context: Although appellants at all times treated the May 24 "Memorandum and Order" as an appealable order, the "separate document" rule is to be strictly applied as concerns the commencement of the appeal period.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 960 F.2d 237, 237
citation_a.parenthetical: emphasizing that the "separate document" requirement "should always be interpreted 'to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss' "
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (applying rule 58 mechanically notwithstanding previous aborted appeal by same appellant within appeal period); Fiore, 960 F.2d at 235 (discussing technicality of rule 58); Gregson & Assocs. Architects v. Government of the V.I., 675 F.2d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir.1982) {Indrelunas applied despite both parties’ treatment of memorandum opinion as appealable order); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 688-90 (4th Cir.1978) (“nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments” had been entered); see also Fiore, 960 F.2d at 237 (emphasizing that the “separate document” requirement “should always be interpreted ‘to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss’ ”) (quoting Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1121); Willhauck v. Halpin, 919 F.2d 788, 792 (1st Cir.1990) (same); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice 1158.02.1[2], at 58-20 to 21. Nevertheless, a notice of appeal deemed premature due to noncompliance with the “separate document” rule does not deprive the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction, Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 384, 385, 98 S.Ct. at 1120; see also Smith, 936 F.2d at 1394 (applying Bankers Trust), and the appeal may proceed in the normal course where the court of appeals determines that the “separate document” requirement was waived by the parties.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 585 F.2d 683, 688-90
citation_b.parenthetical: "nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments" had been entered
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (applying rule 58 mechanically notwithstanding previous aborted appeal by same appellant within appeal period); Fiore, 960 F.2d at 235 (discussing technicality of rule 58); Gregson & Assocs. Architects v. Government of the V.I., 675 F.2d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir.1982) {Indrelunas applied despite both parties’ treatment of memorandum opinion as appealable order); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 688-90 (4th Cir.1978) (“nor are we free to penalize plaintiffs ... by binding them to their erroneous assertion that judgments” had been entered); see also Fiore, 960 F.2d at 237 (emphasizing that the “separate document” requirement “should always be interpreted ‘to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss’ ”) (quoting Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1121); Willhauck v. Halpin, 919 F.2d 788, 792 (1st Cir.1990) (same); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice 1158.02.1[2], at 58-20 to 21. Nevertheless, a notice of appeal deemed premature due to noncompliance with the “separate document” rule does not deprive the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction, Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 384, 385, 98 S.Ct. at 1120; see also Smith, 936 F.2d at 1394 (applying Bankers Trust), and the appeal may proceed in the normal course where the court of appeals determines that the “separate document” requirement was waived by the parties.