context: 136 Yet that interpretation is new. For years, divisions of the court of appeals agreed that the statute's "probable cause" requirement implied a lawful stop.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 833 P.2d 830, 831
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that a police officer may not direct a driver to submit to aleohol testing absent "probable cause" and, by implication, "reasonable suspicion for the initial stop"
citation_a.sentence: Seq, e.g., Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831 (Colo.App.1992) (holding that a police officer may not direct a driver to submit to aleohol testing absent "probable cause" and, by implication, "reasonable suspicion for the initial stop"); see also Baldwin v. Huber, 223 P.3d 150, 152 (Colo.App.2009) (evaluating whether the initial stop was lawful under the reasonable suspicion standard); Wallace v. Dep't of Revenue, 787 P.2d 181, 182-83 (Colo.App.1989) (concluding, under an old statutory scheme, that the initial stop was "justified under the reasonable suspicion standard").
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 787 P.2d 181, 182-83
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding, under an old statutory scheme, that the initial stop was "justified under the reasonable suspicion standard"
citation_b.sentence: Seq, e.g., Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831 (Colo.App.1992) (holding that a police officer may not direct a driver to submit to aleohol testing absent "probable cause" and, by implication, "reasonable suspicion for the initial stop"); see also Baldwin v. Huber, 223 P.3d 150, 152 (Colo.App.2009) (evaluating whether the initial stop was lawful under the reasonable suspicion standard); Wallace v. Dep't of Revenue, 787 P.2d 181, 182-83 (Colo.App.1989) (concluding, under an old statutory scheme, that the initial stop was "justified under the reasonable suspicion standard").