context: . The circumstances surrounding any allegedly voluntary confession or consent to search include whether the purported confessor or consenter is subjected to custodial interrogation.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: "[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 'inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion." (emphasis supplied
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) ("[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station " (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) ("[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied)).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 423 U.S. 411, 424
citation_b.parenthetical: identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the "confines of [a] police station " (emphasis supplied
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) ("[A]s one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether ... the statements of the prisoner were voluntary.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (identifying custodial status as one relevant, non-disposi-tive voluntariness factor, and contrasting consents given while in custody in a public place from those given within the “confines of [a] police station " (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370-71, 375 (8th Cir.1989) (identifying custodial atmosphere and police interrogation as relevant voluntariness factors); cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) ("[T]he Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive ' and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.” (emphasis supplied)).