context: Assuming Ms. Perez's affidavit is accurate, she and Juror 79 saw each other in a store sometime around 2006, long before the jury was seated in this case. (R. 979, Salazar's Mot. for New Trial, Ms. Perez's Aff. PP 6-8.) The jury foreperson testified that Juror 79 reported recognizing one or more family members on the train or at a store during trial, but there is no evidence that they spoke to each other or interacted in any way. (5/30/08 Tr. at 31-33.) This type of random, innocuous contact is not the type of extraneous influence, such as the attempted bribery of a juror or direct threats made to a juror, requiring a hearing under Remmer.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 263 F.3d 723, 723
citation_a.parenthetical: no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was "not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer"
citation_a.sentence: See Whitehead, 263 F.3d at 723 (no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was “not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer”); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir.1985) (no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous); see also Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 160 n. 6 (4th Cir1998) (limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced “competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced "competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions."
citation_b.sentence: See Whitehead, 263 F.3d at 723 (no hearing required where potential extraneous influence was “not a third-party contact of the sort described in Remmer”); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir.1985) (no error where district court declined to conduct inquiry into juror reaction to an extraneous communication because, unlike Remmer, the comment heard by a juror was ambiguous and innocuous); see also Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 160 n. 6 (4th Cir1998) (limiting Remmer to cases where defendant introduced “competent evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication or contact, and that it was more than innocuous interventions.”).