context: Like the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, however, I find the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Calderon unpersuasive. As these courts of appeals explained, Hohn is undoubtedly distinguishable on the ground that it was limited to the question of whether an application for a certificate of appealability constitutes an appealable ease, a question entirely different from when a case is deemed "filed" under AED-PA.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 175 F.3d 506, 506
citation_a.parenthetical: the Ninth Circuit's rebanee on Hohn in deciding whether a motion for appointment of counsel is a "case pending" under AEDPA is "inapt"
citation_a.sentence: See also Gosier, 175 F.3d at 506 (the Ninth Circuit’s rebanee on Hohn in deciding whether a motion for appointment of counsel is a “case pending” under AEDPA is “inapt”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 167 F.3d 1040, 1040
citation_b.parenthetical: "Hohn and Ex Parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA ... or ... a motion for the appointment of counsel ... would constitute an appealable case"
citation_b.sentence: See Moore, 195 F.3d at 1163 (Hohn is “limited to the determination that the rejection by the district court of the preliminary motion constitutes an appealable case”); Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d at 1040 (“Hohn and Ex Parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA ... or ... a motion for the appointment of counsel ... would constitute an appealable case”).