context: Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of "Merrill Lynch." Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to "Merrill Lynch" as a controlling entity.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 101 F.3d 263, 270
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that a parent company would, at the very least, have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiary's fraud in order to have the requisite scienter
citation_a.sentence: See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that a parent company would, at the very least, have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiary’s fraud in order to have the requisite scienter).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 969 F.Supp. 242, 242
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary's fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent."
citation_b.sentence: See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”).