context: Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 585 F.3d 182, 185-87
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult "pornography" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 553 F.3d 65, 74-76
citation_b.parenthetical: vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the "possession of any kind of pornographic material" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and "no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials).