context: Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 875 So.2d 579, 583
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland
citation_a.sentence: See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that the state court's determination that the petitioner "could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case"
citation_b.sentence: See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland).