context: The reasoning underlying Monessen was that prejudgment interest is a part of damages, which are "inseparably connected with the right of action" under FELA.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65
citation_a.parenthetical: distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is "directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant," from costs and disbursements, which "are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury"
citation_a.sentence: See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (holding that “costs and disbursements” are a “procedural element” separate from the concept of “just compensation” under the Minnesota Constitution)."
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 243 Minn. 1, 7
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that "costs and disbursements" are a "procedural element" separate from the concept of "just compensation" under the Minnesota Constitution
citation_b.sentence: See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (holding that “costs and disbursements” are a “procedural element” separate from the concept of “just compensation” under the Minnesota Constitution)."