context: Without making a determinative decision, we note that the practical application of SS 204b to plaintiff presents an instructive comparison to the case at bar. Unlike the current case, if SS 204b's seventy-percent rule had been applied to plaintiff, the statute's plain terms would have retroactively increased the length of plaintiffs minimum sentence. This, presumably, would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 684 So. 2d 671, 678
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that statutory amendment requiring eighty-five percent of sentence be served before prisoner is eligible for parole is Ex Post Facto Clause violation
citation_a.sentence: Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range); see also Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671, 678 (Miss. 1996) (holding that statutory amendment requiring eighty-five percent of sentence be served before prisoner is eligible for parole is Ex Post Facto Clause violation).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 133 S. Ct. 2084, 2084
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range
citation_b.sentence: Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range); see also Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671, 678 (Miss. 1996) (holding that statutory amendment requiring eighty-five percent of sentence be served before prisoner is eligible for parole is Ex Post Facto Clause violation).