context: But as in Gomez, this argument relies on a propensity inference: that Stacy's history of involvement with methamphetamine manufacturing makes it more likely that he intended to use the pseudoephedrine pills he collected in 2010 through 2012 to make methamphetamine. For that reason, we are persuaded that the court erred by admitting the evidence of Stacy's prior involvement with methamphetamine.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 765 F.3d 720, 726-27
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that admission of prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute was error
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 726-27 (7th Cir.2014) (concluding that admission of prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute was error); United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 980 (7th Cir.2013) (same); Miller, 673 F.3d at 699-700 (same); see also Gomez, 763 F.3d at 862-63 (rejecting government’s argument as relying on the theory of “[o]nce a drug dealer, always a drug dealer”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 763 F.3d 862, 862-63
citation_b.parenthetical: rejecting government's argument as relying on the theory of "[o]nce a drug dealer, always a drug dealer"
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 726-27 (7th Cir.2014) (concluding that admission of prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute was error); United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 980 (7th Cir.2013) (same); Miller, 673 F.3d at 699-700 (same); see also Gomez, 763 F.3d at 862-63 (rejecting government’s argument as relying on the theory of “[o]nce a drug dealer, always a drug dealer”).