context: Even though TWI provided evidence that might persuade a jury to conclude that Janczak's leave ultimately played no role in his termination, the grant of summary judgment prematurely took that determination from the jury.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, "the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented"
citation_a.sentence: See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 700 F.3d 1227, 1227
citation_b.parenthetical: observing that "sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination," and that "the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required"
citation_b.sentence: See Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (observing that “sum-' mary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination,” and that “the question ... is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of [the employer], but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that, in deciding whether to grant summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (concluding that summary judgment in employment discrimination case was premature despite significant weaknesses in employee’s argument).