context: The basis for implied trusts -- indeed, their most evident difference from express trusts -- is the absence of any expressed words evincing the intent of the would-be settlor to create a trust for the would-be beneficiary. The existence of such words obviates a claim for a resulting trust (where the settlor designated one person as the beneficiary but, the claimant argues, meant for someone else to be the beneficiary) or a constructive trust (where the settlor designated one person but, the claimant argues, equity demands a different beneficiary).
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: holding "[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law"
citation_a.sentence: See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (holding that “the operative facts” of a constructive trust “can be proved by parol”); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438 A.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (holding “[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law”); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (“It is true that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts.
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 374 A.2d 873, 873
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that "the operative facts" of a constructive trust "can be proved by parol"
citation_b.sentence: See Hertz, supra, 374 A.2d at 873 (holding that “the operative facts” of a constructive trust “can be proved by parol”); see also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 438 A.2d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (holding “[t]he statute of frauds ... do[es] not apply to constructive trusts, which are implied by operation of law”); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (“It is true that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting trusts.