context: As articulated in our case law, to determine whether a person's consent was voluntarily given or coerced, the proper analytical framework is whether a person has knowingly waived his right to refuse to consent to the search.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 44 N.J. 353, 353
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that "many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested"
citation_a.sentence: See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707
citation_b.parenthetical: setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent
citation_b.sentence: See Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (establishing standard of voluntariness of consent under Article I, Paragraph 7, as knowing and intelligent waiver, which includes knowledge of right to refuse consent); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) (setting forth various non-exhaustive factors supporting either voluntary or coerced nature of consent). Free choice remains an indispensable tenet of our law — for example, the choice to submit to interrogation or to consent to a search. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 355, 346 A.2d 66 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (“Consent contemplates the exercise of a choice” and free choice is “effectively safeguarded if the occupant of the premises knows that the search may be refused.”); see also King, supra, 44 N.J. at 353, 209 A.2d 110 (noting that “many decisions have sustained a finding that consent was voluntarily given even though the consent was obtained under the authority of the badge or after the accused had been arrested”).