context: The Naranjos assert that reasonable reliance may constitute good cause, but have failed to demonstrate that their reliance was reasonable. In our view, it is not reasonable to rely on an opposing attorney's representation or statement of the law when both attorneys have readily accessible means to read, interpret, and apply it.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56
citation_a.parenthetical: reliance upon the clerk's advice did not constitute good cause because clerk's office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance
citation_a.sentence: Cf. Veal v. United States, 84 Fed.Appx. 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.2004) (reliance upon the clerk’s advice did not constitute good cause because clerk’s office has no duty to provide step-by-step guidance).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 997 P.2d 615, 618-19
citation_b.parenthetical: denying claim of equitable estoppel because party had readily accessible means to discover the truth, and finding no good cause on other grounds
citation_b.sentence: See Campbell, 144 Idaho at 257-58, 159 P.3d at 894-95 (no good cause when service was late because one attorney accepted in good faith that the other attorney would remind him to serve process); Regjovich v. First Western Investments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 157-58, 997 P.2d 615, 618-19 (2000) (denying claim of equitable estoppel because party had readily accessible means to discover the truth, and finding no good cause on other grounds).