context: Given the highly deferential AEDPA standard, it is even possible that if Pennsylvania merely had a generic burglary statute that did not differentiate between burglarizing an occupied or unoccupied building, a reasonable application of the "fact of a prior conviction" exception might have permitted the judge to look at facts underlying the prior burglary conviction to determine whether Garrus was convicted of burglarizing an occupied building.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find "not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 495 U.S. 575, 602
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that under a federal "three strikes" law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 153, 157 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that Apprendi allows a sentencing judge to find “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but [certain] other related issues as well”); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that under a federal “three strikes” law, the sentencing judge may only find facts that were necessary to the prior conviction).