context: What Arsenault's argument actually amounts to is faulting the judge for "not assigning] the weight to certain factors that [he] thought appropriate" and not taking into account specific considerations -- such as the elderly-prisoner problem -- which he finds relevant.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 595 F.3d 42, 49
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that the district judge's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record "evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors"
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2015) (“That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court’s sentencing decision.”); see also United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that the district judge’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 780 F.3d 475, 479
citation_b.parenthetical: "That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court's sentencing decision."
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2015) (“That the [appellant] would prefer an alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the district court’s sentencing decision.”); see also United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that the district judge’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”).