context: The transfers could still have been made for "value," however, if the debtors received "property" in exchange for the transfers. The consideration for the transfers was the use of the defendants' money over a period of time. The use of money may be "property" in some contexts.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: for federal gift tax purposes the use of money "is itself a legally protectible property interest"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336, 104 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 79 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (for federal gift tax purposes the use of money “is itself a legally protectible property interest”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest
citation_b.sentence: See also Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (1963) (implying that transfers were not fraudulent to the extent they did not exceed the legal rate of interest). We conclude, however, that the use of investors’ money to perpetuate a Ponzi scheme is not the type of “property” and hence “value” Congress had in mind when it passed section 548(a)(2).