context: An employer should not automatically be held hable for the discriminatory motivation of a subordinate employee that leads to an adverse employment action for another employee. However, if the formal deci-sionmakers choose to act in accordance with a report, decision, or recommendation of a biased subordinate without independently evaluating the aggrieved employee's situation, the imposition of liability may be appropriate. If such claims are accepted at face value, the subordinate's discriminatory statements and actions may then be fairly imputed to the formal decisionmak-ers and, by virtue of them, to the employer.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 118 F.3d 542, 547
citation_a.parenthetical: noting that "there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the 'cat's paw" of the subordinate"
citation_a.sentence: See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers).
citation_b.signal: cf.
citation_b.parenthetical: recognizing that the "cat's paw" doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers
citation_b.sentence: See e.g., Rios, 252 F.3d at 382 (noting that “[statements of non decision makers become relevant ... when the ultimate decision maker’s action is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ for the subordinate’s recommendation”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.2000) (recognizing case law holding that an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that “there can be situations in which the forbidden motive of a subordinate employee can be imputed to the employer because, under the circum stances of the case, the employer simply acted as the ‘cat’s paw" of the subordinate”); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that the “cat’s paw” doctrine has been employed by lower courts to impose liability upon an employer for the discriminatory motivations of nondecisionmakers).