context: The defense did not offer the evidence under the first or second exceptions. We hold that the evidence did not qualify under the third exception because it was not relevant.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 44 MJ 174, 179-80
citation_a.parenthetical: alleged victim's sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oi consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is "so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant's version"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is “so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant’s version”); see also United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994), quoting United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1988) (reputation and opinion evidence about victim’s past sexual behavior “are not relevant indicators” of consent). Accordingly, we hold that the military judge did not err in excluding SSgt W’s testimony about SrA B’s sexual orientation.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 855 F.2d 1528, 1533
citation_b.parenthetical: reputation and opinion evidence about victim's past sexual behavior "are not relevant indicators" of consent
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is “so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant’s version”); see also United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994), quoting United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1988) (reputation and opinion evidence about victim’s past sexual behavior “are not relevant indicators” of consent). Accordingly, we hold that the military judge did not err in excluding SSgt W’s testimony about SrA B’s sexual orientation.