context: Because of the modest social interest in prosecuting misdemeanors, and the need to be cognizant of the large risks to privacy from over-seizing cell phone information, a limited "plain view" rule provides a bright line for police and strikes the right balance.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 552 F.3d 412, 412
citation_a.parenthetical: "Of course, once the cell phone was held for evidence, other officers and investigators were entitled to conduct a further review of its contents ... without seeking a warrant"
citation_a.sentence: See e.g., Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810 (approving very limited war-rantless search of phone in order to discover the phone’s own phone number); but see Murphy, 552 F.3d at 412 (“Of course, once the cell phone was held for evidence, other officers and investigators were entitled to conduct a further review of its contents ... without seeking a warrant”). Since there is no dispute that the deputies went further than looking at only that which was in plain view on the cell phones, this Court would hold that the search violated Lustig’s Fourth Amendment rights.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 670 F.3d 810, 810
citation_b.parenthetical: approving very limited war-rantless search of phone in order to discover the phone's own phone number
citation_b.sentence: See e.g., Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810 (approving very limited war-rantless search of phone in order to discover the phone’s own phone number); but see Murphy, 552 F.3d at 412 (“Of course, once the cell phone was held for evidence, other officers and investigators were entitled to conduct a further review of its contents ... without seeking a warrant”). Since there is no dispute that the deputies went further than looking at only that which was in plain view on the cell phones, this Court would hold that the search violated Lustig’s Fourth Amendment rights.