context: Nor is the fact that Dallio ultimately performed competently in conducting his defense necessarily material to determine the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver under Faretta.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 422 U.S. 836, 836
citation_a.parenthetical: "[The defendant's] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself."
citation_a.sentence: See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 509 U.S. 389, 399
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, * not the competence to represent himself."
citation_b.sentence: See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (“[The defendant’s] technical legal knowledge ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, • not the competence to represent himself.”).