context: And, it is only where, for procedural or other reasons, the state courts deprive the plaintiff of such an opportunity that Younger does not apply. But, that party, already engaged in a state proceeding, cannot ordinarily obtain a hearing in federal court on its federal claim simply because it believes the state will reject the claim on the merits.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 528 F.2d 198, 198
citation_a.parenthetical: " '[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.' "
citation_a.sentence: See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 411 U.S. 564, 575-79
citation_b.parenthetical: Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment
citation_b.sentence: See Ahrensfeld, 528 F.2d at 198 (“ ‘[W]e must assume that [the state court] would properly determine the merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.’ ”) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir.1972)); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (Younger abstention not appropriate where plaintiffs proved state administrative board was biased by pecuniary interest and prejudgment).