context: Given that judges are not only generally held to higher standards than lawyers, but, when acting in their official capacities, are performing official government functions, it is likely, when a judge is charged with the obstruction of the administration of justice due to the contents of a judicial opinion, that an even lower standard than a "substantial likelihood" of obstruction may apply.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 131 S. Ct. 2351, 2351
citation_a.parenthetical: "a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 542 P.2d 684, 684
citation_b.parenthetical: "For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”).