context: Since the statute is derogatory of the traditional powers of the Court to administer a class action, it should be construed strictly and consistent with its plain meaning. The Order sought to be appealed is not prohibited by the statute, and must therefore be within the Court's discretion to make. No evidence of an abuse of discretion is cited. In any case, this type of discretionary decision is generally inappropriate for appellate review.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38
citation_a.parenthetical: "Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion."
citation_a.sentence: See Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (“Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion.”) (citations omitted); see also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir.1963) (per curiam) (“[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b) to ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’ ”) In Koehler our Court of Appeals observed that:
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 313 F.2d 431, 434
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b
citation_b.sentence: See Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (“Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion.”) (citations omitted); see also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir.1963) (per curiam) (“[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b) to ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’ ”) In Koehler our Court of Appeals observed that: