context: In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 162 F.3d 271, 271
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors
citation_a.sentence: See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck).
citation_b.signal: but see
citation_b.identifier: 537 U.S. 322, 342
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors."
citation_b.sentence: But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”).