context: The majority of circuit courts to have considered the question, however, have answered it in the affirmative.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.parenthetical: continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff
citation_a.sentence: See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: "if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties' agreement," and its authority to do so "clearly establishes a 'judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,' as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced"
citation_b.sentence: See Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.2003) (finding that the parties’ settlement agreement conveyed prevailing party status upon plaintiff because “until the district court signed the dismissal Order retaining jurisdiction, the Agreement was not yet in affect” and, therefore, “it was the court’s order that created the change in the legal relationship between plaintiffs and ... defendants”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that if a private settlement is enforceable against opposing party through a court order, even though the order is titled “Consent Decree,” the party in whose favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed., 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002) (interpreting footnote 7 in Buckhan-non as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree” and finding plaintiff to be a prevailing party because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement); Am. Disability Assoc., Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2002) (“if the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement,” and its authority to do so “clearly establishes a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,’ as required by Buckhannon, because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the settlement enforced”); but see, Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.2003) (continuing enforcement jurisdiction is insufficient to convey prevailing party status on the plaintiff).