context: Specifically, Anderson, Vollmer, Foster and Hornstein testified that they always rely on a borrower's balance sheet when they consider a new line of credit. Horizon asserts that this routine practice establishes that they relied on Debtor's balance sheet when they considered approving his loan. Although' the Court overruled objections to the admissibility of this evidence, this testimony does not definitively establish actual reliance.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: "Once routine practice evidence has been admitted, Rule 406 does not limit the district court's consideration of such evidence, or the weight that it may be given"
citation_a.sentence: See Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2009 WL 1405144, at *4 (N.D.Ga. May 15, 2009) (“Ultimately, habit evidence is to be “weighed and considered by the trier of fact in the same manner as any other type of direct or circumstantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1985); see also U.S. v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 33 n. 24 (1st Cir.2001) (“Once routine practice evidence has been admitted, Rule 406 does not limit the district court’s consideration of such evidence, or the weight that it may be given”). To the contrary, the Court finds their testimony, without more, lacks credibility and is unpersuasive.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 2009 WL 1405144, at *4
citation_b.parenthetical: "Ultimately, habit evidence is to be "weighed and considered by the trier of fact in the same manner as any other type of direct or circumstantial evidence.' "
citation_b.sentence: See Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2009 WL 1405144, at *4 (N.D.Ga. May 15, 2009) (“Ultimately, habit evidence is to be “weighed and considered by the trier of fact in the same manner as any other type of direct or circumstantial evidence.’ ”) (quoting Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1985); see also U.S. v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 33 n. 24 (1st Cir.2001) (“Once routine practice evidence has been admitted, Rule 406 does not limit the district court’s consideration of such evidence, or the weight that it may be given”). To the contrary, the Court finds their testimony, without more, lacks credibility and is unpersuasive.