context: Second, as previously mentioned in this opinion, Matheny's prior convictions support the reasonableness of the district court's sentence. Because Matheny cannot demonstrate prejudice from the district court's consideration of one prior arrest, his substantial rights have not been affected.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 507 U.S. 735, 735
citation_a.parenthetical: stating that "[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial rights' prong of Rule 52(b
citation_a.sentence: See Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 629 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.”); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (stating that “[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b)”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 433 F.3d 629, 629
citation_b.parenthetical: "[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details."
citation_b.sentence: See Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d at 629 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had adequate grounds to depart upward despite its error in considering the prior arrests for which the PSR did not set forth the factual details.”); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (stating that “[njormally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b)”).