context: We recognize that GMD opposes this result. GMD argues on appeal that certain improper remarks by Anthony's counsel during closing argument necessitate a new trial on damages because the remarks infected the jury's verdict with passion and prejudice.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 931 F.2d 125, 125
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts "protects against the potential contamination of a jury's liability findings"
citation_a.sentence: Cf. De León López, 931 F.2d at 125 (noting that the rule against remittitur in cases of tainted jury verdicts “protects against the potential contamination of a jury’s liability findings”) (emphasis added); 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2815 (1973) (same); J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, 6A ¶ 59.08[7] (1993) (same).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: "It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required."
citation_b.sentence: See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1561 (10th Cir.1991) (“It is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that case, a new trial is required.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1941, 118 L.Ed.2d 547 (1992); see also De León López v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 125 (1st Cir.1991); Seidman, 923 F.2d at 1140. GMD makes no claim of error, however, and does not assert that the alleged remarks contaminated the jury’s liability findings.