context: See, e.g., RAP 2.2(b)(6) (providing that the State or a local government may appeal only "[a] sentence in a criminal case which is outside the standard range for the offense or which the state or local government believes involves a miscalculation of the standard range"); RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range for the offense shall not be appealed."). This precept arises from the notion that, so long as the sentence falls within the proper presumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no abuse of discretion, as a matter of law as to the sentence's length. However, this prohibition does not bar a party's right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 112 Wn.2d 419, 423
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution
citation_a.sentence: App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.parenthetical: determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the "same criminal conduct" for purposes of sentencing
citation_b.sentence: App. 869, 876, 20 P.3d 476 (2001) (determination of whether two or more crimes should be considered the “same criminal conduct” for purposes of sentencing); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989) (noting that an absolute prohibition on the right to appeal would violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution).