context: The government's case against Hands contained weaknesses similar to those identified in Marshall: the direct evidence consisted entirely of the testimony of wit nesses of highly questionable credibility, and the circumstantial evidence was far less convincing than the Marshall circumstantial evidence. Hands's case turned entirely upon which biased witnesses the jury chose to believe. Evidence that tended to erode Hands's credibility and to prejudice the jury against him, therefore, could have had a substantial -- perhaps overpowering -- impact on the jury's deliberations.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 23 F.3d 570, 575
citation_a.parenthetical: finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that "significantly interfered with the jury's ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir.1994) (reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where “[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury’s credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the cumulative effect of several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that undercut defendant’s credibility was not harmless error; noting that defendant, to go free, needed to persuade jury that he was credible and that the prosecution witnesses, who testified in exchange for leniency, were not); United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700-01 (D.C.Cir.1999) (no harmless error where “credibility was key”); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994) (finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that “significantly interfered with the jury’s ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 26 F.3d 1098, 1103
citation_b.parenthetical: reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where "[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury's credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified"
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir.1994) (reversing conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct where “[t]he prejudicial effect of [the] misconduct cannot be disputed, as this case turned largely on the jury’s credibility determinations of the several witnesses who testified”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the cumulative effect of several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that undercut defendant’s credibility was not harmless error; noting that defendant, to go free, needed to persuade jury that he was credible and that the prosecution witnesses, who testified in exchange for leniency, were not); United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700-01 (D.C.Cir.1999) (no harmless error where “credibility was key”); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994) (finding error not harmless and vacating conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct that “significantly interfered with the jury’s ability to make an essential and liminal credibility determination”).