context: Both federal and state courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted Manson to stand for the proposition that extrinsic evidence of guilt should play no part when courts analyze the independent reliability of an inherently suggestive identification procedure.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 728 F.2d 1533, 1546
citation_a.parenthetical: "[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis" of admissibility of eyewitness identification
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "[Ojther evidence of a defendant's guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness's personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness's identification."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir.2013) (“[E]vidence extrinsic to an identification cannot be considered in evaluating the reliability of the identification.” (em phasis omitted)); Raheem, supra, 257 F.3d at 141 (concluding “that evidence of record that is unrelated to an identification but that is supportive of a finding of guilt is properly considered in harmless-error analysis, not in the due process inquiry of whether the identification has reliability”); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]dmissibility rests on the reliability of the identification judged solely by the circumstances indicating whether it was likely to be a well-grounded identification, not whether it seems likely to have been correct in light of other available evidence.” (citation omitted)); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1546 (8th Cir.1984) (“[Ojther evidence of guilt does not play a formal role in the analysis” of admissibility of eyewitness identification); see also Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1988) (“[Ojther evidence of a defendant’s guilt, not dealing with the individual eyewitness’s personal observation and memory, plays no part in the analysis of the reliability of that eyewitness’s identification.”); Richards v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.I. 379, 388 n. 4, 2010 WL 318405 (V.I.2010) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, it is evident that corroborating evidence of guilt would be relevant only to a harmless error analysis.”).