context: For purposes of the Corrupt Organizations Act, it is unnecessary to consider whether these acts are sufficient for conviction of the predicate drug offenses. Indeed, our case law emphasizes that conviction of the predicate offenses is neither required nor necessary in the determination of a violation of the corrupt organizations statute.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 806 A.2d 1280, 1287
citation_a.parenthetical: "Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income 'from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.' 18 Pa.C.S. SS 911(b
citation_a.sentence: See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 806 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa.Super.2002) (“Under the Corrupt Organization Act, an offense could be established by proving, inter alia, that a person received income ‘from a pattern of racketeering activity in which he participated as a principal.’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(1). The statute defined the element of ‘racketeering’ as ‘any act which is indictable’ under a prescribed number of Crimes Code chapters. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(l)(i). Significantly, this language does not require any criminal conviction, but merely a pattern of ‘indictable’ acts”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: upholding a defendant's conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts
citation_b.sentence: See also Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 423 Pa.Super. 1, 620 A.2d 9 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 619, 637 A.2d 279 (1993) (upholding a defendant’s conviction for violation of the corrupt organizations statute even though he had been acquitted of the predicate criminal acts).