context: The "reasonable speculation" standard is materially different from the Jackson standard in that it prohibits convictions from resting on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. This new standard strongly disfavors circumstantial evidence, contrary to our long-standing recognition that a criminal conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence alone.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 329 F.3d 253, 261
citation_a.parenthetical: "[W]e do not favor direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, as either type of evidence may satisfactorily support a conviction."
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 758 (1st Cir.2007) (“[Cjircumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to provide a basis for conviction.”); see also United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir.2003) (“[W]e do not favor direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, as either type of evidence may satisfactorily support a conviction.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 507 F.3d 749, 758
citation_b.parenthetical: "[Cjircumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to provide a basis for conviction."
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 758 (1st Cir.2007) (“[Cjircumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to provide a basis for conviction.”); see also United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir.2003) (“[W]e do not favor direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, as either type of evidence may satisfactorily support a conviction.”).