context: This court has reduced convictions of murder in the first degree predicated on felony-murder only where the evidence suggested that the felony intended by the defendant would not suffice for felony-murder in the first degree.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 364 Mass. 145, 146, 151-152
citation_a.parenthetical: evidence that defendant distracted victim while codefendant sought to remove money from victim's pocket, with killing occurring suddenly when victim realized what defendants were doing, suggested that defendant intended "to steal surreptitiously, not by violence as in a robbery," thus making conviction of felony-murder in first degree contrary to weight of evidence
citation_a.sentence: See Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 146, 151-152 (1973) (evidence that defendant distracted victim while codefendant sought to remove money from victim’s pocket, with killing occurring suddenly when victim realized what defendants were doing, suggested that defendant intended “to steal surreptitiously, not by violence as in a robbery,” thus making conviction of felony-murder in first degree contrary to weight of evidence); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 394-396 (1971) (evidence suggested breaking and entering to steal money from vending machines after hours when factory building would likely be vacant; murder of security guard occurring during that breaking and entering would be only murder in second degree; reduction of verdict of murder in first degree appropriate, especially where judge failed to give jury option of felony-murder in second degree).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: reducing verdict where theories of felony-murder in both first and second degrees submitted to jury without defining elements of predicate felonies for either degree of murder
citation_b.sentence: See also Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 424-425 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968) (reducing verdict where theories of felony-murder in both first and second degrees submitted to jury without defining elements of predicate felonies for either degree of murder). This court’s power under G.