context: In the right-to-counsel context, the Supreme Court has countenanced clarifying questions only to ascertain whether a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is actually an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused "indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated" when deciding whether police had honored the accused's Fifth Amendment rights
citation_a.sentence: See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 469 U.S. 91, 95
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that "[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance"
citation_b.sentence: See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (focusing only on the threshold question of whether the accused “indicate[d] in any manner that he d[id] not wish to be interrogated” when deciding whether police had honored the accused’s Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that “[t]his case concerns the threshold inquiry: whether Smith invoked his right to counsel in the first instance”).