context: Nonetheless, we have "borrowed" this part of section 2508(d) and applied it to mandatory transfers. Likewise, we construe section 2509(g) as applying to mandatory transfers under 2508(b), just as it applies to permissive transfers under 2508(d), because to do otherwise would -- as discussed above -- lead to absurd results.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.parenthetical: "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available."
citation_a.sentence: Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982) (“interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); Disabled in Action of Penn. v. Southeastern Penn.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 52 V.I. 350, 365
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that "would lead to unjust and absurd results" because such an interpretation would be "clearly inconsistent with the Legislature's intent"
citation_b.sentence: Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We also consider the overall object and policy of the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with common sense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 365 (V.I. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation of a Virgin Islands statute that “would lead to unjust and absurd results” because such an interpretation would be “clearly inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent”).