context: "[SJubstantive due process ensures that [a state proceeding which results in a deprivation of property] is not arbitrary and capricious." Although the First Circuit routinely has rejected substantive due process claims in the zoning and land-use contexts, it has "left the door slightly ajar for federal relief in truly horrendous situations."
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: finding "vague" complaints of "a pattern of selective and excessive enforcement of municipal regulations" were not conscience-shocking
citation_a.sentence: Nestor Colon Medina, 964 F.2d at 45; accord Licari, 22 F.3d at 350; Collier v. Town of Harvard, No. 95-cv-11652, 1997 WL 33781338, at *5 (D.Mass. Mar. 28, 1997); see Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43 (noting “even abridgments of state law [in the land-use context] committed in bad faith do not necessarily amount to constitutional deprivation of due process,” but acknowledging that there could exist a “type of egregious official behavior which could conceivably work a breach of the due process clause”); cf. Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634 (1st Cir.2013) (finding “vague” complaints of “a pattern of selective and excessive enforcement of municipal regulations” were not conscience-shocking).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 811 F.2d 43, 43
citation_b.parenthetical: noting "even abridgments of state law [in the land-use context] committed in bad faith do not necessarily amount to constitutional deprivation of due process," but acknowledging that there could exist a "type of egregious official behavior which could conceivably work a breach of the due process clause"
citation_b.sentence: Nestor Colon Medina, 964 F.2d at 45; accord Licari, 22 F.3d at 350; Collier v. Town of Harvard, No. 95-cv-11652, 1997 WL 33781338, at *5 (D.Mass. Mar. 28, 1997); see Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43 (noting “even abridgments of state law [in the land-use context] committed in bad faith do not necessarily amount to constitutional deprivation of due process,” but acknowledging that there could exist a “type of egregious official behavior which could conceivably work a breach of the due process clause”); cf. Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634 (1st Cir.2013) (finding “vague” complaints of “a pattern of selective and excessive enforcement of municipal regulations” were not conscience-shocking).