context: Given that Smith has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the procedural bar and that the State did not intentionally waive the bar, we deem it appropriate for this court to apply the procedural bar.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 118 F.3d 312, 316
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver
citation_a.sentence: See Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1451 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court); cf. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that a court of appeals •has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 996 F.2d 1442, 1451
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court
citation_b.sentence: See Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1451 (2d Cir.1993) (stating that a court of appeals may raise the procedural bar sua sponte despite the. fact that the issue was not addressed in the district court); cf. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that a court of appeals has discretion to apply Teague despite state waiver); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that a court of appeals •has discretion to require exhaustion of state court remedies despite state waiver).