context: Several circuits also hold that plaintiffs claiming that an executive officer's conduct, grouped under the term "sexual assault," violated the substantive Due Process Clause must show the officer's conduct shocked the conscience as part of their claims.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 271 F.3d 341, 342-43, 344-45
citation_a.parenthetical: applying the conscience-shocking test when a plaintiff alleged an officer shoved him
citation_a.sentence: We agree. See Cummings v. Mclntire, 271 F.3d 341, 342-43, 344-45 (1st Cir.2001) (applying the conscience-shocking test when a plaintiff alleged an officer shoved him); see also Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 272-73 (opining though not holding that the conscience-shocking test likely applies to deprivations of property). In this case the jury was correctly instructed on the shocks-the-conscience element.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 568 F.3d 272, 272-73
citation_b.parenthetical: opining though not holding that the conscience-shocking test likely applies to deprivations of property
citation_b.sentence: We agree. See Cummings v. Mclntire, 271 F.3d 341, 342-43, 344-45 (1st Cir.2001) (applying the conscience-shocking test when a plaintiff alleged an officer shoved him); see also Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 272-73 (opining though not holding that the conscience-shocking test likely applies to deprivations of property). In this case the jury was correctly instructed on the shocks-the-conscience element.