context: To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 518 F.2d 352, 364
citation_b.parenthetical: "Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. SS 1961, which defines 'racketeering activity' with reference to specific offenses, 'pattern of racketeering activity' with reference to a definite number of acts of 'racketeering activity' within specified time periods, and 'enterprise' and 'person' with standard language of established meaning."
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument).