context: (Sipes Dep. at 68-69.) That agreement, as explained above, makes clear that Mr. Hargarten, by himself, lacked authority to provide equity in Defendant to Mr. Sipes. (Form.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511
citation_a.parenthetical: reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent's actual authority
citation_a.sentence: Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 577 P.2d 765, 771
citation_b.parenthetical: reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority
citation_b.sentence: Ag. at § 3.2.) As far as Mr. Sipes is concerned, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of Defendant’s words and deeds could not have made it apparent to him that Mr. Hargarten had authority to give him equity in Defendant. See Trustees of American Federation of Musicians and Employees’ Pension Fund v. Steven Scott Enter.s, Inc., 40 F.Supp.2d 503, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (reasoning that reliance on apparent authority ceased to be reasonable once a plaintiff knew of the agent’s actual authority); cf. Van Pelt v. State Bd., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (reasoning in the context of promissory estoppel that there can be no reasonable reliance where the putative promisee knew that the alleged promisor lacked authority); American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 679 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (W.D.Mo.1987) (reasoning that any apparent authority ended when the plaintiff received and read a letter that made clear that the agent lacked authority).