context: The plain language of the immunity provision indicates that its purpose is to grant persons who comment about a judicial officer absolute protection from civil or criminal liability, even .when criticism leveled against a judge is a false statement of fact that damages the judge's reputation. Thus, the provision would set forth a new common law defamation standard when the subject of a critical comment is a judicial officer.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 882 P.2d 1293, 1299
citation_a.parenthetical: the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern
citation_a.sentence: See Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Colo.1994) (the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern); see also In re Proposed Petition “Petition Procedures”, 900 P.2d 104, 109 (Colo.1995) (proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive “fundamental rights” unrelated to these procedural changes).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 900 P.2d 104, 109
citation_b.parenthetical: proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive "fundamental rights" unrelated to these procedural changes
citation_b.sentence: See Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Colo.1994) (the First Amendment does not confer absolute immunity upon those who criticize a judicial officer on a matter of public concern); see also In re Proposed Petition “Petition Procedures”, 900 P.2d 104, 109 (Colo.1995) (proposed initiative contained multiple subjects which both altered the procedures for filing petitions and created substantive “fundamental rights” unrelated to these procedural changes).