context: Christopher therefore had an opportunity to address the deficiencies in his evidence, whether by filing an amended response seven days before the hearing or requesting leave to file an amended response less than seven days before the hearing. As in Carpenter, the rules provided Christopher with a remedy before the summary judgment hearing.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 157 S.W.3d 442, 442
citation_a.parenthetical: observing that "nothing in this record suggests that before summary judgment was granted," pro se litigant realized her mistake
citation_a.sentence: Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (stating that Crad-dock’s purpose — “to alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available” — does not apply “when our rules provide the defaulting party a remedy.”); see also Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442 (observing that “nothing in this record suggests that before summary judgment was granted,” pro se litigant realized her mistake).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 98 S.W.3d 686, 686
citation_b.parenthetical: stating that Crad-dock's purpose -- "to alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available" -- does not apply "when our rules provide the defaulting party a remedy."
citation_b.sentence: Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (stating that Crad-dock’s purpose — “to alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available” — does not apply “when our rules provide the defaulting party a remedy.”); see also Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442 (observing that “nothing in this record suggests that before summary judgment was granted,” pro se litigant realized her mistake).