context: Because of such a paramount objective, the First Amendment's protection of religious exercise does not typically extend to violent acts.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 47 F.3d 642, 656
citation_a.parenthetical: "we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm"
citation_a.sentence: See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act."
citation_b.sentence: See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice).