context: Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court's interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 779 N.W.2d 860, 860
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that "the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff' in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide
citation_a.sentence: See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); cf. Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (noting that “the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff’ in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide). If the legislature had intended to advance those policies by excluding pre-verdict UIM payments from the definition of collateral sources, it could have expressly so provided.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 574 N.W.2d 425, 425
citation_b.parenthetical: recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous
citation_b.sentence: See Wynkoop, 574 N.W.2d at 425 (recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous). It is the role of the legislature, not this court, to properly effectuate the policy concerns respondent references.