context: But this argument presumes the very conclusion that is at issue in this case--namely, that the NYPD can prohibit unrecognized groups, including the LOA, from marching in parades in uniform and behind their organization banners. The danger of a prior restraint, as opposed to ex post disciplinary action, is precisely that making predictions ex ante as to what restrictions on speech will ultimately be found permissible is hazardous and may chill protected speech.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [an ex ante restriction] chills potential speech before it happens."
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. at 481, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[E]x ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments, carry risks of overinclu-siveness and underinclusiveness.”); id. at 468, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (majority opinion) (“[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [an ex ante restriction] chills potential speech before it happens.”); see also New York Magazine, 136 F.3d at 131 (“We consider prior restraints to be particularly abhorrent to the First Amendment in part because they vest in government agencies the power to determine important constitutional questions properly vested in the judiciary.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 136 F.3d 131, 131
citation_b.parenthetical: "We consider prior restraints to be particularly abhorrent to the First Amendment in part because they vest in government agencies the power to determine important constitutional questions properly vested in the judiciary."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. at 481, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[E]x ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments, carry risks of overinclu-siveness and underinclusiveness.”); id. at 468, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (majority opinion) (“[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [an ex ante restriction] chills potential speech before it happens.”); see also New York Magazine, 136 F.3d at 131 (“We consider prior restraints to be particularly abhorrent to the First Amendment in part because they vest in government agencies the power to determine important constitutional questions properly vested in the judiciary.”).