context: Moreover, Adkins has offered circumstantial evidence to support her claim that she was fired because of her disability -- that PRMC terminated her, knowing she was at the time restricted to light duty, and simultaneously ignored its responsibility to reasonably accommodate her. Considering the record in the light most favorable to Adkins, we conclude that a factfinder may infer that she was terminated because of her disability.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 456 U.S. 288, 288
citation_a.parenthetical: "Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace."
citation_a.sentence: See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: "Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case."
citation_b.sentence: See also Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); cf. Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 687, 882 A.2d 288 (2005) (“Whether there has been a waiver of a contractual right involves a matter of intent that ordinarily turns on the factual circumstances of each case.”).