context: "[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case."
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge
citation_a.sentence: See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 648 F.2d 479, 479
citation_b.parenthetical: no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense
citation_b.sentence: Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense).