context: The sole basis for the government's argument appears to be that Finley's employer, not Finley, had a property interest in the phone and that Finley should have expected the employer to read the messages on the phone after he returned it to the employer. But a property interest in the item searched is only one factor in the analysis, and lack thereof is not dispositive.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "[C]apacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion."
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) (“[C]apacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.”); see also Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d at 615 (“[N]o one of [the Ibarra] factors is necessarily decisive .... ”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 140 F.3d 615, 615
citation_b.parenthetical: "[N]o one of [the Ibarra] factors is necessarily decisive .... "
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) (“[C]apacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.”); see also Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d at 615 (“[N]o one of [the Ibarra] factors is necessarily decisive .... ”).