context: Majority Op. at 263. This might very well be true. Indeed, we might guess as to whether the court would have concluded that Watkins's conduct did in fact qualify for the enhancement. But I do not think we should affirm a defendant's sentence based on a hunch, even a strong one.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 647 F.3d 450, 459
citation_a.parenthetical: "[Tjhis Court cannot assume, without unambiguous indication to the contrary, that the sentence would be the same absent the error."
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Feldman, 647 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.2011) (“[Tjhis Court cannot assume, without unambiguous indication to the contrary, that the sentence would be the same absent the error.”); cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117-18 (2d Cir.2005) (“Perhaps in some cases an appellate court could make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, but that guess might be wrong____”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 397 F.3d 103, 117-18
citation_b.parenthetical: "Perhaps in some cases an appellate court could make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, but that guess might be wrong____"
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Feldman, 647 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.2011) (“[Tjhis Court cannot assume, without unambiguous indication to the contrary, that the sentence would be the same absent the error.”); cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117-18 (2d Cir.2005) (“Perhaps in some cases an appellate court could make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, but that guess might be wrong____”).