context: Vaughn's appeal complains that the post-conviction court applied the wrong standard because Harbor held that there is no requirement that the new factor "frustrate" the sentence in order to justify modification of that sentence. The post-sentencing court may still, however, consider whether the new factor frustrates the original sentencing scheme.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50
citation_a.parenthetical: "A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed."
citation_a.sentence: See id., 2011 WI 28, ¶ 50, 333 Wis. 2d at 78, 797 N.W2d at 840 ("A circuit court might conclude that its entire approach to sentencing would have been different had it been aware of a fact that is 'highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.' Even so, the court may not be able to conclude that the new fact, which would have changed its entire approach to sentencing, necessarily frustrates the purpose of the original sentence it imposed.") (quoted source omitted).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384
citation_b.parenthetical: "In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence."
citation_b.sentence: See also State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶ 89, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 384, 797 N.W.2d 451, 476 ("In determining whether to exercise its discretion to modify a sentence on the basis of a new factor, the circuit court may, but is not required to, consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the original sentence.").