context: In avoiding unwarranted disparities, as in evaluating other key sentencing factors, district courts have enormous discretion. The Supreme Court has consistently instructed us, and we have reminded ourselves, that the appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the district judge.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court."
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 518 U.S. 81, 97
citation_b.parenthetical: "[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”) (citations omitted); accord Carty, 520 F.3d at 993 (“We may not reverse just because we think a different sentence is appropriate.”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we are certain that we would have imposed a different sentence had we worn the district judge’s robe, we can’t reverse on that basis.”) (emphasis added).