutorial powers of their state governments. The danger in succumbing to such temptation is that rules designed to secure the integrity of the legal process can gradually take the form of escape valves whose only notable effect is to provide safe haven for indisputably guilty persons.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 111 S.Ct. 1264, 1264
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that " 'the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence' "
citation_a.sentence: Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that “ ‘the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence’ ”) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); see also Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir.1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) (warning against the dangers of expansive judicial applications of the Miranda rules and urging the judiciary “to monitor carefully the costs of these rules as they are applied to the cases that come before us”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 918 F.2d 1387, 1394
citation_b.parenthetical: warning against the dangers of expansive judicial applications of the Miranda rules and urging the judiciary "to monitor carefully the costs of these rules as they are applied to the cases that come before us"
citation_b.sentence: Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that “ ‘the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence’ ”) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); see also Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir.1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) (warning against the dangers of expansive judicial applications of the Miranda rules and urging the judiciary “to monitor carefully the costs of these rules as they are applied to the cases that come before us”).