context: The Financing Order follows the same structure as countless other orders and contracts, i.e., a more specific provision follows the more general provision. A court does not violate contract interpretation principles simply because it finds a more detailed provision to control the outcome over a general provision that has panoptic applicability.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 3 F.3d 11, 17
citation_a.parenthetical: noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general
citation_a.sentence: See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract
citation_b.sentence: See Parkhurst v. Gibson, 133 N.H. 57, 63, 573 A.2d 454 (1990) (noting the accepted interpretive rule that a general, preliminary clause does not take priority over specific provisions of a contract); 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 32:10 (4th ed. 1999) (“Where general and specific clauses conflict, the specific clause governs the meaning of the contract.”); see also Lawson v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2003) (noting the rule of contract interpretation that the specific controls the general).