context: Concerns as to whether a proposed plan is abusive of the bankruptcy process can be addressed through the good faith requirement of SS 1129(a)(3). Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process (hereafter "Adjusting Chapter 11 ") 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 562-63 (Fall, 1995); Markell, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. 38; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 204. Furthermore, before a plan can be crammed down, the proponent must demonstrate that the plan does not unfairly discriminate against and is fair and equita ble to any class that rejects it.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 485 U.S. 197, 206
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code"
citation_a.sentence: See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 156 B.R. 71, 71
citation_b.parenthetical: observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as SSSS 1129(a
citation_b.sentence: See ZRM-Oklahoma, 156 B.R. at 71 (observing that concerns expressed by Greystone III and its progeny are adequately addressed through other provisions of the Code such as §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7) & 1129(b)); see also Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11, 69 Am.Bankr.L.J. at 562; Markel, Clueless, 11 Bankr.Dev. J. at 43; Rusch, Gerrymandering, 63 U. Colo. L.Rev. at 200-01. Furthermore, we must presume that Congress carefully crafted the provisions of § 1129 with an eye toward ensuring that the reorganization process does not impose inequitable results upon the parties in involved. Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (stating that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confínes of the Bankruptcy Code”).