context: . Relators argue, however, that because the restraining orders targeted only persons identified with the "pro-life" movement, the orders were, in context, aimed at the "pro-life" message, and are thus not "content-neutral." This argument has been explicitly rejected in a number of the cases cited above.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 939 F.2d 63, 63
citation_a.parenthetical: court order applying only to pro-life protesters not "content-based" because "only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation"
citation_a.sentence: See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not "content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not "content neutral" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 874 F.2d 1085, 1090
citation_b.parenthetical: ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators' speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech
citation_b.sentence: See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not "content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not "content neutral" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action).