context: Wright's waiver does not meet this standard because the record suggests that at the time he entered into the plea agreement, Wright was not aware that he might be ordered to pay a large restitution payment that possibly exceeds the losses to Amy proximately caused by his conduct. Wright's plea agreement referred to the general restitution provisions of 18 U.S.C. SSSS 3663 and 3663A, which both indisputably include proximate causation as a condition of restitution. Additionally, Wright's plea agreement reserved the right to appeal "any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum."
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 217 F.3d 262, 271-72
citation_a.parenthetical: vacating a SS 3663 restitution award for lack of evidence of causation
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 271-72 (5th Cir.2000) (vacating a § 3663 restitution award for lack of evidence of causation); see also United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (vacating a § 3663 restitution order, despite an appeal waiver, because the order was not limited to losses caused by the defendant and thus exceeded the statutory maximum).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 71 F.3d 1143, 1146
citation_b.parenthetical: vacating a SS 3663 restitution order, despite an appeal waiver, because the order was not limited to losses caused by the defendant and thus exceeded the statutory maximum
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 271-72 (5th Cir.2000) (vacating a § 3663 restitution award for lack of evidence of causation); see also United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (vacating a § 3663 restitution order, despite an appeal waiver, because the order was not limited to losses caused by the defendant and thus exceeded the statutory maximum).