context: Addressing federal parole violations, the former Fifth Circuit rejected the double jeopardy argument, similar to the one pressed here, that when parole is revoked upon violation, the time spent on parole should count towards time served on a prisoner's sentence. The former Fifth Circuit explained that in federal parole, the "time spent on parole shall not diminish the sentence where a prisoner has violated his parole and is required to serve the remainder of his sentence."
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 419 F.2d 390, 390
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that a state prisoner is in custody pursuant to his original state conviction and sentence upon reincarceration after his parole is revoked
citation_a.sentence: Clark, 374 F.2d at 953; see also Thompson v. Cockrell, 263 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that Due Process Clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked); cf. Dill v. Holt, 371 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir.2004) (concluding that a state prisoner is in custody pursuant to his original state conviction and sentence upon reincarceration after his parole is revoked). Moreover, our predecessor court has rejected the argument that it violates due process principles to require a parole violator to serve the remaining time on his sentence, even if that causes the prisoner’s “incarceration [to extend] past the final expiration of the maximum sentence as established at the time of imposition.” Sturgis v. United States, 419 F.2d 390, 390 (5th Cir.1969); see also Swicegood v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 755 F.2d 880, 881 (11th Cir.1985) (noting that parole violation results in forfeiture of good time credit and credit for time spent on parole).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 263 F.3d 423, 426
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that Due Process Clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked
citation_b.sentence: Clark, 374 F.2d at 953; see also Thompson v. Cockrell, 263 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that Due Process Clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked); cf. Dill v. Holt, 371 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir.2004) (concluding that a state prisoner is in custody pursuant to his original state conviction and sentence upon reincarceration after his parole is revoked). Moreover, our predecessor court has rejected the argument that it violates due process principles to require a parole violator to serve the remaining time on his sentence, even if that causes the prisoner’s “incarceration [to extend] past the final expiration of the maximum sentence as established at the time of imposition.” Sturgis v. United States, 419 F.2d 390, 390 (5th Cir.1969); see also Swicegood v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 755 F.2d 880, 881 (11th Cir.1985) (noting that parole violation results in forfeiture of good time credit and credit for time spent on parole).