context: To the extent that the majority appears to believe that someone who testifies in an otherwise protected hearing is, ipso facto, immunized from the consequences of any self-incriminating admissions made during his testimony, I disagree. There is a clear and legally recognized distinction between the mere act of testifying on one hand and, on the other hand, making admissions while testifying that provide independent grounds for discipline.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in "virtually every" such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext
citation_a.sentence: See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2381 n. 5, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: "Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline."
citation_b.sentence: See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2381 n. 5, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”).