context: In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity."
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 411 F.3d 474, 501
citation_a.parenthetical: addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context
citation_a.sentence: Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that a plaintiff "must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred"
citation_b.sentence: Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same).