context: "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead legal theories." Accordingly, when a plaintiff does plead legal theories, it can later alter those theories.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 772 F.3d 802, 808-09
citation_a.parenthetical: plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed on new summary judgment theory that re-characterized already-alleged facts and did not offer "any unfair surprise"
citation_a.sentence: Vidimos, 99 F.3d at 222; see also Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed on new summary judgment theory that re-characterized already-alleged facts and did not offer “any unfair surprise”).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 799 F.3d 729, 743-44
citation_b.parenthetical: plaintiff did not inappropriately add new claim during summary judgment briefing when factual basis was alleged in complaint
citation_b.sentence: Id. (“[T]here is no burden on the plaintiff to justify altering its original theory.”); CMFG Life Insurance Co. v. RBS Securities, Inc., 799 F.3d 729, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff did not inappropriately add new claim during summary judgment briefing when factual basis was alleged in complaint); Rabé v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that, after reversal of dismissal on pleadings, district court would have supplemental jurisdiction over claims not articulated, but implicit, in complaint). As a general rule, district courts should not hold plaintiffs to their earlier legal theories unless the changes unfairly harm the defendant or the case’s development—for example, by making it “more costly or difficult” to defend the case, or by causing unreasonable delay.