context: . When pendant jurisdiction extends to joined state-law claims, federal courts still retain discretion not to exercise it. For example, when state claims substantially predominate the federal court may decline to hear those claims.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.parenthetical: "if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals"
citation_a.sentence: Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 ("if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 ("if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well."); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 383 U.S. 726, 726
citation_b.parenthetical: "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well."
citation_b.sentence: Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130 ("if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate ... the state claims may be ... left for resolution to state tribunals”); see § 1367(c)(2). Moreover, if the claim on which federal jurisdiction was founded has been dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the state law claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 ("if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well."); see § 1367(c)(3). Thus, if pendant jurisdiction here had extended to plaintiff’s remaining state claims, and if no other independent basis for jurisdiction was found, then remand of the claims would have been appropriate, particularly in light of the efficiencies to be gained by returning this action to state court where the other individual actions against Stepan have been consolidated for the purposes of discovery. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).