context: Our view that larceny may be proved by evidence that the property owner lacked the mental capacity to consent is in harmony with most of the cases from other jurisdictions where the courts have interpreted similar statutes that do not include lack of consent as an element of the crime.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant's actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult
citation_a.sentence: Cf. State v. Maxon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 67, 79-80 (2003) (concluding that capacity of mentally handicapped victim could not be considered under felony theft statute because defendant’s actions already covered under specific offense of mistreatment of dependent adult).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 553 So. 2d 673, 679
citation_b.parenthetical: "even without an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that victim in a prosecution for theft"
citation_b.sentence: See Gainer v. State, 553 So. 2d 673, 679 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (“even without an express statutory provision . . . mental deficiency on the part of the victim, which is known or should be known to the defendant, can render ineffective the apparent consent by that victim in a prosecution for theft”); Calonico, 256 Conn, at 153 (holding that mental capacity may be considered on issue of victim’s intent); People v. Cain, 238 Mich. App. 95,128-129 (1999) (affirming larceny conviction because victim lacked mental capacity to consent to taking); Camiola, 225 A.D.2d at 380-381 (holding that jury may consider victim’s mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victim’s knowledge and consent).