context: Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 363 F.3d 317, 326
citation_a.parenthetical: "[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity."
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 407 U.S. 143, 145
citation_b.parenthetical: "The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... "
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”