context: It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant
citation_a.sentence: See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal.
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 516 F.2d 78, 86
citation_b.parenthetical: holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause
citation_b.sentence: See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause).