context: In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case."
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 441 F.3d 1152, 1159
citation_a.parenthetical: "Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case's proffered evidence."
citation_a.sentence: United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale."
citation_b.sentence: United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”).