context: Martin does not dispute that had he been in attendance, he would have been permitted to have his attorney present, confront the witnesses who testified, and call witnesses to speak on his behalf. While he alludes to possible problems with notice for the May 3 hearing, the Court finds that Defendants' repeated attempts to provide Martin with the necessary information constitute constructive service.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 767 F.2d 273, 273
citation_a.parenthetical: post-termination proceedings require, at a minimum " 'that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him/ " (quoting Carter, 767 F.2d at 273
citation_a.sentence: Cf. Mitchell, 375 F.3d at 480-81 (post-termination proceedings require, at a minimum “ ‘that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him/ ” (quoting Carter, 767 F.2d at 273)).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 409 F.3d 279, 285
citation_b.parenthetical: Constitution only requires notice that is "reasonably calculated" to apprise party of action
citation_b.sentence: See Karkoukli’s, Inc. v. Dohany, 409 F.3d 279, 285 (6th Cir.2005) (Constitution only requires notice that is “reasonably calculated” to apprise party of action). In all, Martin raises no legitimate objections to the method by which Defendants carried out the May 3 hearing and its sufficiency under the Fourteenth Amendment.