context: Inherent in the concept of constructive knowledge is what an objective examination of the facts would reveal to a reasonable person. See Black's Law Dietionary 876 (7th ed. 1999) ("Knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law"). In other words, rather than requiring a jury to infer actual knowledge on the part of the defendant from circumstantial evidence, we stated in Sidway that a defendant could be "imputed" with knowledge that a reasonable person would have gathered from the circumstances of the accident or impact, i.e., what a reasonable evaluation of the circumstances would reveal.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 574 A.2d 1264, 1267
citation_a.parenthetical: we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the "true spirit and doctrine of the law" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused
citation_a.sentence: See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 81, 574 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1990) (we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the “true spirit and doctrine of the law” to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 139 Vt. 485, 485-86
citation_b.parenthetical: noting "[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage"
citation_b.sentence: Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage”). Thus, the trial court’s instruction on constructive knowledge, allowing the jury to impute to defendant knowledge that a reasonable investigation of the circumstances of the accident would reveal, was consistent with the spirit and doctrine of our decision in Sidway, and did not constitute reversible error.