context: The district court also correctly determined that case law clearly established this constitutional claim.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 411 F.3d 762, 772, 774
citation_a.parenthetical: "[W]e conclude the right of a nonviolent [and non-resistant] arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest [for disorderly conduct] was clearly established as of November 9, 2000."
citation_a.sentence: See St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude the right of a nonviolent [and non-resistant] arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest [for disorderly conduct] was clearly established as of November 9, 2000.”); see also Minchella v. Bauman, 72 Fed.Appx. 405, 408-09 (6th Cir.2003) (denying summary judgment to officers on an excessive-force claim — relating to an arrest in 1999 — because the plaintiffs “crime was not severe,” the plaintiff “posed no threat to the Officers or the community” and the evidence was “inconclusive as to whether [the plaintiff] was ‘slammed’ into the car, and ... as to whether [the plaintiff] physically resisted the arrest”); Davis v. Yovella, No. 95-5415, 1997 WL 159363, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1997) (denying qualified immunity to an officer on an excessive-force claim because “the charges against [the plaintiff] ... were not serious,” “there [was] no evidence that [the plaintiff] posed a risk to the officers or anyone present,” “the record show[ed] that he did not resist arrest” and the plaintiff “sought medical attention for pain in his neck and back”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 72 Fed.Appx. 405, 408-09
citation_b.parenthetical: denying summary judgment to officers on an excessive-force claim -- relating to an arrest in 1999 -- because the plaintiffs "crime was not severe," the plaintiff "posed no threat to the Officers or the community" and the evidence was "inconclusive as to whether [the plaintiff] was 'slammed' into the car, and ... as to whether [the plaintiff] physically resisted the arrest"
citation_b.sentence: See St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude the right of a nonviolent [and non-resistant] arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest [for disorderly conduct] was clearly established as of November 9, 2000.”); see also Minchella v. Bauman, 72 Fed.Appx. 405, 408-09 (6th Cir.2003) (denying summary judgment to officers on an excessive-force claim — relating to an arrest in 1999 — because the plaintiffs “crime was not severe,” the plaintiff “posed no threat to the Officers or the community” and the evidence was “inconclusive as to whether [the plaintiff] was ‘slammed’ into the car, and ... as to whether [the plaintiff] physically resisted the arrest”); Davis v. Yovella, No. 95-5415, 1997 WL 159363, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1997) (denying qualified immunity to an officer on an excessive-force claim because “the charges against [the plaintiff] ... were not serious,” “there [was] no evidence that [the plaintiff] posed a risk to the officers or anyone present,” “the record show[ed] that he did not resist arrest” and the plaintiff “sought medical attention for pain in his neck and back”).