context: However, under the circumstances of this contested matter, where the Code itself delimits the periods of a debtor's exclusivity generally to 120 days, and 180 days respectively, see 11 U.S.C. SS 1121(b), (c)(3), it would be unfair to demand that the Committees meet a heightened burden.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 21 B.R. 618, 620
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that the bankruptcy court has "the power to vacate a final judgment" and "may exercise this power very liberally."
citation_a.sentence: See In re Durkalec, 21 B.R. 618, 620 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982) (stating that the bankruptcy court has “the power to vacate a final judgment” and “may exercise this power very liberally.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 498 U.S. 279, 286
citation_b.parenthetical: "Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless 'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.' "
citation_b.sentence: See also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S.Ct. 654, 659, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (“Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’ ”).