context: Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice SS 4.29, at 284 (8th ed.2002). Hence the Supreme Court's summary disposition in Cooper cannot be interpreted as endorsing the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning, particularly since that reasoning flatly contradicts Widmar.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was "plausible," it was improper because it would "leave little vitality" to an earlier Supreme Court decision
citation_a.sentence: See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument."
citation_b.sentence: See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court's interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was “plausible,” it was improper because it would “leave little vitality” to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. 533 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.”).