context: Nevertheless, it does not appear that Shelton, as a matter of law, sanctions dismissal at the pleading stage for failure to allege a present ability to tender. Indeed, the procedural posture (decided at the summary judgment stage) and language appearing in that case suggest otherwise. In particular, the Shelton court, in upholding the district court's granting of summary judgment, relied on the particular circumstances and evidence presented and noted the trial judge had specifically determined that the plaintiffs were unable to tender the loan proceeds.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 329 F.3d 1173, 1173
citation_a.parenthetical: noting the lack of evidence of the borrower's capacity to pay back her loan and holding district court had discretion to demand assurance of the borrower's ability to repay loan proceeds to avoid an unnecessary trial on the merits
citation_a.sentence: See also Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1173 (noting the lack of evidence of the borrower’s capacity to pay back her loan and holding district court had discretion to demand assurance of the borrower’s ability to repay loan proceeds to avoid an unnecessary trial on the merits).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 486 F.3d 821, 821
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining "[although the better practice may have been for the trial judge to set terms for rescission by allowing the [plaintiffs] a time certain to tender the net loan proceeds, it was unnecessary under the facts of this ease"
citation_b.sentence: See Shelton, 486 F.3d at 821 (explaining “[although the better practice may have been for the trial judge to set terms for rescission by allowing the [plaintiffs] a time certain to tender the net loan proceeds, it was unnecessary under the facts of this ease”).