context: P 12. Second, use of the term "willfully" indicates that the charge was brought under subsection (a)(i), that Hawkins "purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly" caused bodily injury to another. The Court has held that terms "willfully" and "knowingly" have substantially the same meaning in criminal statutes.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 977 So.2d 329, 335
citation_a.parenthetical: "An act 'willfully' done is an act 'knowingly' and 'intentionally' done."
citation_a.sentence: See also Boyd v. State, 977 So.2d 329, 335 (¶ 22) (Miss.2008) (“An act ‘willfully’ done is an act ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’ done.”); Moore v. State, 676 So.2d 244, 246 (Miss.1996) (“willfully” has the same meaning as “knowingly”). Relying on Ousley, the Court of Appeals held that the terms “wilfully and feloniously” had substantially the same meaning as “purposely or knowingly” when ruling on the sufficiency of a jury instruction for aggravated assault.
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 122 So. 732, 732
citation_b.parenthetical: indictment was sufficient even though it used the words "willfully, unlawfullyf,] and feloniously" rather than "knowingly" as used in the statute
citation_b.sentence: Ousley, 122 So. at 732 (indictment was sufficient even though it used the words “willfully, unlawfullyf,] and feloniously” rather than “knowingly” as used in the statute).