context: These reasonable inferences indicate that Hohenwald engaged in calculated decision-making fueled by anger, not terror.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 624 N.W.2d 585, 591
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion when he made "rational" and "calculating" attempts to avoid detection for the crime he had just committed
citation_a.sentence: Cf. State v. Stewart, 624 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn.2001) (concluding that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion when he made “rational” and “calculating” attempts to avoid detection for the crime he had just committed).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 398 N.W.2d 657, 664
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that a defendant's decision to chase the victim and continue his attack "indicates hate instead of terror"
citation_b.sentence: See Van Keuren, 759 N.W.2d at 40 (stating that anger alone is insufficient to form the basis for heat-of-passion manslaughter); State v. Richardson, 398 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn.1986) (holding that a defendant’s decision to chase the victim and continue his attack “indicates hate instead of terror”). Thus, the circumstances proved support reasonable inferences that establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Hohenwald’s reason and willpower were neither clouded nor weakened at the time of the killings.