context: Pleener submits that the district court erred when, in employing McDonnell Douglas analysis to her claim of discriminatory removal as principal, it concluded that Pleener had failed to adduce evidence that defendant's proffered nondiseriminatory reason for her removal was pretextual and that the real reason for her removal was racial bias. We disagree. While Pleener disputes the merits of the Board's view of (1) the deteriorating state of affairs at Beach Channel High School, (2) Pleener's role in that deterioration, and (3) her inability to provide the leadership necessary to restore stability, she failed to adduce any evidence that the Board did not sincerely hold that view or that otherwise would permit a factfinder to conclude that the Board's real reason for removing her was her race.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 230 F.3d 34, 44
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error, that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination
citation_a.sentence: See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 44 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error, that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 12 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir.1995) (“To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Myers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 684 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.1982) (“Even if the Brotherhood’s factfinding was mistaken, that circumstance would not establish discrimination in the absence of facts indicating that some identifiable group within the Local was erroneously being branded as ‘contracting members’ as a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory denial of their right to vote.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 684 F.2d 225, 227
citation_b.parenthetical: "Even if the Brotherhood's factfinding was mistaken, that circumstance would not establish discrimination in the absence of facts indicating that some identifiable group within the Local was erroneously being branded as 'contracting members' as a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory denial of their right to vote."
citation_b.sentence: See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 44 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error, that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 12 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir.1995) (“To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Myers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 684 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.1982) (“Even if the Brotherhood’s factfinding was mistaken, that circumstance would not establish discrimination in the absence of facts indicating that some identifiable group within the Local was erroneously being branded as ‘contracting members’ as a pretext for accomplishing a discriminatory denial of their right to vote.”).