context: In other words, only Oklahoma law governed the case. And Oklahoma does not permit a claim for gross negligence as an exemption to. the Workers' Compensation Act; thus, a gross-negligence claim necessarily < could not have supported Ms. Phillips's action.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 44 P.3d 553, 563
citation_a.parenthetical: "Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong's equivalent."
citation_a.sentence: See Parret, 127 P.3d at 575-76 (distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act) (emphasis omitted); see also Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla.2002) (“Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong’s equivalent.”); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 362 (Okla.1993) (“While ‘ordinary’ and ‘gross’ negligence differ in degree, ‘negligence’ and ‘willful and wanton' misconduct’ differ in kind.”). In sum, it is irrelevant whether Texas law might have recognized a claim for gross negli gence because Texas law was not applicable.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 127 P.3d 575, 575-76
citation_b.parenthetical: distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and "willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm" and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers' Compensation Act
citation_b.sentence: See Parret, 127 P.3d at 575-76 (distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act) (emphasis omitted); see also Myers v. Lashley, 44 P.3d 553, 563 (Okla.2002) (“Gross negligence, ... falls short of an. intentional wrong’s equivalent.”); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 362 (Okla.1993) (“While ‘ordinary’ and ‘gross’ negligence differ in degree, ‘negligence’ and ‘willful and wanton' misconduct’ differ in kind.”). In sum, it is irrelevant whether Texas law might have recognized a claim for gross negli gence because Texas law was not applicable.