context: The Second Circuit, prior to Daubert, departed from a strict application of the Frye general acceptance test, though, as in Dau- bert, acceptance of the proffered evidence in the scientific community has been a considered factor.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 895 F.Supp. 582, 585
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that defendant's argument that Rea and Bortnovsky must be revisited in light of Daubert was tenuous, as the Second Circuit found in Williams that a determination of admissibility of scientific evidence should be made under the Federal Rules
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Lech, 895 F.Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (noting that defendant’s argument that Rea and Bortnovsky must be revisited in light of Daubert was tenuous, as the Second Circuit found in Williams that a determination of admissibility of scientific evidence should be made under the Federal Rules).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 958 F.2d 1206, 1224
citation_b.parenthetical: referring to absence of demonstrated reliability and relevance of polygraph evidence in record, as later mandated to be considered in Daubert
citation_b.sentence: United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1224 (2d Cir.1992) (referring to absence of demonstrated reliability and relevance of polygraph evidence in record, as later mandated to be considered in Daubert). Therefore, defendants argue that under the standard later enunciated in Daubert, the Second Circuit has already found polygraph evidence inadmissible under Rule 702.