context: Second, contrary to Joseph's contention, the trial judge did not tell the jury that a battery tester was a deadly weapon. Rather, the trial judge merely mentioned the battery tester and instructed the jury to find whether that object constituted a deadly weapon.
citation_a.signal: cf.
citation_a.identifier: 429 F.2d 552, 556
citation_a.parenthetical: finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, "as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use"
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”).
citation_b.signal: see
citation_b.identifier: 293 F.3d 863, 870
citation_b.parenthetical: finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant had used a baton because that fact was undisputed, and noting that the jury itself had to determine whether the baton constituted a dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 395, 154 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2002); cf. United States v. Davis, 429 F.2d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the trial court committed error by instructing the jury that a pistol is a deadly weapon, “as the question was one for the jury, and that a weapon may or may not be deadly according to its size and the manner of its use”).