context: Its chief drawback, as demonstrated here, is its duration. Congress, though, has addressed the matter of delay directly, see 15 U.S.C. SS 717r(d)(2); 33 U.S.C. SS 1341(a)(1), and by divesting states of their customary review of state agency orders and opinions in this field, see 15 U.S.C. SS 717r(d)(l). We see no indication that Congress otherwise intended to dictate how (as opposed to how quickly) MassDEP conducts its internal decision-making before finally acting.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 20 F.3d 1418, 1427
citation_a.parenthetical: "[T]he CWA sets up a system of 'cooperative federalism,' in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs."
citation_a.sentence: See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources .... ”); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states’ role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to ‘implement ... permit programs’ like [the one at issue here.]”); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf't, Dep’t of Interior, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he CWA sets up a system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.”); cf. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the NGA “expressly does not preempt” certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 723 F.3d 238, 240
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that the NGA "expressly does not preempt" certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states
citation_b.sentence: See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources .... ”); United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the CWA, Congress expressed its respect for states’ role through a scheme of cooperative federalism that enables states to ‘implement ... permit programs’ like [the one at issue here.]”); S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf't, Dep’t of Interior, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he CWA sets up a system of ‘cooperative federalism,’ in which states may choose to be primarily responsible for running federally-approved programs.”); cf. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that the NGA “expressly does not preempt” certain environmental protection laws like the Clean Air Act that contemplate a robust role for states).