context: This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 811 F.2d 1119, 1125
citation_a.parenthetical: discussing doctrine of "virtual representation" which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when "the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests" of party to second suit
citation_a.sentence: Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree).
citation_b.signal: but cf.
citation_b.identifier: 615 F.Supp. 111, 115
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree
citation_b.sentence: Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree).