context: Although plaintiffs IQ test results from both Dr. Taylor and Dr. Cash and the application of section 12.05 were addressed during the administrative hearings, the ALJ never explicitly addressed those issues in his decision. The ALJ's silent disregard of the verbal IQ obtained by Dr. Cash was error.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 81 F.3d 821, 830-831
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that an examining physician's opinion can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record, and "[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician"
citation_a.sentence: See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-831 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that an examining physician’s opinion can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record, and “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician”); cf. Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633-634 (9th Cir.1987) (reversing and remanding for consideration of whether the claimant met section 12.05 where the claimant’s IQs “obtained during psychological testing by two clinical psychologists ranged from a high of 76 to a low of 69, thereby satisfying the first prong of section 12.05(C)”) (footnote omitted); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1184 (3d Cir.1992) (stating that “a valid verbal scale IQ test administered by a qualified professional using the WAIS may be sufficient to establish” mental retardation under the first prong of section 12.05C).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 970 F.2d 1178, 1184
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that "a valid verbal scale IQ test administered by a qualified professional using the WAIS may be sufficient to establish" mental retardation under the first prong of section 12.05C
citation_b.sentence: See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-831 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that an examining physician’s opinion can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record, and “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician”); cf. Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633-634 (9th Cir.1987) (reversing and remanding for consideration of whether the claimant met section 12.05 where the claimant’s IQs “obtained during psychological testing by two clinical psychologists ranged from a high of 76 to a low of 69, thereby satisfying the first prong of section 12.05(C)”) (footnote omitted); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1184 (3d Cir.1992) (stating that “a valid verbal scale IQ test administered by a qualified professional using the WAIS may be sufficient to establish” mental retardation under the first prong of section 12.05C).