context: We think that the nuanced, case-specific approach of Williams is consistent with the strictures of Rufo and with the equitable nature of relief from a decree under Rule 60(b)(5).
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 112 S.Ct. 760, 760
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a court order when '"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application' "
citation_a.sentence: See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 760 (noting that Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a court order when ‘“it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application’ ”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 969 F.2d 1278, 1278
citation_b.parenthetical: "the decision as to whether to modify or dissolve [a structural decree] is at bottom an exercise of equitable power" that calls for a "deferential standard of review"
citation_b.sentence: See also Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1278 (“the decision as to whether to modify or dissolve [a structural decree] is at bottom an exercise of equitable power” that calls for a “deferential standard of review”).