context: Here, we conclude the requisite articulable reasonable suspicion existed to stop defendant's car as a result of the officer's observations that (a) the car was the same color and make, and it had the same peculiar tire feature, as the car used by suspects in a homicide; and (b) the car had a cracked windshield and an item dangling from the rearview mirror.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 948 P.2d 506, 508
citation_a.parenthetical: reasonable suspicion from cracked taillight and windshield and missing headlight
citation_a.sentence: See People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 834 (Colo.App.1996)(reasonable suspicion from tip that a possible crime was being committed by person driving white Cadillac with out-of-state plates); see also People v. Jackson, 948 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked taillight and windshield and missing headlight); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 145 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked windshield and obstructed license plate).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 937 P.2d 826, 834
citation_b.parenthetical: reasonable suspicion from tip that a possible crime was being committed by person driving white Cadillac with out-of-state plates
citation_b.sentence: See People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 834 (Colo.App.1996)(reasonable suspicion from tip that a possible crime was being committed by person driving white Cadillac with out-of-state plates); see also People v. Jackson, 948 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked taillight and windshield and missing headlight); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 145 (Colo.1997)(reasonable suspicion from cracked windshield and obstructed license plate).