context: . In the instant case, notwithstanding that the challenged AFP procedures were revised within three months after the filing of the pro se complaint, Domegan does not contend that an informal alteration in the parties' legal relationship was occasioned by the litigation.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 581 F.2d 281, 281
citation_a.parenthetical: "We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit."
citation_a.sentence: See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281 (“We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit."); see also Langton, 928 F.2d at 1225 (“‘the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice’ to engage the gears of the catalyst test.”) (quoting Martinez v. Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Finance Corp., 628 F.Supp. 996, 1001 (D.R.I.1986)).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 928 F.2d 1225, 1225
citation_b.parenthetical: "'the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice' to engage the gears of the catalyst test."
citation_b.sentence: See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281 (“We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit."); see also Langton, 928 F.2d at 1225 (“‘the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice’ to engage the gears of the catalyst test.”) (quoting Martinez v. Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Finance Corp., 628 F.Supp. 996, 1001 (D.R.I.1986)).