context: . The dissent disagrees with our reading of Dodds and argues that the Arkansas courts have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of uberrimae fidei. Even if we were to agree with the dissent's reading of Dodds, however, Stipcich nonetheless still counsels that we take uberrimae fidei to be the law of Arkansas because there is an absence of an explicit rejection of this "generally recognized rule."
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 277 U.S. 318, 318
citation_a.parenthetical: "This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon."
citation_a.sentence: See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 ("This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.”); see also Cohen, Friedlander & Martin Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir.1948) (following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 166 F.2d 63, 66
citation_b.parenthetical: following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary
citation_b.sentence: See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 ("This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.”); see also Cohen, Friedlander & Martin Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir.1948) (following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary).