context: The statements at issue in the present case are also non-testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because they were not "procured for the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 557 U.S. 305, 312, n. 2
citation_a.parenthetical: "[MJedical reports created for treatment purposes ... would not be testimonial under our decision today."
citation_a.sentence: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 392, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (emphasis added); see id., (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (“[A] statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.”); cf. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312, n. 2, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2533, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (“[MJedical reports created for treatment purposes ... would not be testimonial under our decision today.”) (citations omitted); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2692-93, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) (“[S]ince only testimonial statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause[,] [statements to | nfriends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation [by women in abusive relationships], and statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules[.]”); Bryant, 562 U.S. at 390, 131 S.Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion [a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence] adopts ... the discredited logic of- White [ ] ... [when it] announces that in future cases it will look to ‘standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable,’ when deciding whether a statement is testimonial.”). Although the state has evidently not produced any proof of the victim’s demise, unavailability of the declarant is not a prerequisite for introducing the statements as a matter of either the hearsay exception in La. C.E. art. 803(4), or the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "[A] statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony."
citation_b.sentence: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 392, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (emphasis added); see id., (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (“[A] statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.”); cf. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312, n. 2, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2533, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (“[MJedical reports created for treatment purposes ... would not be testimonial under our decision today.”) (citations omitted); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2692-93, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) (“[S]ince only testimonial statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause[,] [statements to | nfriends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation [by women in abusive relationships], and statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules[.]”); Bryant, 562 U.S. at 390, 131 S.Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion [a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence] adopts ... the discredited logic of- White [ ] ... [when it] announces that in future cases it will look to ‘standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable,’ when deciding whether a statement is testimonial.”). Although the state has evidently not produced any proof of the victim’s demise, unavailability of the declarant is not a prerequisite for introducing the statements as a matter of either the hearsay exception in La. C.E. art. 803(4), or the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.