context: Plaintiff argues that the core function of the IRGC is commercial, and therefore it is merely an agency or instrumentality of the state and is subject to punitive damages. In previous actions, this Court has repeatedly declined to award punitive damages against the IRGC finding that, under Roeder, the IRGC is governmental rather than a commercial entity.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46
citation_a.parenthetical: awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million
citation_a.sentence: See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162
citation_b.parenthetical: finding no evidence that the IRGC's functions are commercial rather than governmental
citation_b.sentence: See Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 270-71 (concluding that there was insufficient evidence to determine that the IRGC is commercial); Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 60-61 (same); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F.Supp.2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.2006) (Lam-berth, J.) (finding no evidence that the IRGC’s functions are commercial rather than governmental); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 32-33 (D.D.C.2005) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (declining to award punitive damages but acknowledging that the IRGC “appears to be a true ‘instrumentality’ of the dominant party of the state, used by the government and its officials in largely ‘illegal,’ paramilitary, and sub rosa activities”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 116 (D.D.C.2005) (Bates, J.) (recognizing that “the IRGC does not easily fit into Roeder’s dichotomy” but determining that the IRGC is more like an “armed force” than a commercial agency or instrumentality of the state); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. A. No. 01-863, 2004 WL 2216534, *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2004) (Kay, Mag. J.) (finding that the IRGC’s core functions were analogous to those of MOIS); but see Bayani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 530 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.2007) (Kennedy, J.) (awarding punitive damages against the IRGC in the amount of $400 million).