context: App., Vol. 3, at 313. We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion that this provider's form supports, and does not contradict, the ALJ's RFC finding. Thus, we find no reversible error in the ALJ's failure to discuss this opinion.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 739 F.3d 578, 578-79
citation_a.parenthetical: "[A]n ALJ's failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ's assessment of residual functional capacity."
citation_a.sentence: See Mays, 739 F.3d at 578-79 (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity.”); see also Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.2004) (“When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant’s RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened.”). For the same reason, we conclude the ALJ’s failure to discuss the assessments of two state agency psychologists, Drs.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 379 F.3d 945, 947
citation_b.parenthetical: "When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant's RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened."
citation_b.sentence: See Mays, 739 F.3d at 578-79 (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity.”); see also Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.2004) (“When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant’s RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened.”). For the same reason, we conclude the ALJ’s failure to discuss the assessments of two state agency psychologists, Drs.