context: Thus, under plain language of Rule 32(c)(1), Nap-pi was entitled to an opportunity to comment on the information in the report during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, given that the Rule is intended to promote "focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues," it follows that the Rule requires that counsel for the defendant and the government be provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the information at issue. Thus, we hold that where, as here, counsel are faced with having to review and address the contents of an additional document on which the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a meaningful opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to counsel for the defendant and the government within a sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at sentencing and, depending on the document, prepare a response or contest it.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 171 F.3d 389, 392
citation_a.parenthetical: "Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing."
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 941 F.2d 8, 18
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant's testimony at the sentencing hearing
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir.1999) (“Rule 32 requires that except in limited circumstances, ... the defendant must have the opportunity to review information that will be used for sentencing.”); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.1992) (vacating sentence where victim’s letter impacted restitution order and the court and Probation Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that “[w]e agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters without disclosure to him was violative of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32”); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court “should endeavor to insulate themselves” from extraneous documents it receives pri- or to sentencing unless it “makes them known to the parties”); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that sentencing courts considering extraneous documents should either “make clear that the document is not being used for its factual content, or should disclose to the defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine and challenge it”); see also United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that district court should have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing hearing).