context: We have interpreted this scheme, in a variety of circumstances, as vesting sole authority to make post-dispositional decisions in the director of the agency responsible for supervision.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 851 A.2d 503, 512
citation_a.parenthetical: in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director "is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 411 A.2d 345, 347
citation_b.parenthetical: "It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute." "As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., In re K.A., 879 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C.2005) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency custody, holding that trial court did not have authority to release juvenile from agency custody, and noting that “[i]n delinquency cases, the only power that the trial court retains after a commitment — and even then, only if it is reserved in the commitment order — is a veto power over [the agency]’s decision to release the delinquent juvenile”); In re M.O.R., 851 A.2d 503, 512 (D.C.2004) (in case of delinquent child sentenced to probation, holding that court had no authority to extend term of probation in absence of motion to that effect from agency director, and noting that the agency director “is the person with statutory authority to terminate pro bation before its expiration date”); In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905, 912 (D.C.2003) (in case of delinquent child committed to agency’s custody, holding that court had no authority to order agency to place juvenile in a particular facility); see also In re J. M. W., 411 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C.1980) (“It is generally well established that a court is without authority to suspend or impose a sentence of a nature or in a manner not specified by statute.” “As a result, the judiciary is frequently without power to modify, review or alter a sentence, regardless of a change in circumstances, once it becomes final.”) (citations omitted).