context: Warrants have survived particularity challenges even where they have called for the seizure of many categories of items. Although the warrants at issue here encompass many types of records, they sufficiently describe what is within their terms.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 196 F.3d 1206, 1216
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that "[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for '[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]' describefd] with particularity the items to be seized"
citation_a.sentence: See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 427 U.S. 463, 479-81
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that the inclusion of the phrase "together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown" did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was "clear from the context that the term 'crime' in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]"
citation_b.sentence: See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (holding that the inclusion of the phrase “together with other fruits, instru-mentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown” did not render search warrants impermissibly general where it was “clear from the context that the term ‘crime’ in the warrants referred] only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of [one specific real estate lot]”); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1350 n. 5 (finding, in case involving racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, bank fraud, and the filing of false tax returns, that search warrant was sufficiently particular; warrant provided for seizure of eleven categories of records, the last of which encompassed “property that constitutes evidence of the above-enumerated offenses, fruits of the crimes named-above and property which is or has been used to commit the crimes enumerated herein”); see also United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that “[d]ue to the peculiar nature of a charge of fraud, especially where corporations are used as vehicles of fraud, an application to search the premises of [the corporate office] for ‘[b]ooks, [l]edgers, [Receipts, [fin-voices, [b]usiness records, the identification of [fjinancial accounts and any other evidence which is evidence in violation of [two sections of Title 18]’ describefd] with particularity the items to be seized”); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508-09 & n. 15 (11th Cir.1986) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and finding search warrant sufficiently particular in case involving conspiracy and financial fraud; warrant authorized seizure from a corporate office of numerous types of records, including “banking records,” “personnel files,” and “financial records,” and the court noted that “the government here had no obligation to restrict the search to specific documents where the evidence, detailed fully in the accompanying affidavits, demonstrated widespread efforts to defraud customers through a variety of misleading disclosures and representations”); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 613-14 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of motion to suppress in case involving charges of subscription to false statements on income tax returns, finding that warrant authorizing seizure of, inter alia, “United States currency, promissory notes, life insurance policies, documents of assignment of life insurance policy proceeds” and “all property constituting evidence of the crimes of making and conspiring to make extortionate extensions of credit, financing extortionate extensions of credit, and collections of and conspiracy to collect extortionate extensions of credit” and “ ‘all property’ constituting evidence of loansharking” was sufficiently particular) ; United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531-32 (11th Cir.1985) (finding warrant sufficiently specific in RICO conspiracy and mail and wire fraud case despite fact that name of co-defendant was in warrant but not affidavit where warrant and its attached exhibit clearly indicated that correspondence addressed to co-defendant and two business entities was within the scope of probable cause, and finding extensive list of firms and entities whose property was to be seized passed muster because the attached warrant affidavit clarified ambiguities as to the dates at issue and the scope of the fraudulent scheme); United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985) (rejecting “general warrant” argument in mail fraud case where warrant authorized seizure of specific items “and miscellaneous merchandise fraudulently obtained from vendors throughout the United States ... in violation of [three sections of Title 18]” and finding that “[t]he warrant was as specific as possible under the circumstances as to all merchandise seized”).