context: In his plea agreement, Richardson waived his right to appeal with the exception of "only those issues raised and subsequently denied by the Court with regard to the defendant's motion to suppress." (R. (Richardson) v. 1, doc. 112, plea agreement at 7, para. 11 (emphasis added).) That language clearly precludes Richardson from raising on appeal any new arguments in support of his suppression motion.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 374 F.3d 957, 957-58
citation_a.parenthetical: holding appeal waiver in conditional guilty plea agreement precluded defendant from asserting new argument on appeal in support of suppression motion
citation_a.sentence: See Anderson, 374 F.3d at 957-58 (holding appeal waiver in conditional guilty plea agreement precluded defendant from asserting new argument on appeal in support of suppression motion); see also United States v. Ochoa-Colchado, 521 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that, “[w]hen considering whether an appeal falls within the scope of a waiver of appellate rights, the general rule is that any appellate rights not expressly reserved are waived”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 521 F.3d 1292, 1299
citation_b.parenthetical: noting that, "[w]hen considering whether an appeal falls within the scope of a waiver of appellate rights, the general rule is that any appellate rights not expressly reserved are waived"
citation_b.sentence: See Anderson, 374 F.3d at 957-58 (holding appeal waiver in conditional guilty plea agreement precluded defendant from asserting new argument on appeal in support of suppression motion); see also United States v. Ochoa-Colchado, 521 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that, “[w]hen considering whether an appeal falls within the scope of a waiver of appellate rights, the general rule is that any appellate rights not expressly reserved are waived”).