context: Specifical-' ly, Sewell contends that the statute did not apply because he did not possess the required mental state and he went to trial solely to preserve a legal challenge to the district court's pre-trial exclusion of evidence regarding his intoxication. Both of these arguments concern Sewell's denial of an essential factual element of guilt by contending that he was too high on crack cocaine to form the necessary criminal intent, and there is some controversy whether the sentencing reduction is available in these circumstances.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 140 F.3d 367, 381
citation_a.parenthetical: upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant's defense that he lacked specific intent
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 381 (2d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of Section 3E1.1 reduction based in part on defendant’s defense that he lacked specific intent).
citation_b.signal: but see
citation_b.parenthetical: upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant "contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea" and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct
citation_b.sentence: But see United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906, 120 S.Ct. 250, 145 L.Ed.2d 210 (1999) (upholding application of Section 3E1.1 reduction where defendant “contended that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea” and thus essentially challenged the applicability of statute to his conduct); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir.1990) (same).