context: Second, the defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting the blood test results because the law enforcement officer did not have probable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages before requiring the defendant to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933(l)(a). As the record reflects that the law enforcement officer did not require the defendant to submit to the blood test, but rather the law enforcement officer obtained the blood sample after the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw, we find that this argument lacks merit.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 70 So.3d 642, 648
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that "blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible"
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Geiss, 70 So.3d 642, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”); see also State v. Murray, 51 So.3d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Kujawa v. State, 405 So.2d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 405 So.2d 251, 252
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test
citation_b.sentence: See State v. Geiss, 70 So.3d 642, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”); see also State v. Murray, 51 So.3d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Kujawa v. State, 405 So.2d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test).