context: More to the point, we think that district attorneys and other prosecuting authorities cannot be compelled to participate in a hearing that would test the merits of their case in a civil deprivation proceeding brought by a separate government entity and that is at most tangential to the criminal case. Decisions of other courts, including New York's highest court, strongly suggest that important state policy interests weigh against requiring such participation.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898
citation_b.parenthetical: the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities).