context: The Baers acknowledge that the statute could be interpreted that way as well. See ibid. This case therefore is unlike those where the relevant government actor is constrained by law to deny the application.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of SS 661(3
citation_a.sentence: See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 6 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (“appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661(3)”). The Secretary, on whom the statute confers “discretion,” 625 ILCS 5/6-106(b), could grant the Baers’ applications.
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law
citation_b.sentence: Cf. Mefford v. White, 331 Ill.App.3d 167, 264 Ill.Dec. 555, 770 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ill.App.2002) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to statute and regulation, but expressly not addressing whether an applicant similar to the Baers complied with the statute and regulation as a matter of Illinois law).