context: Other Washington decisions have employed a more complete analysis to uphold the same statute on the ground that threats themselves are nonprotected speech.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 91 Wn. App. 373, 373-74
citation_b.parenthetical: analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected "true threat"
citation_b.sentence: See State v. Young, 83 Wn.2d 937, 941-42, 523 P.2d 934 (1974) (holding that RCW 9.61.160 does not prohibit advocating use of force but, rather, prohibits threats); State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 405, 411, 748 P.2d 276 (1988) (holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 (analyzing overbreadth of RCW 9A.72.160 (intimidating a judge) by considering whether speech was nonprotected “true threat”).