context: And finally, O'Melveny & Myers said that the Court would not "adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law." To be sure, FEHBA has a preemption provision; but even if the provision does not cover reimbursement claims (a proposition we reject in the next section of this opinion), that limitation cannot override the strong federal interests in displacing state law in our case.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: "[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O'Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme."
citation_a.sentence: See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: "The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' -- i.e., supports a reasonable inference -- that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption."
citation_b.sentence: See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (“the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a.conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e do not think that the Supreme Court in O’Melveny intended to foreclose the possibility of displacing, with a federal common law rule, a state rule of decision that would conflict with specific policies of a comprehensive federal scheme.”); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ — i.e., supports a reasonable inference — that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express' clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”).