context: Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre-2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment -- which is what the de-tainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. SS 287.7(d)-- falls well on the arrest side of the divide.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: emphasizing that the Supreme Court had "never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here" based solely on reasonable suspicion, and "cannot do so on the facts presented by this case"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 445 F.2d 217, 222
citation_b.parenthetical: whether an immigration stop of "several minutes" could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a "difficult ]" question, but upholding the stop as it was "minutes rather than hours"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had “never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here” based solely on reasonable suspicion, and “cannot do so on the facts presented by this case”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir.2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (DÍC.Cir.1971) (whether an immigration stop of “several minutes” could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a “difficult ]” question, but upholding the stop as it was “minutes rather than hours”).