context: In this way Bradshaw effectively granted the Bank the power, in the case of HBP's default, to prefer other creditors over the government. While we agree with the district judge that when the Bank iroze HBP's accounts Bradshaw lacked the power to pay the taxes absent the Bank's approval, this lack of power was the direct result of the Agreement which Bradshaw had negotiated and entered into on behalf of HBP. At the time the Agreement was executed in May 1985, it is clear that Bradshaw was a responsible person under SS 6672. Bradshaw could not cease to be a responsible person simply by ceding to the Bank the right to exert financial control over HBP.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 40 F.3d 305, 308
citation_a.parenthetical: "the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under SS 6672"
citation_a.sentence: See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under § 6672”); cf. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir.1989) (“[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others”); Charlton, 2 F.3d at 240 (“[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 2 F.3d 240, 240
citation_b.parenthetical: "[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability"
citation_b.sentence: See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under § 6672”); cf. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir.1989) (“[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others”); Charlton, 2 F.3d at 240 (“[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability”).