context: Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Condition 21 simply requires him to acquire the approval of his probation officer, and condition 23 specifically applies to websites "frequented by children." Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions 21 and 28.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 990 N.E.2d 515, 515-16
citation_a.parenthetical: upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children
citation_a.sentence: See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children); McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 450 (holding that the defendant/child molester's probation condition-which restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officer-was reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public); Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 118 (holding that the trial court did not err by restricting the defendant/child molester's gaccess to computers and online computer services).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 836 N.E.2d 267, 275
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights
citation_b.sentence: See also Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights).