context: The BIA concluded that Diaz-Jaimes was ineligible to adjust his status because his conviction under Oregon Revised Statute SS 163.415 was a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsequent to the BIA's order, we held that a conviction under a similar California state statute did not categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 506 F.3d 688, 693
citation_a.parenthetical: engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude
citation_a.sentence: See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.2007) (engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061 (crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 465 F.3d 1061, 1061
citation_b.parenthetical: crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury
citation_b.sentence: See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir.2007) (engaging in intercourse with a minor is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061 (crimes against protected classes do not necessarily involve moral turpitude if they do not result in injury).