context: Even assuming that Heck does not bar Victory's revocation claims, dismissal was nonetheless proper. Victory has not alleged that he was denied any constitutional or federal right at his revocation proceedings.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 171 F.3d 757, 761
citation_a.parenthetical: "[Pjarole board officials, like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to ... revoke parole."
citation_a.sentence: See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999) (“[Pjarole board officials, like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to ... revoke parole.”); see also Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that absolute immunity often bars due process damages claims by individuals serving invalidated sentences).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 23 F.3d 652, 658
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining that absolute immunity often bars due process damages claims by individuals serving invalidated sentences
citation_b.sentence: See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999) (“[Pjarole board officials, like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to ... revoke parole.”); see also Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that absolute immunity often bars due process damages claims by individuals serving invalidated sentences).