context: Courts in other jurisdictions have also described the denial of the right to a jury trial as structural error.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 310 F.3d 600, 604
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that the defendant's attorney's waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 313 F.3d 363, 372
citation_b.parenthetical: suggesting that a jury waiver issue was "arguably not subject to harmless error analysis"
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 170 P.3d 727, 731 (Ct.App.2007) (holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right, structural error occurred); People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726, 736 (2001) (finding that the trial court’s improper inducement of a jury-trial waiver amounted to a structural defect); cf., e.g., Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.2002) (suggesting that a jury waiver issue was “arguably not subject to harmless error analysis”); United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district court’s failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was harmless.”); Edwards v. Sasser, 462 F.Supp. 374, 378 (E.D.Va.1979) (“Denial of the right to trial by jury cannot be deemed harmless error.”); Balbosa v. State, 275 Ga. 574, 571 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2002) (“We are of the opinion that a harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a jury trial waiver.”); State v. Simpson, 29 Kan.App.2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2001) (declining to say that the failure to advise a defendant of the right to a twelve-person jury was harmless); State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 393, 404 n. 9 (Ct.App.2002) (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis where there was no valid jury waiver).