context: Moreover, Sherman has failed to show a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Juror #12's statements were not so inherently prejudicial such as to deny Sherman a fair trial because (1) the comments did not necessarily brand Sherman as a criminal who had committed the specific crimes at issue in this case; and (2) the comments did not link Sherman to any other criminal violations.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 272 Ga. 684, 688
citation_a.parenthetical: Where prospective juror's comments "neither necessarily implied Appellants' guilt of the offense under consideration, nor linked them to other criminal violations," the remarks were not inherently prejudicial and did not deprive the Appellants of their right to begin their trial with a jury "free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion."
citation_a.sentence: See Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 688 (5) (531 SE2d 84) (2000) (Where prospective juror’s comments “neither necessarily implied Appellants’ guilt of the offense under consideration, nor linked them to other criminal violations,” the remarks were not inherently prejudicial and did not deprive the Appellants of their right to begin their trial with a jury “free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: juror's comment during voir dire that the defendant was a "firebug" was inherently prejudicial where the defendant was on trial for arson
citation_b.sentence: Cf. Moore v. State, 156 Ga. App. 92 (1) (274 SE2d 107) (1980) (juror’s comment during voir dire that the defendant was a “firebug” was inherently prejudicial where the defendant was on trial for arson).