context: Courts that have applied the Knights test have done so, in part, because they interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Knights as authorizing a general balancing test, rather than a special-needs test, when a person searched has a reduced expectation of privacy, regardless of whether the search is supported by individualized suspicion.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 430 F.3d 665, 665
citation_a.parenthetical: "Courts that have relied upon Knights as justifying the application of a general balancing test to DNA-indexing statutes have emphasized Knights's status as a probationer and his knowledge of the probation search condition, which reduced his expectation of privacy."
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (reasoning that Knights affirmed the possibility that “conditional releasees’ diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search’s reasonableness outside the strictures of special needs analysis”); see also Goord, 430 F.3d at 665 (“Courts that have relied upon Knights as justifying the application of a general balancing test to DNA-indexing statutes have emphasized Knights’s status as a probationer and his knowledge of the probation search condition, which reduced his expectation of privacy.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 379 F.3d 832, 832
citation_b.parenthetical: reasoning that Knights affirmed the possibility that "conditional releasees' diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search's reasonableness outside the strictures of special needs analysis"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (reasoning that Knights affirmed the possibility that “conditional releasees’ diminished expectations of privacy may be sufficient to justify the judicial assessment of a parole or probation search’s reasonableness outside the strictures of special needs analysis”); see also Goord, 430 F.3d at 665 (“Courts that have relied upon Knights as justifying the application of a general balancing test to DNA-indexing statutes have emphasized Knights’s status as a probationer and his knowledge of the probation search condition, which reduced his expectation of privacy.”).