context: See Tex.Crim. Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an "invalid" condition, "the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition."
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 842 S.W.2d 284, 285
citation_a.parenthetical: holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant's deferred adjudication probation
citation_a.sentence: Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant’s deferred adjudication probation); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 789 S.W.2d 50, 51
citation_b.parenthetical: deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation
citation_b.sentence: Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant’s deferred adjudication probation); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty).