context: The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the principles of accessory liability pursuant to SS 53a-8. Specifically, he contends that the trial court's inclusion of language pertaining to theories of joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy in its jury instructions was improper because it had allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty as an accessory without finding that he had the intent required for commission of the substantive offense.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 237 Conn. 518, 536
citation_a.parenthetical: inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 278 Conn. 598, 611-19
citation_b.parenthetical: accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability
citation_b.sentence: See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 536, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (inclusion of common design language in instruction on accessory liability for murder was improper because state is not required to prove specific intent to kill under common design theory); see also State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 611-19, 900 A.2d 485 (2006) (accessorial liability and conspiracy are distinct theories of criminal liability).