context: Indeed, the importance of disclosure to the tribunal of potential mental disabilities is so central to the integrity of judicial determinations that it is well settled that even a private plaintiff has statutory and common-law obligations to come forward with information that the party against whom he seeks relief may be mentally disabled and therefore unable to adequately represent himself.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem
citation_a.sentence: See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: "It is the [landlord's] obligation to bring the [tenant's] possible mental incompetency to the Court's attention .... "
citation_b.sentence: See Parras v. Ricciardi, 185 Misc.2d 209, 710 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-97 (2000) (“It is the [landlord’s] obligation to bring the [tenant’s] possible mental incompeténcy to the Court’s attention .... ”); see also Oneida Nat’l Bank v. Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 326 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-62 (4th Dep’t 1971) (interpreting CPLR 1201 and CPLR 1203, guardian ad litem statutes, and holding that default could not be granted without appointment of guardian ad litem); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 (providing for entry of judgment by default where defendant “is not an infant or incompetent person”).