context: Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285
citation_a.parenthetical: "[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer's] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination"
citation_a.sentence: See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection).
citation_b.signal: but see
citation_b.identifier: 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection
citation_b.sentence: See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection).