context: Moreover, we note that Maxwell took the stand to corroborate Jenkins's impeachment testimony that Lavoris Smith had made a prior statement inconsistent with her testimony.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 229 Kan. 47, 61
citation_a.parenthetical: "[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney's testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution"
citation_a.sentence: See also State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 61, 622 P.2d 986, 996 (1981) (“[rjeversible prejudice results from the attorney’s testimony when the attorney actively participates in the criminal prosecution”), modified on other ground, State v. Hayes, 239 Kan. 443, 720 P.2d 1049 (1986).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.parenthetical: reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney's active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution's principal witness to the only real factual issue
citation_b.sentence: Compare State v. Miller, 391 So.2d 1159, 1161-64 (La.1980) (in finding harmless the assistant district attorney’s resumption of his role as co-prosecutor after having testified, the court considered, among other factors, that he was an impeachment witness), with Wal drop v. State, 424 So.2d at 1346, 1351 (reversal warranted where the prosecutor was the prosecution’s principal witness, testifying as to the defendant’s confession and written statement, the latter of which, the court noted, intensified and magnified the oral statement, leaving no doubt of the defendant’s guilt); State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.1971) (reversal warranted because of the prejudicial effect of the prosecuting attorney’s active prosecution of the case while serving as the prosecution’s principal witness to the only real factual issue).