context: However, several district courts have held otherwise, i.e., that the "exceptional reasons" provision of SS 3145(c) is only available to the appellate courts.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 937 F.Supp. 507, 509
citation_a.parenthetical: "we will not consider Nesser's 'exceptional reasons' argument for bail ..., finding that Congress reserved this task for the court of appeals."
citation_a.sentence: See U.S. v. Nesser, 937 F.Supp. 507, 509 (W.D.Pa.1996) (Cindrich, J.) (“we will not consider Nesser’s ‘exceptional reasons’ argument for bail ..., finding that Congress reserved this task for the court of appeals.”); U.S. v. Salome, 870 F.Supp. 648, 652 (W.D.Pa.1994) (Diamond, J.) (“the jurisdiction established by § 3145 is appellate jurisdiction”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 242 F.Supp.2d 489, 491
citation_b.parenthetical: "Congress has mandated that the United States Courts of Appeals are the only courts with the jurisdiction to override a SS 3143(a
citation_b.sentence: See also In re Sealed Case, 242 F.Supp.2d 489, 491 (E.D.Mich.2003) (Gadola, J.) (“Congress has mandated that the United States Courts of Appeals are the only courts with the jurisdiction to override a § 3143(a)(2) mandatory detention and order the release of a defendant because of exceptional reasons, pursuant to § 3145(c).”); cf. U.S. v. Bloomer, 791 F.Supp. 100, 102 (D.Vt.1992) (Billings, J.) (“we think that § 3145(c) by its very provisions applies exclusively to reviewing courts and not to courts which initially ordered release or detention”).