context: Notwithstanding Defendants' oral assertions they are not waiving counsel, but see Memoranda at 1 (wherein each Defendant states "this Defendant now makes this [his/her] knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by counsel and asserts [his/her] right to waive the right to counsel and to proceed Pro Se"), the Court concludes Defendants have at this point knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived their right to counsel and invoked their right to self-representation. It is also noted either may later waive the right to proceed pro se, either explicitly or by their conduct.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 665 F.2d 611, 611
citation_a.parenthetical: "Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant's subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether."
citation_a.sentence: See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611 (“Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct."
citation_b.sentence: See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611 (“Even if defendant requests to represent himself, however, the right may be waived through defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether.”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[T] he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”).