context: [P 18] Sanderson's assertion the word "delivering" in N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(E) and 4(d)(2)(F) includes certified mail would render the inclusion of the specific mailing requirements under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(A)(v) and 4(d)(2)(D)(iii) redundant and largely meaningless.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 30 F.3d 75, 77
citation_a.parenthetical: holding the Rule 4 requirement of "delivery" to the appropriate United States Attorney required personal service, not service by certified mail
citation_a.sentence: See Bickel, 530 N.W.2d at 320 (stating a presumption the legislature acts with purpose and does not perform idle acts); cf. Helmets v. Sortino, 545 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D.1996) (hold ing, prior to the 1999 amendment of N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(A)(v) . and 4(d)(2)(D)(iii) to allow third-party commercial delivery, .that Federal Express delivery is not mail delivery); Gabriel v. United States, 30 F.3d 75, 77 (7th Cir.1994) (holding the Rule 4 requirement of “delivery” to the appropriate United States Attorney required personal service, not service by certified mail).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 530 N.W.2d 320, 320
citation_b.parenthetical: stating a presumption the legislature acts with purpose and does not perform idle acts
citation_b.sentence: See Bickel, 530 N.W.2d at 320 (stating a presumption the legislature acts with purpose and does not perform idle acts); cf. Helmets v. Sortino, 545 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D.1996) (hold ing, prior to the 1999 amendment of N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(A)(v) . and 4(d)(2)(D)(iii) to allow third-party commercial delivery, .that Federal Express delivery is not mail delivery); Gabriel v. United States, 30 F.3d 75, 77 (7th Cir.1994) (holding the Rule 4 requirement of “delivery” to the appropriate United States Attorney required personal service, not service by certified mail).