context: Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that a reasonable officer in Bomar's position would not have stopped Hernandez absent a desire to investigate his suspicions of illegal drug activity. We therefore hold that the stop was pretextual.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 929 F.2d 500, 502
citation_a.parenthetical: stop was not pretextual because even though officers suspected defendant of drug trafficking, they would have made the stop anyway because defendant was carelessly speeding in violation of state law
citation_a.sentence: See United States v. Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that traffic stop for driving with a cracked windshield was pretextual because state law did not prohibit driving with a cracked windshield and government did not establish any other legitimate reason for the stop); cf. United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir.1991) (stop was not pretextual because even though officers suspected defendant of drug trafficking, they would have made the stop anyway because defendant was carelessly speeding in violation of state law).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 36 F.3d 886, 889
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that traffic stop for driving with a cracked windshield was pretextual because state law did not prohibit driving with a cracked windshield and government did not establish any other legitimate reason for the stop
citation_b.sentence: See United States v. Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that traffic stop for driving with a cracked windshield was pretextual because state law did not prohibit driving with a cracked windshield and government did not establish any other legitimate reason for the stop); cf. United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir.1991) (stop was not pretextual because even though officers suspected defendant of drug trafficking, they would have made the stop anyway because defendant was carelessly speeding in violation of state law).