context: When the legislature has stated the purpose of a state law and specified the criteria for evaluating compliance with it, then a local ordinance imposing different requirements is inconsistent with the state statute. But if the state and local provisions serve different purposes, then different methods of determining compliance do not render the two provisions inconsistent.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes
citation_a.sentence: See Robinson v. City of Longview, 936 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ) (holding that ordinance prohibiting topless dancing at locations where alcoholic beverages are served was not inconsistent with state law prohibiting municipalities from imposing stricter standards on premises where a liquor license is required). Thus, to determine if the ordinance is inconsistent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982) (“[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.”). In ascertaining these purposes, we rely on the statements of the body that enacted the provision.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 633 S.W.2d 790, 796
citation_b.parenthetical: "[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable."
citation_b.sentence: See Robinson v. City of Longview, 936 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ) (holding that ordinance prohibiting topless dancing at locations where alcoholic beverages are served was not inconsistent with state law prohibiting municipalities from imposing stricter standards on premises where a liquor license is required). Thus, to determine if the ordinance is inconsistent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982) (“[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.”). In ascertaining these purposes, we rely on the statements of the body that enacted the provision.