context: The Commonwealth now argues that we must reverse the District Court because in 2003 Lincoln waived the issue he intends to raise in his reinstated appeal. The Commonwealth's shifting positions cause us to consider whether to impose an equitable bar (called judicial estoppel) on its new argument.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state's waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
citation_a.sentence: See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 520 F.3d 997, 1002
citation_b.parenthetical: judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner's procedural default
citation_b.sentence: See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).