context: There is another deficiency in the record that also precludes a finding that Kirkpatrick's waiver was valid. 'Where courts have previously found waivers of habeas claims to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore valid, they have done so after a hearing at which the court conducts a colloquy to assess the petitioner's intentions and whether he understands the consequences of the waiver.
citation_a.signal: see
citation_a.identifier: 495 U.S. 732, 732-33
citation_a.parenthetical: concluding that a state court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the waiver was intelligently executed
citation_a.sentence: See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concluding that a state court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the waiver was intelligently executed); Dennis, 378 F.3d at 884 (accepting a state court waiver as valid because that court “engaged in a comprehensive colloquy” with the petitioner during which “[t]he court had [petitioner] re-read his initial habeas petition ... and the court reviewed with [petitioner] the assignments of error alleged in the petition” and the petitioner in court “asserted his desire to give up his right to pursue each of these claims”); Fahy, 516 F.3d at 183-85 (holding that even though the state court did engage in a colloquy with the petitioner, that colloquy was insufficient to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the state court had refused to permit petitioner’s counsel to ask him questions that would probe the waiver’s validity); see also St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 947 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding).
citation_b.signal: see also
citation_b.identifier: 217 F.3d 939, 947
citation_b.parenthetical: finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding
citation_b.sentence: See, e.g., Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223 (concluding that a state court waiver was valid only after that court questioned the petitioner under oath and concluded specifically that the waiver was intelligently executed); Dennis, 378 F.3d at 884 (accepting a state court waiver as valid because that court “engaged in a comprehensive colloquy” with the petitioner during which “[t]he court had [petitioner] re-read his initial habeas petition ... and the court reviewed with [petitioner] the assignments of error alleged in the petition” and the petitioner in court “asserted his desire to give up his right to pursue each of these claims”); Fahy, 516 F.3d at 183-85 (holding that even though the state court did engage in a colloquy with the petitioner, that colloquy was insufficient to establish that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the state court had refused to permit petitioner’s counsel to ask him questions that would probe the waiver’s validity); see also St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 947 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a waiver was not valid because no court ever had a chance to question the petitioner on the record as to his intentions and understanding).