context: For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi's affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi's counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi's counsel is plainly wrong.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 375 F.3d 219, 219
citation_a.parenthetical: "Rule 56(e)'s requirement ... means that an affidavit's hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial."
citation_a.sentence: See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (“Rule 56(e)’s requirement ... means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.”); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that hearsay statement “did not constitute competent evidence” and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 118 F.3d 106, 111
citation_b.parenthetical: bald assertions not based on personal knowledge were properly ignored by district court in granting summary judgment
citation_b.sentence: See also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.1997) (bald assertions not based on personal knowledge were properly ignored by district court in granting summary judgment).