context: . To the extent Nelson also has argued that the court erred in dismissing his action because he was proceeding without counsel, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." However, both the Supreme Court and this Court have concluded that a defendant's pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural rules.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 197 F.3d 1098, 1104
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines
citation_a.sentence: See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court "never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because "experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 508 U.S. 106, 113
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining that the Court "never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel," because "experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law"
citation_b.sentence: See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court "never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because "experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines).