context: We agree with Boudreaux's assessment that courts have routinely applied the qualified immunity defense to actions seek ing damages against public officials performing discretionary functions.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: penalties are "intended to punish culpable individuals," not "to extract compensation or restore the status quo"
citation_a.sentence: See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1223, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief,” namely “penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 211 F.3d 1210, 1216
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that "the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act" in a private cause of action
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials who are sued under the Federal Wiretap Act” in a private cause of action); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that Congress’ silence regarding the common law defense of qualified immunity indicated that it was available to “a public official sued in her individual capacity” by a former employee under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). But the instant case is distinguishable. The SEC does not seek damages from Boudreaux in a private suit; rather this is a government enforcement action that seeks civil monetary penalties against the defendants.