context: . These courts, as did the district court here, have referred to a voluntary resignation as a "waiver" of procedural rights to which the employee would otherwise be entitled under the due process clause.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 638 F.Supp. 168, 168
citation_a.parenthetical: "[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived."
citation_a.sentence: See Morrell, 638 F.Supp. at 168 (“[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.”); Schoepf, 606 F.Supp. at 390 ("[P]laintiff’s resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived."); see also Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 ("[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 677 F.2d 543, 543
citation_b.parenthetical: "[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them."
citation_b.sentence: See Morrell, 638 F.Supp. at 168 (“[H]aving voluntarily resigned, plaintiff cannot now claim he was denied procedural protections that he waived.”); Schoepf, 606 F.Supp. at 390 ("[P]laintiff’s resignation was voluntary and, thus, any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled are waived."); see also Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 ("[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the [employee] has simply refused to avail himself of them.”).