context: . Duncan argues that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate's credibility determinations because the court relied on impermissible factors in discrediting his testimony, including Duncan's self-interest and use of a translator at the suppression hearing. Even if the district court relied on impermissible factors, any error was harmless.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 289 F.3d 744, 749
citation_a.parenthetical: we accept a credibility determination "unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (we accept a credibility determination “unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it”) (citation omitted).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 835 F.2d 1406, 1411
citation_b.parenthetical: applying harmless error review in the context of the denial of a motion to suppress
citation_b.sentence: United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error review in the context of the denial of a motion to suppress). Internal inconsistencies existed in Duncan's testimony and nothing compelled a rejection of the magistrate's credibility determination, given that Duncan's testimony corroborated the officer’s testimony in material respects.