context: Nor does the legislative history suggest that the General Assembly intended to create a new and separate offense. We conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for heat of passion to be an affirmative defense to the offense of first-degree assault.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 830 P.2d 1085, 1088
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that the General Assembly chose not to classify heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first-degree assault
citation_a.sentence: See People v. Pennese, 830 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo.App.1991) (stating that the General Assembly chose not to classify heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first-degree assault); see also People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Colo.1989) (rejecting argument that alibi was an affirmative defense and noting that an alibi defense was not expressly established by statute as an affirmative defense).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 768 P.2d 1235, 1239
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting argument that alibi was an affirmative defense and noting that an alibi defense was not expressly established by statute as an affirmative defense
citation_b.sentence: See People v. Pennese, 830 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo.App.1991) (stating that the General Assembly chose not to classify heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first-degree assault); see also People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Colo.1989) (rejecting argument that alibi was an affirmative defense and noting that an alibi defense was not expressly established by statute as an affirmative defense).