context: That exclusion sufficed in this case to vindicate the purpose of the rule. In so ruling, we leave open the question whether suppression would be necessary and proper at the sentencing phase where it is shown that the police acted egregiously, e.g., by undertaking a warrantless search for the very purpose of obtaining evidence to increase a defendant's sentence.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 402 F.2d 599, 611-13
citation_a.parenthetical: evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was "blatantly illegal," and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved
citation_a.sentence: See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added).
citation_b.signal: but see
citation_b.identifier: 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25
citation_b.parenthetical: limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence "would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures "
citation_b.sentence: See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added).