context: . The parties agree that, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Boone is a public official for purposes of this defamation action.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice
citation_a.sentence: See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice
citation_b.sentence: See McClain v. Arnold, 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980) (joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a police officer is a public official for defamation actions, thereby requiring the plaintiff's proof of actual malice); see also Botchie v. O’Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 432 S.E.2d 458 (1993) (applying actual malice standard to deputy sheriff's defamation action); Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 451 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1994) (public officials such as police officers must establish actual malice).