context: Granting qualified immunity in such instances would thwart SS 1983's purpose of preventing the abuse of official authority. Indeed, one of the primary concerns of those common law courts that refused to recognize cooperation with law enforcement as a defense in false arrest actions was that private defendants should not be shielded from liability for their assistance in patent abuses of police authority.
citation_a.signal: but see
citation_a.identifier: 3 So. 441, 441
citation_a.parenthetical: 'When [the officer's] general power is known, his call will justify the citizen in yielding obedience, unless [the private citizen] has notice of the want of authority in the particular case in which assistance is required." (emphasis added
citation_a.sentence: But see Watson, 3 So. at 441 (‘When [the officer’s] general power is known, his call will justify the citizen in yielding obedience, unless [the private citizen] has notice of the want of authority in the particular case in which assistance is required.” (emphasis added)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 139 cmt. d (1965) (stating that “the [private] actor is privileged to rely upon the officer’s request and assist him unless the facts are such that the actor knows or is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer’s suspicion is unreasonable”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 1815 WL 992, at *5
citation_b.parenthetical: "Suppose the officer in this case had proceeded, without necessity or provocation, to beat and wound the plaintiff or his family, it is very clear that these two defendants would not be justified in aiding him in such wanton abuse."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Oystead v. Shed, 12 Mass.-, 1815 WL 992, at *5 (“Suppose the officer in this case had proceeded, without necessity or provocation, to beat and wound the plaintiff or his family, it is very clear that these two defendants would not be justified in aiding him in such wanton abuse.”).