context: Finally, with respect to the receipt statute in particular, the Court also notes that those courts to address vagueness challenges to this statute have found that it is not unconstitutionally vague.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 564 F.3d 1301, 1310-12
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"
citation_a.sentence: United States v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1052, 128 S.Ct. 682, 169 L.Ed.2d 533 (2007) (analyzing the plain language of the receipt statute and finding that the defendant had “not established that § 2252A(a)(2) fails either the ‘notice’ or ‘arbitrary enforcement’ tests for unconstitutional vagueness.”); United States v. Powers, No. 07-CR-103A, 2009 WL 2601103, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009) (finding the reasoning in Watzman persuasive and concluding that receipt statute was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Marcus, 193 F.Supp.2d 552, 557-58 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (finding that the receipt statute “clearly apprises indi viduals of the nature of the conduct proscribed”); cf. Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1310-12 (11th Cir.2009) (finding that certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) were not unconstitutionally vague on their face because the FCRA “clearly definefd]” the prohibited conduct and did not give law enforcement, courts, or juries the ability to apply the provisions in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.parenthetical: analyzing the plain language of the receipt statute and finding that the defendant had "not established that SS 2252A(a)(2) fails either the 'notice' or 'arbitrary enforcement' tests for unconstitutional vagueness."
citation_b.sentence: United States v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1052, 128 S.Ct. 682, 169 L.Ed.2d 533 (2007) (analyzing the plain language of the receipt statute and finding that the defendant had “not established that § 2252A(a)(2) fails either the ‘notice’ or ‘arbitrary enforcement’ tests for unconstitutional vagueness.”); United States v. Powers, No. 07-CR-103A, 2009 WL 2601103, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009) (finding the reasoning in Watzman persuasive and concluding that receipt statute was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Marcus, 193 F.Supp.2d 552, 557-58 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (finding that the receipt statute “clearly apprises indi viduals of the nature of the conduct proscribed”); cf. Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1310-12 (11th Cir.2009) (finding that certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) were not unconstitutionally vague on their face because the FCRA “clearly definefd]” the prohibited conduct and did not give law enforcement, courts, or juries the ability to apply the provisions in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner).