context: In this case, the Retirement System does have the "power and privileges of a corporation," S.C.Code Ann. SSSS 9-1-20, 9-11-20, including the powers to "sue and be sued," to "make contracts," and to buy and sell property, id. SS 33-3-102. But, contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the designation of an entity as a corporation with the power to sue and be sued is not conclusive in establishing its autonomy.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: "It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... -- this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated"
citation_a.sentence: See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 745 F.3d 139, 139
citation_b.parenthetical: finding that the autonomy factor "cut both ways," even though the entity had the "power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name"
citation_b.sentence: See Oberg, 745 F.3d at 139 (finding that the autonomy factor “cut both ways,” even though the entity had the “power to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and purchase and sell property in its own name”); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199, 49 S.Ct. 104, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929) (“It is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the general grant of power to sue or be sued ... — this suit, in effect, is against the state and must be so treated”).