context: Regardless of the particulars, which the courts have not yet explored in depth, as a general rule, the hurdle Gisbrecht erects for the claimant's attorney is rather low, and a change to the agreement is warranted at least, and perhaps at most, when justice requires.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037
citation_a.parenthetical: approving $25,132.50, or 18.2 percent of past-due benefits, for 56 hours
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Yarnevic v. Apfel, 359 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1363-67 (N.D.Ga.2005) (approving a contingency fee agreement resulting in an award of $21,057.75 for approximately 33 hours of work conducted primarily by the attorney’s paralegals and noting, “Since Gisbrecht ... the district courts generally have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto hourly rates may exceed those for non contingency-fee arrangements”); Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F.Supp.2d 829 (S.D.W.Va.2003) (approving a request for an award under a contingency fee agreement of $18,000, or approximately 9 percent of the past-due benefits awarded, for 12.56 hours); Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D.Cal.2003) (approving $25,132.50, or 18.2 percent of past-due benefits, for 56 hours); Martin v. Barnhart, 225 F.Supp.2d 704 (W.D.Va.2002) (approving $10,189.50, or 25 percent, for 16.82 hours); see also Kay, 176 F.3d at 1325 (describing the “contingent fee” method as it was applied prior to Gisbrecht as “essentially erect[ing] a rebuttable presumption that a contingency fee arrangement of 25 percent or less is a reasonable fee, absent evidence suggesting otherwise”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 176 F.3d 1325, 1325
citation_b.parenthetical: describing the "contingent fee" method as it was applied prior to Gisbrecht as "essentially erect[ing] a rebuttable presumption that a contingency fee arrangement of 25 percent or less is a reasonable fee, absent evidence suggesting otherwise"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Yarnevic v. Apfel, 359 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1363-67 (N.D.Ga.2005) (approving a contingency fee agreement resulting in an award of $21,057.75 for approximately 33 hours of work conducted primarily by the attorney’s paralegals and noting, “Since Gisbrecht ... the district courts generally have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto hourly rates may exceed those for non contingency-fee arrangements”); Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F.Supp.2d 829 (S.D.W.Va.2003) (approving a request for an award under a contingency fee agreement of $18,000, or approximately 9 percent of the past-due benefits awarded, for 12.56 hours); Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D.Cal.2003) (approving $25,132.50, or 18.2 percent of past-due benefits, for 56 hours); Martin v. Barnhart, 225 F.Supp.2d 704 (W.D.Va.2002) (approving $10,189.50, or 25 percent, for 16.82 hours); see also Kay, 176 F.3d at 1325 (describing the “contingent fee” method as it was applied prior to Gisbrecht as “essentially erect[ing] a rebuttable presumption that a contingency fee arrangement of 25 percent or less is a reasonable fee, absent evidence suggesting otherwise”).