context: The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Mendoza-Barragan's second motion to reopen for reissuance, because the evidence in the record does not compel the conclusion that Mendoza-Barragan did not receive the BIA's prior order dismissing his appeal.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: "[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight."
citation_a.sentence: See Hernandez-Velasquez, 611 F.3d at 1078 (“[T]he BIA enjoys a rebuttable ‘presumption of mailing’ when it issues a decision accompanied by a properly addressed and dated cover letter ..., [which] may be rebutted by affidavits of nonreceipt....”); see also Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 611 F.3d 1078, 1078
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]he BIA enjoys a rebuttable 'presumption of mailing' when it issues a decision accompanied by a properly addressed and dated cover letter ..., [which] may be rebutted by affidavits of nonreceipt...."
citation_b.sentence: See Hernandez-Velasquez, 611 F.3d at 1078 (“[T]he BIA enjoys a rebuttable ‘presumption of mailing’ when it issues a decision accompanied by a properly addressed and dated cover letter ..., [which] may be rebutted by affidavits of nonreceipt....”); see also Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.”).