context: The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 384 F.3d 38, 44
citation_a.parenthetical: "So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'" (alterations in original
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996))).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 370 U.S. 139, 143
citation_b.parenthetical: in jail setting, "official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996))).