context: By describing the location of the keys which would provide entry into the closet, Milian provided additional evidence of his consent to the search. Appellant argues that this case is distinguishable from cases such as Allison in which the keys are physically presented and more closely analogous to cases in which the defendant gives a qualified or equivocal response and fails to present officials with the keys.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 442 F.Supp. 736, 738
citation_a.parenthetical: defendant says nothing but permits law enforcement agent to retrieve key from defendant's pocket
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Patacchia, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir.1979) (defendant expresses willingness but inability to open trunk because of damage to rear of car and absence of trunk key); cf. United States v. Ester, 442 F.Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (defendant says nothing but permits law enforcement agent to retrieve key from defendant’s pocket).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 602 F.2d 218, 219
citation_b.parenthetical: defendant expresses willingness but inability to open trunk because of damage to rear of car and absence of trunk key
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Patacchia, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir.1979) (defendant expresses willingness but inability to open trunk because of damage to rear of car and absence of trunk key); cf. United States v. Ester, 442 F.Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (defendant says nothing but permits law enforcement agent to retrieve key from defendant’s pocket).