context: In analyzing the Cort factors we will focus on the second factor ("whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with a private right of action") as "the key inquiry in this calculus."
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 540 U.S. 526, 534
citation_a.parenthetical: "The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text...."
citation_a.sentence: Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511; see also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text....”).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 487 F.3d 734, 739
citation_b.parenthetical: "Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent."
citation_b.sentence: Opera Plaza, 376 F.3d at 835. See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2007) (“Indeed, the three Cort questions that are not explicitly focused on legislative intent are actually indicia of legislative intent, such that the Cort test itself is focused entirely on intent.”). Here, congressional intent weighs decisively against finding a private right of action. “We ... begin ... our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of [the statute].”