context: The Act sets forth a statutory scheme for the licensing of security guards and grants them the power to arrest and detain persons on the premises they have been hired to protect. S.C.Code Ann. SS 40-17-130 (Law.Co-op.1986). If Crooks had arrested plaintiff on Colonial Life's premises in exercise of rights granted him under SS 40-17-130 of the Act, he clearly would have been acting under the color of state law.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect); see also State v. Brant, 278 S.C. 188, 293 S.E.2d 703 (1982) (“According to this provision [§ 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.” (emphasis added)).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "According to this provision [SS 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect." (emphasis added
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407 (D.S.C.1976) (security guard found to have acted under color of state law when he allegedly arrested and assaulted the plaintiff on premises he was hired to protect); see also State v. Brant, 278 S.C. 188, 293 S.E.2d 703 (1982) (“According to this provision [§ 40-17-130], a security guard licensed by SLED stands in the shoes of the sheriff for purposes of arrest while he is on the property is is hired to protect.” (emphasis added)).