context: First, Hall had the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine all of the eyewitnesses in order to cast doubt on their ability to identify him. As we have explained, any weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 665 F.2d 616, 641
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory "can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation"
citation_a.sentence: See Larkin, 978 F.2d at 971 (excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant’s counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identifications); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (concluding that “vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,” which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory “can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 978 F.2d 971, 971
citation_b.parenthetical: excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant's counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses' eyewitness identifications
citation_b.sentence: See Larkin, 978 F.2d at 971 (excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant’s counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identifications); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (concluding that “vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,” which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory “can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation”).