context: It is, as indicated, certainly arguable that these varying ascriptions of the language used and meaning intended by the defendants are insufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find, as Stone had the burden to prove, that defendants misrepresented to him their power to expel him summarily.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: "Neither plaintiff's rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto."
citation_a.sentence: See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 106 S.Ct. 2512, 2512
citation_b.parenthetical: "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment]."
citation_b.sentence: See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient [to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment].”); see also Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F.Supp. 1068, 1078 (D.Md.1975) (“Neither plaintiff’s rhetoric nor his imagination can make undisputed facts into disputed ones or raise a genuine issue with respect thereto.”), aff'd, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.1976).