context: I believe that the effective preclusion of a party's right to 'exercise his or her challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, in the absence of effective measures to cure such defect, is ordinarily reversible error.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 79 Hawai'i 165, 174
citation_a.parenthetical: "[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant's right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice."
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 767 S.W.2d 705, 709
citation_b.parenthetical: in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs "were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges"
citation_b.sentence: See State v. Carvalho, 79 Hawai'i 165, 174, 880 P.2d 217, 226 (App.1994) (“[T]he denial or impairment of a defendant’s right of peremptory challenge in a criminal case is reversible error not requiring a showing of prejudice.”), cert. granted, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994), cert. dismissed, 78 Hawai'i 474, 896 P.2d 930 (1995); Leslie v. Allen-Bradley Co., 203 Mich.App. 490, 513 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1994) (in case where tidal judge limited plaintiffs number of peremptory challenges, in violation of statute, reversing because “a party need not demonstrate prejudice arising from a claim of defective jury selection, since the requirement would impose an impossible burden” (citation omitted)); cf. Babcock v. Northwest Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989) (in medical malpractice case where trial court initially excluded any discussion of tort reform, and where juror during voir dire volunteered in front of venire his familiarity with advertisements regarding the need for tort reform, holding that trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting questions regarding such reforms because the result was that the plaintiffs “were denied the opportunity to intelligently exercise challenges”); Fluharty v. Wimbush, 172 W.Va. 134, 304 S.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1983) (“It is ... reversible error for a trial judge ... to ... limit the questioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon litigant’s ability to determine whether the jurors are free from interest, bias[,] or prejudice, or to effectively hinder the exercise of peremptory challenges.”