context: Griego has alleged no formal or written policy-- whether an informal policy exists at all is ultimately a question of fact -- and so the analysis changes. Discriminatory application of a facially' neutral law -- and New Mexico's domestic-battery statute is facially neutral -- violates the Equal Protection Clause when there is a showing of both (i) discriminatory intent or purpose; and (ii) discriminatory effect.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 143 F.3d 1299, 1312
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that, "to assert a viable equal protection claim, plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them"
citation_a.sentence: See also Marsh v. Newton, 134 F.3d 383, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (“‘To establish a gender-based claim under the Equal Protection Clause, [the plaintiff] must, .as a threshold matter, demonstrate that [the plaintiff has] been treated differently by a state actor than others who are similarly situated simply because [the plaintiff] belong[s] to a particular class.’” (quoting Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.1996))); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that, “to assert a viable equal protection claim, plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them”). If the plaintiff can produce evidence of discriminatory purpose, then the burden shifts to the government to prove that it would have taken the same action without the discriminatory motivation.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 403 U.S. 217, 224
citation_b.parenthetical: "[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it."
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (“[0]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” (emphasis in original)); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (“[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”).