context: Under the legal principals set forth in II.B supra, the material submitted by the Poradisovs in 2003 was sufficient to meet the Poradisovs' burden on their motion. It certainly warranted more than a perfunctory (and clearly inaccurate) mention by the BIA as being "merely cumulative."
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 404 F.3d 295, 304
citation_a.parenthetical: in denying Zhao's motion to reopen, BIA abused its discretion by disposing, in a single sentence, of new country conditions evidence as "'largely repeating]' " the evidence from the original record
citation_a.sentence: See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (in denying Zhao’s motion to reopen, BIA abused its discretion by disposing, in a single sentence, of new country conditions evidence as “‘largely repeating]’ ” the evidence from the original record); cf. Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 492 (1st Cir.1994) (vacating and remanding denial of asylum because country conditions evidence was “far too extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general statement”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 40 F.3d 482, 492
citation_b.parenthetical: vacating and remanding denial of asylum because country conditions evidence was "far too extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general statement"
citation_b.sentence: See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (in denying Zhao’s motion to reopen, BIA abused its discretion by disposing, in a single sentence, of new country conditions evidence as “‘largely repeating]’ ” the evidence from the original record); cf. Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 492 (1st Cir.1994) (vacating and remanding denial of asylum because country conditions evidence was “far too extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general statement”).