context: . The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text.
citation_a.signal: see also
citation_a.parenthetical: holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor
citation_a.sentence: Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that “the Code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse.”). Compare Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) (for purposes of section 523(a)(2), an agent’s fraud is not imputed to the principal unless the principal knew or should have known of the fraud).
citation_b.signal: no signal
citation_b.identifier: 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194
citation_b.parenthetical: "[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions."
citation_b.sentence: Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that “the Code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse.”). Compare Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) (for purposes of section 523(a)(2), an agent’s fraud is not imputed to the principal unless the principal knew or should have known of the fraud).