context: The Appellants raised this argument in the context of their general contention that they were entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 264 Ga. 744, 752
citation_a.parenthetical: "The doctrine of official immunity... provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority."
citation_a.sentence: See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752 (6) (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (“The doctrine of official immunity... provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.”) (citations omitted); see also Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 620 (697 SE2d 775) (2010) (“Where there is an established policy requiring an official to take specified action in a specified situation, the policy creates a ministerial duty on the part of the official to perform the specified task.”) (citations omitted); Common Cause/Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 482 (2) (614 SE2d 761) (2005) (“A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 279 Ga. 480, 482
citation_b.parenthetical: "A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty."
citation_b.sentence: See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752 (6) (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (“The doctrine of official immunity... provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.”) (citations omitted); see also Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 620 (697 SE2d 775) (2010) (“Where there is an established policy requiring an official to take specified action in a specified situation, the policy creates a ministerial duty on the part of the official to perform the specified task.”) (citations omitted); Common Cause/Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 482 (2) (614 SE2d 761) (2005) (“A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).