context: Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with our jurisprudence interpreting Rule 222 wherein our appellate courts have found that a decision under this rule does not preempt an award of attorney's fees to which one is otherwise entitled, i.e., statutorily authorized.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: recognizing, in a partition action, that whether Respondents were entitled to appellate attorney's fees pursuant to section 15-61-110 was a determination for the circuit court
citation_a.sentence: See Taylor v. Medenica, 332 S.C. 324, 504 S.E.2d 590 (1998) (awarding Respondents a $1,000 attorneys’ fee and $81.66 for costs as allowed by Rule 222 and holding that Respondents could seek additional attorneys’ fees in the circuit court under the UTPA, which provides for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs); Muller v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 313 S.C. 412, 416, 438 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1993) (finding Appellant waived right to recover appellate costs and fees under Rule 222 as he failed to file an itemized statement of costs prior to the Court’s issuance of the remittitur, but holding that Appellant could seek appellate costs in the circuit court based on his statutory right under section 29-5-10 (authorizing costs incurred for the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien) as “Rule 222 does not preempt an award of attorney’s fees to which one is otherwise entitled” (citation omitted)); McDowell v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 539, 543, 405 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1991) (holding that an award of attorney’s fees under Supreme Court Rule 38 (precursor to Rule 222) did not “preempt an award of attorney’s fees to which one is otherwise entitled” and, thus, Appellant could seek an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 15-77-300, which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency); see also Parker v. Shecut, 359 S.C. 143, 597 S.E.2d 793 (2004) (recognizing, in a partition action, that whether Respondents were entitled to appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to section 15-61-110 was a determination for the circuit court).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 304 S.C. 539, 543
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that an award of attorney's fees under Supreme Court Rule 38 (precursor to Rule 222
citation_b.sentence: See Taylor v. Medenica, 332 S.C. 324, 504 S.E.2d 590 (1998) (awarding Respondents a $1,000 attorneys’ fee and $81.66 for costs as allowed by Rule 222 and holding that Respondents could seek additional attorneys’ fees in the circuit court under the UTPA, which provides for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs); Muller v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 313 S.C. 412, 416, 438 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1993) (finding Appellant waived right to recover appellate costs and fees under Rule 222 as he failed to file an itemized statement of costs prior to the Court’s issuance of the remittitur, but holding that Appellant could seek appellate costs in the circuit court based on his statutory right under section 29-5-10 (authorizing costs incurred for the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien) as “Rule 222 does not preempt an award of attorney’s fees to which one is otherwise entitled” (citation omitted)); McDowell v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 539, 543, 405 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1991) (holding that an award of attorney’s fees under Supreme Court Rule 38 (precursor to Rule 222) did not “preempt an award of attorney’s fees to which one is otherwise entitled” and, thus, Appellant could seek an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 15-77-300, which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency); see also Parker v. Shecut, 359 S.C. 143, 597 S.E.2d 793 (2004) (recognizing, in a partition action, that whether Respondents were entitled to appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to section 15-61-110 was a determination for the circuit court).