context: "A primary purpose of ERISA is to ensure the integrity and primacy of the written plans ... [so that] the plain language of an ERISA plan should be given its literal and natural meaning." Against this plain legislative purpose, if the ERISA plan expressly provides that its members are obligated to reimburse the plan for "the value of services provided, arranged, or paid for," we do not think it can be considered "unfair" to require plan members to abide by the agreement.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 78 F.3d 127, 127
citation_a.parenthetical: " 'Enrichment is not "unjust" where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' "
citation_a.sentence: See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (" 'Enrichment is not "unjust” where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' ") (citation omitted); cf. Pierce v. Christmas Tree Shops, Inc., 429 Mass. 91, 706 N.E.2d 633, 636 n. 5 (Mass.1999) (rejecting same argument, under Massachusetts law); cf. also Health Cost Controls, 139 F.3d at 1072 (noting that defendant "has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 139 F.3d 1072, 1072
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that defendant "has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA"
citation_b.sentence: See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (" 'Enrichment is not "unjust” where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' ") (citation omitted); cf. Pierce v. Christmas Tree Shops, Inc., 429 Mass. 91, 706 N.E.2d 633, 636 n. 5 (Mass.1999) (rejecting same argument, under Massachusetts law); cf. also Health Cost Controls, 139 F.3d at 1072 (noting that defendant "has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA”).