context: The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has found that Rule 16's good-cause standard governs a party's ability to amend his complaint after the district court has entered a scheduling order.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.identifier: 986 F.Supp. 959, 980
citation_a.parenthetical: describing "two-step analysis" required under Rules 15 and 16 when a motion to amend the pleadings and join additional parties is filed after the scheduling order deadline
citation_a.sentence: Id. at 1419 (“[Bjecause Sosa’s motion to amend was filed after the scheduling order’s deadline, she must first demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b) before we will consider whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).”); see also Dilmar Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986 F.Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C.1997) (describing “two-step analysis” required under Rules 15 and 16 when a motion to amend the pleadings and join additional parties is filed after the scheduling order deadline).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.parenthetical: "[Wjhen a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party's delay may be excused."
citation_b.sentence: Sosa v. Airprint Sys., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 n. 2 (1998) (“[Wjhen a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party’s delay may be excused.”). It is only after the court addresses whether the proposed amendment may be granted under Rule 16 that the court is to determine whether it is proper under Rule 15.