context: Even assuming it does, courts applying actual innocence for non-capital sentencing have noted that for purposes of the actual innocence exception, " 'actual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Thus, some circuits have held that "for the actual innocence exception to apply in the noncapital sentencing context, a movant must show that he is factually innocent of the conduct or underlying crime that serves as the predicate for the enhanced sentence."
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 333 F.3d 372, 381-82
citation_a.parenthetical: involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies
citation_a.sentence: See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (holding under ACCA that the actual innocence of sentence exception “applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes.”); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir.2003) (involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 612 F.3d 270, 284
citation_b.parenthetical: holding under ACCA that the actual innocence of sentence exception "applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes."
citation_b.sentence: See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (holding under ACCA that the actual innocence of sentence exception “applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes.”); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d Cir.2003) (involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies).