context: Whether the vehicle's engine was running when the trooper initiated his seizure of the defendant is a matter of critical importance to the defendant's motion to suppress, for "operation]" of a motor vehicle, G.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 263 Mass. 22, 24
citation_a.parenthetical: "[a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of G. L. c. 90, SS 24, when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle"
citation_a.sentence: See Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 24 (1928) (“[a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of G. L. c. 90, § 24, when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 400 Mass. 181, 184
citation_b.parenthetical: starting engine of vehicle, or making use of power provided by engine, constitutes "operation" of motor vehicle for purposes of G. L. c. 90, SS 24
citation_b.sentence: See also Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 400 Mass. 181, 184 (1987) (starting engine of vehicle, or making use of power provided by engine, constitutes “operation” of motor vehicle for purposes of G. L. c. 90, § 24); Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 320-321 (1994) (intoxicated driver asleep in vehicle with key in ignition and engine running warrants inference of “operation”; driver’s intention in starting vehicle is not element of statutory offense of operating while under influence).