context: Addressing the temporal proximity, the plaintiff sent the November 2006 letter two months before Ridgely proposed the plaintiffs termination. Def.'s Reply at 21. This district has varied as to whether two months is sufficient to establish a causal connection.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149
citation_a.parenthetical: stating a two month span "is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination"
citation_a.sentence: See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that a two month period “might be enough ... to prove the causation prong”); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (stating a two month span “is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes that the plaintiff has established a causal connection.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity
citation_b.sentence: See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that a two month period “might be enough ... to prove the causation prong”); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (stating a two month span “is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes that the plaintiff has established a causal connection.