context: This Court agrees that Minera Yanaco-cha's contacts with the IFC in the District are not "continuous and systematic" as required by due process.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 2003 WL 1807148, at *4
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that a foreign defendant was not present in New York for the purposes of jurisdiction simply because it engaged in financing transactions there
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Fan-del, 345 F.2d at 89 (“Washington presents many business organizations with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, ... and that the purpose of Congress was not to make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.”); see also In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000, No. 1428 (SAS), 01 Civ. 7342, 2003 WL 1807148, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.4, 2003) (holding that a foreign defendant was not present in New York for the purposes of jurisdiction simply because it engaged in financing transactions there) (citing Clarke v. Fonix Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6116 (RPP), 1999 WL 105031, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.1, 1999) (reasoning that “[r]aising financing is not a form of ‘doing business’ for the purpose of
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 345 F.2d 89, 89
citation_b.parenthetical: "Washington presents many business organizations with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, ... and that the purpose of Congress was not to make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Fan-del, 345 F.2d at 89 (“Washington presents many business organizations with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, ... and that the purpose of Congress was not to make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.”); see also In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000, No. 1428 (SAS), 01 Civ. 7342, 2003 WL 1807148, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.4, 2003) (holding that a foreign defendant was not present in New York for the purposes of jurisdiction simply because it engaged in financing transactions there) (citing Clarke v. Fonix Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6116 (RPP), 1999 WL 105031, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.1, 1999) (reasoning that “[r]aising financing is not a form of ‘doing business’ for the purpose of