context: See McAllister, 29 F.3d at 118A-85 ("[W]hile interpreting federal statutes is a question of federal law, Congress can make the meaning of a statute dependent on state law."). The decisions in Dickerson and Bustamante still stand for the proposition that, absent legislative indication to the contrary, the meaning of "conviction" for purposes of a federal statutory scheme is to be determined under prevailing federal law.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 998 F.2d 231, 236
citation_a.parenthetical: "[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary."
citation_a.sentence: See Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.1993) (“[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary.”); cf. McAllister, 29 F.3d at 1185 (treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 29 F.3d 1185, 1185
citation_b.parenthetical: treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law
citation_b.sentence: See Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.1993) (“[Dickerson ] still stands for the general proposition that federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of a plain language to the contrary.”); cf. McAllister, 29 F.3d at 1185 (treating Dickerson as still authoritative, outside context of gun laws, for principle that guilty plea plus probation equals conviction under federal law).