context: In Baucum we did not apply the Blackledge/Menna exception because Baucum challenged a sentencing statute. But subsequent cases have made clear that Drew waived his constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(8) because he failed to raise his challenge below.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 96 F.3d 1477, 1482
citation_a.parenthetical: 'We do not reach David's Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru’s facial constitutional challenge to the ‘school-yard statute,’ ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by” Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1996) (‘We do not reach David’s Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower court.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 97 F.3d 1471, 1476
citation_b.parenthetical: "[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru's facial constitutional challenge to the 'school-yard statute,' ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by" Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[Bjecause Ishmeal Badru’s facial constitutional challenge to the ‘school-yard statute,’ ... is raised for the first time on appeal, it is barred by” Baucum, 80 F.3d 539.) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1996) (‘We do not reach David’s Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower court.”).