context: Other state courts have also applied Luce to impeachment by a statement obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 83 P.3d 123, 125-26
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that when a defendant elects not to testify, but has made an adequate offer of proof as to the testimony he would have given, he may challenge on appeal the trial court's decision to allow impeachment with evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
citation_a.sentence: But see, e.g., State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 199-200, 204 (Vt. 1987) (ruling that the defendant could challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision allowing the State to impeach him with evidence that had been obtained in violation of his Miranda, rights, even though he neither testified nor made an offer of proof at trial); cf. State v. Cherry, 83 P.3d 123, 125-26 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that when a defendant elects not to testify, but has made an adequate offer of proof as to the testimony he would have given, he may challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision to allow impeachment with evidence allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 347 P.3d 109, 109-10
citation_b.parenthetical: declining to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, "it is impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Wagner v. State, 347 P.3d 109, 109-10 (Alaska 2015) (declining to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda because, without his testimony, “it is impossible to tell whether the court’s ruling affected [his] decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury”); Jordan v. State, 591 A.2d 875, 876-78 (Md. 1991) (concluding that the appellate court could not review the defendant’s constitutional argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use his allegedly involuntary confession to impeach him because he elected not to testily); cf. People v. Boyd, 682 N.W.2d 459, 459-60 (Mich. 2004) (ruling that the defendant had to testify at trial to preserve for review his challenge to the trial court’s in limine ruling that allowed into evidence his post-arrest silence).