context: With regard to nonaction, "the general rule [is] that when a civil statute is silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs factual determinations required by that statute." This rule applies equally to statutes that provide for multiple damages.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for statutory punitive damages under General Statutes SSSS 47a-43 and 47a-46 and stating that "[a]bsent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, we continue to presume that when a statutory private right of action includes multiple damages, the plaintiffs burden of proof is the same as that in other tort cases"
citation_a.sentence: See Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., supra, 221 Conn. 683 (applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for statutory punitive damages under General Statutes §§ 47a-43 and 47a-46 and stating that “[a]bsent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, we continue to presume that when a statutory private right of action includes multiple damages, the plaintiffs burden of proof is the same as that in other tort cases”); see also Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133, 137-38, 628 A.2d 25 (1993) (applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for punitive damages under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g). Accordingly, when the legislature has intended to impose a different standard of proof in a civil statute, it has seen fit to include explicit language in the statute to effectuate that intent.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 32 Conn. App. 133, 137-38
citation_b.parenthetical: applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for punitive damages under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act pursuant to General Statutes SS 42-110g
citation_b.sentence: See Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., supra, 221 Conn. 683 (applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for statutory punitive damages under General Statutes §§ 47a-43 and 47a-46 and stating that “[a]bsent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, we continue to presume that when a statutory private right of action includes multiple damages, the plaintiffs burden of proof is the same as that in other tort cases”); see also Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 32 Conn. App. 133, 137-38, 628 A.2d 25 (1993) (applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for punitive damages under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g). Accordingly, when the legislature has intended to impose a different standard of proof in a civil statute, it has seen fit to include explicit language in the statute to effectuate that intent.