context: Even when "physical fitness" is a selection criterion that is related to an essential function of the job, however, it "may not be used to exclude an individual with a disability if that individual could satisfy the criterion] with the provision of a reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. SS 1630.10 (emphasis added). To the extent "physical fitness" is a separate criterion, therefore, it has the capacity to screen out disabled employees and therefore the possibility of violating the ADA's requirement of an individualized assessment of an employee's capabilities.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 122 F.3d 461, 466
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that the determination of whether one qualifies as a qualified individual with a disability "necessarily involves an individualized assessment of the individual and the relevant position"
citation_a.sentence: See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7 (“It is unlawful for a covered entity to use standards, criteria, or methods of administration, which are not job-related and consistent with business necessity, and: (a) That have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability”); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that the determination of whether one qualifies as a qualified individual with a disability “necessarily involves an individualized assessment of the individual and the relevant position”); see also Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F.Supp. 1137, 1154 & n. 10 (D.Minn.1995) (holding that a “must be cured” or “100% healed” policy is a per se violation of the ADA because the policy does not allow a case-by-case assessment of an individual’s ability to perform essential functions of the individual’s job, with or without accommodation); Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F.Supp. 379 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (same).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that a "must be cured" or "100% healed" policy is a per se violation of the ADA because the policy does not allow a case-by-case assessment of an individual's ability to perform essential functions of the individual's job, with or without accommodation
citation_b.sentence: See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7 (“It is unlawful for a covered entity to use standards, criteria, or methods of administration, which are not job-related and consistent with business necessity, and: (a) That have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability”); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that the determination of whether one qualifies as a qualified individual with a disability “necessarily involves an individualized assessment of the individual and the relevant position”); see also Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F.Supp. 1137, 1154 & n. 10 (D.Minn.1995) (holding that a “must be cured” or “100% healed” policy is a per se violation of the ADA because the policy does not allow a case-by-case assessment of an individual’s ability to perform essential functions of the individual’s job, with or without accommodation); Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F.Supp. 379 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (same).