context: Furthermore, the omission of such proximate-cause language is especially suggestive of Congress's intent not to require proximate causation in SS 841(b)(1)(E)(r) because Congress included the language at issue here--viz., "death ... results from the use"--in 2008, after our sister circuits uniformly had held that identical language in SS 841(b)(1)(C) lacked a proximate-cause element.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 514 F.3d 121, 138
citation_a.parenthetical: "What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent's death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part."
citation_a.sentence: See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: "We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement."
citation_b.sentence: See Houston, 406 F.3d at 1124 (“The plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) demonstrates that proximate cause is not a required element.”); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001) (“We hold that this language is unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burrage v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir.l999) (“Plainly, if we read a particularized foreseeability requirement into [§ 841(b)(1)(C) ], we would limit the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate Congress’ intent.”); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.1994) (“Quite simply, the plain language of § 841(b)(1)(C) does not. require, nor does it indicate, that prior to applying the enhanced sentence, the.district court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable event.”); see also United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250, 1254-55 (11th Cir.2011) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)(C)’s enhanced penalty requires only proof that the death resulted from the victim’s use of a controlled substance dispensed by the defendant.”); United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 138 (1st Cir.2008) (“What is required under the death-enhancing statute is that the government prove cause-in-fact, that is, that the decedent’s death was caused in fact by his or her use of drugs that were distributed either, by the defendant himself or by others in a conspiracy of which the defendant was a part.”).