context: Although General Poly evidently was not satisfied with the quality of the resin from that run, it cannot now argue that it did not have notice of its existence. Second, even if the record were otherwise, we are unwilling to read into the written agreement an obligation on the part of Allied to notify General Poly of the availability of prime resin, because no such provision appears in the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.parenthetical: plaintiff failed to exercise an option to purchase "in the clear and explicit manner stated in the separation agreement"
citation_a.sentence: See Meccico v. Meccico, 559 N.Y.S.2d 974, 76 N.Y.2d 822, 559 N.E.2d 668 (1990) (“Where the contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, the courts must determine the intent of the parties from within the four corners of the instrument.”); cf. Remetich v. Remetich, 110 A.D.2d 760, 488 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1985) (plaintiff failed to exercise an option to purchase “in the clear and explicit manner stated in the separation agreement”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.parenthetical: "Where the contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, the courts must determine the intent of the parties from within the four corners of the instrument."
citation_b.sentence: See Meccico v. Meccico, 559 N.Y.S.2d 974, 76 N.Y.2d 822, 559 N.E.2d 668 (1990) (“Where the contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, the courts must determine the intent of the parties from within the four corners of the instrument.”); cf. Remetich v. Remetich, 110 A.D.2d 760, 488 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1985) (plaintiff failed to exercise an option to purchase “in the clear and explicit manner stated in the separation agreement”).