context: First, it is axiomatic that the right that plaintiff asserts -- namely, his right under the First Amendment to be free from retaliation for his union activities and for testifying in a lawsuit -- is clearly established.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 892 F.2d 1135, 1141
citation_a.parenthetical: "the proscription of retaliation for a plaintiffs exercise of First Amendment rights has long been established"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Dobosz v. Walsh, 892 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir.1989) (“the proscription of retaliation for a plaintiffs exercise of First Amendment rights has long been established”); see also Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir. 1997) (county judge not entitled to qualified immunity from retaliation claim because “it is well-established that a public official’s retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of § 1983.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 130 F.3d 246, 264
citation_b.parenthetical: county judge not entitled to qualified immunity from retaliation claim because "it is well-established that a public official's retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of SS 1983."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Dobosz v. Walsh, 892 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir.1989) (“the proscription of retaliation for a plaintiffs exercise of First Amendment rights has long been established”); see also Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 264 (6th Cir. 1997) (county judge not entitled to qualified immunity from retaliation claim because “it is well-established that a public official’s retaliation against an individual exercising his or her First Amendment rights is a violation of § 1983.”).