context: Furthermore, as the trial court observed in its memorandum of decision, the Wilsons and the Keatings, who reside at 8 and 12 Runkenhage Road, respectively, "have deeded access [rights] over the right-of-way" for purposes of ingress to and egress from their landlocked properties. In light of this fact, the court reasonably could have concluded that the Herbericks were not troubled by the plaintiffs use of the right-of-way for the same purposes or, if they were, that they had decided to acquiesce to such use in the interest of neighborhood harmony.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: passive acquiescence should not be confused with permission for purposes of determining existence of prescriptive easement
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Phillips v. Bonadies, supra, 105 Conn. 726 (passive acquiescence should not be confused with permission for purposes of determining existence of prescriptive easement); see also Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, supra, 78 Conn. App. 708-709 (evidence supported finding that owner had passively acquiesced in plaintiffs use of property and therefore that use was adverse); 25 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Easements and Licenses § 54 (2004) (“[t]he foundation of a right by prescription is acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied on to establish the easement by prescription”). In any event, in view of the trial court’s extensive factual findings, all of which are amply supported by the record, the defendant cannot prevail on her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support that court’s determination that the plaintiff had obtained a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way for the purposes of ingress to and egress from her home.*
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: evidence supported finding that owner had passively acquiesced in plaintiffs use of property and therefore that use was adverse
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Phillips v. Bonadies, supra, 105 Conn. 726 (passive acquiescence should not be confused with permission for purposes of determining existence of prescriptive easement); see also Gallow-Mure v. Tomchik, supra, 78 Conn. App. 708-709 (evidence supported finding that owner had passively acquiesced in plaintiffs use of property and therefore that use was adverse); 25 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Easements and Licenses § 54 (2004) (“[t]he foundation of a right by prescription is acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied on to establish the easement by prescription”). In any event, in view of the trial court’s extensive factual findings, all of which are amply supported by the record, the defendant cannot prevail on her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support that court’s determination that the plaintiff had obtained a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way for the purposes of ingress to and egress from her home.*