context: The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that orders denying absolute immunity are renewable on interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 183 F.3d 962, 965
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity raised in a 12(b
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of President’s claim to absolute immunity was proper); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979) (reviewing claim of immunity under Speech or Debate Clause); see also Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity raised in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of President's claim to absolute immunity was proper
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction over denial of President’s claim to absolute immunity was proper); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979) (reviewing claim of immunity under Speech or Debate Clause); see also Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity raised in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine”).