context: Nevertheless, our appellate courts have not applied the Zerbst standard to the waiver of a defendant's right to raise a double jeopardy defense. Defendants have, therefore, been deemed to have waived the right to assert the defense . simply by failing to do so at various stages in the trial and appellate process.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 390 Mass. 472, 479
citation_a.parenthetical: waiver for failing to assert defense at de novo jury trial following bench trial
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dunnington, 390 Mass. 472, 479 (1983) (waiver for failing to assert defense at de novo jury trial following bench trial); Commonwealth v. Deeran, 397 Mass, at 142 (waiver for failing to assert defense in first motion for a new trial).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 27 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 87-88
citation_b.parenthetical: finding no waiver, but distinguishing the case on the ground that it involved successive prosecutions in different courts, thereby implicating issues similar to jurisdiction, which may be challenged at any time
citation_b.sentence: See also Poretta v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 763, 769 (1991) (permissibility of reprosecution following the defendant’s “successful motion for mistrial does not depend on whether the motion satisfied the ‘knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’ standard of Johnson v. Zerbst”). Cf. Commonwealth v. Norman, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 87-88 (finding no waiver, but distinguishing the case on the ground that it involved successive prosecutions in different courts, thereby implicating issues similar to jurisdiction, which may be challenged at any time).