context: First, the "palpable defect" standard is novel, vague, and inconsistent with the language and purpose of Rule 59. The standard for remittitur is the same in wrongful death and personal injury cases.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 715 P.2d 758, 760
citation_a.parenthetical: suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court's consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409 P.2d 714 (1966) (holding that the trial court “did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive” and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action); cf. Begay v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 505, 507, 715 P.2d 758, 760 (1986) (suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court’s consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 100 Ariz. 6, 14
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that the trial court "did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive" and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Alires v. S. Pac. Co., 100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409 P.2d 714 (1966) (holding that the trial court “did not exceed its judicial discretion in finding that the damages ordered by the jury were excessive” and ordering remittitur in a wrongful death action); cf. Begay v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 505, 507, 715 P.2d 758, 760 (1986) (suggesting no difference between personal injury and wrongful death cases concerning the trial court’s consideration of a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages).