context: The probation officer was not obliged to warn Acantara in advance that his statements at the revocation hearing could be used against him. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(A) (requiring only that written notice of "the alleged violation" be given). Nor has Acantara explained why his seemingly voluntary statements at the hearing were involuntary or compelled, so as to implicate the Fifth Amendment.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 228 F.3d 19, 22
citation_a.parenthetical: rejecting a claim that Miranda warnings are generally required before a person is subjected to "in-court questioning"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 110-11 (2d Cir.2002) (concluding that a person charged with a supervised release violation who voluntarily chooses to testify at a revocation hearing cannot later claim that his testimony was compelled); see also United States v. Meléndez, 228 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2000) (rejecting a claim that Miranda warnings are generally required before a person is subjected to “in-court questioning”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 299 F.3d 103, 110-11
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that a person charged with a supervised release violation who voluntarily chooses to testify at a revocation hearing cannot later claim that his testimony was compelled
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 110-11 (2d Cir.2002) (concluding that a person charged with a supervised release violation who voluntarily chooses to testify at a revocation hearing cannot later claim that his testimony was compelled); see also United States v. Meléndez, 228 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2000) (rejecting a claim that Miranda warnings are generally required before a person is subjected to “in-court questioning”).