context: . The issue of whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the prosecution's case-in-chief has divided the circuits. The majority hold that such use is not constitutionally permissible.
citation_a.signal: but cf.
citation_a.identifier: 408 F.3d 1102, 1111
citation_a.parenthetical: comment on defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak
citation_a.sentence: But cf. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985) (testimony of defendants' pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence properly admitted; no fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of non-Miranda-induced silence); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2005) (comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence permissible as substantive government evidence where defendant was under no official compulsion to speak); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (dicta that government may reference defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence without raising constitutional questions).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 774 F.2d 530, 538
citation_b.parenthetical: testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir.1985) (testimony regarding defendant's apparent lack of surprise when arrested and given Miranda warnings violated due process); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir.2000) ("use of a defendant's prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment”); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (district court erred in allowing government to comment on defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991) (admission into evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda refusal to answer questions constituted plain error); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) ("custody and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda ”; government's comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was error); see also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (noting in dicta "we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government’s direct case”).