context: A defendant is an armed career criminal when he violates 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) and has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e)(1). Because a Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, we reject this argument.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 659 F.3d 117, 118-20
citation_a.parenthetical: holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 118-20 (1st Cir.2011) (holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA); United States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993) (larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence); see also United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 230-33 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 596 F.3d 228, 230-33
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 118-20 (1st Cir.2011) (holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA); United States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993) (larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence); see also United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 230-33 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline).