context: The cases cited by Diamond stand only for the proposition that under New York law, a claim for equitable distribution does not seek a judgment that affects the prop erty in a manner contemplated by Article 65.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 495 N.Y.S.2d 443, 443
citation_a.parenthetical: "The fact that plaintiff may be entitled to an equitable distribution with regard to the residence does not give rise to [the extraordinary] privilege [of filing of a notice of pendency]."
citation_a.sentence: See Gross, 114 A.D.2d at 1003, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (“The fact that plaintiff may be entitled to an equitable distribution with regard to the residence does not give rise to [the extraordinary] privilege [of filing of a notice of pendency].”); Fakiris, 177 A.D.2d at 543, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (citing Gross for same); see also Sehgal v. Sehgal, 220 A.D.2d 201, 201, 631 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App.Div.1995) (“A claim that real property is a marital asset subject to distribution does not, by itself, establish grounds for a lis pendens.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 631 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361
citation_b.parenthetical: "A claim that real property is a marital asset subject to distribution does not, by itself, establish grounds for a lis pendens."
citation_b.sentence: See Gross, 114 A.D.2d at 1003, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (“The fact that plaintiff may be entitled to an equitable distribution with regard to the residence does not give rise to [the extraordinary] privilege [of filing of a notice of pendency].”); Fakiris, 177 A.D.2d at 543, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (citing Gross for same); see also Sehgal v. Sehgal, 220 A.D.2d 201, 201, 631 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App.Div.1995) (“A claim that real property is a marital asset subject to distribution does not, by itself, establish grounds for a lis pendens.”).