context: Accordingly, insofar as the district court's enhancement of Davila-Rodriguez's sentence as a career offender under SS 4B1.1 involved determinations that he had prior convictions, these determinations did not implicate the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker line of cases. Moreover, to the extent that Davila-Rodriguez's argument can be construed as asserting that Almendarez-Torres is not applicable because the government had to show that his prior convictions, in addition to existing, were "crimes of violence," we also have rejected this argument.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 431 F.3d 744, 749
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that, "whether a previous conviction is a 'crime of violence' is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [SS 4B1.2]"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that, “whether a previous conviction is a ‘crime of violence’ is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [§ 4B1.2]”); see also United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the defendant’s argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) was without merit).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 409 F.3d 1274, 1277
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that the defendant's argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in SS 2L1.2(b
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that, “whether a previous conviction is a ‘crime of violence’ is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [§ 4B1.2]”); see also United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the defendant’s argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) was without merit).