context: Certain courts have used this dichotomy in stressing that, because Congress failed to address the retroactive impact of the Act's amendments to 28 U.S.C. SSSS 2254 and 2255, no legislative intent can be discerned and the courts should proceed to the second stage of Landgraf analysis wherein retroactivity is predicated upon considerations of basic fairness and settled legal rights.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that the first stage of Landgraf analysis is conclusive, and that only the Act's habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively
citation_a.sentence: Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996); see also Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) ("The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent.”); but see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that the first stage of Landgraf analysis is conclusive, and that only the Act’s habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 101 F.3d 1565, 1570
citation_b.parenthetical: "The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent."
citation_b.sentence: Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996); see also Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) ("The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent.”); but see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that the first stage of Landgraf analysis is conclusive, and that only the Act’s habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively).