context: As for whether the breach must be material to the transaction, we need not address this argument because the case at hand satisfied any such requirement. The very reason bribes were paid to the adjusters was to obtain favorable results in settlements. The insurance companies, acting as reasonable entities, were bound to have considered the fact that their employees had a financial interest in settling cases to be important information with respect to those settlements.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 786 F.2d 77, 80-81
citation_a.parenthetical: holding, in a case involving falsified insurance claims, that "the government needed to prove only that [defendant] employed a deceptive scheme intending to prevent the insurer from determining for itself a fair value of recovery"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 280 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming jury instruction charging that a representation was material if “a reasonable person might have considered [it] important in making a decision”); see also United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.1986) (holding, in a case involving falsified insurance claims, that “the government needed to prove only that [defendant] employed a deceptive scheme intending to prevent the insurer from determining for itself a fair value of recovery”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 86 F.3d 277, 280
citation_b.parenthetical: affirming jury instruction charging that a representation was material if "a reasonable person might have considered [it] important in making a decision"
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 280 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming jury instruction charging that a representation was material if “a reasonable person might have considered [it] important in making a decision”); see also United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.1986) (holding, in a case involving falsified insurance claims, that “the government needed to prove only that [defendant] employed a deceptive scheme intending to prevent the insurer from determining for itself a fair value of recovery”).