context: Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court's interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 779 N.W.2d 860, 860
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that "the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff' in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide
citation_a.sentence: See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); cf. Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (noting that “the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff’ in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide). If the legislature had intended to advance those policies by excluding pre-verdict UIM payments from the definition of collateral sources, it could have expressly so provided.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 413 N.W.2d 283, 286
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court."
citation_b.sentence: See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); cf. Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (noting that “the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff’ in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide). If the legislature had intended to advance those policies by excluding pre-verdict UIM payments from the definition of collateral sources, it could have expressly so provided.