context: We have interpreted the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c), relating to delays involving the gathering of material evidence, and concluded that such time is not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 212 Kan. 180, 185-86
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c
citation_a.sentence: (Emphasis added.); see State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 185-86, 509 P.2d 1125 (1973) (stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c), making a total delay of 191 days not to be counted against the State).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that "delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period."
citation_b.sentence: State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994) (stating that “delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.”)