context: In determining whether there is significant federal involvement, our cases focus not only on the efforts to obtain a warrant, but also on the execution of the warrant. However, since no federal officers were involved in the criminal investigation, or in obtaining or executing the warrant, federal rules did not apply to the search.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 956 F.2d 847, 847
citation_a.parenthetical: section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence
citation_a.sentence: Id. at 662-63. See also Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (section 3109 not applicable where state officers acted totally without federal involvement in seizing evidence); United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 242 (8th Cir.1995) (no “significant federal involvement” where no federal officer participated in initial entry and search of residence, and where federal officers not contacted until after state officers found what they believed to be explosives). In United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir.1997), we held that even the presence of federal officers at the search would not have constituted significant federal involvement, at least where state officers obtained and executed a warrant issued by a state judge as part of an investigation based on state law.
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search "in substance and effect ... a joint operation" of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply
citation_b.sentence: Cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) (before the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states, federal participation in execution of state warrant rendered the search “in substance and effect ... a joint operation” of local and federal officers to which federal exclusionary rules apply); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949) (“The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means.