context: Second, petitioner cites no authority, and we are aware of none, suggesting that due process requires a hearing, as opposed to consideration on the written record, when a post-conviction petitioner wants a new appointed attorney because of dissatisfaction with existing counsel. Such a requirement is not compelled by Geist, and we decline to so extend its rationale.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 314 Or 353, 368
citation_a.parenthetical: post-conviction petitioner was not denied due process because of statutory time limitation for filing petition
citation_a.sentence: See Geist, 310 Or at 190 (holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands); cf. Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 368, 839 P2d 217 (1992) (post-conviction petitioner was not denied due process because of statutory time limitation for filing petition).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 310 Or 190, 190
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands
citation_b.sentence: See Geist, 310 Or at 190 (holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands); cf. Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 368, 839 P2d 217 (1992) (post-conviction petitioner was not denied due process because of statutory time limitation for filing petition).