context: (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nevertheless, companies may be held liable for discrimination even where the decision-making official did not intentionally discriminate if the information used by that official in deciding to terminate a worker's employment was filtered through another employee who had a discriminatory motive.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 944 F.2d 409, 413-14
citation_a.parenthetical: discriminatory intent of employer's agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker
citation_a.sentence: See Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1991) (discriminatory intent of employer’s agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker); see also Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 1993) (“when a committee has ‘acted as the conduit of [a supervisor’s] prejudice — his cat’s paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability’ ”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 990 F.2d 1051, 1057
citation_b.parenthetical: "when a committee has 'acted as the conduit of [a supervisor's] prejudice -- his cat's paw -- the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability' "
citation_b.sentence: See Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1991) (discriminatory intent of employer’s agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker); see also Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 1993) (“when a committee has ‘acted as the conduit of [a supervisor’s] prejudice — his cat’s paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability’ ”).