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Sep 10

Breakpoint Transformers for Modeling and Tracking Intermediate Beliefs

Can we teach natural language understanding models to track their beliefs through intermediate points in text? We propose a representation learning framework called breakpoint modeling that allows for learning of this type. Given any text encoder and data marked with intermediate states (breakpoints) along with corresponding textual queries viewed as true/false propositions (i.e., the candidate beliefs of a model, consisting of information changing through time) our approach trains models in an efficient and end-to-end fashion to build intermediate representations that facilitate teaching and direct querying of beliefs at arbitrary points alongside solving other end tasks. To show the benefit of our approach, we experiment with a diverse set of NLU tasks including relational reasoning on CLUTRR and narrative understanding on bAbI. Using novel belief prediction tasks for both tasks, we show the benefit of our main breakpoint transformer, based on T5, over conventional representation learning approaches in terms of processing efficiency, prediction accuracy and prediction consistency, all with minimal to no effect on corresponding QA end tasks. To show the feasibility of incorporating our belief tracker into more complex reasoning pipelines, we also obtain SOTA performance on the three-tiered reasoning challenge for the TRIP benchmark (around 23-32% absolute improvement on Tasks 2-3).

Neural embedding of beliefs reveals the role of relative dissonance in human decision-making

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

SimpleToM: Exposing the Gap between Explicit ToM Inference and Implicit ToM Application in LLMs

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Belief in the Machine: Investigating Epistemological Blind Spots of Language Models

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Embers of Autoregression: Understanding Large Language Models Through the Problem They are Trained to Solve

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

ThinkSum: Probabilistic reasoning over sets using large language models

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Language Models (Mostly) Know What They Know

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

The Consciousness Prior

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

SemEval-2023 Task 7: Multi-Evidence Natural Language Inference for Clinical Trial Data

This paper describes the results of SemEval 2023 task 7 -- Multi-Evidence Natural Language Inference for Clinical Trial Data (NLI4CT) -- consisting of 2 tasks, a Natural Language Inference (NLI) task, and an evidence selection task on clinical trial data. The proposed challenges require multi-hop biomedical and numerical reasoning, which are of significant importance to the development of systems capable of large-scale interpretation and retrieval of medical evidence, to provide personalized evidence-based care. Task 1, the entailment task, received 643 submissions from 40 participants, and Task 2, the evidence selection task, received 364 submissions from 23 participants. The tasks are challenging, with the majority of submitted systems failing to significantly outperform the majority class baseline on the entailment task, and we observe significantly better performance on the evidence selection task than on the entailment task. Increasing the number of model parameters leads to a direct increase in performance, far more significant than the effect of biomedical pre-training. Future works could explore the limitations of large models for generalization and numerical inference, and investigate methods to augment clinical datasets to allow for more rigorous testing and to facilitate fine-tuning. We envisage that the dataset, models, and results of this task will be useful to the biomedical NLI and evidence retrieval communities. The dataset, competition leaderboard, and website are publicly available.

Fact Recall, Heuristics or Pure Guesswork? Precise Interpretations of Language Models for Fact Completion

Language models (LMs) can make a correct prediction based on many possible signals in a prompt, not all corresponding to recall of factual associations. However, current interpretations of LMs fail to take this into account. For example, given the query "Astrid Lindgren was born in" with the corresponding completion "Sweden", no difference is made between whether the prediction was based on knowing where the author was born or assuming that a person with a Swedish-sounding name was born in Sweden. In this paper, we present a model-specific recipe - PrISM - for constructing datasets with examples of four different prediction scenarios: generic language modeling, guesswork, heuristics recall and exact fact recall. We apply two popular interpretability methods to the scenarios: causal tracing (CT) and information flow analysis. We find that both yield distinct results for each scenario. Results for exact fact recall and generic language modeling scenarios confirm previous conclusions about the importance of mid-range MLP sublayers for fact recall, while results for guesswork and heuristics indicate a critical role of late last token position MLP sublayers. In summary, we contribute resources for a more extensive and granular study of fact completion in LMs, together with analyses that provide a more nuanced understanding of how LMs process fact-related queries.

Modeling Open-World Cognition as On-Demand Synthesis of Probabilistic Models

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Exploring Next Token Prediction in Theory of Mind (ToM) Tasks: Comparative Experiments with GPT-2 and LLaMA-2 AI Models

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

LMEnt: A Suite for Analyzing Knowledge in Language Models from Pretraining Data to Representations

Language models (LMs) increasingly drive real-world applications that require world knowledge. However, the internal processes through which models turn data into representations of knowledge and beliefs about the world, are poorly understood. Insights into these processes could pave the way for developing LMs with knowledge representations that are more consistent, robust, and complete. To facilitate studying these questions, we present LMEnt, a suite for analyzing knowledge acquisition in LMs during pretraining. LMEnt introduces: (1) a knowledge-rich pretraining corpus, fully annotated with entity mentions, based on Wikipedia, (2) an entity-based retrieval method over pretraining data that outperforms previous approaches by as much as 80.4%, and (3) 12 pretrained models with up to 1B parameters and 4K intermediate checkpoints, with comparable performance to popular open-sourced models on knowledge benchmarks. Together, these resources provide a controlled environment for analyzing connections between entity mentions in pretraining and downstream performance, and the effects of causal interventions in pretraining data. We show the utility of LMEnt by studying knowledge acquisition across checkpoints, finding that fact frequency is key, but does not fully explain learning trends. We release LMEnt to support studies of knowledge in LMs, including knowledge representations, plasticity, editing, attribution, and learning dynamics.

Is Chain-of-Thought Reasoning of LLMs a Mirage? A Data Distribution Lens

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.

Why think step by step? Reasoning emerges from the locality of experience

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Leveraging Pre-trained Language Models for Time Interval Prediction in Text-Enhanced Temporal Knowledge Graphs

Most knowledge graph completion (KGC) methods learn latent representations of entities and relations of a given graph by mapping them into a vector space. Although the majority of these methods focus on static knowledge graphs, a large number of publicly available KGs contain temporal information stating the time instant/period over which a certain fact has been true. Such graphs are often known as temporal knowledge graphs. Furthermore, knowledge graphs may also contain textual descriptions of entities and relations. Both temporal information and textual descriptions are not taken into account during representation learning by static KGC methods, and only structural information of the graph is leveraged. Recently, some studies have used temporal information to improve link prediction, yet they do not exploit textual descriptions and do not support inductive inference (prediction on entities that have not been seen in training). We propose a novel framework called TEMT that exploits the power of pre-trained language models (PLMs) for text-enhanced temporal knowledge graph completion. The knowledge stored in the parameters of a PLM allows TEMT to produce rich semantic representations of facts and to generalize on previously unseen entities. TEMT leverages textual and temporal information available in a KG, treats them separately, and fuses them to get plausibility scores of facts. Unlike previous approaches, TEMT effectively captures dependencies across different time points and enables predictions on unseen entities. To assess the performance of TEMT, we carried out several experiments including time interval prediction, both in transductive and inductive settings, and triple classification. The experimental results show that TEMT is competitive with the state-of-the-art.

Benchmarking Commonsense Knowledge Base Population with an Effective Evaluation Dataset

Reasoning over commonsense knowledge bases (CSKB) whose elements are in the form of free-text is an important yet hard task in NLP. While CSKB completion only fills the missing links within the domain of the CSKB, CSKB population is alternatively proposed with the goal of reasoning unseen assertions from external resources. In this task, CSKBs are grounded to a large-scale eventuality (activity, state, and event) graph to discriminate whether novel triples from the eventuality graph are plausible or not. However, existing evaluations on the population task are either not accurate (automatic evaluation with randomly sampled negative examples) or of small scale (human annotation). In this paper, we benchmark the CSKB population task with a new large-scale dataset by first aligning four popular CSKBs, and then presenting a high-quality human-annotated evaluation set to probe neural models' commonsense reasoning ability. We also propose a novel inductive commonsense reasoning model that reasons over graphs. Experimental results show that generalizing commonsense reasoning on unseen assertions is inherently a hard task. Models achieving high accuracy during training perform poorly on the evaluation set, with a large gap between human performance. We will make the data publicly available for future contributions. Codes and data are available at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/CSKB-Population.

Thought Anchors: Which LLM Reasoning Steps Matter?

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

How FaR Are Large Language Models From Agents with Theory-of-Mind?

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

In Search of the Long-Tail: Systematic Generation of Long-Tail Knowledge via Logical Rule Guided Search

Since large language models have approached human-level performance on many tasks, it has become increasingly harder for researchers to find tasks that are still challenging to the models. Failure cases usually come from the long-tail distribution - data that an oracle language model could assign a probability on the lower end of its distribution. Current methodology such as prompt engineering or crowdsourcing are insufficient for creating long-tail examples because humans are constrained by cognitive bias. We propose a Logic-Induced-Knowledge-Search (LINK) framework for systematically generating long-tail knowledge statements. Grounded by a symbolic rule, we search for long-tail values for each variable of the rule by first prompting a LLM, then verifying the correctness of the values with a critic, and lastly pushing for the long-tail distribution with a reranker. With this framework we construct a dataset, Logic-Induced-Long-Tail (LINT), consisting of 200 symbolic rules and 50K knowledge statements spanning across four domains. Human annotations find that 84% of the statements in LINT are factually correct. In contrast, ChatGPT and GPT4 struggle with directly generating long-tail statements under the guidance of logic rules, each only getting 56% and 78% of their statements correct. Moreover, their "long-tail" generations in fact fall into the higher likelihood range, and thus are not really long-tail. Our findings suggest that LINK is effective for generating data in the long-tail distribution while enforcing quality. LINT can be useful for systematically evaluating LLMs' capabilities in the long-tail distribution. We challenge the models with a simple entailment classification task using samples from LINT. We find that ChatGPT and GPT4's capability in identifying incorrect knowledge drop by ~3% in the long-tail distribution compared to head distribution.

Consistency-based Abductive Reasoning over Perceptual Errors of Multiple Pre-trained Models in Novel Environments

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

GenCLS++: Pushing the Boundaries of Generative Classification in LLMs Through Comprehensive SFT and RL Studies Across Diverse Datasets

As a fundamental task in machine learning, text classification plays a crucial role in many areas. With the rapid scaling of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly through reinforcement learning (RL), there is a growing need for more capable discriminators. Consequently, advances in classification are becoming increasingly vital for enhancing the overall capabilities of LLMs. Traditional discriminative methods map text to labels but overlook LLMs' intrinsic generative strengths. Generative classification addresses this by prompting the model to directly output labels. However, existing studies still rely on simple SFT alone, seldom probing the interplay between training and inference prompts, and no work has systematically leveraged RL for generative text classifiers and unified SFT, RL, and inference-time prompting in one framework. We bridge this gap with GenCLS++, a framework that jointly optimizes SFT and RL while systematically exploring five high-level strategy dimensions-in-context learning variants, category definitions, explicit uncertainty labels, semantically irrelevant numeric labels, and perplexity-based decoding-during both training and inference. After an SFT "policy warm-up," we apply RL with a simple rule-based reward, yielding sizable extra gains. Across seven datasets, GenCLS++ achieves an average accuracy improvement of 3.46% relative to the naive SFT baseline; on public datasets, this improvement rises to 4.00%. Notably, unlike reasoning-intensive tasks that benefit from explicit thinking processes, we find that classification tasks perform better without such reasoning steps. These insights into the role of explicit reasoning provide valuable guidance for future LLM applications.

Measuring Reasoning Utility in LLMs via Conditional Entropy Reduction

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Unforgettable Generalization in Language Models

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

Thinking Out Loud: Do Reasoning Models Know When They're Right?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

ProcBench: Benchmark for Multi-Step Reasoning and Following Procedure

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

SaySelf: Teaching LLMs to Express Confidence with Self-Reflective Rationales

Large language models (LLMs) often generate inaccurate or fabricated information and generally fail to indicate their confidence, which limits their broader applications. Previous work elicits confidence from LLMs by direct or self-consistency prompting, or constructing specific datasets for supervised finetuning. The prompting-based approaches have inferior performance, and the training-based approaches are limited to binary or inaccurate group-level confidence estimates. In this work, we present the advanced SaySelf, a training framework that teaches LLMs to express more accurate fine-grained confidence estimates. In addition, beyond the confidence scores, SaySelf initiates the process of directing LLMs to produce self-reflective rationales that clearly identify gaps in their parametric knowledge and explain their uncertainty. This is achieved by using an LLM to automatically summarize the uncertainties in specific knowledge via natural language. The summarization is based on the analysis of the inconsistency in multiple sampled reasoning chains, and the resulting data is utilized for supervised fine-tuning. Moreover, we utilize reinforcement learning with a meticulously crafted reward function to calibrate the confidence estimates, motivating LLMs to deliver accurate, high-confidence predictions and to penalize overconfidence in erroneous outputs. Experimental results in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of SaySelf in reducing the confidence calibration error and maintaining the task performance. We show that the generated self-reflective rationales are reasonable and can further contribute to the calibration. The code is made public at https://github.com/xu1868/SaySelf.

Shifting Attention to Relevance: Towards the Uncertainty Estimation of Large Language Models

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in natural language generation and instruction following, a persistent challenge lies in their susceptibility to "hallucinations", which erodes trust in their outputs. Although Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) presents a promising solution, its accurate implementation within the context of LLMs remains a significant hurdle. To address this critical roadblock, our research originates from a fundamental heuristic insight: tokens within auto-regressive LLM-generated text do not equally reflect the underlying meaning. Some tokens carry greater relevance and representativeness than others, owing to the phenomenon of "linguistic redundancy", wherein a select few keywords suffice to convey the essence of lengthy sentences. Regrettably, existing methodologies treat all tokens with equal importance when estimating uncertainty, disregarding these inherent generative inequalities. Our analysis reveals a significant issue with state-of-the-art: numerous tokens (and sentences) of limited semantic significance receive equal or even excessive weighting during uncertainty estimation. To rectify this bias, we propose to jointly Shifting Attention to more Relevant (SAR) components, at both the token- and the sentence-levels for accurate uncertainty estimation. We conduct extensive experiments involving a range of popular "off-the-shelf" LLMs, including instruction-tuned LLMs such as Vicuna, WizardLM, and LLaMA-2-chat, as well as pretrained LLMs like OPT and LLaMA, with model sizes extending up to 33B parameters. We carry out evaluation across various free-form question-answering tasks, encompassing domains such as reading comprehension, science Q&A, and medical Q&A. Our experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of SAR in addressing the challenges of uncertainty estimation within the realm of LLMs.

Augmenting LLMs with Knowledge: A survey on hallucination prevention

Large pre-trained language models have demonstrated their proficiency in storing factual knowledge within their parameters and achieving remarkable results when fine-tuned for downstream natural language processing tasks. Nonetheless, their capacity to access and manipulate knowledge with precision remains constrained, resulting in performance disparities on knowledge-intensive tasks when compared to task-specific architectures. Additionally, the challenges of providing provenance for model decisions and maintaining up-to-date world knowledge persist as open research frontiers. To address these limitations, the integration of pre-trained models with differentiable access mechanisms to explicit non-parametric memory emerges as a promising solution. This survey delves into the realm of language models (LMs) augmented with the ability to tap into external knowledge sources, including external knowledge bases and search engines. While adhering to the standard objective of predicting missing tokens, these augmented LMs leverage diverse, possibly non-parametric external modules to augment their contextual processing capabilities, departing from the conventional language modeling paradigm. Through an exploration of current advancements in augmenting large language models with knowledge, this work concludes that this emerging research direction holds the potential to address prevalent issues in traditional LMs, such as hallucinations, un-grounded responses, and scalability challenges.

When Can Models Learn From Explanations? A Formal Framework for Understanding the Roles of Explanation Data

Many methods now exist for conditioning model outputs on task instructions, retrieved documents, and user-provided explanations and feedback. Rather than relying solely on examples of task inputs and outputs, these approaches use valuable additional data for improving model correctness and aligning learned models with human priors. Meanwhile, a growing body of evidence suggests that some language models can (1) store a large amount of knowledge in their parameters, and (2) perform inference over tasks in textual inputs at test time. These results raise the possibility that, for some tasks, humans cannot explain to a model any more about the task than it already knows or could infer on its own. In this paper, we study the circumstances under which explanations of individual data points can (or cannot) improve modeling performance. In order to carefully control important properties of the data and explanations, we introduce a synthetic dataset for experiments, and we also make use of three existing datasets with explanations: e-SNLI, TACRED, and SemEval. We first give a formal framework for the available modeling approaches, in which explanation data can be used as model inputs, as targets, or as a prior. After arguing that the most promising role for explanation data is as model inputs, we propose to use a retrieval-based method and show that it solves our synthetic task with accuracies upwards of 95%, while baselines without explanation data achieve below 65% accuracy. We then identify properties of datasets for which retrieval-based modeling fails. With the three existing datasets, we find no improvements from explanation retrieval. Drawing on findings from our synthetic task, we suggest that at least one of six preconditions for successful modeling fails to hold with these datasets. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/peterbhase/ExplanationRoles

SelfCheckGPT: Zero-Resource Black-Box Hallucination Detection for Generative Large Language Models

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 are capable of generating highly fluent responses to a wide variety of user prompts. However, LLMs are known to hallucinate facts and make non-factual statements which can undermine trust in their output. Existing fact-checking approaches either require access to token-level output probability distribution (which may not be available for systems such as ChatGPT) or external databases that are interfaced via separate, often complex, modules. In this work, we propose "SelfCheckGPT", a simple sampling-based approach that can be used to fact-check black-box models in a zero-resource fashion, i.e. without an external database. SelfCheckGPT leverages the simple idea that if a LLM has knowledge of a given concept, sampled responses are likely to be similar and contain consistent facts. However, for hallucinated facts, stochastically sampled responses are likely to diverge and contradict one another. We investigate this approach by using GPT-3 to generate passages about individuals from the WikiBio dataset, and manually annotate the factuality of the generated passages. We demonstrate that SelfCheckGPT can: i) detect non-factual and factual sentences; and ii) rank passages in terms of factuality. We compare our approach to several existing baselines and show that in sentence hallucination detection, our approach has AUC-PR scores comparable to grey-box methods, while SelfCheckGPT is best at passage factuality assessment.

How new data permeates LLM knowledge and how to dilute it

Large language models learn and continually learn through the accumulation of gradient-based updates, but how individual pieces of new information affect existing knowledge, leading to both beneficial generalization and problematic hallucination, remains poorly understood. We demonstrate that when learning new information, LLMs exhibit a "priming" effect: learning a new fact can cause the model to inappropriately apply that knowledge in unrelated contexts. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce "Outlandish," a carefully curated dataset of 1320 diverse text samples designed to probe how new knowledge permeates through an LLM's existing knowledge base. Using this dataset, we show that the degree of priming after learning new information can be predicted by measuring the token probability of key words before learning. This relationship holds robustly across different model architectures (PALM-2, Gemma, Llama), sizes, and training stages. Finally, we develop two novel techniques to modulate how new knowledge affects existing model behavior: (1) a ``stepping-stone'' text augmentation strategy and (2) an ``ignore-k'' update pruning method. These approaches reduce undesirable priming effects by 50-95\% while preserving the model's ability to learn new information. Our findings provide both empirical insights into how LLMs learn and practical tools for improving the specificity of knowledge insertion in language models. Further materials: https://sunchipsster1.github.io/projects/outlandish/

Semantic Representation and Inference for NLP

Semantic representation and inference is essential for Natural Language Processing (NLP). The state of the art for semantic representation and inference is deep learning, and particularly Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), and transformer Self-Attention models. This thesis investigates the use of deep learning for novel semantic representation and inference, and makes contributions in the following three areas: creating training data, improving semantic representations and extending inference learning. In terms of creating training data, we contribute the largest publicly available dataset of real-life factual claims for the purpose of automatic claim verification (MultiFC), and we present a novel inference model composed of multi-scale CNNs with different kernel sizes that learn from external sources to infer fact checking labels. In terms of improving semantic representations, we contribute a novel model that captures non-compositional semantic indicators. By definition, the meaning of a non-compositional phrase cannot be inferred from the individual meanings of its composing words (e.g., hot dog). Motivated by this, we operationalize the compositionality of a phrase contextually by enriching the phrase representation with external word embeddings and knowledge graphs. Finally, in terms of inference learning, we propose a series of novel deep learning architectures that improve inference by using syntactic dependencies, by ensembling role guided attention heads, incorporating gating layers, and concatenating multiple heads in novel and effective ways. This thesis consists of seven publications (five published and two under review).

Integrating Knowledge Graph embedding and pretrained Language Models in Hypercomplex Spaces

Knowledge Graphs, such as Wikidata, comprise structural and textual knowledge in order to represent knowledge. For each of the two modalities dedicated approaches for graph embedding and language models learn patterns that allow for predicting novel structural knowledge. Few approaches have integrated learning and inference with both modalities and these existing ones could only partially exploit the interaction of structural and textual knowledge. In our approach, we build on existing strong representations of single modalities and we use hypercomplex algebra to represent both, (i), single-modality embedding as well as, (ii), the interaction between different modalities and their complementary means of knowledge representation. More specifically, we suggest Dihedron and Quaternion representations of 4D hypercomplex numbers to integrate four modalities namely structural knowledge graph embedding, word-level representations (e.g.\ Word2vec, Fasttext), sentence-level representations (Sentence transformer), and document-level representations (sentence transformer, Doc2vec). Our unified vector representation scores the plausibility of labelled edges via Hamilton and Dihedron products, thus modeling pairwise interactions between different modalities. Extensive experimental evaluation on standard benchmark datasets shows the superiority of our two new models using abundant textual information besides sparse structural knowledge to enhance performance in link prediction tasks.

Pair Programming with Large Language Models for Sampling and Estimation of Copulas

Without writing a single line of code by a human, an example Monte Carlo simulation based application for stochastic dependence modeling with copulas is developed using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) fine-tuned for conversations. This includes interaction with ChatGPT in natural language and using mathematical formalism, which, under careful supervision by a human-expert, led to producing a working code in MATLAB, Python and R for sampling from a given copula model, evaluation of the model's density, performing maximum likelihood estimation, optimizing the code for parallel computing for CPUs as well as for GPUs, and visualization of the computed results. In contrast to other emerging studies that assess the accuracy of LLMs like ChatGPT on tasks from a selected area, this work rather investigates ways how to achieve a successful solution of a standard statistical task in a collaboration of a human-expert and artificial intelligence (AI). Particularly, through careful prompt engineering, we separate successful solutions generated by ChatGPT from unsuccessful ones, resulting in a comprehensive list of related pros and cons. It is demonstrated that if the typical pitfalls are avoided, we can substantially benefit from collaborating with an AI partner. For example, we show that if ChatGPT is not able to provide a correct solution due to a lack of or incorrect knowledge, the human-expert can feed it with the correct knowledge, e.g., in the form of mathematical theorems and formulas, and make it to apply the gained knowledge in order to provide a solution that is correct. Such ability presents an attractive opportunity to achieve a programmed solution even for users with rather limited knowledge of programming techniques.

Complexity-Based Prompting for Multi-Step Reasoning

We study the task of prompting large-scale language models to perform multi-step reasoning. Existing work shows that when prompted with a chain of thoughts (CoT), sequences of short sentences describing intermediate reasoning steps towards a final answer, large language models can generate new reasoning chains and predict answers for new inputs. A central question is which reasoning examples make the most effective prompts. In this work, we propose complexity-based prompting, a simple and effective example selection scheme for multi-step reasoning. We show that prompts with higher reasoning complexity, i.e., chains with more reasoning steps, achieve substantially better performance on multi-step reasoning tasks over strong baselines. We further extend our complexity-based criteria from prompting (selecting inputs) to decoding (selecting outputs), where we sample multiple reasoning chains from the model, then choose the majority of generated answers from complex reasoning chains (over simple chains). When used to prompt GPT-3 and Codex, our approach substantially improves multi-step reasoning accuracy and achieves new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on three math benchmarks (GSM8K, MultiArith, and MathQA) and two BigBenchHard tasks (Date Understanding and Penguins), with an average +5.3 and up to +18 accuracy improvements. Compared with existing example selection schemes like manual tuning or retrieval-based selection, selection based on reasoning complexity is intuitive, easy to implement, and annotation-efficient. Further results demonstrate the robustness of performance gains from complex prompts under format perturbation and distribution shift.

Exploring Non-Verbal Predicates in Semantic Role Labeling: Challenges and Opportunities

Although we have witnessed impressive progress in Semantic Role Labeling (SRL), most of the research in the area is carried out assuming that the majority of predicates are verbs. Conversely, predicates can also be expressed using other parts of speech, e.g., nouns and adjectives. However, non-verbal predicates appear in the benchmarks we commonly use to measure progress in SRL less frequently than in some real-world settings -- newspaper headlines, dialogues, and tweets, among others. In this paper, we put forward a new PropBank dataset which boasts wide coverage of multiple predicate types. Thanks to it, we demonstrate empirically that standard benchmarks do not provide an accurate picture of the current situation in SRL and that state-of-the-art systems are still incapable of transferring knowledge across different predicate types. Having observed these issues, we also present a novel, manually-annotated challenge set designed to give equal importance to verbal, nominal, and adjectival predicate-argument structures. We use such dataset to investigate whether we can leverage different linguistic resources to promote knowledge transfer. In conclusion, we claim that SRL is far from "solved", and its integration with other semantic tasks might enable significant improvements in the future, especially for the long tail of non-verbal predicates, thereby facilitating further research on SRL for non-verbal predicates.

Towards Large Reasoning Models: A Survey of Reinforced Reasoning with Large Language Models

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Concept-Guided Chain-of-Thought Prompting for Pairwise Comparison Scoring of Texts with Large Language Models

Existing text scoring methods require a large corpus, struggle with short texts, or require hand-labeled data. We develop a text scoring framework that leverages generative large language models (LLMs) to (1) set texts against the backdrop of information from the near-totality of the web and digitized media, and (2) effectively transform pairwise text comparisons from a reasoning problem to a pattern recognition task. Our approach, concept-guided chain-of-thought (CGCoT), utilizes a chain of researcher-designed prompts with an LLM to generate a concept-specific breakdown for each text, akin to guidance provided to human coders. We then pairwise compare breakdowns using an LLM and aggregate answers into a score using a probability model. We apply this approach to better understand speech reflecting aversion to specific political parties on Twitter, a topic that has commanded increasing interest because of its potential contributions to democratic backsliding. We achieve stronger correlations with human judgments than widely used unsupervised text scoring methods like Wordfish. In a supervised setting, besides a small pilot dataset to develop CGCoT prompts, our measures require no additional hand-labeled data and produce predictions on par with RoBERTa-Large fine-tuned on thousands of hand-labeled tweets. This project showcases the potential of combining human expertise and LLMs for scoring tasks.

Know the Unknown: An Uncertainty-Sensitive Method for LLM Instruction Tuning

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but still face challenges such as hallucinations. One potential reason for hallucinations is the lack of relevant knowledge or context. Thus, a promising solution to mitigate this issue involves instructing LLMs to respond with "I do not know" when a question falls outside their knowledge domain or the provided context. However, in this work, we observed that LLMs struggle to admit their lack of knowledge, primarily due to existing instruction datasets designed to encourage specific answers. To improve large language models' capability to recognize the boundaries of their knowledge, we propose a novel approach called uncertainty-sensitive tuning. This method involves two-stage training designed for uncertainty recognition and prompt-sensitive activation. In the first stage, we guide the LLM to reject unknown questions. In the second stage, we recover the decreased performance in QA tasks by incorporating designed causal instructions. By leveraging this method, we aim to enhance the model's ability to identify areas of uncertainty. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed uncertainty-sensitive tuning method significantly improves the performance of the Llama2-chat-7B model. Specifically, it achieves a substantial 34.7% improvement in handling questions involving knowledge gaps compared to the original model. Moreover, our approach outperforms GPT-4, exhibiting a 9.4% increase in overall performance. We open-source the model and code on GitHub.

Mind the Generation Process: Fine-Grained Confidence Estimation During LLM Generation

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks, they fundamentally lack self-awareness and frequently exhibit overconfidence, assigning high confidence scores to incorrect predictions. Accurate confidence estimation is therefore critical for enhancing the trustworthiness and reliability of LLM-generated outputs. However, existing approaches suffer from coarse-grained scoring mechanisms that fail to provide fine-grained, continuous confidence estimates throughout the generation process. To address these limitations, we introduce FineCE, a novel confidence estimation method that delivers accurate, fine-grained confidence scores during text generation. Specifically, we first develop a comprehensive pipeline for constructing training data that effectively captures the underlying probabilistic distribution of LLM responses, and then train a model to predict confidence scores for arbitrary text sequences in a supervised manner. Furthermore, we propose a Backward Confidence Integration (BCI) strategy that leverages information from the subsequent text to enhance confidence estimation for the current sequence during inference. We also introduce three strategies for identifying optimal positions to perform confidence estimation within the generation process. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that FineCE consistently outperforms existing classical confidence estimation methods. Our code and all baselines used in the paper are available on GitHub.

Navigating the Grey Area: Expressions of Overconfidence and Uncertainty in Language Models

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Let's Predict Sentence by Sentence

Autoregressive language models (LMs) generate one token at a time, yet human reasoning operates over higher-level abstractions - sentences, propositions, and concepts. This contrast raises a central question- Can LMs likewise learn to reason over structured semantic units rather than raw token sequences? In this work, we investigate whether pretrained LMs can be lifted into such abstract reasoning spaces by building on their learned representations. We present a framework that adapts a pretrained token-level LM to operate in sentence space by autoregressively predicting continuous embeddings of next sentences. We explore two embedding paradigms inspired by classical representation learning: 1) semantic embeddings, learned via autoencoding to preserve surface meaning; and 2) contextual embeddings, trained via next-sentence prediction to encode anticipatory structure. We evaluate both under two inference regimes: Discretized, which decodes each predicted embedding into text before re-encoding; and Continuous, which reasons entirely in embedding space for improved efficiency. Across four domains - mathematics, logic, commonsense, and planning - contextual embeddings under continuous inference show competitive performance with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) while reducing inference-time FLOPs on average by half. We also present early signs of scalability and modular adaptation. Finally, to visualize latent trajectories, we introduce SentenceLens, a diagnostic tool that decodes intermediate model states into interpretable sentences. Together, our results indicate that pretrained LMs can effectively transition to abstract, structured reasoning within latent embedding spaces.

Knowing You Don't Know: Learning When to Continue Search in Multi-round RAG through Self-Practicing

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) has shown strong capability in enhancing language models' knowledge and reducing AI generative hallucinations, driving its widespread use. However, complex tasks requiring multi-round retrieval remain challenging, and early attempts tend to be overly optimistic without a good sense of self-skepticism. Current multi-round RAG systems may continue searching even when enough information has already been retrieved, or they may provide incorrect answers without having sufficient information or knowledge. Existing solutions either require large amounts of expensive human-labeled process supervision data or lead to subpar performance. This paper aims to address these limitations by introducing a new framework, SIM-RAG, to explicitly enhance RAG systems' self-awareness and multi-round retrieval capabilities. To train SIM-RAG, we first let a RAG system self-practice multi-round retrieval, augmenting existing question-answer pairs with intermediate inner monologue reasoning steps to generate synthetic training data. For each pair, the system may explore multiple retrieval paths, which are labeled as successful if they reach the correct answer and unsuccessful otherwise. Using this data, we train a lightweight information sufficiency Critic. At inference time, the Critic evaluates whether the RAG system has retrieved sufficient information at each round, guiding retrieval decisions and improving system-level self-awareness through in-context reinforcement learning. Experiments across multiple prominent RAG benchmarks show that SIM-RAG is an effective multi-round RAG solution. Furthermore, this framework is system-efficient, adding a lightweight component to RAG without requiring modifications to existing LLMs or search engines, and data-efficient, eliminating the need for costly human-annotated mid-step retrieval process supervision data.

Speculative Thinking: Enhancing Small-Model Reasoning with Large Model Guidance at Inference Time

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

Quiet-STaR: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Think Before Speaking

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Calibrating Reasoning in Language Models with Internal Consistency

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

When Two LLMs Debate, Both Think They'll Win

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

MindMap: Knowledge Graph Prompting Sparks Graph of Thoughts in Large Language Models

LLMs usually exhibit limitations in their ability to incorporate new knowledge, the generation of hallucinations, and the transparency of their decision-making process. In this paper, we explore how to prompt LLMs with knowledge graphs (KG), working as a remedy to engage LLMs with up-to-date knowledge and elicit the reasoning pathways from LLMs. Specifically, we build a prompting pipeline that endows LLMs with the capability of comprehending KG inputs and inferring with a combined implicit knowledge and the retrieved external knowledge. In addition, we investigate eliciting the mind map on which LLMs perform the reasoning and generate the answers. It is identified that the produced mind map exhibits the reasoning pathways of LLMs grounded on the ontology of knowledge, hence bringing the prospects of probing and gauging LLM inference in production. The experiments on three question & answering datasets also show that MindMap prompting leads to a striking empirical gain. For instance, prompting a GPT-3.5 with MindMap yields an overwhelming performance over GPT-4 consistently. We also demonstrate that with structured facts retrieved from KG, MindMap can outperform a series of prompting-with-document-retrieval methods, benefiting from more accurate, concise, and comprehensive knowledge from KGs. To reproduce our results and extend the framework further, we make our codebase available at https://github.com/wyl.willing/MindMap.

RAR-b: Reasoning as Retrieval Benchmark

Semantic textual similartiy (STS) and information retrieval tasks (IR) tasks have been the two major avenues to record the progress of embedding models in the past few years. Under the emerging Retrieval-augmented Generation (RAG) paradigm, we envision the need to evaluate next-level language understanding abilities of embedding models, and take a conscious look at the reasoning abilities stored in them. Addressing this, we pose the question: Can retrievers solve reasoning problems? By transforming reasoning tasks into retrieval tasks, we find that without specifically trained for reasoning-level language understanding, current state-of-the-art retriever models may still be far from being competent for playing the role of assisting LLMs, especially in reasoning-intensive tasks. Moreover, albeit trained to be aware of instructions, instruction-aware IR models are often better off without instructions in inference time for reasoning tasks, posing an overlooked retriever-LLM behavioral gap for the research community to align. However, recent decoder-based embedding models show great promise in narrowing the gap, highlighting the pathway for embedding models to achieve reasoning-level language understanding. We also show that, although current off-the-shelf re-ranker models fail on these tasks, injecting reasoning abilities into them through fine-tuning still appears easier than doing so to bi-encoders, and we are able to achieve state-of-the-art performance across all tasks by fine-tuning a reranking model. We release Reasoning as Retrieval Benchmark (RAR-b), a holistic suite of tasks and settings to evaluate the reasoning abilities stored in retriever models. RAR-b is available at https://github.com/gowitheflow-1998/RAR-b.

Calibrated Language Models Must Hallucinate

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

Abductive Commonsense Reasoning

Abductive reasoning is inference to the most plausible explanation. For example, if Jenny finds her house in a mess when she returns from work, and remembers that she left a window open, she can hypothesize that a thief broke into her house and caused the mess, as the most plausible explanation. While abduction has long been considered to be at the core of how people interpret and read between the lines in natural language (Hobbs et al., 1988), there has been relatively little research in support of abductive natural language inference and generation. We present the first study that investigates the viability of language-based abductive reasoning. We introduce a challenge dataset, ART, that consists of over 20k commonsense narrative contexts and 200k explanations. Based on this dataset, we conceptualize two new tasks -- (i) Abductive NLI: a multiple-choice question answering task for choosing the more likely explanation, and (ii) Abductive NLG: a conditional generation task for explaining given observations in natural language. On Abductive NLI, the best model achieves 68.9% accuracy, well below human performance of 91.4%. On Abductive NLG, the current best language generators struggle even more, as they lack reasoning capabilities that are trivial for humans. Our analysis leads to new insights into the types of reasoning that deep pre-trained language models fail to perform--despite their strong performance on the related but more narrowly defined task of entailment NLI--pointing to interesting avenues for future research.

OlaGPT: Empowering LLMs With Human-like Problem-Solving Abilities

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

The Impact of Reasoning Step Length on Large Language Models

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Mind Your Step (by Step): Chain-of-Thought can Reduce Performance on Tasks where Thinking Makes Humans Worse

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Eliminating Reasoning via Inferring with Planning: A New Framework to Guide LLMs' Non-linear Thinking

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

The Tensor Brain: Semantic Decoding for Perception and Memory

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.