context: On the one hand, we might consider disqualification to be a kind of additional punishment and then allow a judge (perhaps at the original trial) to find the necessary factual predicate by a preponderance of the evidence.
citation_a.signal: but cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: applying "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" standard where factual finding "will result in a much longer and harsher sentence"
citation_a.sentence: Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence
citation_b.sentence: Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factual finding requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentence may be made by trial judge on a preponderance of the evidence); but cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 408 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” standard where factual finding “will result in a much longer and harsher sentence”), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980).