context: In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O'Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts "hold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause even when the felony for which the defendant was convicted took place before the statute was enacted."
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 820 F.2d 1524, 1527
citation_a.parenthetical: holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense
citation_a.sentence: See also United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321-23 (4th Cir.1991) (assuming no violation of the ex post facto clause regarding the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (concluding no violation of the ex post facto clause when the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) because the temporal focus is the date of the present offense, not the date of the prior felony convictions); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir.1989) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the enhancement provision added to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 924) (stating the defendant is being punished because he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)) (holding n@o violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision “increases the punishment for [being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce]” and “[i]t does not affect the punishment previously meted out to [the defendant] for the ... [crimes] he committed prior to the effective date of the [statute]”); United States v. Patterson, 820 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1987) (holding no ex post facto violation because enhancement provision was already on the books when the defendant committed the 1985 firearm offense).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 26 F.3d 282, 291
citation_b.parenthetical: holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.1994) (holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 563 (9th Cir.1998), (concluding no ex post facto problem because Oregon weapons restriction does not impose punishment for prior crimes, but rather furthers the substantial and legitimate safety interest in preventing the misuse of firearms) (declining to follow Davis or Roehl v. United States, 977 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.1992) and finding persuasive Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir.1942)); Roehl, 977 F.2d at 377-78 (stating 1966 conviction and 1974 conviction could be used as predicates for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and for enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) because each could be a predicate for criminal liability under Wis. Stat. 941.29, which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a gun) (rejecting the defendant’s ex post facto argument because, if prosecuted for violating Wis. Stat. 941.29, his earlier felony convictions could have been predicates without violating the ex post facto clause); United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (determining Congress intended statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms to reach “persons convicted of felonies prior to [the effective date of the statute]”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir.1942) (finding, if a statute “is a bona fide regulation of conduct which the legislature has power to regulate, it is not bad as an ex post facto law even though the right to engage in the conduct is made to depend on past behavi-our, even behaviour before the passage of the regulatory act”).