context: It plainly did not do so here. Second, the Maine Constitution commands a presumption in favor of judicial access. See M.R.S.A.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 2008 WL 4850198, at *3
citation_a.parenthetical: invoking similar "presumption in favor of judicial jurisdiction" to reject title insurer's exhaustion argument
citation_a.sentence: Const. Art. 1, § 19; State v. Bilynsky, 942 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Me.2008); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me.1978) (“In view of that provision, legislation should not be deemed to preclude an injured person from having a remedy of his own for a recognized wrong in the absence of a clear manifestation of intent to that effect.”); see also Johnson, 2008 WL 4850198, at *3 (invoking similar “presumption in favor of judicial jurisdiction” to reject title insurer’s exhaustion argument).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 387 A.2d 220, 223
citation_b.parenthetical: "In view of that provision, legislation should not be deemed to preclude an injured person from having a remedy of his own for a recognized wrong in the absence of a clear manifestation of intent to that effect."
citation_b.sentence: Const. Art. 1, § 19; State v. Bilynsky, 942 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Me.2008); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me.1978) (“In view of that provision, legislation should not be deemed to preclude an injured person from having a remedy of his own for a recognized wrong in the absence of a clear manifestation of intent to that effect.”); see also Johnson, 2008 WL 4850198, at *3 (invoking similar “presumption in favor of judicial jurisdiction” to reject title insurer’s exhaustion argument).