context: Tr. at 36:19-37:15. Indeed, Uber argued that so long as just one driver opted-out of the 2013 Agreement's arbitration provision, the opt-out right necessarily must have been "real," and thus the arbitration provision (and importantly for this discussion, the delegation clause) was not oppressive or otherwise procedurally unconscionable. And even if Uber had presented such evidence, this Court has significant doubts that the California Supreme Court would vindicate an opt-out clause simply because a few signatories out of thousands were able to (and did) successfully opt-out.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression
citation_a.sentence: See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 471-72, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression); see also Duran v. Discover Bank, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App.2009) (unpublished) (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 2009 WL 1709569, at *5
citation_b.parenthetical: concluding that Gentry held generally that "even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion"
citation_b.sentence: See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 471-72, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression); see also Duran v. Discover Bank, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App.2009) (unpublished) (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”).