context: that at least one of our sister circuits has recently suggested that different constitutional standards may apply to stops based on probable cause.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: "We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop."
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 277 F.3d 947, 952-54
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”).