context: As applicable here, that rule indicates that the individual defendants, as sureties, may raise defenses available to B&A in an action seeking to hold the individual defendants liable as sureties. See also Richard A. Lord, 23 Williston on Contracts 61:7 (4th ed 2002) ("The general rule is that the surety is not liable to the creditor unless the principal obligor is liable; thus, the surety may plead the defenses that are available to the principal."). That is so even though a default order was entered against B&A.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 176 Or App 635, 644
citation_a.parenthetical: noting circumstances where a judgment entered in favor of a nondefaulting codefendant would necessarily apply to a defaulting codefendant with the same force and effect
citation_a.sentence: See also Becker v. Pieper, 176 Or App 635, 644, 32 P3d 912 (2001) (noting circumstances where a judgment entered in favor of a nondefaulting codefendant would necessarily apply to a defaulting codefendant with the same force and effect); ORCP 67 E(2) (stating in part, that default against less than all parties in an action against parties jointly indebted does not preclude a judgment in the same action in favor of the remaining parties).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that where default is entered against the principal, the facts alleged to be the basis of the obligation have never been subject to real inquiry and judgment is only prima facie evidence against the surety of the principal's obligation
citation_b.sentence: Kliks v. McCaffrey, 221 Or 81, 350 P2d 417 (1960) (concluding that where default is entered against the principal, the facts alleged to be the basis of the obligation have never been subject to real inquiry and judgment is only prima facie evidence against the surety of the principal’s obligation).