context: As to the events of September 9, IBP is also entitled to summary judgment. IBP's unavailing request for a second sample simply cannot be viewed as an intrusion -- let alone a substantial intrusion -- on plaintiff's privacy.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 765 S.W.2d 497, 502
citation_a.parenthetical: where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F.Supp. at 1451 (plaintiff could not prove that termination for refusal to submit to urinalysis was invasion of privacy); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366-67 (Okla. 1994) (employer did not invade employee’s privacy by demanding random drug test); Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (1989) (where employee refused consent to drug test, employer not liable for invasion of privacy); Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F.Supp. 331, 333 (D.Kan.1982) (employee who refused to let employer search vehicle could not sue for damages “as a result of an act that did not occur.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 963 F.2d 626, 626
citation_b.parenthetical: firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee's privacy
citation_b.sentence: Cf. Borse 963 F.2d at 626 (firing employee who refused to consent to urinalysis and personal property searches would violate public policy exception to Pennsylvania employment-at-will doctrine if testing program would be tortious invasion of employee’s privacy).