context: You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere on my premises you want to search and take anything you find."). Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent proposes.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone."
citation_a.sentence: See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 536 U.S. 194, 207
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that "there are no per se rules" in deciding whether consent was voluntary
citation_b.sentence: See 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was voluntary).