context: (See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves"
citation_a.sentence: See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) ("the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption "should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 482 U.S. 1, 21
citation_b.parenthetical: preemption "should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State."
citation_b.sentence: See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) ("the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption "should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”).