context: Although this evidence clearly and convincingly supports the finding that rather than separating from his spouse, Father "has chosen, instead, to remain with his wife," App. at 17 (Order at 8, P 2), Father's unwillingness to live separately from a mentally ill spouse, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to terminate his parental rights. As our courts have long held: "Mental [disability] of the parents, standing alone, is not a proper ground for terminating parental rights."
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248
citation_a.parenthetical: affirming termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights not only due to "Mother's refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother's ability to effectively care for her children" but concluding that "[i]n addition to not being able to appropri ately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, ... [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home"
citation_a.sentence: Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(c) (1990); Matter of Dull, 521 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (“finding] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted))); but see R.W., Sr., v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (affirming termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights not only due to “Mother’s refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother’s ability to effectively care for her children” but concluding that “[i]n addition to not being able to appropri ately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, ... [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home”); R.G. v. Marion Cty.
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 521 N.E.2d 972, 976
citation_b.parenthetical: "finding] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights" (emphasis in original
citation_b.sentence: Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing Ind.Code § 31-6-5-4(c) (1990); Matter of Dull, 521 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (“finding] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted))); but see R.W., Sr., v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (affirming termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights not only due to “Mother’s refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother’s ability to effectively care for her children” but concluding that “[i]n addition to not being able to appropri ately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, ... [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home”); R.G. v. Marion Cty.