context: Given the material differences between this case and Brown, and the strong circumstantial evidence that Davis served as a lookout and/or helped plan the carjacking, I see no basis to grant Davis habeas relief in light of the AEDPA deference that we are obligated to apply. The key reason for granting habeas relief in Brown was that the evidence there was deemed too speculative for a jury to find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The present case, on the other hand, is distinguishable because the additional facts supporting the jury's verdict push it well beyond an "objectively unreasonable" outcome that would entitle Davis to habeas relief.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 602 F.3d 707, 709-11
citation_a.parenthetical: distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument
citation_a.sentence: See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: explaining that a state court's decision must be "objectively unreasonable" to merit habeas relief
citation_b.sentence: See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that a state court’s decision must be “objectively unreasonable” to merit habeas relief); see also White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709-11 (6th Cir.2009) (distinguishing Brown and denying relief on an aiding-and-abetting, sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument).