context: The degree of authority granted to Puerto Rico to regulate its local affairs is very different from Congress's exclusive powers over the District of Columbia, the other territory excluded by SS 101(52) from authorizing its municipalities under SS 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 977 F.2d 8, 8
citation_a.parenthetical: "If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor."
citation_a.sentence: See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: "The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs."
citation_b.sentence: See Trailer Marine Transp. Corp., 977 F.2d at 8 (“If the government of Puerto Rico were nothing other than the alter ego or imme diate servant of the federal government, then the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would have no pertinence, for a doctrine designed to safeguard federal authority against usurpation has no role when the federal government itself is effectively the actor.”); cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (“Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.”).