context: We are unable to conclude that the officers in this case reasonably relied on the warrant in their possession -- which on its face explicitly authorized the search of the first-floor apartment -- to conduct a search of the apartment on the second floor. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a search warrant for one apartment in a building does not permit the police to enter apartments other than the one specified in their warrant.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 480 U.S. 86, 86
citation_a.parenthetical: "If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's apartment."
citation_a.sentence: See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (“If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb’s apartment.”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (“The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits."
citation_b.sentence: See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (“If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb’s apartment.”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (“The objective standard we adopt ... requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.”).