context: . The briefs filed by the parties also discuss whether CREW has "prudential'' standing to challenge the FEC's action. The Court need not address this issue because Akins suggests that Congress intended to authorize standing to the full limits of Article III when it enacted FECA.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 524 U.S. 19, 19-21
citation_a.parenthetical: using identical analyses for the "zone of interests" component of prudential standing and the "injury in fact" component of Article III standing, and stating that "[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly -- beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which 'prudential' standing traditionally rested."
citation_a.sentence: See 524 U.S. at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (using identical analyses for the "zone of interests" component of prudential standing and the “injury in fact" component of Article III standing, and stating that "[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”) (citations omitted); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that the court need not address "prudential” standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 899 F.2d 24, 27
citation_b.parenthetical: finding that the court need not address "prudential" standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act
citation_b.sentence: See 524 U.S. at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (using identical analyses for the "zone of interests" component of prudential standing and the “injury in fact" component of Article III standing, and stating that "[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”) (citations omitted); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that the court need not address "prudential” standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act).