context: Even if, contrary to the fact, the defendant was prejudiced by the government's change in theory, such prejudice could have been obviated by the defense utilizing the opportunity to recall witnesses and to have the matter adjourned, if necessary, for that purpose.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 92 F.3d 1271, 1291
citation_a.parenthetical: "The rule is clear that a defendant's failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended
citation_a.sentence: See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 170 F.3d 337, 337
citation_b.parenthetical: "Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction."
citation_b.sentence: See Mapp, 170 F.3d at 337 (“Finally, by giving him the opportunity to respond by presenting additional evidence or argument to the jury, the district court carefully avoided causing Moore any arguable prejudice in the giving of the supplemental instruction.”); cf. the following belated disclosure cases which discuss claims of prejudice and the ability to recall witnesses: United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1291 (1st Cir.1996) (“The rule is clear that a defendant’s failure to recall a witness, despite permission to do so, undermines a claim of prejudice based on a disclosure that materialized after the witness finished testifying (but before the trial ended).”); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988) (finding that where defendant was allowed to recall witnesses and re-examine them regarding belatedly disclosed evidence, defendant “had substantial opportunity to use the [evidence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed disclosure”); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1984) (reversal not warranted notwithstanding government’s failure to timely produce evidence favorable to defendants given defendants did not request a continuance, recall witnesses for further examination, or introduce rebuttal evidence, in an effort to neutralize the claimed prejudice).