context: Young's marked lane violation for admittedly "weaving" on the highway provided probable cause to stop him for violating the traffic laws. Further, Trooper Kane had ample reasonable suspicion, based on surveillance by fellow officers observing what they believed to be consistent with drug trafficking and collection of drug proceeds, to stop the truck and investigate.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 350 F.3d 231, 240
citation_a.parenthetical: "fellow officer rule" provides that "knowledge may be imputed from DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1994)(agents may stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity); see also United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 240 (1st Cir.2003) (“fellow officer rule” provides that “knowledge may be imputed from DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 25 F.3d 1, 6
citation_b.parenthetical: agents may stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1994)(agents may stop a moving automobile to investigate their reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity); see also United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 240 (1st Cir.2003) (“fellow officer rule” provides that “knowledge may be imputed from DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop”).