context: Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 878 S.W.2d 530, 552
citation_a.parenthetical: "there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case"
citation_a.sentence: State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence
citation_b.sentence: State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990).