context: P79 If, conversely, the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to "collapse into" the claims against the driver, then it appeal's that the jury would effectively weigh only Ferrer's fault, on the one hand, and the driver's fault, on the other.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, "negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved"
citation_a.sentence: See Watson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 762 P.2d 133, 139-40 (Colo. 1988) (noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant’s individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence); Kussman v. City & Cty. of Denver, 706 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1985) (Neighbors, J., concurring) (“[T]he negligence of persons in an imputed negligence relationship' ought to be treated as a unit, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants, for purposes of comparative negligence.”); see also Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 n.13 (Okla. 1978) (noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, “negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved”). In this scenario (i.e., .the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to “collapse into” the claims against driver), if the jury finds the parties equally at fault, then it would apportion fifty percent fault to Ferrer and fifty percent fault to the driver, which would prevent Ferrer from recovering anything.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 762 P.2d 133, 139-40
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant's individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence
citation_b.sentence: See Watson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 762 P.2d 133, 139-40 (Colo. 1988) (noting that the doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant’s individual fault and thus rejecting a rule of imputed comparative negligence); Kussman v. City & Cty. of Denver, 706 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1985) (Neighbors, J., concurring) (“[T]he negligence of persons in an imputed negligence relationship' ought to be treated as a unit, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants, for purposes of comparative negligence.”); see also Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 n.13 (Okla. 1978) (noting that in the context of imputed or vicarious liability, “negligence of two or more tortfeasors is treated as a unit, so that so far as the comparative negligence doctrine is concerned it is the same as if only one defendant is involved”). In this scenario (i.e., .the direct liability claims against the cab company are dismissed and those claims are permitted to “collapse into” the claims against driver), if the jury finds the parties equally at fault, then it would apportion fifty percent fault to Ferrer and fifty percent fault to the driver, which would prevent Ferrer from recovering anything.