context: Defendants note that there is a strong public policy supporting the right of a client to discharge an attorney at any time, despite contractual provisions to the contrary. From this they argue that, because an attorney has no contractual right to continued employment by his client, plaintiff has not stated a claim under SS 1981. However, even if one were to consider a contract between an attorney and client to be an agreement that is terminable at will by the client, such a contract could not be terminated for a discriminatory reason.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 1994 WL 380620, at *3
citation_a.parenthetical: "There is no 'at-will' defense to a federal discrimination complaint."
citation_a.sentence: See Campbell v. AT & T Communications, 1994 WL 380620, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 18, 1994) (“There is no ‘at-will’ defense to a federal discrimination complaint.”); see also Baker v. Am. Juice, Inc., 870 F.Supp. 878, 883 (N.D.Ind. 1994) (§ 1981 applicable when at-will employee alleged that he had been discharged on the basis of his race).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 870 F.Supp. 878, 883
citation_b.parenthetical: SS 1981 applicable when at-will employee alleged that he had been discharged on the basis of his race
citation_b.sentence: See Campbell v. AT & T Communications, 1994 WL 380620, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 18, 1994) (“There is no ‘at-will’ defense to a federal discrimination complaint.”); see also Baker v. Am. Juice, Inc., 870 F.Supp. 878, 883 (N.D.Ind. 1994) (§ 1981 applicable when at-will employee alleged that he had been discharged on the basis of his race).