context: The present complaint might be interpreted, alternatively, as asserting a substantive due process violation based on the theory that the conduct of appellee Morales "shocks the conscience."
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is "egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking"
citation_a.sentence: See also Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 (substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking”). Offensive conduct is not conscience-shocking, however, in a substantive due process sense, merely because it trespasses on “some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 927 F.2d 6, 6
citation_b.parenthetical: alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which "shocks the conscience"
citation_b.sentence: See Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which “shocks the conscience”).