context: As to the substantive due process claim, the presence of a valid Second Amendment claim would preclude the Court from engaging in a substantive due process analysis. Likewise, the Court would compress Hightower's equal protection claim into her Second Amendment claim.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 346 F.3d 11, 15
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that "we see little basis or justification for applying equal protection analysis" in a situation where an equal protection claims substantially overlaps with a stronger Bill of Rights claim
citation_a.sentence: See Rosenfeld v. Egy, 346 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that “we see little basis or justification for applying equal protection analysis” in a situation where an equal protection claims substantially overlaps with a stronger Bill of Rights claim); see also Nestor Colón Medina & Sucesores, 964 F.2d at 44-45 (same); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir.2011) (rejecting an equal protection claim brought in conjunction with Second Amendment concerns by noting that “although the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under the Second Amendment”) (citation omitted).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 644 F.3d 776, 794
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting an equal protection claim brought in conjunction with Second Amendment concerns by noting that "although the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under the Second Amendment"
citation_b.sentence: See Rosenfeld v. Egy, 346 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that “we see little basis or justification for applying equal protection analysis” in a situation where an equal protection claims substantially overlaps with a stronger Bill of Rights claim); see also Nestor Colón Medina & Sucesores, 964 F.2d at 44-45 (same); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir.2011) (rejecting an equal protection claim brought in conjunction with Second Amendment concerns by noting that “although the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, that right is more appropriately analyzed under the Second Amendment”) (citation omitted).