context: Death penalty cases present special concerns about what voir dire may be constitutionally required, and there are special voir dire rules in such cases.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence
citation_a.sentence: See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738-39, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence); 5 LaFave, et al., supra, § 22.3(a), at 295.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 476 U.S. 28, 36-37
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime
citation_b.sentence: See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (holding that Due Process Clause entitled death-penalty-eligible defendant to voir dire questioning on racial bias where defendant was accused of interracial crime); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738-39, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (state trial court, under Due Process Clause, may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential juror, regardless of facts in the case, would automatically impose the death sentence); 5 LaFave, et al., supra, § 22.3(a), at 295.