context: Although it is true that the analytical processes for determining qualifying crimes under the ACCA and SS 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the INA are similar, the mere fact that a statute is not categorically a violent felony does not preclude it from categorically qualifying as a CIMT. By definition, the category of crimes that qualify as a CIMT is considerably broader than that covered by the ACCA. Indeed, the CIMT category of crimes contains myriad offenses that involve no physical-injury element and therefore could not qualify under the ACCA.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 3 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that "maliciously and wantonly injuring] and destroying] certain personal property of another" by, in that case, killing another man's hogs, was a CIMT
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Sema, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 n. 10 (BIA 1992) (noting that knowledge coupled with intent to harm property can constitute a CIMT); cf. M — , 3 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (BIA 1948) (concluding that “maliciously and wantonly injuring] and destroying] certain personal property of another” by, in that case, killing another man’s hogs, was a CIMT). Accordingly, the possibility that the Washington statute could punish wanton or willful conduct that creates a risk only to property is not alone enough to bring a non-CIMT offense within the statutory terms.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 570 F.3d 690, 690, 692
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that fraudulent use of a Social Security number is a CIMT
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Serra-to-Soto, 570 F.3d at 690, 692 (concluding that fraudulent use of a Social Security number is a CIMT). Moreover, unlike the ACCA, that an offense involves risk only to property is not dispositive to the categorical analysis as applied under the INA.