context: The fact that an action is taken with knowledge that it will cause a breach of contract does not suffice to show tor-tious interference with contract.
citation_a.signal: no signal
citation_a.identifier: 765 N.E.2d 606, 617
citation_a.parenthetical: "one does not induce a second party to breach a contract with a third party when one merely enters into an agreement with the second party with knowledge that the second party is unable to perform both contracts"
citation_a.sentence: McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 617 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (“one does not induce a second party to breach a contract with a third party when one merely enters into an agreement with the second party with knowledge that the second party is unable to perform both contracts”); see also Indiana Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Cardinal Health Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.App.2002) (“[T]he mere fact that Cardinal hired Dr. Wolfe with knowledge that his employment would violate the Agreement’s non-compete clause does not amount to inducement of breach.”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.parenthetical: "[T]he mere fact that Cardinal hired Dr. Wolfe with knowledge that his employment would violate the Agreement's non-compete clause does not amount to inducement of breach."
citation_b.sentence: McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 617 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (“one does not induce a second party to breach a contract with a third party when one merely enters into an agreement with the second party with knowledge that the second party is unable to perform both contracts”); see also Indiana Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Cardinal Health Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.App.2002) (“[T]he mere fact that Cardinal hired Dr. Wolfe with knowledge that his employment would violate the Agreement’s non-compete clause does not amount to inducement of breach.”).