context: Third, the district court did not err in denying appellant's request to represent himself, finding that such requests were delaying tactics.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 874 F.2d 669, 675
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that if the "request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that if the “request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990) (holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 921 F.2d 882, 888
citation_b.parenthetical: holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that if the “request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990) (holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied).