context: The problem is not so much that Officer Chih failed to adequately scrutinize the basis of Ms. Thompson-Wright's knowledge, but rather that he failed to give sufficient weight to her own admission that the basis of her knowledge was either neighborhood rumor or conjecture or an anonymous source whose credibility and reliability were unknown. This court has never held that it should ignore facts that tend to undermine reasonable suspicion.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 73 A.3d 138, 147
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had "dispelled" the officer's reasonable suspicion
citation_a.sentence: See Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297, 301 (D.C. 2016) ("To determine whether police officers had reasonable suspicion, a court must review the totality of the circumstances present.” (emphasis added)); cf. Ramsey v. United States, 73 A.3d 138, 147 (D.C. 2013) (holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had “dispelled” the officer’s reasonable suspicion).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 134 A.3d 297, 301
citation_b.parenthetical: "To determine whether police officers had reasonable suspicion, a court must review the totality of the circumstances present." (emphasis added
citation_b.sentence: See Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297, 301 (D.C. 2016) ("To determine whether police officers had reasonable suspicion, a court must review the totality of the circumstances present.” (emphasis added)); cf. Ramsey v. United States, 73 A.3d 138, 147 (D.C. 2013) (holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had “dispelled” the officer’s reasonable suspicion).