context: Therefore, whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection between negligence and injury is dependent upon whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable to the one who was initially negligent. The "intervening cause must be disconnected from the negligence of the first person and must be of itself an efficient, independent, and self-producing cause of the injury."
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 650 F.2d 817, 821
citation_a.parenthetical: noting, under Ohio law, that an intervening cause must produce the result without the cooperation of the original wrong
citation_a.sentence: Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (1993); Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir.1981) (noting, under Ohio law, that an intervening cause must produce the result without the cooperation of the original wrong).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 213 S.W.3d 264, 274
citation_b.parenthetical: observing that "the intervening cause doctrine is inapplicable where the alleged intervening, superseding cause is the plaintiffs own negligent conduct"
citation_b.sentence: See also Potter v. Ford Motor Co., 213 S.W.3d 264, 274 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (observing that “the intervening cause doctrine is inapplicable where the alleged intervening, superseding cause is the plaintiffs own negligent conduct”).