context: . We note that our analysis in this case accords with the reasoning of the majority of circuits that have considered this precise issue on collateral attack.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 97 F.3d 1345, 1350
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine).