context: In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.parenthetical: acknowledging the "ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available"
citation_a.sentence: Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim
citation_b.sentence: Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim).