context: To be sure, a true claim of negligent supervision in this case might be a back-door attempt to raise a respondeat superior claim premised on an excepted act, as such claims typically depend on the employment relationship.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 141 F.Supp.2d 626, 629
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that Fourth Circuit's pre-Sheridan decisions -- which barred negligent supervision claims premised on intentional acts of government employee -- continue to apply
citation_a.sentence: Schweizer v. Keating, 150 F.Supp.2d 830, 843 (D.Md. 2001) (“Under Maryland law, liability for negligent supervision has arisen, almost exclusively, in cases involving master-servant relationships.”); see also Lilly v. United States, 141 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (S.D.W.Va.2001) (concluding that Fourth Circuit’s pre-Sheridan decisions — which barred negligent supervision claims premised on intentional acts of government employee — continue to apply). But, contrary to the Government’s characterizations, the complaint in this case offers more than a negligent supervision claim.
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 150 F.Supp.2d 830, 843
citation_b.parenthetical: "Under Maryland law, liability for negligent supervision has arisen, almost exclusively, in cases involving master-servant relationships."
citation_b.sentence: Schweizer v. Keating, 150 F.Supp.2d 830, 843 (D.Md. 2001) (“Under Maryland law, liability for negligent supervision has arisen, almost exclusively, in cases involving master-servant relationships.”); see also Lilly v. United States, 141 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (S.D.W.Va.2001) (concluding that Fourth Circuit’s pre-Sheridan decisions — which barred negligent supervision claims premised on intentional acts of government employee — continue to apply). But, contrary to the Government’s characterizations, the complaint in this case offers more than a negligent supervision claim.