context: Supporting our conclusion is the fact that the only other circuits to have considered vagueness challenges to SS 2320 have similarly rejected such arguments.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 45 F.3d 577, 580
citation_a.parenthetical: determining that the phrase "at the time of the manufacture or production," as used in the authorized-use exception to SS 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that § 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir.1995) (determining that the phrase “at the time of the manufacture or production,” as used in the authorized-use exception to § 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir.1987) (‘We have considered Gantos’ argumentf] that § 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that SS 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that § 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir.1995) (determining that the phrase “at the time of the manufacture or production,” as used in the authorized-use exception to § 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir.1987) (‘We have considered Gantos’ argumentf] that § 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.”).