context: Proof that appellant participated in the murder as an accessory before the fact would also suffice to establish appellant's guilt. Hence, we cannot say, viewing the applicable legal elements of murder in the abstract, that proof of the referenced conspiracy is "required" in this context to prove the charged murder.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 261 Va. 200, 200
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, "proof of the specific intent to kill" is not "required" in a malicious wounding case because Code SS 18.2-51 -- which requires proof that the accused had "the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU" -- uses the disjunctive "or" in its description of the required intent for that offense
citation_a.sentence: See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 400 S.E.2d 796, 796
citation_b.parenthetical: "Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one."
citation_b.sentence: See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”).