context: Appellate courts have been quite careful to distinguish between the types of state action which are affirmative or official and those which are passive or dormant. The second district held in First Federal that where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue to collect taxes was the sending of a "formal notice assessment and demand" for delinquent taxes specifying the amount and date due, that such "notice" was a mere naked demand rather than "official action" and the "threat" was contingent and anticipatory rather than real and imminent. Accordingly, the First Federal court determined that in the absence of affirmative or official action to enforce the demand, venue would lie only in the county where the state agency maintains its. official headquarters.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that "tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued," constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department's official headquarters
citation_a.sentence: Cf. Swinscoe v. State, 320 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1976) (where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue’s actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue); Department of Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 336 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1976) (Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that “tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,” constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department’s official headquarters).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department
citation_b.sentence: See also Straughn v. G.J.M., Inc., 344 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department); Department of Revenue v. Crisp, 337 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1977) (notice of assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes and demand for payment, unaccompanied by further action, did not imminently threaten taxpayers’ due process and equal protection rights and was not an imminent “attempt” to seize and sell property of taxpayer; thus, proper venue of taxpayer’s action for declaratory judgment against Department of Revenue was Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department).