context: Although the defendant's first motion to dismiss under the IAD could have served to toll the 180-day period, at the time he filed the motion, the 180-day period was already tolled by the continuance of trial from March 10 to September 25, 2006. More significantly, the defendant's filing of his motion to dismiss did not "occasion" the period of delay from September 25 to November 13, 2006.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 637 So. 2d 921, 925
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions
citation_a.sentence: See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant’s motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial” because: (1) “the record disclose[d] no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed”; (2) “[t]here [wa]s no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”; and (3) the record failed to suggest “how those pleadings could have resulted in delay”).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.identifier: 686 S.W.2d 543, 548
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that "[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant's motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial" because: (1
citation_b.sentence: See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant’s motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial” because: (1) “the record disclose[d] no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed”; (2) “[t]here [wa]s no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”; and (3) the record failed to suggest “how those pleadings could have resulted in delay”).