context: Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 196 Ga. App. 64, 65
citation_a.parenthetical: relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”).