context: In section A of that report, the party listed by name over seventy contributors to the party, together with the amount given by each. Thus, it seems that if one wanted to know what individuals or corporations enabled the Republican Party to make a substantial contribution to Candidate X, one could readily find out. Finally, the Court has some doubt whether the anti-corruption rationale used to justify limits on contributions by individuals is of equivalent relevance in the context of political party contributions.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 146 F.3d 571, 571
citation_a.parenthetical: "There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power."
citation_a.sentence: See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: "[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor."
citation_b.sentence: See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”).