context: Kennedy has cited no authority for this proposition. To the contrary, the law in South Carolina allows the context of the words themselves and the circumstances under which the words are spoken to be considered in determining whether there is a defamatoiy meaning and whether it is actionable per se.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 72 S.E.2d 453, 455
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that when considered in light of circumstances, employer's statement that employee was "short" was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime, namely theft
citation_a.sentence: Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 222 S.C. 226, 235, 72 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1952) (holding that when considered in light of circumstances, employer’s statement that employee was "short” was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime, namely theft); Lily v. Belk’s Dept.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: holding under South Carolina law, where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime, the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime
citation_b.sentence: Store, 178 S.C. 278, 182 S.E. 889 (1935); Turner v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 S.C. 253, 163 S.E. 796 (1932); see Sandifer v. Electrolux Corp., 172 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.1949) (holding under South Carolina law, where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime, the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime). Therefore, we dismiss Kennedy’s arguments in .that regard as unsupported by the law of defamation in this State.