context: However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that disputed facts in the ease "were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version," and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 365 P.3d 358, 364
citation_b.parenthetical: "[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility."
citation_b.sentence: See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony).