context: On the other hand, mere mention of an intent to obtain a warrant or command authorization does not vitiate consent. The question in each case is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the consent is truly voluntary.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 31 MJ 130, 133
citation_a.parenthetical: mention of intent to seek command authorization "must be done in an appropriate manner so as to make the resulting consent truly voluntary"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. McClain, 31 MJ 130, 133 (CMA 1990) (mention of intent to seek command authorization “must be done in an appropriate manner so as to make the resulting consent truly voluntary”); see also United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992) (“When the expressed intention to obtain a warrant is genuine ... and not merely a pretext to induce submission, it does not vitiate consent.”); United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1974) (consent voluntarily given even though FBI agent said warrant would be sought and probably would be given).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 506 F.2d 490, 494
citation_b.parenthetical: consent voluntarily given even though FBI agent said warrant would be sought and probably would be given
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. McClain, 31 MJ 130, 133 (CMA 1990) (mention of intent to seek command authorization “must be done in an appropriate manner so as to make the resulting consent truly voluntary”); see also United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992) (“When the expressed intention to obtain a warrant is genuine ... and not merely a pretext to induce submission, it does not vitiate consent.”); United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1974) (consent voluntarily given even though FBI agent said warrant would be sought and probably would be given).