context: Even assuming that Kamau demonstrated that his group is socially visible, he has not shown that he was persecuted "on account of' his membership in that group.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 707 F.3d 1093, 1093
citation_a.parenthetical: "These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion."
citation_a.sentence: See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground
citation_b.sentence: See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093.