context: If a defendant objects to the declaration of a mistrial, a mistrial must be manifestly necessary for the defendant to be retried or risk violating double jeopardy principles. Manifest necessity analysis generally requires a consideration of whether reasonable alternatives to a mistrial exist.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 6 L.Ed. 165, 165
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant's objection "under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes"
citation_a.sentence: Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880, 886 (1974) (“[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.”); see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes”).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 322 A.2d 880, 886
citation_b.parenthetical: "[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem."
citation_b.sentence: Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880, 886 (1974) (“[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.”); see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes”).