context: This was not an unreasonable application of the Court's precedents, as fairmind-ed jurists could have reached the same result.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 458 F.3d 72, 77
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that an "intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence on remand, thereby precluding application of the Pearce presumption"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an “intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence on remand, thereby precluding application of the Pearce presumption”); cf. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) (holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an “intervening change in law ... can itself justify an increased sentence on remand, thereby precluding application of the Pearce presumption”); cf. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) (holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness).