context: We note that the federal Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as other state courts, have found that due process is not violated when a sexual offender's probationary condition imposes a ban on viewing obscene, pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating materials.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 319 F.3d 177, 192-93
citation_a.parenthetical: finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant).
citation_b.signal: but cf.
citation_b.identifier: 278 F.3d 868, 872
citation_b.parenthetical: finding prohibition on "any pornography" inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.2006) (despite finding the term “pornography” susceptible to various meanings, the’ court found no due process violation' when the facts surrounding defendant’s probation ■ violation show that defendant had adequate notice of what reasonably constituted prohibited pornographic material); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no due process violation with condition prohibiting sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material); United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.2003) (finding adequate notice to defendant in prohibition of “any ‘matter’ that is pornographic”); United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003) (not finding plain error when district court imposed condition prohibiting possession of pornography); Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 99 (finding the prohibition of “any sexually arousing materials” to be sufficiently construed in relationship with other provisions, and not unconstitutionally vague); but cf. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (finding prohibition on “any pornography” inherently vague and remanded for a condition with greater specificity); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263-65 (3d Cir.2001) (finding a condition prohibiting “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography,” as providing inadequate notice to defendant).