context: Hence, consistent with our discussion above, we interpret the document's explicit, and broad, power to create "rules" governing "conditions of eligibility" as carrying with it a similarly broad implied power to interpret those rules. And, the existence of such a delegated power seems to be what Firestone had in mind when it called for "evidence" of a grant of discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 877 F.2d 159, 161
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine "which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan" and "pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request" indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions
citation_a.sentence: Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine “which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan” and “pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request” indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (11th Cir.1989) (same for plan language giving “Claims Administrator” power to make “final and conclusive” determinations “in the administration of the [plan],” so long as such determinations are “reasonable”); but cf. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations).
citation_b.signal: but cf.
citation_b.identifier: 901 F.2d 1369, 1371
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations
citation_b.sentence: Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954; cf. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine “which Employees are eligible to participate in the Plan” and “pro-vid[ing] all parties dealing with the Plan an interpretation of Plan provisions on request” indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (11th Cir.1989) (same for plan language giving “Claims Administrator” power to make “final and conclusive” determinations “in the administration of the [plan],” so long as such determinations are “reasonable”); but cf. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir.1990) (explaining that circuit courts appear split over the degree of plan language specificity required to trigger deferential review of trustee determinations).