context: The statistical evidence thus shows some disparity. A sufficient disparity may constitute a "pattern or practice" of discrimination and may support a finding of intentional discrimination.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that "any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan"
citation_a.sentence: See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 806 F.Supp. 1126, 1143
citation_b.parenthetical: "While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the 'mere fact of a difference in treatment.'"
citation_b.sentence: See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598-99 (2d Cir.1986) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (proof of pattern or practice of discrimination supports inference that “any particular employment decision during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that plan”)); Ellis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 7074,1995 WL 453333, * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1995) (citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1984); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.1981)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 2, 1997 WL 76861 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1997); see also Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F.Supp. 1126,1143 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“While in a disparate treatment ease, proof of discriminatory intent is required, in some cases it can be inferred from the ‘mere fact of a difference in treatment.’”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271-72 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 767 F.Supp. 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.1991).