context: Most--though not all--jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code's commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 928 N.E.2d 317, 320
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that a fleeing suspect created a "substantial risk of bodily injury" to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light
citation_a.sentence: But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. 102, 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (holding that a fleeing suspect created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 101 P.3d 1054, 1058
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under “a common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language”); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, 738-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that “it is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape arrest does not violate” the resisting arrest statute).