context: Courts interpreting Rodriguez also equate accuracy with a professional judgment standard.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 398 F.3d 183, 191
citation_a.parenthetical: overturning jury verdict rendered in favor of person involuntarily committed because jury was not competent to evaluate the professional propriety of the defendant doctors' actions without the assistance of expert testimony
citation_a.sentence: See Monaco v. Carpinello, 2004 WL 3090598, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jul.22, 2004) (“Monaco III”) (due process requires that involuntary commitment determinations be made in accordance with a standard that must not fall substantially below that which is generally accepted in the medical community) (citing Katzman v. Khan, 67 F.Supp.2d 103, 109-10 (E.D.N.Y.1999)); Fisk v. Letterman, 501 F.Supp.2d 505, 524 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (granting summary judgment on claim that commitment violated right to substantive due process where plaintiff presented no evidence that doctor’s determination that she presented a danger to herself or others fell below generally accepted medical standards); Dove v. City of New York, 2005 WL 2387587, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2005); see also Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir.2005) (overturning jury verdict rendered in favor of person involuntarily committed because jury was not competent to evaluate the professional propriety of the defendant doctors’ actions without the assistance of expert testimony).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 501 F.Supp.2d 505, 524
citation_b.parenthetical: granting summary judgment on claim that commitment violated right to substantive due process where plaintiff presented no evidence that doctor's determination that she presented a danger to herself or others fell below generally accepted medical standards
citation_b.sentence: See Monaco v. Carpinello, 2004 WL 3090598, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jul.22, 2004) (“Monaco III”) (due process requires that involuntary commitment determinations be made in accordance with a standard that must not fall substantially below that which is generally accepted in the medical community) (citing Katzman v. Khan, 67 F.Supp.2d 103, 109-10 (E.D.N.Y.1999)); Fisk v. Letterman, 501 F.Supp.2d 505, 524 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (granting summary judgment on claim that commitment violated right to substantive due process where plaintiff presented no evidence that doctor’s determination that she presented a danger to herself or others fell below generally accepted medical standards); Dove v. City of New York, 2005 WL 2387587, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2005); see also Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir.2005) (overturning jury verdict rendered in favor of person involuntarily committed because jury was not competent to evaluate the professional propriety of the defendant doctors’ actions without the assistance of expert testimony).