context: The prerecorded MITS message explicitly advises that "[a]ll call detail and conversation, excluding approved attorney calls, will be recorded," see supra p. 296 (emphasis added), thereby informing the call recipient that the entire "contents" will be intercepted. Consequently, notwithstanding the absence of explicit notice of the lesser intrusion represented by possible monitoring of call content, the recipient is fully informed of the greater intrusion; viz., that the entire conversation, as well as all call "detail," unll be intercepted and recorded. Thus, since the MITS records the entire conversation, any concurrent aural monitoring by authorized DOC officials in no sense exceeds the dimensions of the broad implied consent given to record all call "content," including call "detail."
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 11 F.3d 282, 282
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least "minimal knowledge" of scope of interception
citation_a.sentence: See Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 114, 116-19 (finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions); see also Williams, 11 F.3d at 282 (stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least “minimal knowledge” of scope of interception). Therefore, based on the relevant authoritative decisions, it is at the very least an open question whether the express prior consent provided by MITS-call recipients to the recordation of all call “content” constitutes implied consent to monitoring.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 904 F.2d 114, 114, 116-19
citation_b.parenthetical: finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions
citation_b.sentence: See Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 114, 116-19 (finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions); see also Williams, 11 F.3d at 282 (stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least “minimal knowledge” of scope of interception). Therefore, based on the relevant authoritative decisions, it is at the very least an open question whether the express prior consent provided by MITS-call recipients to the recordation of all call “content” constitutes implied consent to monitoring.