context: Our second major point of disagreement with the district court is its holding that the various statutes under which this action is brought require a showing that the Patels' actions, in conjunction with McLean's, succeeded in ac tually establishing a going business of supplying third parties with sexual opportunities.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 702 F.3d 1066, 1073
citation_a.parenthetical: "In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of SS 1591."
citation_a.sentence: Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 627 F.3d 334, 334
citation_b.parenthetical: adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction
citation_b.sentence: Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction).