context: In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law clause.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 465 F.3d 148, 148
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that the choice of law question was "made easy" by the party's contractual provision agreeing that English law would apply
citation_a.sentence: Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 (holding that the choice of law question was “made easy” by the party’s contractual provision agreeing that English law would apply).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 345 U.S. 588, 588-89
citation_b.parenthetical: "Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply."
citation_b.sentence: See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413; see altso Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89, 73 S.Ct. 921 (“Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was unnecessary.