context: And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 535 U.S. 448, 448
citation_a.parenthetical: "A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny."
citation_a.sentence: See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: "We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech."
citation_b.sentence: Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”).